

own Nation. We cannot be too determined in standing up bravely, courageously and militantly before the great dangers which this conspiracy has caused throughout the world. It is a time for Americans to recapture something of the fine spirit and noble patriotism and firm resolution which enabled you and your comrades to defeat another great tyranny which was afflicting mankind and visiting our Nation with the threat of destruction.

You of Greek blood have a great and mighty heritage. Americans all, who have stood the acid test of the highest demands of Americanism with courage, valor, and devotion, you are descendants of one of the greatest races of all history, a race, a nation, and a people that has been mighty in arms, mighty in spirit, mighty in learning, mighty in its democratic orientation, mighty in its humane traditions, in its culture, in its immeasurable contributions to civilization. Above all, you spring from a people whose inspiring family life, whose loyalty to spiritual values, whose love of religion and belief in God, which has been practiced for centuries, typify a truly great and truly outstanding nation.

For the Greeks have felt, as civilized Americans have felt and still feel, that worthwhile human progress and belief in God Almighty are inseparable. The doctrine that without faith in the Divine Master no nation can long survive is a basic feature of Greek civilization—a doctrine which must be recognized more fully by all peoples of the earth if communism is to be successfully fought.

The achievements of the Greek people ring down through the ages with clarion sound of glory and grandeur. Pericles and the Golden Age, perhaps one of the few periods in all time when the fine arts, cultural life, and individual development in political and artistic values flowed in such a favorable climate.

The famed Acropolis, an historic monument which symbolizes a great culture, which has profoundly influenced human beings throughout the ages, a place of refuge and the inspirational center of glorious olden Greece, the place where Christianity took new and vigorous root, a place which still inspires the Greek people and the free world.

And Aphrodite, the goddess of beauty, typifying the magnificent art of the Greeks, not only beauty in the physical sense, but beauty of the soul, beauty of ideals, beauty of thought and culture.

And if time permitted, I could go on ad infinitum enumerating the monumental accomplishments of the Greeks, and I think

that these glories should be recited frequently not only by your own people but by all true lovers of liberty and culture, because they exemplify so appropriately and beautifully the long successful struggle of man from the cave to the culture and civilization we enjoy at the present moment.

And let me remind you, my friends, that prophecy in the world did not die with the Delphic oracle. Faith in high ideals and undying determination to uphold them did not die when the Golden Age passed into history. We have visible signs, even unto the present hour and in contemporary times, in the heroic fight—an incomparable uphill fight characterized by bitter struggle and bloodshed—the heroic fight of present-day Greece and the present-day Greek people against communism which recently has electrified and inspired the free world. And like the Delphic oracle of the past, the success of that fight is a prophecy and a prediction and an assurance that in the future, just as the Greeks have done, all democratic-minded, liberty-loving, God-fearing peoples in the world following the leadership and example of our own great Nation and joining in a great human brotherhood embracing all those who believe in the true dignity of man and the sanctity of the individual soul will militantly defend and preserve our unequalled, our unparalleled, our incomparable institutions of democracy and justice.

Yes, my friends; I could tell a long story of the glories and the grandeur of Greece, of the sacrifices and devotion and indomitable spirit of your forebears, the Greek people—a story of war and a story of peace, a story of invincible progress through bloody struggle, a story of peerless culture shaped by statesmen, warriors, orators, sculptors, artists, writers, musicians, the drama, the stage, the harp, and lyre, which sounded in the past a song of hope, strength, and courage—which united the Greeks of ancient times and now sound again, here and elsewhere throughout the world, to defy the unspeakable enemies of freedom and to rally true lovers of liberty to do battle against its enemies, to liberate the enslaved, to give new hope and inspiration to subject peoples struggling and suffering under the pall of persecution and exploitation and abominable discrimination that debases the dignity of man and disgraces modern civilization.

There is another side to Greek culture as it has influenced our own great country and that is its scholarship. The logic, the rhetoric and the aesthetics of Aristotle are as realistic and vital and meaningful today as when first written. The ideals of Plato still beckon to those who are pledged to scholar-

ship and freedom of thought. In fact, if you should subtract Greek culture from civilization, there would be no civilization as we know it today because it is a primary cornerstone of our modern political, social and ethical life.

It is pertinent to note in connection with present trends in our own Nation which so greatly disturb us that the Greeks of old were not materialists. They were profoundly spiritual in their approach. They did not embrace mechanistic, sordid philosophies of the jungle which consign human beings to the status of the beast, of which we hear and see so much today. They were idealists, they had their feet on the ground and their gaze turned towards the heavens and for that reason, despite their many contributions to the material world, their greatest triumphs will be found, not in the world of matter or of substance, but in the world of thought and the world of the spirit.

Realizing these things, my friends, it is easy for any of us, except of course the Marxists Communists with their evil designs on personal liberty, to understand why with unquenchable purpose the modern Greeks against powerful revolutionary subversion have gallantly and successfully protected their free way of life. And we of America, greatest free Nation in history, may well be proud that our culture is enriched, ennobled and perfected by the presence and loyalty of so many devoted industrialists, inspired American citizens of Greek heritage. Most of all our country is fortunate and blessed indeed to have men like you and the members of your organization and staunch Americans of every race, color, and creed who are fired with the patriotism, the loyalty and devotion to stand by our country in time of peril and need. With God's guidance, with wise statesmanship, with renewed dedication to the great principles of America, let us go forward to grapple with the problems of the present without fear, compromise or appeasement, confident that in time through adherence to our ideals and unselfish service to our Nation and interest in the common problems of humanity, loyally united to those of common bonds, we will find a way, not only to protect the security of our own beloved land, but to usher in an era of prosperity, security and peace for ourselves and all mankind.

Colonel Voultsos, I thank you one and all. Keep up the good work for the cause of Greece—a Greece again reunited with historic Cyprus and your invaluable work for America, our own great country and its cherished ideals of freedom, democracy and justice.

SENATE

FRIDAY, JANUARY 28, 1955

(Legislative day of Thursday, January 27, 1955)

The Senate met at 11 o'clock a. m., on the expiration of the recess.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, in whose keeping are the destinies of men and nations, endue with Thy wisdom our fallible minds. Lead, Kindly Light, amid the encircling gloom!

Thou knowest that we desire nothing for ourselves that we do not crave for all mankind, a chance to be freemen. In the midst of decisions that concern fearful forces which, if not harnessed by mutual good will, may utterly destroy, give us greatness of soul that the keys of

new power may be used to open doors of plenty for the whole earth. May we shrink from no sacrifice that will prevent serfdom from dominating the earth. May a constant sense of the eternal save us from spiritual decay, from moral cowardice, and from any betrayal of the highest public good. We ask it in the Redeemer's name. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. CLEMENTS, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, January 27, 1955, was dispensed with.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages in writing from the President of the United States submitting nominations were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees. (For nominations this day received, see the end of Senate proceedings.)

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Bartlett, one of its clerks, announced that the House had passed the following bills, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H. R. 587. A bill to provide that persons serving in the Armed Forces on January 31, 1955, may continue to accrue educational benefits under the Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, and for other purposes; and

H. R. 2010. A bill to amend the act of July 10, 1953, which created the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.

COMMITTEE MEETING DURING SESSION OF THE SENATE

On request of Mr. CLEMENTS, and by unanimous consent, the permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations was authorized to sit in executive session during today's session of the Senate.

ORDER FOR TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there may be the customary morning hour for the presentation of petitions and memorials, the introduction of bills, and other routine business, and that any statements made in connection therewith be limited to 2 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the following letters, which were referred as indicated:

REPORT ON OVEROBLIGATION OF AN APPROPRIATION

A letter from the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on the overobligation of the appropriation "Operation and maintenance, Southwestern Power Administration, 1954" (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Appropriations.

REPORT ON AVERAGE MONTHLY FLIGHT PAY FOR CERTAIN OFFICERS IN THE COAST GUARD

A letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, reporting, pursuant to law, the average monthly flight pay for certain officers in the Coast Guard; to the Committee on Armed Services.

EXAMINATION OF NATIONAL BANKS

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend section 5240 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, relating to the examination of national banks (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

AUTHORITY FOR NATIONAL BANKS TO MAKE CERTAIN LOANS

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to permit national banks to make 20-year real-estate loans and 9-month construction loans (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

BALANCE SHEET OF CHESAPEAKE & POTOMAC TELEPHONE CO.

A letter from the vice president, the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., Washington, D. C., transmitting, pursuant to law, a comparative general balance sheet of that company for the year 1954 (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES BY CHESAPEAKE & POTOMAC TELEPHONE CO.

A letter from the vice president, the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., Washington, D. C., transmitting, pursuant to law, the statement of receipts and expenditures of that company, for the year 1954 (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

REPORT ON OPERATIONS UNDER FEDERAL PROPERTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ACT OF 1949

A letter from the Administrator, General Services Administration, transmitting, pursuant

to law, a report on the administration of functions under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1954 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Government Operations.

REPORT ON PROVISION OF WAR-RISK, MARINE, AND LIABILITY INSURANCE

A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting, pursuant to law, a report on the provision of war-risk insurance and certain marine and liability insurance for the American public, as of December 31, 1954 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

REPORT OF CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD

A letter from the Acting Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, Washington, D. C., transmitting, pursuant to law, a report of that Board for the fiscal year 1954 (with an accompanying report); to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

RALPH BENNETT ET AL.

A letter from the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation for the relief of Ralph Bennett and certain other members of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

WAIVING OF REQUIREMENT OF CERTAIN PERFORMANCE AND PAYMENT BONDS

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the act of April 29, 1941, to authorize the waiving of the requirement of performance and payment bonds in connection with certain Coast Guard contracts (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

AMENDMENT OF TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT, RELATING TO CERTAIN FEES

A letter from the Attorney General, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to further amend section 20 of the Trading With the Enemy Act, relating to fees of agents, attorneys, and representatives (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

AMENDMENT OF CODE RELATING TO EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN CLAIMS

A letter from the Secretary of the Air Force, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend section 2680 (j) of title 28 of the United States Code so as to permanently exclude claims arising out of combatant activities or warlike operations (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

INCREASED COMPENSATION FOR CLASSIFIED FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

A letter from the Chairman, United States Civil Service Commission, Washington, D. C., transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to adjust the rates of basic compensation of certain officers and employees of the Federal Government, to authorize the President to establish the maximum number of positions under section 505 of the Classification Act, and for other purposes (with an accompanying paper); to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIAL

Petitions, etc., were laid before the Senate, or presented, and referred as indicated:

By the PRESIDENT pro tempore:

A concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the State of Louisiana; to the Committee on Finance:

"Senate Concurrent Resolution 3

"Whereas the legislature hereby approves the proposed action of the State department of public welfare in preparing to put into effect the conclusion and intent of the leg-

islature as expressed in Act No. 698 of the regular session of 1954 by amending its plan: Therefore be it

"Resolved by the senate (and the house of representatives concurring). That there should be a readjustment of the budget of persons entitled to old-age assistance to allow one person a minimum need of \$85 per month, and to a couple living in the same household, a minimum need of \$134 per month; the same representing the absolute minimum amount needed to sustain such persons in reasonable health and decency in the State of Louisiana and providing for the continued consideration of all income and resources available to applicants for old-age assistance in determining their need; and be it further

"Resolved, That the State department of public welfare shall have the authority to set the maximum payments equal to the maximum upon which Federal funds are earned. Accordingly, this legislative body hereby reaffirms the authority of the State department of public welfare to increase such maximum payments as available funds permit, taking into consideration the requirements of all programs administered by the said department; and be it further

"Resolved, That copies of this resolution be transmitted to the President of the United States, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States, and each Senator and Representative in Congress from the State of Louisiana.

"C. E. BARHAM,

"Lieutenant Governor and President of the Senate,

"CLARENCE C. AYCOCK,

"Speaker of the House of Representatives."

A resolution adopted by Kauai Post, No. 2, Department of Hawaii, the American Legion, Lihue, T. H., favoring the confirmation of the nomination of Philip L. Rice to be associate justice of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BENNETT (for himself and Mr. WATKINS):

A concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the State of Utah; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:

"Senate Concurrent Resolution 1

"Concurrent resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives of the 31st Legislature of the State of Utah, memorializing the Congress of the United States to authorize the Colorado River storage project, including the Echo Park Dam and participating projects

"Be it resolved by the Legislature of the State of Utah (the Governor concurring therein):

"Whereas the waters of the Colorado River and its tributaries have by compact, approved by the legislatures of the States of Arizona, California, Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and Wyoming, been allocated to these several States, and said compact having been approved by the Congress of the United States in 1922; and

"Whereas the upper basin States, consisting of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, through the upper Colorado River Commission and the legislatures of said States and with the approval of Congress, have allocated their proportionate share of the water of said river among themselves; and

"Whereas the conservation and wise use of water of the Colorado River can only be made possible by the construction of strategic storage facilities on said river and its tributaries; and

"Whereas the conservation and wise use of water is of foremost importance to the future agricultural and economic development and the general welfare of the Western United States and of the United States; and

"Whereas the upper Colorado River Commission, working in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Reclamation, has developed a plan, known as the Colorado River storage project, to permit the conservation and wise use of the waters of the Colorado River in the upper basin States; and

"Whereas said Colorado River storage project has been developed after many years of investigation, planning, and on the ground survey of the storage facilities of the upper Colorado River and its tributaries; and

"Whereas said Colorado River storage project has been determined to be the most economical and feasible method of storing and using said waters for the benefit of both the upper and lower basin States; and

"Whereas the storage of water as proposed in the Colorado River storage project is vital to permit the upper basin States to meet its commitment to the lower basin States under the compact of 1922, and to have available the upper basin States' allotment of water as provided in said compact; and

"Whereas certain opposition has developed to the inclusion of the Echo Park Dam as proposed in the Colorado River storage project upon the alleged ground that it constitutes an invasion of a national monument; and

"Whereas the Echo Park Dam is an integral and necessary part of the upper Colorado River project; and

"Whereas at the time the monument boundaries were extended in 1938 to include the Echo Park Dam site, such extension of the boundaries was made expressly subject to prior power and reclamation withdrawals; and

"Whereas prior to 1938 many reclamation and power withdrawals had been made in this area; and

"Whereas the construction of the Echo Park Dam, as proposed in the Colorado River storage project, will not be an invasion of a national monument; nor, because of the reservations incident to the extension of the boundaries of the Dinosaur National Monument, can construction of such dam constitute a precedent for the invasion of any other national park or monument; and

"Whereas no portion of the area set aside in the original Dinosaur National Monument will be affected by the construction of said dam; and

"Whereas the area in the extended boundaries of the Dinosaur National Monument is inaccessible except to a few who will run the 'white' water of the river; and

"Whereas the construction of the Echo Park Dam will make the beauty of the area available to millions who otherwise would not see it, and will develop a prime recreational playground; and

"Whereas to carry out the intent and purposes of the several compacts approved by the legislatures of the several States concerned, and to carry out the purposes and intent of said compacts as approved by Congresses of the United States, the authorization of the Colorado River storage project by the 84th Congress of the United States is imperative: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the 31st Legislature of the State of Utah (the Governor concurring therein), That the 84th Congress of the United States of America be and it is hereby memorialized to promptly, thoroughly, and fairly consider and favorably act upon legislation to authorize the Colorado River storage project, including construction of the Echo Park Dam and participating projects; and be it further

Resolved, That certified copies hereof be promptly transmitted to the President and Vice President of the United States, the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress, United States Senator Arthur V. Watkins, United States Senator Wallace F. Bennett, Representative William A. Dawson, and Representative Henry Aldous Dixon, to the Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay, to the Commissioner of Reclama-

tion, the upper Colorado River Compact Commission, and to the the Governors and legislatures of the following States: Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming."

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the State of Utah, identical with the foregoing, which was referred to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina: A concurrent resolution of the Legislature of the State of South Carolina; to the Committee on Finance:

"Concurrent resolution memorializing Congress to continue a tariff that will protect the American cotton textile industry from competition with the importation of foreign textiles

"Whereas our Government is dedicated to the improving of the standards of living of its citizens, especially the living standards of our lowest income groups; and

"Whereas today the threat to the cotton-textile industry of the United States is becoming more critical because of competition not only in the markets of the world but also here in the United States; and

"Whereas the lower tariffs on textiles become, the easier it is for foreign countries to ship their products to this country and with each increase in the textile production of foreign countries a part of the American industry's foreign market is destroyed: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress of the United States is memorialized to see to it that American tariffs are adequate to protect the American cotton-textile industry; and be it further

Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the President of the United States, to the two Members of the United States Senate, and to each of the Members of the House of Representatives from this State."

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Columbia, S. C., January 26, 1955.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of a resolution adopted by the South Carolina house of representatives and concurred in by the Senate.

INEZ WATSON,
Clerk of the House.

RESOLUTIONS OF RHODE ISLAND GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Mr. PASTORE. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and my colleague, the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], I present, for appropriate reference, and ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island. The first resolution memorializes the Congress to enact legislation to increase the Federal minimum wage rate, and the second favors the enactment of legislation for the creation of Federal disaster insurance.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The resolutions will be received and appropriately referred; and, under the rule, will be printed in the RECORD.

The resolutions presented by Mr. PASTORE were received, appropriately referred, and, under the rule, ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

To the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare:

"Resolution memorializing Congress to enact legislation to increase the Federal minimum wage rate

"Whereas in today's highly competitive struggle for markets, Rhode Island manufac-

turers are faced with unfair competition from a few States and areas with wage rates far below the national average; and

"Whereas such large differentials present a serious threat to established industry in other parts of the Nation, particularly where labor is an important factor; and

"Whereas the Rhode Island textile industry has been especially hard hit by ruinous price competition based on low wage rates at a time when the industry nationally has been in a serious slump causing severe unemployment and wage cuts; and

"Whereas extremely low wage rates in any part of the Nation are a drag on the entire national economy, reducing employment and income levels at a time when increased consumer purchasing power is essential to national economic health: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the general assembly now respectfully calls these facts to the attention of the Congress of the United States, and urges the immediate enactment of legislation to increase the Federal minimum wage rate; and be it further

Resolved, That the Senators and Representatives from the State of Rhode Island in the Congress of the United States are urged to use their best efforts in this behalf; and be it further

Resolved, That the secretary of state be and he is hereby authorized and directed to transmit to the presiding officers of both branches of Congress and to the Senators and Representatives from the State of Rhode Island in the Congress of the United States duly certified copies of this resolution."

The PRESIDENT pro tempore laid before the Senate a resolution of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island, identical with the foregoing, which was referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

To the Committee on Banking and Currency:

"Resolution memorializing Congress to enact legislation for the creation of Federal disaster insurance

"Whereas the recent hurricanes have brought severe flood and tidal wave damage to large areas of Rhode Island; and

"Whereas insurance coverage for such damage has been inadequate, and where available the premium rates therefor have been prohibitive; and

"Whereas His Excellency, Gov. Dennis J. Roberts, in his inaugural message on January 4, 1955, has stated 'insurance which is beyond the reach of the community is worthless'; and

"Whereas Governor Roberts further stated 'if private insurance companies are unable or unwilling to cover the risk then the matter should be dealt with on a national basis by the creation of Federal disaster insurance'; and

"Whereas the general assembly is cognizant of the urgent need for positive action: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations hereby urges the Congress of the United States to enact legislation permitting municipalities and property owners to obtain disaster insurance from the Federal Government or any agency thereof; and be it further

Resolved, That the Senators and Representatives from Rhode Island in said Congress be, and they hereby are, earnestly requested to use their concerted effort to bring about the enactment of such legislation; and be it further

Resolved, That the secretary of state be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to transmit to the Senators and Representatives from Rhode Island in the Congress of the United States duly certified copies of this resolution."

TRANSFER OF UNITED NATIONS NARCOTIC DIVISION TO GENEVA— RESOLUTION

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. President, many of us who are concerned about the increase of traffic in narcotic drugs since the end of World War II have been particularly disturbed by the proposal to transfer the Narcotic Division of the United Nations from New York City to Geneva, Switzerland. I ask unanimous consent that a resolution adopted by the drug, chemical, and allied trades section of the New York Board of Trade opposing this proposed move be printed in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas the Secretary-General of the United Nations has decided to transfer the Narcotic Division of the United Nations from New York to Geneva; and

Whereas New York City has a serious narcotic problem which is due entirely to the international illicit flood of heroin that originates primarily in the Far East, particularly in Communist China, in Turkey, Lebanon, France, Italy, as well as in Mexico; and

Whereas many international narcotic treaties are being ably administered by the United Nations in New York in a stupendous effort to halt the gigantic and diabolical narcotic smuggling activities into New York City and other points of entry; and

Whereas it is of vital importance to retain the Narcotic Division at the New York headquarters of the United Nations to maintain the closest possible cooperation with the United States, which is the chief victim in this vile traffic; and

Whereas the President of the United States has made known the gravity of the present situation by recently appointing a special interdepartmental committee to study the State, national, and international narcotic problem: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the drug, chemical, and allied trades section of the New York Board of Trade vigorously protests the removal of the Narcotic Division of the United Nations from New York City to Geneva, Switzerland, and that copies of this resolution be forwarded to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the United States delegate to the United Nations, to the Members of the United States Senate, and to the mayor of the city of New York.

ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN TYPES OF COMMERCIAL MAIL MATTER— RESOLUTION

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have a resolution, adopted by the City Council of the City of Virginia, Minn., with regard to the elimination of certain types of commercial postal matter, printed in the body of the RECORD and appropriately referred.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolution requesting the President, Postmaster General, our Senators and Congressmen to eliminate and forbid certain types of commercial postal matter

Resolved, by the City Council of the City of Virginia, That—

Whereas the recent change in Federal postal regulations has permitted various concerns to distribute through the mails cir-

culars addressed to "Occupant" in such a manner as to make the Federal postal service a bill-peddling agency for commercial establishments; and

Whereas the great volume of such mail received by the citizens of this city constitutes a nuisance to them and hardships upon the personnel of the postal service responsible for deliveries, and also creates a municipal problem for the city and the disposition of such mail, much of which is spurious; and

Whereas the low charge for the distribution of such advertising matter as well as the low and reasonable charge for other types of commercial mail is such that the continuance of this type of service at less than the cost to the Federal postal service has created a deficit which must be met by raising the rates of legitimate mail service utilized by the ordinary individual: Now, therefore, be it hereby

Resolved, That the City Council of the City of Virginia and the citizens of the city of Virginia express its disapproval and dissatisfaction of the continued rendering of this type of service; and that a copy of this resolution be sent to the President of the United States, the Postmaster General, Senators THYE and HUMPHREY, and Congressman BLATNIK with the specific request that every possible step be taken to eliminate and forbid the continuing distribution of "Occupant" postal delivery and to revise the rates for other types of commercial postal matter so that all classes of mail will bear their equitable share of the cost of the postal service.

Moved by Alderman Virshek, supported by Alderman Glatz, that the above resolution be adopted.

Ayes: Alderman Oklobzija, Vukelich, Ludo, Virshek, Thomas, Glatz, Nelson, Maki, President Stock—9.

Nays: None.

Adopted January 4, 1955.

ARTHUR J. STOCK,
President of the City Council.

Attest:

J. G. MILROY, Jr.,
City Clerk

Presented to the mayor, January 5, 1955.
Returned by the mayor, January 10, 1955.
Approved January 10, 1955:

JOHN VUKELICH,
Mayor.

OLD-AGE ASSISTANCE—RESOLUTION OF BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, LAKE COUNTY, MINN.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD, and appropriately referred, a resolution adopted by the Board of County Commissioners of Lake County, Minn., with regard to old-age assistance.

There being no objection, the resolution was referred to the Committee on Finance, and ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mrs. John LeClair appeared before the board regarding a plan for the payment of an amount equal to the Federal Government's share of old-age assistance directly to every person of the age of 65 and over, with reservations as to income.

Be it resolved, That this board of county commissioners hereby endorses the plan presented by Mrs. John LeClair; and be it further

Resolved, That copies of this plan and this resolution be forwarded to Senator Thye, Senator Humphrey, Congressman Blatnik, and Governor Freeman.

Commissioner Dahlberg moved the adoption of the foregoing resolution and the

same was declared adopted upon the following vote. Yeas—Houle, Degerstedt, Dahlberg, Sandstrom, and Wiklund. Total yeas—5; nays—none.

Adopted January 4, 1955.

STATE OF MINNESOTA,

County of Lake, ss:

I, Paul W. Nelson, auditor of Lake County, Minn., do hereby certify that I have compared the foregoing resolution with the original filed in my office on the 4th day of January 1955, and that the same is a true and correct copy of the whole thereof.

Witness my hand and seal of office at Two Harbors, Minn., this 14th day of January 1955.

PAUL W. NELSON,
Auditor, Lake County, Minn.

Now the Government gives as much as \$35 a month to the States for certain old people. Would it not be fairer to give \$35 direct to every old person of 65, who applied for it? Of course, there should be a limit on their other income, but make it so high, at least \$200 a month, so as to keep administrative costs to a minimum.

Of course, those who need more would get it from the States, as they do now, but the Federal Government would not pay anything to the States for old-age pensions, except for special services, such as for the blind, for medical care, and to medical institutions.

We know \$35 a month is not an adequate pension in itself, but it is rather to supplement other present income. Besides, we would rather have \$35 a month now than a larger amount after we're dead.

The applications could be made through the post office, with the applicant paying a small sum, say 50 cents, to the postmaster, as the postmaster should not have to do more for free than he is now.

REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

The following reports of a committee were submitted:

By Mr. GREEN, from the Committee on Rules and Administration, with an amendment:

S. Res. 23. Resolution to investigate problems relating to economic stabilization and mobilization (Rept. No. 20);

S. Res. 28. Resolution extending the authority of the Committee on Armed Services for hearings and investigations (Rept. No. 21);

S. Res. 36. Resolution extending the time for a study by the Committee on Foreign Relations on technical assistance and related programs (Rept. No. 23);

S. Res. 37. Resolution providing additional funds for the study of strategic and critical materials by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs (Rept. No. 22); and

S. Res. 39. Resolution authorizing the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs to employ temporary additional assistants (Rept. No. 24).

EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF A COMMITTEE

As in executive session,
The following favorable reports of nominations were submitted:

By Mr. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee on Banking and Currency:

Glen E. Edgerton, of the District of Columbia, to be President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington;

Lynn U. Stambaugh, of North Dakota, to be First Vice President of the Export-Import Bank of Washington;

Hawthorne Arey, of Nebraska, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington;

George A. Blowers, of Florida, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington; and

Vance Brand, of Ohio, to be a member of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

BILLS INTRODUCED

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. WILEY:

S. 788. A bill to provide for the establishment of a dairy research laboratory; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

(See the remarks of Mr. WILEY when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. SPARKMAN (for himself, Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. BENDER, Mr. CLEMENTS, Mr. DOUGLAS, Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. GORE, Mr. HENNING, Mr. HILL, Mr. HOLLAND, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. JOHNSTON of South Carolina, Mr. KEFAUVER, Mr. KERR, Mr. KILGORE, Mr. LANGER, Mr. LEHMAN, Mr. LONG, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. MCCLELLAN, Mr. McNAMARA, Mr. MONRONEY, Mr. MORSE, Mr. MURRAY, Mr. NEELY, Mr. NEUBERGER, Mr. SCOTT, Mr. SMATHERS, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. SYMINGTON, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. THYE, Mr. WILEY, and Mr. YOUNG):

S. 789. A bill to continue authority to make funds available for loans and grants under title V of the Housing Act of 1949, as amended; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

(See the remarks of Mr. SPARKMAN when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. GREEN:

S. 790. A bill for the relief of Michael Gerdelan; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 791. A bill to authorize the issuance of a special series of stamps commemorative of the 175th anniversary of the arrival of the French Expeditionary Forces in America; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. PURTELL:

S. 792. A bill for the relief of Spyros Nicholaou Lekatsas; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CURTIS:

S. 793. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code to provide that a Federal tax lien shall not be valid, as against a holder of a mechanic's lien, until notice of such tax lien has been duly filed; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 794. A bill to reserve to certain State and Territorial agencies and tribunals the authority to exercise jurisdiction over labor disputes involving public utilities; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

By Mr. RUSSELL (for himself and Mr. SALTONSTALL) (by request):

S. 795. A bill to amend the National Defense Facilities Act of 1950 to provide for additional facilities necessary for the administration and training of units of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States, and for other purposes;

S. 796. A bill to provide for the relief of certain members of the Armed Forces who were required to pay certain transportation charges covering shipment of their household goods and personal effects upon return from overseas, and for other purposes;

S. 797. A bill to enact certain provisions now included in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act and the Civil Functions Appropriation Act, and for other purposes;

S. 798. A bill to provide for the tonnage composition of the United States Navy with respect to vessels, and for other purposes;

S. 799. A bill to provide that the enlistment contracts or periods of obligated service of

members of the Armed Forces shall not terminate by reason of appointment as cadets or midshipmen at the Military, Naval, Air Force, or Coast Guard Academies, or as midshipmen in the Naval Reserve, and for other purposes;

S. 800. A bill to repeal the act of January 19, 1929 (ch. 86, 45 Stat. 1090), entitled "An act to limit the date of filing claims for retainer pay";

S. 801. A bill to provide for the crediting of certain service toward retirement of reserve personnel;

S. 802. A bill to amend the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, to remove the requirement for a final physical examination for inductees who continue on active duty in another status in the Armed Forces;

S. 803. A bill to amend the act of June 19, 1948 (ch. 511, 62 Stat. 489), relating to the retention in the service of disabled commissioned officers and warrant officers of the Army and Air Force; and

S. 804. A bill to amend section 201 (e) of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as amended, to provide for advance payments of certain pay and allowances of members of the uniformed services, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

(See the remarks of Mr. RUSSELL when he introduced the above bills, which appear under a separate heading.)

By Mr. LANGER:

S. 805. A bill to indemnify drivers of motor vehicles of the postal service against liability for damages arising out of the operation of such vehicles in the performance of official duties; and

S. 806. A bill to amend sections 3182 and 3183 of title 18 of the United States Code so as to authorize the use of an information filed by a public prosecuting officer for making demands for fugitives from justice; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(See the remarks of Mr. LANGER when he introduced the last above-mentioned bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

S. 807. A bill to adjust the rates of annuities for certain employees retired under the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended, prior to April 1, 1948;

S. 808. A bill to amend the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended, so as to provide certain benefits for the widows of employees who died prior to February 28, 1948, and for other purposes;

S. 809. A bill to increase the basic rates of compensation of certain officers and employees of the Federal Government;

S. 810. A bill to amend section 6 of the act of August 24, 1912, as amended, with respect to the recognition of organizations of postal and Federal employees;

S. 811. A bill to reclassify supervisory employees in the field service of the Post Office Department into step-rate grades comparable with those for other postal employees and employees in other Federal services, and to adjust inequities;

S. 812. A bill to make retroactive section 6 (b) (2) of the act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555), as amended, dealing with the restoration to Government service of persons improperly discharged, suspended, or furloughed without pay under section 14 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, and for other purposes;

S. 813. A bill to increase the rates of basic compensation of certain officers and employees of the Government;

S. 814. A bill to provide for exclusion from the mails of mail violating certain State laws dealing with improper solicitations of contributions by charitable organizations and to forbid the payment of money orders therefor;

(See the remarks of Mr. LANGER when he introduced the last above-mentioned bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

S. 815. A bill to amend the Civil Service Retirement Act of May 29, 1930, as amended,

so as to permit the retirement of postal employees who have rendered at least 30 years of service;

S. 816. A bill to grant civil-service employees retirement after 30 years' service; and

S. 817. A bill to provide maternity leave for Government employees; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. LANGER (for himself and Mr. YOUNG):

S. 818. A bill for the relief of the North Dakota State Hospital, Jamestown, N. Dak.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SMATHERS:

S. 819. A bill for the relief of Irene Guay Salentine; and

S. 820. A bill for the relief of Dorothy Mae Howell; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. BEALL:

S. 821. A bill to amend title IX of the District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1937 so as to provide retirement benefits for the office of judge of the District of Columbia Tax Court, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. MAGNUSON:

S. 822. A bill to require the armed services to utilize private American shipping services for the overseas transportation of commodities and civilian personnel; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. LEHMAN:

S. 823. A bill for the relief of Taghi Mirsepassi and his wife Heshmatol-Molouk Philsouf Mirsepassi and their child Khadije S. Mirsepassi; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JACKSON:

S. 824. A bill to authorize and direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain lands erroneously conveyed to the United States; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. BRICKER:

S. 825. A bill to authorize the Federal Communications Commission to establish rules and regulations and make orders with respect to networks and their activities; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. BENDER:

S. 826. A bill to provide for payments by the Federal Government to States or local taxing units adversely affected by Federal acquisition, ownership, or use of defense production facilities, to provide for the taxation of certain Federal properties, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Government Operations.

S. 827. A bill for the relief of Mojsze Hildeshaim and Ita Hildeshaim; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. THYE:

S. 828. A bill to provide that the fluid-milk program for schools established by section 201 (c) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of the National School Lunch Act; to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

By Mr. BENDER:

S. 829. A bill to authorize personnel of the Armed Forces to train for, attend, and participate in the Second Pan-American Games, the Seventh Olympic Winter Games, Games of the XVI Olympiad, future Pan-American Games and Olympic Games, and certain other international amateur sports competitions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. HUMPHREY:

S. 830. A bill for the relief of Iskar Spas Schumanov; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SPARKMAN (for himself and Mr. HILL):

S. 831. A bill to provide for the establishment of the Horse Shoe Bend National Military Park, in the State of Alabama; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. WELKER:

S. 832. A bill for the relief of Jonas Dercautan; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LANGER (for himself and Mr. MAGNUSON):

S. 833. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Esther Chan Lee (Eta Lee); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KEFAUVER:

S. 834. A bill to amend section 203 (a) of the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948; to the Committee on Armed Services.

S. 835. A bill to amend the Federal Unemployment Tax Act; to the Committee on Finance.

S. 836. A bill for the relief of Wong Nan Ling and Wong Nan Fee;

S. 837. A bill for the relief of Aviva Eliel;

S. 838. A bill for the relief of Frank Deakins;

S. 839. A bill for the relief of Antonio Bottei and Clorimondo Mancía;

S. 840. A bill for the relief of Henry Szymerski (Henryk Szymerski) and Polly Henrietta Szymerski;

S. 841. A bill for the relief of Oren E. Cleveland;

S. 842. A bill for the relief of James E. Savage;

S. 843. A bill for the relief of Gerda Graupner; and

S. 844. A bill for the relief of Zev Cohen (Zev Machtani); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 845. A bill to amend the Seniority Act for Rural Mail Carriers to provide a method for the promotion of substitute rural carriers to the position of regular rural carrier; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. LEHMAN:

S. 846. A bill to authorize the Attorney General to suspend deportation and admit for permanent residence under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act certain aliens who have served honorably in the Armed Forces of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

(See the remarks of Mr. LEHMAN when he introduced the above bill, which appear under a separate heading.)

DAIRY RESEARCH CENTER, MADISON, WIS.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill which I caused to be prepared for the purpose of establishing a dairy research center at Madison, Wis. I ask unanimous consent that the bill, together with an article which I wrote for the February 1955 issue of *Better Farming* magazine, be printed in the *RECORD*.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the bill and article will be printed in the *RECORD*.

The bill (S. 788) to provide for the establishment of a dairy research laboratory, introduced by Mr. WILEY, was received, read twice by its title, referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, and ordered to be printed in the *RECORD* as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the Secretary of Agriculture (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary") is hereby authorized and directed to establish a dairy research laboratory to be known and designated as the Dairy Research Laboratory of the Department of Agriculture. The Secretary shall establish such laboratory at Madison, Wis.

SEC. 2. The objectives of the laboratory to be established under this act shall be to conduct and stimulate continuous research into the basic problems of dairying, including but not limited to research relating to the im-

provement of the quality of, and the development of new and improved methods of, packaging, processing, refrigeration, powdering, condensing, transportation, storing, marketing, distribution, and merchandising of dairy commodities; research relating to the combating of livestock disease, the increasing of dairy productivity, the lowering of dairy costs; research relating to the problems of human nutrition and the nutritive value of dairy products, including gains or losses in nutritive value that may take place at any stage in their production, distribution, processing, and preparation for use by the consumer; research relating to the development of present, new, and extended food and nonfood uses and markets for dairy products and byproducts; research relating to the design, development, improvement, and the more efficient use of dairy machines and equipment; and research relating to any other matters that may contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a more effective dairy industry.

SEC. 3. The Secretary is hereby authorized (a) to provide, by construction or otherwise, the necessary facilities for the housing of the Dairy Research Laboratory established under this act, including any equipment necessary to the operation of such laboratory; (b) to maintain, repair, and alter such facilities; (c) to acquire buildings, property, and rights and interests therein by purchase, lease, gift, transfer, condemnation, or otherwise, necessary to the operation of such laboratory; (d) to incur necessary administrative expenses in the establishment and operation of such laboratory, including personal services; (e) to accept in the name of the United States donations of any buildings, property, real or personal, to such laboratory; and (f) to utilize voluntary or uncompensated services at such laboratory.

SEC. 4. In order to facilitate administration and to increase the effectiveness of all dairy research facilities of the Department of Agriculture, the Secretary is authorized and directed, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to transfer the functions, powers, and duties of any other agency, division, bureau, service, section, or other administrative unit in the Department of Agriculture, which is primarily concerned with research in connection with dairy products, to the Dairy Research Laboratory established under this act.

SEC. 5. In carrying out the provisions of this act the Secretary may cooperate with other agencies of the Government, State agencies, State colleges and universities, private research organizations, purchasing and consuming organizations, chambers of commerce, transportation and storage agencies and organizations, and other persons or corporations engaged in the production, packaging, processing, refrigeration, powdering, condensing, transportation, storing, marketing, distribution, and merchandising of dairy products or byproducts.

SEC. 6. The Secretary shall promulgate such orders, rules, and regulations as he deems necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.

SEC. 7. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated such funds as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.

The article presented by Mr. WILEY is as follows:

[From *Better Farming* of February 1955]

"WE NEED A DAIRY RESEARCH CENTER"

(By ALEXANDER WILEY, United States Senator from Wisconsin)

You could be dollars ahead in your milk business this year and every year if we would do a better job of organizing our dairy brain power.

The same kind of concentrated study that opened up vast, new production and marketing fields for wood and aluminum can be used to the advantage of dairy products and

milk producers. One of the results, I'm convinced, would be an improvement in your milk checks.

It's true that dairying is centuries old and we ought to know most of the answers by now, but the fact is we're just beginning to recognize the modern potentialities in milk. Actually, I think we're on the threshold of a vast and uncharted dairy future with new products, new methods, and new markets still ahead.

We need to open the doors to this future as soon as possible. The key is concentrated research—research of the same intensity that unlocked the secrets of the uranium atom.

Today we need a dairy district project for milk just as we had to have a Manhattan District project during World War II to harness the atom.

No other single force holds more dramatic, far-reaching potentialities for dairymen and American agriculture than a dynamic milk-research project on a national scale.

Research into what? I say into everything related to milk: Processing, packaging, refrigeration, powdering, condensing, and merchandising. Research to combat livestock diseases, increase productivity, lower costs, and improve machinery. Research, too, into human nutritional needs.

A lot of this research is already going on, as you know, in private and public laboratories, in colleges and universities, and on experimental farms. Nowhere, though, is it proceeding with the intensity or coordination equal to the needs of our times.

Most inadequate of all, in my opinion, is our research into new industrial uses to be gained from the chemical masterpiece which is milk. Yet it is in this field, I believe, that we will find our greatest opportunities for expansion.

It is altogether reasonable to expect that nature's first and most nearly perfect food should hold promise for new miracles of chemistry, perhaps surpassing even those derived from the lowly corn cob, nuisance sawdust, or from the humble soybean and peanut. Out of these products, research has developed literally hundreds of new uses. Residues which once were regarded as sheer waste have now taken on tremendous economic value.

We can also unlock the secrets of the milk molecule. To get this done I propose establishment of a new dairy research laboratory to serve the Nation. It should be located, I feel, at the heart of the dairy industry, which is Wisconsin—the State we are proud to call America's dairyland.

Such a laboratory can become a fitting companion to the great Forest Products Laboratory at Madison, which over the years has produced a tide of research findings to enrich the entire woodworking industry.

Let me make it perfectly clear that I recognize and appreciate the fine research which has been done thus far by the Department of Agriculture at its four regional research laboratories, one of which has devoted part of its efforts to dairying. Nevertheless, I am convinced we will not tap even 1 percent of the potential discoveries awaiting us until we have a laboratory devoted exclusively to dairy products.

We have hardly touched the hem of the garment of such discoveries so far. We will never touch the full garment until we make an all-out effort.

Suppose, during World War II we had scattered the then infant atomic research into a dozen projects at a dozen locations, uncentralized and uncoordinated. Do you think we could have developed the atomic bomb while the war still raged? Of course not.

Instead, we wisely took a centralized, coordinated approach. We established the Manhattan District Project. We put \$2 billion into it. We made available the greatest scientific geniuses of the allied world. Out of this mammoth effort came the discovery

which led to the end of World War II after the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

By contrast, a dairy district project would not be devoted to destruction, but to construction of the human body and of America's soil. In a very short time it would be recognized as the worldwide spearhead of dairy research.

The time to begin the laboratory is now.

Toward this end, I shall introduce legislation authorizing funds for the prompt establishment of the laboratory. It will take time, of course, to build it and staff it with men of outstanding qualifications. But meanwhile there is no need to be idle; the project can be set in motion now by utilizing whatever facilities are already available.

Later, when the structure is erected, all the dairy research can be brought together within one building—preferably in Wisconsin, to my way of thinking, but in any event in some appropriate, central location.

From the outset, certain facts should be clearly recognized.

1. Early research has already indicated what can be attained in the future. Casein makes a good illustration. It is now used in the manufacture of coated paper, glues, cold-water paints, adhesives, plastics, cosmetics, ink, and a score of other products.

2. The key problem in milk-residue research is economic. To find profitable, new industrial uses for the components of milk, it must be possible to manufacture and distribute them in competition with other products, some of which begin as raw materials less costly than milk.

Time after time, splendid new uses have been found for milk residues; yet they have not been sufficiently competitive.

A synthetic rubber was developed from milk, for example, that was extraordinarily resistant to the action of hot oil. For a time, it was used extensively in gaskets for automobile automatic transmissions. Then, unfortunately, it became apparent that the raw material could be obtained cheaper and more surely from petroleum. Research in this direction was discontinued.

3. The research I am proposing is by no means the exclusive or even the principal remedy for the total dairy problem. It can be, however, an important factor in the solution.

Meanwhile, we must continue work to expand the consumption of both fluid milk and nonfat milk solids. Today you get the highest price, of course, for whole milk going into the consumer trade. But dairy statistics show something else that is important.

In 1953, according to preliminary USDA figures, 18.3 percent of the milk solids produced went into nonfood uses. This amount—primarily the solids in skim milk, buttermilk, and whey—was either fed to pigs or chickens or used for various commercial purposes.

These solids make excellent animal food. More important, however, they are invaluable nutritious human food. New uses should be developed for these nonfat milk solids for human consumption purposes.

Then, after human consumption is increased, the remainder should be devoted to the expanded industrial consumption mentioned before.

There is no good reason why industrial use of milk components should not become an effective safety valve for milk producers, providing an acceptable outlet for solids in times of unusually heavy production. This is no pipe dream. We have been too ready to assume that just because something hasn't been done, it can't be done. That's negative. We don't have to accept the status quo. In my opinion there are no limits to what research can do or the fields, now undreamed of, that can be opened up. The day may even come, if we give wings to research, when industrial demands will be

competing with human consumption needs for the output of our dairy herds.

Right now, though, we don't eat enough of the milk solids and industry doesn't have sufficient uses for them. We urgently need some more pioneering work on both fronts.

The necessity for this research is certain to increase as time passed. By 1975, there could be more than 190 million Americans. In serving this expanding population, however, we may find that our milk surplus has grown rather than diminished. Milk production per cow in 1975 will probably average close to 7,000 pounds of milk a year. Under these circumstances, we must have ready some sound alternative uses for milk components.

Anyone who thinks the task is unsolvable underestimates the genius of American industry and chemistry. Cynics should remember what was accomplished during the war, when the whole powdered milk field was revolutionized almost overnight.

American flexibility operates in our favor. Americans will change their eating habits just as corporations will change their buying habits if we (1) devise new and better products, (2) package better-tasting, more attractive and economical food, or (3) produce less expensive raw materials.

Frozen orange juice is a case in point. A few years ago there was no such thing.

Who can tell what new milk products will be devised or what new forms of powdering, condensing, refrigerating, and packaging will be developed if we concentrate on this research job?

The odds for success are against us, though, unless we make an all-out effort. Only a dairy research laboratory is equal to this effort.

Whatever the cost of the laboratory, it will be worth it.

Our experience is that for every dollar invested in research, we may get back in actual taxpayer wealth from \$5 to \$100 or more.

We spent \$70,000 cooperating with the Florida citrus commission in the development of orange-juice concentrate. But last year Americans paid an estimated \$150 million for 43 million gallons of this frozen juice. This is just one of many illustrations of what a small Federal research expenditure can help accomplish.

Think of the good that could be accomplished by intensive research in milk. A dairy research laboratory—working hand-in-hand with the great universities and great corporation laboratories—is a challenge to America. It is a challenge I will offer to the 84th Congress.

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may speak for not to exceed 5 minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Senator from Wisconsin may proceed.

Mr. WILEY. The Nation's dairy industry is confronted by a great many challenges. One problem is low prices. For example, in 1954, Wisconsin dairymen received only \$3.54 per hundred-weight of milk—a distressingly inadequate return. Still another of the important challenges is to find ways and means of utilizing the vast amount of surpluses which are at present piling up in America's warehouses. This presents a challenge.

The basic fact of the current situation is that American consumption is far too low in relation to dairy products. If consumption were increased, it would more than absorb the present so-called surplus. We must do everything possible, therefore, to encourage increased

consumption. This will require improved processing, merchandising, packaging, retailing, advertising, public relations of dairy products.

At the producing end, we must find new techniques for turning out even better quality, lower cost, better tasting, more appealing dairy products. To do this will take research and it is for this primary purpose that I am proposing the new laboratory today.

At the same time, research of a totally different type is also required. I refer to research into new byproducts of milk.

Within this generation, there have been a series of revolutionary discoveries of new uses of other basic agricultural commodities. I believe that what has been done with respect to the cotton plant, the peanut, the corn, and other agricultural items, can and should be done with regard to milk. I believe that from the molecule of milk can be extracted secrets for new uses which can be of tremendous significance to the American dairy industry.

I point out that, as I stated in the Better Farming article which is printed in today's RECORD, a great deal of outstanding research is now being performed. For example, at the University of Wisconsin, able research chemists, biologists, physicists, and others are every day attacking many phases of milk uses.

The research center should be the basis for an all-out coordinated mass attack on the whole dairy problem. In Wisconsin there are produced about 17 billion pounds of milk a year. We are talking now about opening up the gates for foreign trade, and yet there are barriers which prevent the shipment of Wisconsin milk into the city of Washington. Of course, the laboratory to which I have referred would not go into that phase of the problem.

Mr. President, if we in this country were to consume the amount of milk we should, of course that would answer the problem to a large extent; but with the advent of atomic energy, we have been delving into new fields of research. We might very well think in terms of utilizing this great natural food in many other directions than that in which it is now being used.

What I am proposing by means of this dairy research center is a type of all-out, coordinated, mass attack on the dairy problem. Such a research center will be capable, within a relatively short period of time, I repeat, of producing discoveries which otherwise might not be forthcoming for a generation.

I should like to make clear that I have very definitely planned that the splendid work of the various State agricultural experiment stations be continued. Obviously all dairy research work cannot be placed under one roof, at one dairy research center. Much can and should be continued on the present Federal-State basis, rather than by having everything transplanted to one location exclusively. At the same time, I believe that savings can be effected by greater coordination within the research center.

Mr. President, I earnestly hope that in accordance with the facts which are

set forth in the article from Better Farming, action can be taken to set up this research laboratory.

Let me say that I believe it is the function of government to reach out for new knowledge and to apply that knowledge to the betterment of its citizens. I feel that through the coordinated avenue I have suggested, if such an institute or research center were established in, let us say, Madison, Wis., we would have there a research center which would lead into undiscovered fields and to the utilization of the vast amount of energy which is to be found in milk; and the result would be the betterment of the race.

EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR FUNDS FOR CERTAIN LOANS AND GRANTS

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BENDER], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLEMENTS], the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], the senior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. EASTLAND], the junior Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the junior Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the senior Senator from Missouri [Mr. HENNINGSEN], my colleague, the senior Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the senior Senator from Florida [Mr. HOLLAND], the junior Senator from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], the senior Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON], the senior Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER], the senior Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. KERR], the senior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. KILGORE], the senior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER], the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], the senior Senator from Washington [Mr. MAGNUSON], the junior Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], the senior Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA], the junior Senator from Oklahoma [Mr. MONRONEY], the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], the senior Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY], the junior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], the junior Senator from Oregon [Mr. NEUBERGER], the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. SCOTT], the junior Senator from Florida [Mr. SMATHERS], the junior Senator from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], the junior Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], the junior Senator from South Carolina [Mr. THURMOND], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. THYE], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. WILEY], and the junior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. YOUNG], I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to continue authority to make funds available for loans and grants under title V of the Housing Act of 1949, as amended.

The bill would continue the farm housing program which was established under title V of the Housing Act of 1949. The provisions of this program were originally sponsored by Representative BOB JONES, of the Eighth District of Alabama, and I. Representative JONES is

today introducing a bill identical to this one.

In spite of the great good accomplished under this farm housing program during the 5 years of its operation, it was virtually allowed to die last year. This was so even though Congress unanimously voted to continue the authority for it. Unfortunately, the Bureau of the Budget did not submit an estimate, and funds were not appropriated.

Mr. President, many Senators on both sides of the aisle originally supported this Farm Housing Act, and have consistently voted for continuation of the authority. Let me say that when the act was extended last year, a great number of Senators joined in sponsoring the bill.

I have not had an opportunity to invite all Senators who may be interested to join this year in sponsoring this bill. With that in mind, I now request that the bill lie on the table until next Wednesday, before being printed, so that any Senators who may wish to do so may join the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] and I as cosponsors of the bill.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a statement I have prepared in connection with the bill.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the statement will be printed in the RECORD.

The bill (S. 789) to continue authority to make funds available for loans and grants under title V of the Housing Act of 1949, as amended, introduced by Mr. SPARKMAN (for himself and Mr. FULBRIGHT), was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

The statement presented by Mr. SPARKMAN is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR SPARKMAN

In passing the Housing Act of 1949, Congress said in clear terms that we recognized the need for financial assistance to both farm and city families living in substandard homes if these families were to have an opportunity to obtain decent and adequate housing.

Title V of the act specifically authorized loans to farm owners to enable them to build, modernize or repair their homes and farm service buildings needed to operate their farms profitably. The original act authorized annual appropriations for 4 fiscal years, beginning July 1, 1949. Although the law was amended in 1952 to extend the appropriation authorities for an additional year, no provision for loan appropriations was made beyond the 1954 fiscal year.

Last year Congress extended the authorities of title V of the Housing Act of 1949, but did not appropriate funds to continue the program. The Budget Bureau submitted no estimate.

Originally the act authorized appropriations of \$275 million for farm housing purposes. Only about a third of this amount was actually made available. The general curtailment of nondefense Government expenditures associated with the Korean war as well as certain building material shortages that existed in immediate postwar years are the principal reasons why the farm housing program did not reach its anticipated volume.

The amount available for the 1954 fiscal year was \$19 million. The demand for these loans was so great that almost all of the

funds were committed within 6 months. The Farmers' Home Administration received thousands of applications that went unsatisfied because the farm housing funds were insufficient to fill the needs.

Approximately 19,600 farm families have benefited from the nearly \$100 million of farm housing funds that were made available during the years 1950-54 inclusive. With these funds they built or repaired over 16,000 farm homes, approximately 14,000 farm service buildings and over 7,200 water systems. In my home State of Alabama, over 700 families have received farm housing loans to build new and modern homes, and over 200 additional families repaired and modernized their homes. In addition, about 400 farm service buildings and more than 600 water systems have been financed with farm housing funds. In all, about \$6 million was loaned to Alabama farmers for these purposes.

This is a mere beginning in solving the problems of substandard housing on our Alabama farms but it does demonstrate the effectiveness of the farm housing loan authorities in meeting a critical need of farm families for construction credit.

That Alabama farmers want better housing is shown by the fact that the demand for these loans was so great during the last year the program was active that 80 percent of the funds allotted to Alabama was obligated within 2 months.

The cost of these new homes has been exceptionally low. To a person accustomed to the price of city homes, it seems almost unbelievable that farm families should be able to build good, substantial homes at an average cash outlay of less than \$6,500. While these homes are modest in design, they do meet all the generally accepted requirements of a decent, safe and sanitary living.

Low cash cost when compared with similar urban homes results from a number of reasons. One is the fact that there is no land cost involved. Another is that the borrower and his family ordinarily are able to contribute a substantial amount of labor, and a third is that in many cases borrowers have been able to utilize such materials as timber, sand, gravel, or stone from their own farms or else obtain such materials from local sources at a low cost.

Low cost, however, does not mean low quality. Each of these homes was required to meet the construction standards of the Farmers' Home Administration. These standards protect the borrower against faulty construction and the Government against unsound investment. The standards are flexible enough to permit a farmer to use his skills and ingenuity to build at minimum cost the kind of a home of which he and his family are justifiably proud.

In addition to providing financing for farm homes, the farm housing program offers farm families an opportunity to build or improve service buildings needed to put their farms on a paying basis, and to operate them more efficiently.

A fourth of the farm housing funds have been used for purposes such as building dairy barns, general-purpose barns, poultry houses, and for installing water systems. While this has not been the largest field of activity of the housing program it has been a highly significant one. Through it some farmers have been able to put their units on a paying basis; others have been able to make necessary changes in their farm buildings to meet the changing requirements of our present-day agriculture; and others have changed their building facilities so as to use more efficiently their family labor and their land.

The nature of the farming business—one in which the family home and income-producing activities are inseparably joined—makes this authority an important phase of our farm housing program.

The level of living of farm families depends upon the productivity of their farm. When through the addition or modernization of farm service buildings farm families of moderate means, such as the ones to whom farm housing loans are made, are able to increase their income, they are better able to pay the cost of a decent home.

These housing loans to farm families who are unable to obtain their credit from the usual sources are sound investments. During the 4 years that the farm housing program was in operation, borrowers established a commendable repayment record. As of January 31, 1954, less than 5 percent of the borrowers had not paid in full the amounts that had become due on their loans. Approximately one-third had paid more than was due.

I am particularly proud of the repayment record established by the borrowers in Alabama. Of the almost 1,000 farm housing borrowers who had payments due at the end of 1953, less than 1 percent had not paid the full amount due on their loan. These few are the families who did not have sufficient resources to meet the credit requirements of conventional lenders for a construction loan. However, as soon as they make sufficient progress to qualify for a loan from another source they will be required to refinance their Government loans with private or cooperative lending institutions. They only need adequate credit on reasonable terms and an opportunity to prove that they are good credit risks. When the construction work is finished and the loans become seasoned, private credit agencies can and will carry the remaining debt.

The farm housing program is not in competition with private and cooperative credit, but rather it is an integral part of our total credit system that will enable farm families to have homes comparable to those enjoyed by city dwellers. I think we will all agree that a high percentage of our city families are well housed today because they have been aided in their home purchase or improvement through Government-financed, insured, or guaranteed program. We should do no less for the farm families.

Although the inadequacy of farm homes has been less conspicuous and perhaps less publicized than the slums in the cities, a far greater percentage of our farm families are living in substandard houses than is true of urban families. Nationwide, 1 out of every 5 farm families is living in a house that is so dilapidated that it either needs to be replaced or else needs major repairs. In Alabama only 1 farm family out of 12 has the commonly accepted convenience of a private toilet, bath, and hot running water. One out of four families live in homes having less than four rooms. A high percentage of Alabama farm homes are not only inadequate but 1 out of every 3 needs major repairs or needs to be replaced.

The economic and social problems associated with inadequate housing on a fifth of our Nation's farms are too great to be brushed aside. The idea that privation and hardship necessarily are a part of farm life was commonly accepted during the years when our country was being settled, but today farm families want, and I believe they are entitled to, the same conveniences that city people enjoy.

Farm families for one reason or another frequently have deferred home improvements until they had paid for their farms. The idea has prevailed among both farmers and lenders that the house was something to be improved out of savings and that it was not prudent for the farmer to borrow to give his family a decent home. This postponement of home improvements frequently extended beyond the years of greatest family need—the years when the children were at home. Particularly during these years, the household duties of farm wives meant hard labor and drudgery without such commonly ac-

cepted conveniences as electricity, running water, and efficiently designed and equipped kitchens.

This postponement of home improvements was largely because of economic necessity and not by choice. All too frequently farm families never did accumulate enough money to build a decent home. The possibilities of obtaining a long-term amortized loan to build a new home were exceedingly rare; consequently, many of these families were forced to patch up and continue to live in run down and inadequate homes.

Today, farm families no longer accept the notion that because they choose farming as a way of life they need to live in homes that are inconvenient and inadequate. To the extent that private and cooperative credit sources can meet the building credit needs of farm families they should be encouraged to do so. Government loan guaranties and insurance have encouraged private capital to finance improved housing for our city families on a substantial scale. When private credit was not available direct Government loans have been provided. What farm families want and need is a like opportunity to finance farm-building improvements.

The farm-housing section of the Housing Act of 1949 gives this opportunity to the farm families who cannot obtain their financing from private or cooperative sources. The limited funds that have been made available under this act have proved its effectiveness in helping farm families of modest means improve their homes.

We need to extend these authorities. They are an essential part of our national housing program which has as its objective the progressive improvements of our housing standards with the eventual realization of a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR THE ARMED SERVICES

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], I introduce for appropriate reference 10 bills relating to the armed services. Each of these bills is requested by the Department of Defense and is accompanied by a letter of transmittal from the appropriate military department. I ask unanimous consent that the letters of transmittal be printed in the RECORD immediately following the listing of the bills introduced.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bills will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the letters of transmittal will be printed in the RECORD, as requested by the Senator from Georgia.

The bills, introduced by Mr. RUSSELL (for himself and Mr. SALTONSTALL) (by request) were received, read twice by their titles, and referred to the Committee on Armed Services, as follows:

S. 795. To amend the National Defense Facilities Act of 1950 to provide for additional facilities necessary for the administration and training of units of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States, and for other purposes.

(The letter accompanying Senate bill 795 is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D. C., January 6, 1955.

HON. RICHARD M. NIXON,
President of the Senate.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is forwarded herewith a draft of legislation to amend the National Defense Facilities Act of 1950 to provide for additional facilities necessary for

the administration and training of units of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States, and for other purposes.

This proposal is a part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1955, and the Bureau of the Budget has advised that there would be no objection to its transmittal to the Congress for consideration. The Department of the Army has been designated as the representative of the Department of Defense for this legislation. It is recommended that this proposal be enacted by the Congress.

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

It is the purpose of this proposed legislation to convert the existing temporary program for the acquisition of facilities for the Reserve components to a permanent program by repealing both the time and monetary limitations imposed by the National Defense Facilities Act of 1950.

The National Defense Facilities Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 829) authorizes the acquisition and utilization of such facilities as may be necessary for the proper development, training, operation, and maintenance of units of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Section 3 of that act limits the amount authorized to be appropriated to \$250 million over a period of the 5 fiscal years following its enactment. Such period will expire with fiscal year 1956, and it is contemplated that the amount of authorization utilized by that time will approach the monetary limitation established in the act.

If section 3 is amended, as proposed, the Secretary of Defense will be authorized to continue such program on a permanent basis within the limits of such amounts as the Congress may, from time to time, appropriate for such purpose. The acquisition, including construction, which would be so authorized, would provide for additional increments of the longer-range requirements of the Reserve components. Additionally, establishment of the program on a permanent basis would permit more effective long-range planning in this area.

COST AND BUDGET DATA

Enactment of this proposal would result in no increase in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT T. STEVENS,
Secretary of the Army.

S. 796. To provide for the relief of certain members of the Armed Forces who were required to pay certain transportation charges covering shipment of their household goods and personal effects upon return from overseas, and for other purposes.

(The letter accompanying Senate bill 796 is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,
Washington, January 3, 1955.

HON. RICHARD M. NIXON,
President of the Senate.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is forwarded herewith a draft of legislation to provide for the relief of certain members of the Armed Forces who were required to pay certain transportation charges covering shipment of their household goods and personal effects upon return from overseas, and for other purposes.

This proposal is a part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1955 and the Bureau of the Budget has advised that there would be no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of the Congress. The Department of the Air Force has been designated as the representative of the Department of Defense for this legislation. It is recommended that this proposal be enacted by the Congress.

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

The purpose of this proposed legislation is to afford relief for certain military per-

sonnel who, on their return from an overseas or Alaskan tour of duty, were charged with transportation, packing, crating, temporary storage, drayage, and unpacking of household goods and personal effects for poundage in excess of 9,000 pounds net.

Certain provisions of the Joint Travel Regulations covering weight limitations on shipments of household goods, established pursuant to the Career Compensation Act of 1949, were limited by the Appropriation Acts of 1953 and 1954.

Section 632 of Public Law 488, 82d Congress (Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1953), provides that no part of any appropriation contained in that act shall be available to expense of transportation, packing, crating, temporary storage, drayage, and unpacking of household goods and personal effects in excess of an average of 5,000 pounds net, such average to be based on the total number of shipments authorized for permanent change of station during the previous fiscal year but not exceeding 9,000 pounds net in any one shipment.

Section 629 of Public Law 179, 83d Congress (Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1954), while retaining the weight limitations of 5,000 and 9,000 pounds net, differs from section 632 of Public Law 488, 82d Congress, in that the qualification as to average, "such average to be based upon the total number of shipments authorized for permanent change of station during the previous fiscal year," is omitted. Further, the limitations imposed in section 629 are not "applicable in the case of members transferred to or serving in stations outside the continental United States or in Alaska under orders relieving them from a duty station within the United States prior to July 10, 1952, and who are returned to the United States under orders relieving them from a duty station beyond the United States or in Alaska on or after July 1, 1953." In other words, personnel who meet the above-stated requirements will not be affected by the 5,000- or 9,000-pound limitations but are limited by the provisions of the joint travel regulations established in accordance with the Career Compensation Act of 1949.

While section 629, Public Law 179, 83d Congress, offers relief not afforded in section 632, Public Law 488, 82d Congress, certain inequities have arisen from its application. This proposal would remove these inequities. Under section 629 personnel who complete their overseas or Alaskan tour and return to the States under orders relieving them from duty on July 1, 1953, are protected under the saving provision of that section; personnel who were ordered overseas prior to July 10, 1952, but who returned on June 30, 1953, or earlier, are not so protected. In the first case, the transportation, crating, etc. (if within the limiting provisions of the joint travel regulations), are paid for by the Government; in the second case the individual must reimburse the Government for poundage in excess of 9,000 pounds net. The individual required to make such reimbursement had, in good faith, shipped household goods to the overseas or Alaskan theater in accordance with joint travel regulations then in effect. In some cases personnel for whom relief is sought are members of the Reserve who were recalled to active duty, had their household goods shipped at Government expense, were led to believe the return shipment would be at Government expense, and have since been called upon to defray part of the cost of the return shipment when being returned to an inactive duty status. Actions of this nature lend support to the charge that the services are constantly changing the conditions of service from those in effect at the time military personnel came on active duty.

While the military departments have not considered the 9,000-pound limitation to be applicable to intratheater moves of personnel who were not subject to the limitation on their overseas shipment, the proposal does

expressly exempt such moves from the limitation.

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCES

A similar proposal was submitted to the 83d Congress on May 26, 1954, as a part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1954, and was introduced as S. 3575, but no further action was taken thereon.

COST AND BUDGET DATA

It is estimated that the enactment of this proposal will result in an increased cost to the Army of \$50,000 and to the Navy of \$13,000 for fiscal year 1956. These amounts can be absorbed within funds appropriated for such purpose.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD E. TALBOTT.

S. 797. To enact certain provisions now included in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act and the Civil Functions Appropriation Act, and for other purposes.

(The letter accompanying Senate bill 797 is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE,

Washington, January 23, 1955.

HON. RICHARD M. NIXON,

President of the Senate.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is forwarded herewith a draft of legislation to enact certain provisions now included in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act and the Civil Functions Appropriation Act, and for other purposes, and a sectional analysis thereof.

This proposal is a part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1955 and the Bureau of the Budget has advised that it has no objection to the submission of this proposal for the consideration of the Congress. The Department of the Air Force has been designated as the representative of the Department of Defense for this legislation. It is recommended that this proposal be enacted by the Congress.

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

This proposed legislation would provide legislative authorization for certain activities of the Department of Defense now supported only by provisions contained in the annual appropriation acts. A detailed discussion of each section is contained in the attached sectional analysis.

COST AND BUDGET DATA

The enactment of this proposal will cause no apparent increase in the budgetary requirements for the Department of Defense.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD E. TALBOTT.

"SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF A BILL TO ENACT CERTAIN PROVISIONS NOW INCLUDED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION ACT AND THE CIVIL FUNCTIONS APPROPRIATION ACT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

"Section 1: (a) This subsection would enact into permanent law the authority contained in the following provisions of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955 (Public Law 488, 83d Cong.)—

"Military personnel, Army: 'Donations of not to exceed \$25 to each prisoner upon each release from confinement in an Army prison (other than a disciplinary barracks) and to each person discharged for fraudulent enlistment.'

"Maintenance and operations, Army: 'Donations of not to exceed \$25 to each prisoner upon each release from confinement in a disciplinary barracks'; 'civilian clothing, not to exceed \$30 in cost, to be issued each person upon each release from confinement in an Army prison and to each soldier discharged otherwise than honorably, or sentenced by a civil court to confinement in a civil prison, or interned or discharged as an alien enemy.'

"Maintenance and operations, Air Force: 'Civilian clothing and, when necessary, an overcoat, the cost of all not to exceed \$30,

for each person upon each release from a military prison.'

"Military personnel, Air Force: 'Donations of not to exceed \$25 to each civilian prisoner upon each release from a military prison, to each enlisted man discharged otherwise than honorably upon each release from confinement under court-martial sentence, and to each person discharged for fraudulent enlistment.'

"It provides authority for the issuance of civilian outer clothing to prisoners released from military and naval prisons who do not possess personally owned clothing. It also makes possible the furnishing of a small amount of cash to such released prisoners, in order that they may purchase meals and other necessities during the trip to their homes.

"(b) This subsection would repeal the Navy statutes relating to the furnishing of transportation, civilian clothing, and gratuities to prisoners. Those statutes would no longer be necessary because of subsection (a), above, and section 2.

"Section 2: This section would provide permanent authority for the furnishing of subsistence, quarters, and supplies and services required for health and personal necessity, to applicants, accepted applicants and rejected applicants for enlistment, registrants called for induction under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, and rejected registrants, persons in military custody not in a pay status, such as prisoners, and, in emergencies, supernumeraries, including stragglers from other military units and shipwrecked mariners. It permits commutation of subsistence to applicants for enlistment and registrants, including those rejected. This section would replace the following provisions of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955:

"Military personnel, Army: 'Authorized issues of articles to prisoners, other than those in disciplinary barracks'; 'subsistence of * * * selective service registrants called for induction and applicants for enlistment while held under observation, and prisoners (except those at disciplinary barracks)'; 'subsistence of supernumeraries necessitated by emergent military circumstances.'

"Maintenance and operations, Army: 'Subsistence of prisoners at disciplinary barracks'; 'authorized issues of articles for use of applicants for enlistment and persons in military custody.'

"Military personnel (Air Force): 'Rations for applicants for enlistment, * * * and general prisoners'; 'commutation of rations, as authorized by regulations, to applicants for enlistment, and general prisoners, while sick in hospitals; subsistence of supernumeraries necessitated by emergent military circumstances.'

"Section 3: (a) This subsection would amend section 303 (e) of the Career Compensation Act so as to include persons discharged for fraudulent enlistment or for reason of minority among the categories to whom traveling expenses may be paid. Current law authorizes transportation in kind and a \$10 donation for persons discharged from the Army and Air Force for fraudulent enlistment, and transportation in kind and subsistence for those similarly discharged from the Navy. This would place all three services on a uniform basis, and permit deletion of appropriation language for the Army and Air Force which raises the amount of the donation to \$25. The phrase "or for reason of minority" has been added because the Uniform Standards for Discharge approved by the Secretary of Defense on August 2, 1948, provide that minors who enlist with false representations as to age or without parental consent and who meet applicable standards for discharge are discharged for reason of minority and not for fraudulent enlistment.

"(b) This subsection amends section 501 (a) of the Career Compensation Act of 1949 to make applicable to officers of the Reserve components the authority to provide rations to personnel on inactive-duty training when the duty period or periods total 8 or more hours in any one calendar day. As originally enacted, section 501 (a) authorized payment of only basic pay to Reserve personnel on inactive-duty training. In some instances, particularly with National Guard units, when the duty period involved is for purposes of firing weapons on a range, it is necessary to arrive at the range area early in the morning and spend the entire day at the location. In such instances, personnel were required to furnish their own meals, and the cost of these took a large part, if not all, of the basic pay the individual received. This problem was solved in part by an amendment to section 501 (a), which was contained in section 244 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, and which authorized rations in kind to enlisted personnel when the inactive-duty training period totals 8 hours in 1 day. However, the same problem exists as to officers. There is no authority to pay them subsistence allowances unless they are placed on active duty for the day involved, and such active duty entitles them also to quarters allowance, for which there is no necessity or justification. Accordingly, the furnishing of subsistence in these circumstances to both officers and enlisted members of the Reserve components has been authorized by appropriation act provisions, which are as follows in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955:

"Reserve personnel requirements (Army): 'Subsistence for members of the Army Reserve for drills of 8 or more hours duration in any one calendar day.'

"Army National Guard: 'Subsistence for officers attending drills of 8 or more hours duration in any 1 calendar day.'

"(c) This subsection would repeal present statutes covering transportation, subsistence, and donations for persons discharged for fraudulent enlistment, since they would be authorized travel expenses by (b) above.

"Section 4: This subsection would amend section 125 of the National Defense Act, as it relates to issuance of civilian clothing to persons discharged for bad conduct, unsuitability, unsuitability, or inaptitude. The amendment would delete the present \$30 limit on the cost of clothing, which makes it difficult to provide a suit and an overcoat. It would also clarify the categories of discharges to whom such clothing may be issued, specifying that they include persons discharged otherwise than honorably, or otherwise than under honorable conditions. It would also add the category of persons interned or discharged as alien enemies, now covered by appropriation act provisions. These persons may be entitled to honorable discharges because of the character of their service, but should not be permitted to retain the uniform. Persons discharged under honorable conditions for reasons of unsuitability or inaptitude are not permitted to retain their uniforms, but persons discharged under honorable conditions for other reasons are permitted to retain them. The language suggested in the first clause of the revision is the same as now contained in the fifth proviso of 10 U. S. C. 1393.

"Section 5: (a) This subsection would provide permanent authority for the payment of expenses and rewards (not exceeding \$25) for the apprehension and delivery of personnel absent without leave, deserters, stragglers, or persons who have escaped from custody. The amount of money is left to the determination of the Secretaries of the military departments in order to allow sufficient flexibility for a permanent law. This authority is now provided for the Army and Air Force by appropriation act provisions,

which appear in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955, as follows:

"Military personnel, Army: 'expenses of apprehension and delivery of deserters, prisoners, and soldiers absent without leave, including payment of rewards (not to exceed \$25 in any one case).'

"Maintenance and operation, Army: 'expenses of apprehension and delivery of prisoners escaped from disciplinary barracks, including payment of rewards not exceeding \$25 in any one case, and expenses of confinement of such prisoners in nonmilitary facilities.'

"Military personnel (Air Force): 'expenses of apprehension and delivery of deserters, prisoners, and members of the Air Force absent without leave, including payment of rewards (not to exceed \$25 in any one case).'

"(b) This subsection would repeal a portion of section 22 of the act of August 2, 1946, the permanent Navy authority for expenses and rewards for apprehension of deserters. It would no longer be needed since subsection (a) would apply to all military departments on a uniform basis.

"Section 6: This section constitutes basic authority for section 706 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955, and other provisions concerning prisoners contained in the appropriations for each military department, and spells out in somewhat greater detail the expenses which are authorized in the case of prisoners of war. Such authority appears necessary and desirable in view of the fact that the United States is obligated under the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929, relating to the treatment of prisoners of war, and other provisions of international law, to provide all of such services for prisoners of war of enemy nations. The section also covers similar personnel in custody who are not technically prisoners of war, such as interned enemy aliens.

"Section 7: The act of January 21, 1870 (sec. 1259, Revised Statutes; 10 U. S. C. 990), provides that no retired officer of the Army may be recalled to active duty unless such action is specifically authorized by law. For a number of years the appropriation for the United States Military Academy has included a proviso authorizing such recall for the duties of librarian at the Academy. It is worded as follows in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act 1955: 'that the duties of the librarian at the United States Military Academy may be performed by a retired officer detailed on active duty.'

"Section 7 enacts this authority into substantive law. It has been found that retired officers are well qualified for these positions by virtue of their background and experience. Their employment results in a saving to the Government, since the cost of the employment is limited to the difference between their retired pay and active-duty pay, which is much less than the cost of employing a qualified civilian.

"Section 8: Section 704 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955, provides authority for the employment in additional numbers of such military and naval personnel as may be detailed to duty with agencies not a part of the Department of Defense. There are several provisions of law authorizing the detail of military and naval personnel to other agencies on a reimbursement basis, but there is no general authority permitting their employment in addition to the numbers otherwise authorized and appropriated for the respective military departments. Inasmuch as such assignments reduce the number of military and naval personnel available to the services for military purposes, the authority to employ such personnel in additional numbers should be permanent and in conjunction with the authority to detail personnel.

"Section 9: This section enacts into substantive law the following proviso of the appropriation 'Military personnel, Army,' which has been repeated in appropriation

acts since the fiscal year 1945: 'Section 212 of the act of June 30, 1932 (5 U. S. C. 59a), shall not apply to retired military personnel on duty at the United States Soldiers' Home.' This provision permits the payment of compensation to retired military personnel employed in the operation and administration of the Soldiers' Home. Such compensation is payable from the Soldiers' Home Trust Fund rather than general funds of the Treasury.

"Section 10: (a) This subsection would enact into permanent law the authority contained in section 707 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955, whereby the military departments are authorized to expend out of appropriations available for construction or maintenance amounts required for minor construction, conversion of and extensions to existing structures, and improvements at facilities of the department concerned, with a stated limitation of \$50,000 for any one project, except that the limitation on the cost of any project determined by the Secretary of Defense to be urgently required for the national defense shall not exceed \$200,000. The subsection states that the cost of any project shall not exceed an amount stated in the appropriation act concerned, which would permit annual adjustment of limitations.

"(b) This subsection repeals the permanent Navy law authorizing minor construction in amounts not exceeding \$20,000 for any one project. The stated limitation has been increased by annual appropriation act provisions since 1946. The repealed statute would be supplanted by subsection (a).

"Section 11: The provisions of section 3734, Revised Statutes, as amended, prohibit the expenditure of funds upon any public building until after sketch plans of the building, together with outline description and detailed estimates of cost, have been made by the Administrator of General Services. Since the military departments supervise construction programs for military purposes, and exercise jurisdiction over military installations, this requirement clearly should not be applicable to military construction. Accordingly, appropriation acts for a number of years have included provisions waiving the requirements of this section of the Revised Statutes. Such waivers appear in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955, under the titles 'Aircraft and Related Procurement' (Navy), and 'Facilities' (Navy). This section would enact such provisions into permanent law to the extent of waiving the making of sketch plans and detailed cost estimates by the Administrator of General Services in the case of military construction authorized by law for the Department of Defense.

"Sections 355 and 1136, Revised Statutes, include provisions prohibiting the expenditure of funds upon any land purchased by the United States until the written opinion of the Attorney General in favor of the validity of title is obtained. The Department of Justice is able to act expeditiously on title clearances in most cases, and normally the requirement can be met without adverse effect on military requirements. However, occasional instances arise where the urgent need for the construction requires that title be obtained and construction started on the basis of the title examination made by the military department. In recognition of this need, appropriation acts since 1940 have included provisions either waiving the requirement or permitting acquisition of land and initiation of construction prior to written approval of title by the Attorney General. Examples of such provisions are contained in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955, under the titles 'Aircraft and Related Procurement' (Navy), 'Facilities' (Navy), 'Aircraft and Related Procurement' (Air Force). This section would enact such provisions into permanent law so that the authority would be

available when its use is dictated by urgent circumstances.

"Section 12: The purpose of this section is to enact into specific permanent law the authority for the military departments to furnish utility services, without reimbursement, buildings on military reservations used by nationally recognized welfare organizations. Since 1931, the Army has had specific statutory authority for this in annual appropriation acts. The Air Force appropriations have carried similar provisions since 1949. This section would indicate clearly that such authority exists for all three military departments on a uniform basis.

"Section 13: This section enacts into substantive law the following provision of the appropriation 'Procurement and production, Army' of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1954: 'Ammunition for military salutes at institutions to which issue of weapons for salutes is authorized.' A similar provision is not included in the 1955 appropriation act because the funds from 1954 were considered sufficient for the needs in 1955. However, future appropriation acts will undoubtedly contain this item. Comparable provisions have appeared in Army appropriation acts since the fiscal year 1897. An example of the institutions referred to in State homes for soldiers and sailors, to which the issue of obsolete but serviceable weapons for salutes is authorized by the act of February 8, 1889 (25 Stat. 657), as amended (50 U. S. C. 66). In the interest of uniformity, the section is made applicable to all military departments.

"Section 14: (a) This subsection would amend the act of May 28, 1928 (45 Stat. 786; 32 U. S. C. 181c), by deleting therefrom any reference to the amount (\$7,500) which may be appropriated annually for incidental expenses of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice. It has been the practice in annual appropriation acts for the Congress to specify the amount which may be used for this purpose, which is generally in excess of the amount herein specified. This amendment permits the amount to be adjusted from year to year in proportion to the requirements based upon the program for the year.

"(b) The existing statute authorizing the activities of the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, the Act of June 7, 1924, merely provides for the necessary expenses of the Board and its members, and is silent as to the rate of travel allowances to be paid to members when they are traveling in connection with their duties as such members. The Board includes a few civilian members in addition to the military personnel who make up the majority of the Board. The Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955, includes a provision that travel expenses of civilian members of the Board shall be paid in accordance with the Standardized Government Travel Regulations, as amended. This subsection would amend the 1924 act to provide that travel expenses of members of the Board shall be paid on the basis now specified by annual appropriation acts.

"Section 15: (a) This subsection would enact into substantive law the authority now provided for the Army and Air Force by annual appropriation acts to make expenditures for inter-American cooperation, which includes such activities as military missions to Latin-American countries, the translation and printing of military texts to be used by their armies in the interest of standardization of methods, and expenses of visits of Latin-American officers to the United States for indoctrination in United States military methods.

"(b) This subsection repeals Navy permanent law on the above subject, since subsection (a) would be uniformly applicable to all military departments.

"Section 16: Annual appropriations for the National Guard since 1937 have included au-

thority for the settlement and payment of claims for damage to or loss of private property incident to the operation of camps of instruction. These activities are not covered by existing claims statutes, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act or the Military Personnel Claims Act, since the units concerned are not in Federal service, even though the pay of the troops, the expense of operation of camps, and other training expenses are paid from Federal funds. However, since the training is for the purpose of improving the state of readiness of National Guard units to participate in the defense of the United States, it appears entirely proper that claims of this type should be paid from Federal funds as an incidental expense of training. This section would provide permanent statutory authority for this purpose, making clear that it creates no right of action against the United States, and would replace the appropriation act provision, which reads as follows in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955: 'claims (not to exceed \$1,000 in any one case) for damages to or loss of private property incident to the operation of Army and Air National Guard camps of instruction, either during the stay of units of said organizations at such camps or while en route thereto or therefrom.'

"Section 17: (a) This subsection would enact into permanent law provisions in the appropriations for the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, reading as follows in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955:

"Army National Guard: 'services of personnel of the National Guard employed as civilians without regard to their military rank, and the number of caretakers authorized to be employed under provisions of law (32 U. S. C. 42) may be such as is deemed necessary by the Secretary of the Army.'

"Air National Guard: 'Provided, further, That the number of caretakers authorized to be employed under the provision of law (32 U. S. C. 42) may be such as is deemed necessary by the Secretary of the Air Force.' The provisions of section 90 of the National Defense Act were amended in 1935 to authorize placing the property and equipment of the National Guard of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in a common pool for care, maintenance and storage. The advantages of this pooling, from the standpoint of economy, are apparent. However, the 1935 amendment placed a limit of 15 on the number of caretakers to be employed for any one pool. With the increase in the amount and size of National Guard equipment, the limitation to 15 caretakers became inadequate, and appropriation acts since 1939 (Public Law 179, 83d Cong., title III) have suspended the limitation. This subsection would delete the limitation from the permanent statute.

"Section 90 of the National Defense Act also prohibits the employment as caretakers of persons who hold commissions as officers in the National Guard, except for one officer not above the grade of captain for each pool or heavier-than-air squadron. In many cases, the persons best qualified to act as caretakers are those who happen to hold such commissions. In recognition of this, annual appropriation acts have suspended this prohibition since 1946. This subsection would also amend section 90 to include affirmative authority for such employment of caretakers without regard to their military rank.

"(b) This subsection would repeal the prohibition on employment of commissioned officers as caretakers, discussed in (a) above.

"Section 18: This section would enact into substantive law the following provisions of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1955 'Army National Guard' and 'Air National Guard': 'travel expenses (other than mileage), as authorized by law for Army personnel on active duty, for Army National

Guard division, regimental and battalion commanders while inspecting units in compliance with National Guard regulations when specifically authorized by the Chief, National Guard Bureau'; 'travel expenses (other than mileage), on the same basis as authorized by law for Air National Guard personnel on active Federal duty, of Air National Guard commanders while inspecting units in compliance with National Guard regulations when specifically authorized by the Chief, National Guard Bureau.'

"The commanders specified perform travel, as directed by National Guard regulations, for the purpose of inspecting units to determine the status of training, condition of equipment, progress of organization, and similar matters. Since they are not in Federal status, they are not covered by existing laws relating to payment of travel expenses. It appears inequitable to require such commanders to pay travel expenses from their own pockets for official duties of this nature. However, this section would require specific authorization by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau for the use of official funds for such travel, as does the existing appropriation language.

"Section 19: (a) (b) These subsections provide the basis for expenditure of funds for emergencies, extraordinary expenses, and confidential activities of the Department of Defense and the Departments of the Army and Air Force, which have heretofore been covered by provisions of annual appropriation acts. The present authority appears in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955, under the appropriations 'Salaries and expenses' (Office of the Secretary of Defense), 'Contingencies' (Department of Defense), 'Maintenance and Operations, Army' and 'Contingencies' (Air Force), and is not enlarged by this subsection. It is also provided that expenditures for confidential purposes shall be final and conclusive only when specified by the appropriation act providing the funds. In the interest of uniformity, the subsections are made applicable to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of all the military departments.

"(c) The Secretary of the Navy having been included in the authorizing language of subsections (a) and (b), the authority granted in the statute repealed would no longer be necessary.

"Section 20: This section would enact into substantive law the same authority provided in the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955, under the heading 'Claims' as follows: 'repayment of amounts determined by the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force, or officers designated by them, to have been erroneously collected from military and civilian personnel of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force or from States, Territories, or the District of Columbia, or members of National Guard units thereof.'

"This authority provides a quick and simple method of repaying amounts erroneously collected from the mentioned personnel, or from States, Territories, or the District of Columbia in connection with National Guard activities. The erroneous collections arise in various ways, such as charges for property thought to be lost, but later located after the collection is made. Direct payment avoids the delay, expense, and paperwork incident to processing claims through the General Accounting Office for the very small amounts usually involved.

"Section 21: Section 303 (b) of the Army and Air Force Authorization Act of 1949 provides that funds appropriated to the military departments for procurement of technical military equipment and supplies, construction of public works, and research and development shall remain available until expended unless otherwise provided in the appropriation act concerned. Since the enactment of that section, it has been necessary to carry in every military appropriation act a provision stating that none of the funds in

the act shall be available until expended unless expressly so provided in that appropriation or another appropriation act. For accounting and budget purposes, the provision in the Army and Air Force Authorization Act is unfeasible, since lump-sum appropriations do not indicate what portion of the total amount is for the procurement of technical military equipment and supplies, or for research and development. Thus an unspecified portion of the lump-sum appropriation would be available until expended, while the balance would be available for 1 year. This section would amend section 303 (b) of the Army and Air Force Authorization Act to provide that funds of the type specified shall remain available until expended when so provided in the appropriation act concerned. This will permit deletion of the superseding language carried in annual appropriation acts, which appears as section 713 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955, as follows: 'No part of any appropriation contained in this act shall be available until expended unless expressly so provided elsewhere in this or some other appropriation act.'

"Section 22: This section would enact into permanent law the following provisions of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1955:

"SEC. 702. Section 3648, Revised Statutes, shall not apply, in the case of payments made from appropriations contained in this act, (1) to payments made in compliance with the laws of foreign countries or their ministerial regulations, (2) to payments for rent in such countries for such periods as may be necessary to accord with local custom, or (3) to payments made for tuition.

"SEC. 705. Appropriations contained in this act shall be available for insurance of official motor vehicles in foreign countries, when required by laws of such countries; payments in advance of expenses determined by the investigating officer to be necessary and in accord with local custom for conducting investigations in foreign countries incident to matters relating to activities of the Department concerned."

"Maintenance and operations (Air Force): 'rental of land or purchase of options to rent land without reference to section 3648, Revised Statutes, as amended, * * * and other necessary expenses of combat maneuvers.'

"Maintenance and operations, Army: 'And in administering the provisions of 43 U. S. C. 315g, rentals may be made in advance; field exercises and maneuvers, including payments in advance for rentals or options to rent land.'

"Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes prohibits the advance payment of public moneys unless authorized by an appropriation act or other law. The various payments listed in this section have been authorized by the appropriation act provisions quoted above, which are not legislative in nature, but add unnecessary wording to the annual appropriation acts. In the case of activities in foreign countries, it is often necessary to make advance payments of the type mentioned in this section, under local law, regulation, or custom. In the case of tuition, it is the normal practice to require payment in advance. In the case of insurance on official motor vehicles in foreign countries, the Comptroller General has in the past held that it is the general policy of the United States Government to act as a self-insurer, and that payments for insurance from appropriated funds will not be approved in the absence of a clear expression of the desire of Congress that funds be used for that purpose. This has created difficulty in certain foreign countries, where mandatory laws require insurance coverage of certain designated types as a prerequisite to the operation of motor vehicles. In certain cases activities of the Department of Defense would be seriously hampered if official vehicles are precluded from entering the foreign country concerned.

"In the case of losses incident to termination of grazing permits, the provisions of the act of July 9, 1942, as amended by the act of May 28, 1948, authorize payments to holders of grazing permits or licenses on land owned by or under the control of the Federal Government, to compensate them for losses suffered when their permission to use the range lands is terminated because of the need of such lands for war or national defense purposes. These payments make it possible for these users of the public range to continue livestock operations in cases where they might otherwise be driven out of business by inability to obtain other grazing land. In many cases, such users urgently need advance payment of the compensation for losses, so that they will have sufficient funds to pay advance rental on other grazing property. In recognition of this, appropriation acts since 1949 have carried provisions authorizing these payments to be made in advance.

"Advance payments for rentals or options to rent land needed for field exercises or maneuvers are required to assure ability to use the required areas when owners insist on advance payments.

"Section 23: This section includes a number of items now covered by the appropriation 'Cemeterial expenses' in the Department of the Army Civil Functions Appropriation Act. All of the items are specifically authorized by the mentioned appropriation act with the exception of the maintenance of soldiers' plots or monuments in the United States, and the authority to purchase flags, however, present authorizing language has been interpreted to include these expenses.

"Section 24: Section 2 of the act of August 2, 1946, which would be repealed by this section, authorizes the Navy to provide for physical examination by civilians of employees engaged in hazardous occupations. The authority contained in that section is unnecessary in view of the provisions of the act of August 8, 1946, relative to health programs for Government employees.

"Section 25: (a) This subsection would provide uniform permanent authority for all military departments to pay rewards for information leading to the discovery or recovery of missing Government property (Public Law 458, 83d Cong., sec. 709). The Navy now has this authority in the statute which would be repealed by (b). The authority is particularly needed to assist in the recovery of valuable property such as torpedoes and guided missiles.

"(b) This subsection would repeal the Navy statute which provides the authority which would be granted to all military departments by (a).

"Section 26: Section 4 of Public Law 557, 82d Congress, an act to facilitate the performance of research and development work by the military departments, provides that contracts for research and development may provide for the acquisition or construction by, or furnishing to, the contractor of research, developmental or test facilities as determined necessary for performance of the contract. The reports of the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services (H. Rept. 548, S. Rept. 863) state the understanding of those committees that the wording of section 4 will make research and development funds available for the furnishing or construction of such facilities. However, appropriations specifically made for construction are available to the military departments and it has been a long-standing rule of the Comptroller General that where a specific appropriation for a purpose exists, a general appropriation may not be used for that purpose. Therefore, doubt exists as to whether or not section 4 permits the use of research and development funds for furnishing construction of facilities. This section will remove such doubt and amend

section 4 to make specific reference to availability of appropriations, also making possible the deletion of appropriation language. This section would make permanent authority now found in section 728 of Public Law 458, 83d Congress.

"Section 27: This section authorizes delegation and redelegation, with stated exceptions, of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments by this act. The exceptions, which may not be delegated, are (a) the authority to prescribe or approve regulations, and (b) the authority to approve use of funds for emergencies and extraordinary expenses, under section 23."

S. 798. A bill to provide for the tonnage composition of the United States Navy with respect to vessels, and for other purposes.

(The letter accompanying Senate bill 798 is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D. C., January 5, 1955.

HON. RICHARD M. NIXON,
President of the Senate.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There are forwarded herewith a draft of legislation to provide for the tonnage composition of the United States Navy with respect to vessels, and for other purposes, and a sectional analysis thereof.

This proposal is a part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1955. The responsibility for representing the Department of Defense on this legislation has been delegated to this Department by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

This proposed legislation is designed to provide a new basic authorizing act for the Navy with respect to vessels. The proposed bill reflects the changing needs of the Navy which cut completely across the traditional categories and types of vessels contemplated by existing law as based on the Washington and London Treaties. It would repeal all existing tonnage authorization and provide a new tonnage composition made up of four categories of vessels; namely, combatant vessels, auxiliary vessels, service craft, and experimental vessels. The combatant vessel category would consist of four subcategories, (1) warships (aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc.), (2) amphibious warfare vessels (including landing craft), (3) mine warfare vessels (minelaying and minesweeping), and (4) patrol vessels. Provision is made for the category, "experimental vessels," in order to provide a classification for certain types which may or may not have combatant characteristics and are not auxiliaries or service craft, and for ships which have been altered for test purposes to such an extent that they have for all practical purposes lost their initial classification. The Secretary of the Navy would determine the types of vessels included in each category and subcategory and would be authorized to classify vessels and to maintain a naval vessel register listing each vessel by appropriate category, subcategory, and classification.

A continuing shipbuilding, conversion, and modernization program would be provided in the proposed bill. Such program would include prototype vessels incorporating progress made in research and development. The proposed bill also provides for the disposition and for the orderly replacement of naval vessels.

The Vinson-Trammell Act (act of Mar. 27, 1934; 48 Stat. 503, ch. 95, as amended), provided a continuing shipbuilding authority, but subsequent acts authorizing construction of auxiliaries, mine craft, landing craft, patrol vessels, and district craft during World War II and the national emergency period preceding made no provision for replacement.

The tonnage composition of the Navy as of September 30, 1954, is set forth below accord-

ing to the categories and subcategories which the proposed legislation would employ. This tabulation includes active fleet vessels, reserve fleet vessels, naval reserve training vessels, vessels building, vessels suspended, vessels authorized and funded for but not started, and vessels delivered partially completed. It does not include noncommissioned vessels assigned to the Military Sea Transportation Service.

Combatant vessels:	Tonnage
Warships.....	4,275,680
Amphibious warfare vessels and landing craft.....	1,747,170
Mine warfare vessels.....	225,439
Patrol vessels.....	375,590
Total combatant vessels.....	6,623,879
Auxiliary vessels.....	1,957,641
Service craft.....	552,902
Experimental vessels.....	3,035
Grand total.....	9,137,457

For the purpose of providing continuing shipbuilding authorization, the proposed legislation provides for the following tonnage composition for the Navy:

Percentage of Sept. 30, 1954, tonnage

Combatant:		
Warships.....	4,500,000	105
Amphibious warfare vessels and landing craft.....	2,000,000	114
Mine warfare vessels.....	300,000	133
Patrol vessels.....	400,000	106
Total combatant vessels.....	7,200,000	109
Auxiliary vessels.....	2,000,000	102
Service craft.....	600,000	109
Experimental vessels.....	200,000	6,589
Grand total.....	10,000,000	110

In order to provide for the changing needs of the naval service, the Secretary of the Navy would be authorized to vary the tonnage authorizations by categories and subcategories a maximum of 20 percent, but he would not be authorized to exceed the total authorized tonnage of 10 million tons.

In the event of war or national emergency, the Secretary of the Navy would be authorized to acquire or construct vessels of such size, type, and design as he determines to be best suited for the prosecution of the war or for the national security without reference to tonnage authorizations contained in this bill. It is emphasized, however, that it is intended that the authority of this section is to be exercised only under the extreme emergency circumstances indicated.

The proposed bill requires new warships construction, by type, to be divided equally between private and naval shipyards. Inasmuch as the national security requires a nucleus of naval shipbuilding skills and facilities in both the private and naval shipyards, an exception is made to the equal division requirement in cases where the Secretary of the Navy, with the approval of the President, determines that such exception is necessary to develop prototypes or to maintain such skills and facilities. Provision is also made for the construction of such vessels on the Pacific coast as the President may deem necessary to maintain adequate shipyard facilities in that area.

Provision is made in the proposed bill for the acquisition and disposition of vessels for the Military Sea Transportation Service and for the transfer of vessels between the Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Treasury, Interior, or Commerce, with or without reimbursement.

The proposed bill would reenact existing statutory provisions which prohibit the disposition of naval vessels by sale, charter, or by scrapping, except as provided by law; or the disposition of naval vessels by transfer, exchange, or sale, unless certified by the Chief of Naval Operations as not essential

to national defense; or the sale, transfer, or other disposition of any warship, unless authorized by the Congress.

No provision in the proposal is intended to imply a request for contract authorization. Acquisition, construction, or conversion will not be undertaken by the Secretary of the Navy until appropriations have been enacted and approved for such acquisition, construction, or conversion.

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCES

S. 2862 and H. R. 6827 were introduced in the 81st Congress as a result of the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The general purposes of S. 2862 and H. R. 6827 were to repeal the aircraft and ship construction limitations contained in the Vinson-Trammell Act and to provide for the suspension of the profit limitations contained in the said act with respect to contracts subject to renegotiation.

COST AND BUDGET DATA

Enactment of this measure would result in no increased cost to the Government. Funds for shipbuilding would continue to be requested in annual budgets.

This proposed legislation has been approved by the Bureau of the Budget. The Department of the Navy, on behalf of the Department of Defense, recommends that the proposal be enacted by the Congress.

Sincerely yours,

C. S. THOMAS.

S. 799. A bill to provide that the enlistment contracts or periods of obligated service of members of the Armed Forces shall not terminate by reason of appointment as cadets or midshipmen at the Military, Naval, Air Force, or Coast Guard Academies, or as midshipmen in the Naval Reserve, and for other purposes.

(The letter accompanying Senate bill 799 is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D. C., January 5, 1955.

HON. RICHARD M. NIXON,
President of the Senate,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is forwarded herewith a draft of proposed legislation to provide that the enlistment contracts or periods of obligated service of members of the Armed Forces shall not terminate by reason of appointment as cadets or midshipmen at the Military, Naval, Air Force, or Coast Guard Academies, or as midshipmen in the Naval Reserve, and for other purposes.

This proposal is a part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1955 and the Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of the Congress. The Department of the Navy has been designated as the representative of the Department of Defense for this legislation. It is recommended that this proposal be enacted by the Congress.

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

The purpose of the legislation is to provide that members of the Armed Forces appointed as cadets at the United States Military Academy or the United States Air Force Academy, or as midshipmen at the United States Naval Academy, or as midshipmen in the Naval Reserve, or as cadets at the United States Coast Guard Academy, from enlisted status in any of the Armed Forces, would have a contingent enlisted status while continuing as cadets or midshipmen. In the event of separation prior to graduation, these persons would revert to their enlisted status, and be continued in such enlisted status for the remainder of their obligated service.

This legislation is considered necessary due to the actions of certain cadets and midshipmen in recent years, subsequent to the enactment of legislation requiring compulsory military service. Those young men,

having enlisted or having been inducted into one of the Armed Forces, having been appointed as cadets at the Military Academy, as midshipmen at the Naval Academy, as midshipmen in the Naval Reserve or as cadets at the Coast Guard Academy, and having been discharged from enlisted status for the convenience of the Government to accept appointments as cadets or midshipmen, have tendered resignations, had them accepted, and thus have evaded further military service. Under present selective-service regulations, all further military service is avoided in such a situation.

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE

A similar proposal was submitted to the 83d Congress by the Department of the Navy on February 1, 1954, as part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1954. That proposal was introduced as H. R. 7788 and S. 2906. The act of April 1, 1954 (68 Stat. 47) established the United States Air Force Academy and this proposal has been extended to cover cadets of that Academy.

COST AND BUDGET DATA

Enactment of this proposal would result in no increase in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense.

Sincerely yours,

C. S. THOMAS.

S. 800. A bill to repeal the act of January 19, 1929 (ch. 86, 45 Stat. 1090), entitled "An act to limit the date of filing claims for retainer pay."

(The letter accompanying Senate bill 800 is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington, D. C., January 5, 1955.

HON. RICHARD M. NIXON,
President of the Senate,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is forwarded herewith a draft of legislation to repeal the act of January 19, 1929 (ch. 86, 45 Stat. 1090), entitled "An act to limit the date for filing claims for retainer pay."

This proposal is part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1955 and the Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of the Congress. The Department of the Navy has been designated as the representative of the Department of Defense for this legislation. It is recommended that this proposal be enacted by the Congress.

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

The purpose of this legislation is to repeal the act of January 19, 1929 (ch. 86, 45 Stat. 1090). Section 1 of the act related to claims for retainer pay of members of the Naval Reserve Force and the Marine Corps Reserve which accrued prior to July 1, 1925, and is no longer effective. Section 2 of the act established a 3-year statute of limitations on claims for advance payment by assigned members of the Fleet Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve, and on claims for compensation for the performance of drills, equivalent instruction or duty, appropriate duty or for administrative functions, and for uniform gratuity accruing to members of the Naval Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve subsequent to July 1, 1925. Section 3 provides that the provisions of the act shall not apply to certain members of the Fleet Reserve and the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve.

The 3-year statute of limitations on claims by naval and Marine Corps reservists, established by section 2 of the act of January 19, 1929, supra, was enacted at a time when there was no general statute of limitations on the filing of claims in the General Accounting Office. There is no counterpart applicable to claims of reserve personnel of the other armed services or to claims generally. Such claims are subject to the act of October 9, 1940 (ch. 788, 54 Stat. 1061;

31 U. S. C. 71a), which established a general 10-year statute of limitations on the filing of claims with the General Accounting Office.

There appears to be no sound reason why claims of naval and Marine Corps reservists should be subject to a 3-year statute of limitations while all other claims are subject to the 10-year limitation established by the act of October 9, 1940, *supra*. Enactment of this legislation would remove this discrimination and would make all claims subject to the same 10-year statute of limitations.

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCES

This proposal was submitted to the 83d Congress by the Department of the Navy on April 15, 1954, as a part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1954, but was not introduced.

COST AND BUDGET DATA

Enactment of this proposal would result in no increase in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense.

Sincerely yours,

C. S. THOMAS.

S. 801. A bill to provide for the crediting of certain service toward retirement of reserve personnel.

(The letter accompanying Senate bill 801 is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Washington, D. C., January 5, 1955.

HON. RICHARD M. NIXON,

President of the Senate,

United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is forwarded herewith a draft of legislation to provide for the crediting of certain service toward retirement of reserve personnel.

This proposal is part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1955 and the Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of the Congress. The Department of the Navy has been designated as the representative of the Department of Defense for this legislation. It is recommended that this proposal be enacted by the Congress.

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

The purpose of this legislative proposal is to amend the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948 (62 Stat. 1081) so as to permit members of the reserve components of the Armed Forces to receive credit, for purposes of retirement under title III of that act (10 U. S. C. 1036a), for service as an appointed aviation cadet; a nurse; a dietitian or physical therapist appointed in the Medical Department of the Army of the United States under the act of December 22, 1942 (56 Stat. 1072; 10 U. S. C., 81 note). The proposal would also amend section 6 of the act of February 21, 1946 (60 Stat. 27; 34 U. S. C. 410b), so as to permit officers of the Nurse Corps of the Naval Reserve to count for purposes of retirement, upon completion of 20 or more years of active duty, the same type of service which officers of the Nurse Corps of the Regular Navy may count for that purpose.

Under the act of April 15, 1935 (49 Stat. 156), the Navy's original aviation cadet law, candidates were appointed as aviation cadets in the Naval Reserve. Following the completion of their training they remained aviation cadets and performed active duty involving flying for a period of 3 years in that status, at the expiration of which time they were appointed commissioned officers in the Naval Reserve. The period of service performed as appointed aviation cadets may not now be credited under section 302 of the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948, inasmuch as the status of appointed aviation cadet is not mentioned in that section. Since 1942, when the Naval Aviation Cadet Act of 1942 (56 Stat. 737; 34 U. S. C. 850a-850m) was

enacted, aviation cadets of the Naval Reserve have an enlisted status and thus receive credit for the period they serve as aviation cadets. Aviation cadets of the Air Force have always had an enlisted status and thus receive credit for their aviation cadet service. The proposed legislation would permit members of the reserve components who performed active duty as appointed aviation cadets to count that active duty for retirement purposes under title III of the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948.

Under the present wording of section 302 of the Army and Air Force Vitalization and Retirement Equalization Act of 1948, officers of the Reserve components of the Armed Forces who, prior to their appointment as commissioned officers under the Army-Navy Nurses Act of 1947, served on active duty as Regular or Reserve nurses in the Army and Navy, or as dietitians or physical therapists in the Medical Department of the Army, may not count that service for purposes of retirement under title III of that act. Inasmuch as that service is considered active Federal service for retirement purposes for officers of the Regular Army, Navy, and Air Force, it is only equitable that officers of the Reserve components should have like credit for similar service. The proposed legislation would authorize credit for that type of service for officers of the Reserve components.

Section 6 of the act of February 21, 1946 (60 Stat. 27), as amended (34 U. S. C. 410b), permits officers of the Regular Navy or Marine Corps or of the Reserve components thereof to retire, in the discretion of the President, when they have completed more than 20 years of active service, at least 10 years of which has been active commissioned service. Section 207 (h) of the Army-Navy Nurses Act of 1947, as amended (34 U. S. C. 43g (h)), provides the following for officers of the Regular Navy Nurse Corps:

"(h) The number of years' service to be credited to officers of the Navy Nurse Corps in determining their eligibility for voluntary retirement shall be based on the total of all active service either under an appointment or contract or as a commissioned officer in the Nurse Corps of the Army or Navy, or the Reserve components thereof and all active service in the Nurse Corps or the Nurse Corps Reserve abolished by this act, shall, for this purpose only, be regarded as commissioned service in the Navy or the Reserve components thereof, as the case may be."

The proposed legislation would permit officers of the Navy Nurse Corps Reserve to count for voluntary retirement after more than 20 years of active service the same type of service which section 207 (h) of the Army-Navy Nurses Act of 1947 permits officers of the Regular Navy Nurse Corps to count for that purpose.

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCES

A similar legislative proposal was submitted to the 83d Congress as a part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1954 and was introduced as S. 3176. No further action was taken on the bill.

COST AND BUDGET DATA

It is not possible to make any worth while estimate of the fiscal effects of the enactment of this proposed legislation, inasmuch as there is no way to determine how many members of the Reserve components who would be affected by this proposal will eventually qualify for retirement. However, it is considered that the cost will be negligible and can be absorbed in current appropriations.

Sincerely yours,

C. S. THOMAS.

S. 802. A bill to amend the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, to remove the requirement for a final physical examination for inductees who continue on active duty in another status in the Armed Forces.

(The letter accompanying Senate bill 802 is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Washington, D. C.

HON. RICHARD M. NIXON,

President of the Senate.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is forwarded herewith a draft of legislation to amend the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended, to remove the requirement for a final physical examination for inductees who continue on active duty in another status in the Armed Forces.

This proposal is part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1955 and the Bureau of the Budget advised that there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of the Congress. The Department of the Army has been designated as the representative of the Department of Defense for this legislation. It is recommended that this proposal be enacted by the Congress.

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

The proposed amendment to the Universal Military Training and Service Act (62 Stat. 614), as amended (50 U. S. C. App. 459 (a)) is designed to eliminate the necessity for a final physical examination when an inductee under the act continues on active duty in another status, as by enlistment in a Regular component or as a Reserve on active duty in the Armed Forces.

Section 9 (a) of the above act requires that each individual "who is inducted into the Armed Forces under this title for training and service shall be given a physical examination at the beginning of such training and service, and upon the completion of his period of training and service under this title, each such person shall be given another physical examination and, upon his written request, shall be given a statement of physical condition by the Secretary concerned." The necessity for both of these examinations is obvious in the case of the average inductee who serves a period of military duty and then is separated from the service. However, a large number of inductees, after short periods of service, desire to enlist in the Regular components of the Armed Forces or to continue on active duty in a Reserve status. It is necessary, in order to comply with the act cited above, to give these individuals a physical examination before this change in status may be made. Nonetheless, the Armed Forces are not required by law to give a physical examination to a member of a Reserve component who enlists in a Regular component under similar circumstances. Yet physical standards for induction, enlistment, and separation are the same whether the person is an inductee or a member of a Reserve or Regular component. Once the individual is accepted by one of the Armed Forces, the Government assumes certain responsibilities with respect to physical fitness irrespective of the individual's component. If the individual acquires a physical defect of such nature as to make him unfit for continued duty, he is ordinarily separated from the Armed Forces. If the individual acquires a nondisqualifying compensable defect, the Government is liable whether he is an inductee or a member of a Regular or Reserve component. In any event, the individual who changes his status during his service receives a physical examination when he is separated from the Regular service or from active duty in a Reserve status, in accordance with other regulations and laws. Accordingly, in an instance where there is no break in the military service the physical examination which is required for an inductee upon the completion of his period of training and service does not accomplish any useful purpose which is not already provided for in other existing procedures.

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCES

This proposal was submitted to the 83d Congress by the Department of the Army on

March 3, 1954, as a part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1954 and was introduced as H. R. 8277 and S. 3122.

COST AND BUDGET DATA

It is estimated that if this proposal is enacted, it would result in a saving of \$80,000 for the Department of the Army.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT T. STEVENS,
Secretary of the Army.

S. 803. A bill to amend the act of June 19, 1948 (ch. 511, 62 Stat. 489), relating to the retention in the service of disabled commissioned officers and warrant officers of the Army and Air Force.

(The letter accompanying Senate bill 803 is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Washington, D. C., December 23, 1954.

HON. RICHARD M. NIXON,

President of the Senate.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is forwarded herewith a draft of legislation to amend the act of June 19, 1948 (ch. 511, 62 Stat. 489), relating to the retention in the service of disabled commissioned officers and warrant officers of the Army and Air Force.

This proposal is part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1955 and the Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of the Congress. The Department of the Army has been designated as the representative of the Department of Defense for this legislation. It is recommended that this proposal be enacted by the Congress.

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

The act of June 19, 1948 (ch. 511, 62 Stat. 489), provides in substance that disabled officers, warrant officers, and flight officers of the Army and Air Force of the United States without component and who hold no other military status will be retained in service, until their treatment for physical reconstruction has reached a point where they will not be further benefited by retention in the military service. The purpose of this act was to preserve the military status of certain disabled officers, warrant officers, and flight officers, who held no appointment other than a temporary appointment in the Army of the United States, until their treatment for physical reconstruction had reached a point where they would not be further benefited by retention in the military service, notwithstanding that the statutes under which they have received their appointments may be terminated or rendered inoperative.

Subsequent to the enactment of this act, the services have implemented the report to the President from the Committee on Veterans' Medical Services, approved February 3, 1951. The implementation prescribes early transfer to Veterans' Administration facilities and early separation for certain disabled members of the uniformed services. Members affected by the report from the Committee on Veterans' Medical Services may be Regular or Reserve officers. However, officers who hold no appointment other than a temporary appointment in the Army or Air Force of the United States are precluded from such early transfer and separation by reason of the act of June 19, 1948, and this situation creates an inequity in the treatment of disabled officers.

In addition to eliminating the present inequality of treatment of temporary officers as compared to that afforded other officers of the Army and Air Force, the legislative proposal will permit retention in the active service of those Army and Air Force Reserve officers whose 5-year appointments would otherwise expire while undergoing hospitalization and evaluation of their possible entitlement to disability retirement or severance benefits. Until July 8, 1957, the current 5-year appointments of Reserve officers of the Army and Air Force will be expiring. It

is foreseen that in some cases the individuals concerned will, at the time of such termination, be on active duty but undergoing necessary hospitalization or physical evaluation of possible entitlement to disability benefits. It is very possible that some of these officers may, by reason of physical injury or disease, be mentally incompetent to accept the indefinite Reserve appointment.

Under such circumstances the disability benefits provided by the Career Compensation Act and to which the individual would otherwise be entitled would not be payable unless formal determination of such entitlement is made prior to termination of military status. Uncontrollable factors such as the time, the nature, or character of disabilities in such cases could result in loss of benefits. The proposed amendment will authorize retention of such individuals in active service for the purpose of hospitalization and determination of their possible entitlement to disability benefits.

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCES

This proposal was submitted to the Congress by the Department of the Army on December 16, 1953, as a part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1954. It was introduced as H. R. 7332 and S. 2691.

COST AND BUDGET DATA

Enactment of this proposal would result in no increase in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT T. STEVENS,
Secretary of the Army.

S. 804. A bill to amend section 201 (e) of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as amended, to provide for advance payments of certain pay and allowances of members of the uniformed services, and for other purposes.

(The letter accompanying Senate bill 804 is as follows:)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Washington, D. C., December 22, 1954.

HON. RICHARD M. NIXON,

President of the Senate.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is forwarded herewith a draft of legislation to amend section 201 (e) of the Career Compensation Act of 1949, as amended, to provide for advance payments of certain pay and allowances of members of the uniformed services, and for other purposes.

This proposal is part of the Department of Defense legislative program for 1955 and the Bureau of the Budget has advised that there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of the Congress. The Department of the Army has been designated as the representative of the Department of Defense for this legislation. It is recommended that this proposal be enacted by the Congress.

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

This proposed legislation would provide that members of the uniformed services may, incident to release from active duty or training duty, be paid in advance, without regard to the actual performance of travel, pay, and allowances to which they are otherwise entitled for the period required to travel from their last duty station to home.

A similar provision of law was first enacted by the act of March 4, 1923 (42 Stat. 1508), and was carried forward to section 3 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942 (56 Stat. 360), which was repealed by the Career Compensation Act of 1949. However, the Career Compensation Act omitted such provision for advance payments. Section 98 of the National Defense Act (act of June 3, 1916, 39 Stat. 207), now authorizes payment in advance to members of the National Guard participating in encampments, maneuvers, or other exercises.

Payment of advance pay under this proposed legislation could be accomplished by

one voucher at the time the member leaves the post of duty, incident to release from active duty or training duty, without the necessity of follow-up procedures or additional payments and without regard to whether or not the member, so far as pay and allowances are concerned, actually traveled to his home. This procedure would obviate the additional workload on personnel officers in preparing vouchers and also on disbursing officers in computing and paying such vouchers for 2 or 3 days' pay and in many instances only 1 day's pay when such a member is required to wait until he has performed the travel to his home.

LEGISLATIVE REFERENCES

A similar proposal was included in the Department of Defense legislative program for 1954 and was introduced in the 83d Congress in the form of H. R. 8540 and S. 3211. No further action was taken on the bills.

COST AND BUDGET DATA

The enactment of this proposal will cause no apparent increase in the budgetary requirements of the Department of Defense.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT T. STEVENS,
Secretary of the Army.

USE OF AN INFORMATION FILED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTING OFFICERS IN CERTAIN CASES

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to amend sections 3182 and 3183 of title 18 of the United States Code so as to authorize the use of an information filed by a public prosecuting officer for making demands for fugitives from justice. I am introducing this bill at the request of the chief justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 806) to amend sections 3182 and 3183 of title 18 of the United States Code so as to authorize the use of an information filed by a public prosecuting officer for making demands for fugitives from justice, introduced by Mr. LANGER, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

IMPROPER SOLICITATION OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I introduce, for appropriate reference, a bill to provide for exclusion from the mails of matter violating certain State laws dealing with improper solicitations of contributions by charitable organizations and to forbid the payment of money orders therefor. I might say that this bill is introduced as a result of an investigation made by a committee of the senate of the State of New York, which showed that of millions upon millions of dollars collected ostensibly for charitable purposes more than 85 percent of the money collected was used by the persons who did the collecting.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred.

The bill (S. 814) to provide for exclusion from the mails of mail violating certain State laws dealing with improper

solicitations of contributions by charitable organizations and to forbid the payment of money orders therefor, introduced by Mr. LANGER, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION OF CERTAIN ALIENS

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to amend the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952 in a minor respect in order to provide relief from deportation to illegally entered aliens who have served honorably in the Armed Forces of the United States in the Korean conflict, in World War II, or otherwise for a period of 3 years. I ask unanimous consent that a statement on this bill, prepared by me, be printed in the Record.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The bill will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the statement will be printed in the Record.

The bill (S. 846) to authorize the Attorney General to suspend deportation and admit for permanent residence under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act certain aliens who have served honorably in the Armed Forces of the United States, introduced by Mr. LEHMAN, was received, read twice by its title, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

The statement presented by Mr. LEHMAN is as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR LEHMAN

I am today introducing a bill to permit veterans who have served honorably in the Korean conflict in the armed services of the United States but who originally entered the United States illegally to be relieved from deportation and be allowed to remain in the United States at the discretion of the Attorney General.

I am proposing an amendment to that section of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 which provides for suspension of deportation, applying that suspension to a number of veterans who have honorably served the United States but who have remained in the United States in technical defiance of the law. Most of them came over to this country as seamen and jumped ship. They were drafted or enlisted in the armed services and served honorably and in some cases with great distinction, and are now, despite their services and sacrifices in the cause of the United States, being faced with orders of deportation. The present law is so restrictive that no discretion is given to the Attorney General to suspend deportation in these cases. The entire section dealing with suspension of deportation needs to be drastically rewritten in order to be in accord with the traditions of the United States. Legislation is now being drafted which would accomplish this among many other sweeping changes in our present immigration law. However, pending the introduction of this bill and congressional consideration of this overall legislation, I feel that prompt relief should be provided in this restricted group of cases which, according to my information, does not include more than 100 individuals. Some of the cases that have come to me are truly appealing, including some veterans who have received high decorations for bravery and gallantry in Korea and elsewhere.

During their stay in the United States, they have abided by all our laws and have

shown every indication of being good citizens. If they have violated any law, suspension of deportation would not apply.

This legislation would only apply to the following classes of veterans:

(a) Those who have served in World War II.

(b) Those who have served in the combat zone in Korea.

(c) Those who have served for periods aggregating 3 years or more in the armed services of the United States.

They must be certified to have served honorably and to have been honorably separated from the services. It then comes within the discretion of the Attorney General whether to suspend deportation. No such discretionary authority is now vested in him.

HOUSE BILLS REFERRED OR PLACED ON CALENDAR

The following bills were each read twice by their titles, and referred, or placed on the calendar, as indicated:

H. R. 587. A bill to provide that persons serving in the Armed Forces on January 31, 1955, may continue to accrue educational benefits under the Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

H. R. 2010. A bill to amend the act of July 10, 1953, which created the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations; placed on the calendar.

PRINTING OF MANUSCRIPT ENTITLED "OUR CAPITOL" AS A SENATE DOCUMENT

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, during the 83d Congress, the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] requested and received unanimous consent that the manuscript entitled "Our Capitol" be printed as a Senate document, with illustrations.

I am informed that the supply of that document is almost exhausted. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the manuscript, with corrections, and illustrations, be printed as a Senate document of the 84th Congress, and that 15,000 additional copies be printed for the Senate document room. The manuscript is well prepared, and is greatly in demand by all of the offices.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Kentucky? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

TRANSFER OF CERTAIN HOSPITALS AND FACILITIES—DISCHARGE OF A COMMITTEE—REFERENCE OF LETTER

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Armed Services be discharged from the further consideration of a letter from the Secretary of the Army dated December 21, 1954, relating to a bill to authorize the transfer of hospitals and related facilities between the Veterans' Administration and the Department of Defense, and for other purposes, and that the letter be referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RELIEF OF CERTAIN ARMY AND AIR FORCE NURSES—DISCHARGE OF A COMMITTEE—REFERENCE OF LETTER

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Armed Services be discharged from further consideration of a letter from the Secretary of the Air Force, dated January 3, 1955, and addressed to the Vice President, forwarding a draft of legislation to provide for the relief of certain Army and Air Force nurses, and for other purposes, and that the letter be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, where the proposed legislation properly belongs.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Georgia? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

REVOLVING FUND FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF CERTAIN AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES—DISCHARGE OF A COMMITTEE—REFERENCE OF LETTER

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. President, a letter from the Secretary of the Army, dated December 21, 1954, relating to a proposed bill to repeal Public Law 820, 80th Congress, entitled "An act to provide a revolving fund for the purchase of agricultural commodities and raw materials to be processed in occupied areas and sold," was referred to the Committee on Armed Services. I ask that this letter be referred to the Committee on Agriculture and Forestry.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ISSUANCE OF SPECIAL POSTAGE STAMP AS A MEMORIAL TO THE LATE SENATOR TAFT—ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS OF BILL

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, on yesterday, I introduced a bill (S. 783) to provide for the issuance of a special postage stamp in honor of the late Senator Robert A. Taft. It was intended that the bill be introduced on behalf of myself, and the two Senators from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER and Mr. BENDER]. I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed with the names of the Senators from Ohio and myself as cosponsors.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Indiana? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

NOTICE OF HEARINGS ON NOMINATIONS OF PHILIP D. REED AND ERWIN D. CANHAM, TO BE MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. President, the Senate received today the nominations of the following-named persons to be members of the United States Advisory Commission on Information for a term

expiring January 27, 1958, and until their successors have been appointed and qualified: Philip D. Reed, of New York, and Erwin D. Canham, of Massachusetts.

I give notice that these nominations will be considered by the Committee on Foreign Relations at the expiration of 6 days, in accordance with the committee rule.

THE CONSTRUCTIVE WORK OF THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL

Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I was pleased recently to receive a copy of the splendid annual report of the Advertising Council for 1953-54. This 30-page booklet is an impressive demonstration of the vitality and the civic-mindedness of the American free-enterprise system.

As is well stated on page 3 by Mr. Philip L. Graham, publisher of the Washington Post and Times Herald and chairman of the council for 1953-54:

If a demonstration were needed that the social conscience of American business has quickened or that industry now views the public good as indivisible from its own, the history of Advertising Council provides it.

The year of constructive work reflected in this booklet represents an inspiring story to America, and, indeed, to the world, which too often has had a distorted view of American free enterprise.

I ask unanimous consent that a brief statement I have prepared on this subject, along with an appended list of distinguished council participants, may be printed in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement and list were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR WILEY

One of the miracles of America is the role which advertising plays through all media of public expression.

Thanks to the Advertising Council, this great constructive force has been mobilized for a tremendous variety of patriotic and civic programs.

Each year around \$60 million in advertising space and time are contributed to Government campaigns alone by American business through the Advertising Council. In addition, the support of nongovernmental campaigns reaches a value of approximately \$40 million annually.

The Advertising Council utilizes every medium available for public communication and information. This includes: magazines, newspapers, television, car cards, outdoor posters, radio business people, house magazines, and sheet posters.

VARIED PATRIOTIC PROGRAMS

Among its great campaigns during 1953-54 were programs for better schools; an appreciation of the future of America; support of CARE; strengthening of civil defense; aid to community chests; support of the Crusade for Freedom; strengthening of American engineering; fire prevention, including forest-fire protection; strengthening of the Ground Observer Corps; the national-blood program; the Red Cross; encouragement of religion in American life; accident prevention; student-nurse recruitment; United States savings bonds sales; USO-Mail Call.

CONSTITUENT GROUPS

The council has six constituent organizations: The American Association of Advertising Agencies, the Association of National Advertisers, the Bureau of Advertising of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the Magazine Publishers Association, the Na-

tional Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, the Outdoor Advertising Association of America.

OFFICIAL APPRECIATION

We read in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and we hear in other media and forums of American life numerous criticisms from time to time of this or that feature of American business. So, I believe that it is altogether fitting and appropriate that we give praise when it is genuinely due and that we salute this great constructive institution—the Advertising Council.

The fact that the council's invaluable services are recognized and appreciated by our Government is indicated by the outstanding leaders of the executive branch and of the legislative branch, as well, who have participated in Washington conferences of the council or who have had other cordial contact with it.

I wish the Advertising Council well and trust that its members will carry on in their great job in the service of our Nation.

THIS IDEA SPREADS OVERSEAS

The social responsibility of the American free enterprise system is, I believe, one of the most distinguishing characteristics of 20th century America. It is a feature which should be duplicated by other free-enterprise nations throughout the world.

In this connection, may I say this: As ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and as its former chairman, I am particularly impressed with the splendid job which the Advertising Council has performed in such work as its efforts for the Crusade for Freedom.

Moreover, the council idea, I am glad to say, has already gone global. Public service advertising is making headway now in various foreign countries. A right idea such as this cannot help but be of inspiration to freemen everywhere.

DISTINGUISHED EXECUTIVES

The officers, chairmen of board committees and the board of directors of the council represent a blue ribbon list of American industry. No corporation in America or group of corporations could possibly afford to employ men and women with such tremendous and high-compensated talent as the Advertising Council has available, enthusiastically and without pay, for the service of 163 million Americans.

The same is true of its public policy committee representing all phases of American life and of the industries advisory committee.

I append hereto a list of the individuals serving in these various important capacities.

THE ADVERTISING COUNCIL

OFFICERS AND CHAIRMEN OF BOARD COMMITTEES, 1954-55

Stuart Peabody, chairman; Louis N. Brockway, vice chairman; Leo Burnett, vice chairman; John C. Sterling, vice chairman; Theodore S. Repplier, president; Allan M. Wilson, vice president; George P. Ludlam, vice president; Frederic R. Gamble, secretary; Paul B. West, treasurer; Louis N. Brockway, chairman, executive committee; Leo Burnett, chairman, campaigns review committee; Charles G. Mortimer, chairman, finance committee; Harold E. Fellows, chairman, Government relations committee; Chester J. La Roche, chairman, nominating committee; Philip L. Graham, chairman, planning committee; F. Bourne Ruthrauff, chairman, promotion committee; Edwin W. Ebel, chairman, radio and television committee; Henry G. Little, chairman, sponsorship committee.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS, 1954-55

Fred E. Adams, president, G. M. Basford Co.; William R. Baker, Jr., chairman, Benton & Bowles, Inc.; Harold S. Barnes, di-

rector, Bureau of Advertising of the ANPA; Theodore L. Bates, partner, Ted Bates & Co.; Nelson Bond, vice president and director of advertising, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., Inc.; Frank Braucher, president, Magazine Advertising Bureau; Lee H. Bristol, president, Bristol-Myers Co.; Louis N. Brockway, executive vice president, Young & Rubicam, Inc.; C. H. Brower, executive vice president, Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc.; Thomas D'Arcy Brophy, chairman of the board, Kenyon & Eckhardt, Inc.; Leo Burnett, president, Leo Burnett Co., Inc.; William G. Chandler, president, Scripps-Howard Supply Co.; Evans Clark, New York, N. Y.; Fairfax M. Cone, president, Foote, Cone & Belding; Felix W. Coste, vice president, The Coca-Cola Co.; David R. Daniel, publisher, The Hartford Times; Richard E. Deems, vice president and general advertising manager, Hearst Magazines, Inc.; Edwin W. Ebel, director of corporate marketing, General Foods Corp.; Philip J. Everest, vice president of sales and promotion, Transportation Displays, Inc.; Harold E. Fellows, president and chairman, National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters; Bennett H. Fishler, editor and publisher, Herald-News and Sunday News, of Ridgewood, N. J.; Edwin S. Friendly, vice president, New York World-Telegram and Sun; Kerwin H. Fulton, president, Outdoor Advertising, Inc.; Samuel C. Gale, vice president and director of advertising and public service, General Mills, Inc.; Frederic R. Gamble, president, American Association of Advertising Agencies; Edward G. Gerbic, vice president of merchandising and advertising, Johnson & Johnson; Philip L. Graham, publisher, The Washington Post and Times Herald; Robert M. Gray, advertising and sales promotion manager, Esso Standard Oil Co.; Arthur P. Hall, vice president in charge of advertising and public relations, Aluminum Company of America; George W. Healy, editor, New Orleans Times-Picayune; Joseph Katz, president, The Joseph Katz Co.; Robert E. Kintner, president, American Broadcasting Co.; Arthur W. Kohler, vice president and advertising director, Curtis Publishing Co.; Chester J. LaRoche, president, C. J. LaRoche & Co., Inc.; Roy E. Larson, president, Time, Inc.; Henry G. Little, president, Campbell-Ewald Co.; George P. Ludlam, vice president, The Advertising Council; Dean James E. McCarthy, director, Outdoor Advertising Foundation, University of Notre Dame; Howard J. Morgens, vice president in charge of advertising, The Procter & Gamble Co.; Charles G. Mortimer, president, General Foods Corp.; Wesley I. Nunn, advertising manager, Standard Oil Co. (Indiana); Harry O'Mealla, Jr., president, O'Mealla Outdoor Advertising Co.; Thomas F. O'Neill, chairman and president, Mutual Broadcasting System; Stuart Peabody, assistant vice president, The Borden Co.; W. B. Potter, director of advertising, Eastman Kodak Co.; Theodore S. Repplier, president, The Advertising Council; William Reydel, vice president, Cunningham & Walsh, Inc.; Burr L. Robbins, president, General Outdoor Advertising Co.; F. Bourne Ruthrauff, vice president, Ruthrauff & Ryan, Inc.; Myles Standish, chairman of the Board, Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Inc.; Frank Stanton, president, Columbia Broadcasting System; John C. Sterling, publisher, This Week Magazine; J. B. Stewart, treasurer, Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Inc.; Harold B. Thomas, Stamford, Conn.; J. L. Van Volkenburg, president, Columbia Broadcasting System Television Network; H. M. Warren, vice president of advertising and sales promotion, National Carbon Co.; Sylvester L. Weaver, Jr., president, National Broadcasting Co.; Paul B. West, president, Association of National Advertisers; Allan M. Wilson, vice president, The Advertising Council; Albert E. Winger, Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.; Chris J. Witting, president, Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.; James W. Young, senior consultant, J. Walter Thompson Co.

AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS

Advertising Association of the West, Advertising Federation of America, Agricultural Publishers' Association, Associated Business Papers, International Advertising Association, International Affiliation of Sales and Advertising Clubs, National Association of Transportation Advertising, National Editorial Association, National Industrial Advertisers Association, National Retail Dry Goods Association, Newspaper Advertising Executives Association.

CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS

American Association of Advertising Agencies, Association of National Advertisers, Bureau of Advertising of the ANPA, Magazine Publishers Association, National Association of Radio and Television Broadcasters, Outdoor Advertising Association of America.

PUBLIC POLICY COMMITTEE

Chairman, Paul G. Hoffman, chairman, the Studebaker Corp.; vice chairman, Evans Clark, trustee, Twentieth Century Fund; Dr. Sarah Gibson Blanding, president of Vassar College; Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, director, Department of Trusteeship, United Nations; Olive Clapper, publicist; Chester C. Davis; Henry Fleisher, director of publicity, Congress of Industrial Organizations; Clarence Francis, director, General Foods Corp.; Dr. Alan Gregg, vice president, Rockefeller Foundation; Helen Hall, director, Henry Street Settlement; Dr. Lawrence A. Kimpton, chancellor, University of Chicago; A. E. Lyon, executive secretary, Railway Labor Executives' Association; Eugene Meyer, chairman, board of directors, the Washington Post and Times Herald; Dr. William I. Myers, dean, New York State College of Agriculture at Cornell University; Elmo Roper, public-opinion analyst; Boris Shishkin, economist, American Federation of Labor; Dr. George N. Shuster, president, Hunter College; Roger W. Straus, chairman, American Smelting & Refining Co.; Reese H. Taylor, president, Union Oil Co. of California; Dr. Henry M. Wriston, president, Brown University.

INDUSTRIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Chairman: Charles E. Wilson, chairman of the executive committee of the board of directors, W. R. Grace & Co.

Vice chairman: Donald David, dean graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University.

Members: S. C. Allyn, president, the National Cash Register Co.; Bromwell Ault, vice president, Interchemical Corp.; Melvin H. Baker, chairman, National Gypsum Co.; William Balderston, president, Philco Corp.; M. J. Baum, executive vice president, Hickey-Freeman Co.; Lawrence D. Bell, president and general manager, Bell Aircraft Corp.; S. Bruce Black, president, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.; Fred Bohen, president, Meredith Publishing Co.; George P. Brett, Jr., president, the Macmillan Co.; Edward G. Budd, Jr., president, the Budd Co.; Harry A. Bullis, chairman of the board, General Mills, Inc.; M. W. Clement, former chairman of the board, the Pennsylvania Railroad Co.; John S. Coleman, president, Burroughs Adding Machine Co.; John L. Collier, chairman and chief executive officer, the B. F. Goodrich Co.; George H. Coppers, president, National Biscuit Co.; Harlow H. Curtice, president, General Motors Corp.; E. A. Darr, president, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; Leland I. Doan, president, the Dow Chemical Co.; Thomas Drever, chairman, American Steel Foundries; Charles T. Fisher, Jr., president, National Bank of Detroit; Frank M. Folsom, president, Radio Corporation of America; Clarence Francis, director, General Foods Corp.; Joseph G. Griswold, Jr., partner, the Widdicomb Furniture Co.; F. G. Gurley, president, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway System; Charles B. Harding, senior partner, Smith, Barney & Co.; Thomas J. Hargrave, chairman, Eastman Kodak Co.;

Conrad N. Hilton, president, Hilton Hotels; H. E. Humphries, Jr., president, United States Rubber Co.; Roy C. Ingersoll, president, Borg-Warner Corp.; W. A. Johnston, president, Illinois Central Railroad; James S. Knowlson, chairman of the board and president, Stewart-Warner Corp.; Barry T. Leithead, president, Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc.; J. Preston Levis, chairman of the board, Owens-Illinois Glass Co.; Philip Liebmann, president, Liebmann Breweries, Inc.; John A. Logan, president, National Association of Food Chains; George H. Love, president, Pittsburgh Consolidated Coal Co.; J. Spencer Love, chairman of the executive committee, Burlington Mills Corp.; John L. McCaffrey, president, International Harvester Co.; Neil McElroy, president, the Procter & Gamble Co.; J. A. Martino, president, National Lead Co.; Charles G. Mortimer, president, General Foods Corp.; J. J. Nance, president and general manager, Packard Motor Car Co.; J. B. O'Hara, chairman of the Board, Dr. Pepper Co.; Herbert A. Payne, vice president and secretary, the Home Insurance Co.; Charles S. Payson, chairman of the board, Refined Syrups & Sugars, Inc.; Harris Perlstein, president, Pabst Brewing Co.; Gwilym A. Price, president, Westinghouse Electric Corp.; W. A. Roberts, president, Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.; Reuben B. Robertson, chairman of the board, the Champion Paper and Fiber Co.; T. J. Ross, Ivy Lee and T. J. Ross; Gen. Frank R. Schwengel, president, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.; Robert B. Smallwood, president, Thomas J. Lipton, Inc.; J. P. Spang, Jr., president, Gillette Co.; Frederick W. Specht, president, Armour and Co.; Philip Sporn, president, American Gas & Electric Service Corp.; W. A. Stewart, president, American Optical Co.; Charles J. Stilwell, president, the Warner & Swasey Co.; W. C. Stolk, president, American Can Co.; John R. Suman, vice president, Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey); Reese H. Taylor, president, the Union Oil Co. of California; George Van Gorder, president, McKesson & Robbins, Inc.; Robert L. Warren, chairman of the board, Brockway Glass Co., Inc.; James B. Weber, Jr., vice president, the J. L. Hudson Co.; Sidney J. Weinberg, partner, Goldman, Sachs & Co.; C. M. White, president, Republic Steel Corporation; H. Fred Wilkie, director, Distillers Corp.-Seagrams, Ltd. (Canada); Dr. Robert E. Wilson, chairman, Standard Oil Co. (Indiana).

CHAIRMAN OF THE GROUP COMMITTEES

Chairman, business paper advisory committee: Nelson Bond, vice president and director of advertising, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co.

Chairman, house magazine advisory committee: K. C. Pratt, editor, Stet magazine.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business? If not, morning business is concluded.

TRIBUTE TO THE LATE SENATOR
HUGH BUTLER, OF NEBRASKA

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, it is appropriate, I am sure, that my first remarks in this Chamber pay tribute to our former colleague, Hugh Butler.

The esteem in which he was held was noted by many Senators, on both sides of the aisle, at the time of his death last summer. To me, his loss was the loss of a friend in the truest and noblest sense of friendship. I sought his counsel before seeking membership in the House of Representatives in 1938. Through all my years in the House, I valued his contribution to me as a friend, and as a man of keen judgment and great character.

In his private life, Hugh Butler grew in a manner possible only in America. From a humble beginning, he overcame personal handicap, to gain an education and to earn a prominent role in the business and civic life of his community.

As he prospered, he devoted much of his time and wealth to the welfare of others. His church, his college, and many, many others were the recipients of his bounty.

Hugh Butler's life was marked with personal tragedy. Two sons died in childhood; and his devoted wife, Faye, died as he entered his first term in the Senate. He never overcame this grief, but it served to make him always mindful of another's tribulation. He lived selflessly and generously, devoting both his public and private roles to doing for others.

Perhaps the greatest achievement of Hugh Butler was that, despite his many successes, he lived a simple and frugal life. Whenever he paused in his travels over Nebraska he was among friends. He worked diligently for the people of Nebraska because he had a deep affection for them and he knew and understood their problems.

Success in life varies with individual interpretation. But, I am sure, when defined in the abstract, success is measured by one's contribution to others. If this be true, Hugh Butler was eminently successful. His contributions, both material and spiritual, enriched those who knew him, and will make life better for many who will never have known him.

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF
ARMED FORCES TO PROTECT SECURITY OF FORMOSA

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 159) authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories of that area.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD an editorial published in the Washington Post and Times Herald of September 11, 1954, entitled "Questions on Quemoy," and I should particularly like to have the editorial writer of the Washington Post and Times Herald who wrote the editorial in today's Washington Post and Times Herald, entitled "No Preventive War," which I shall also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD following the editorial of September 11, 1954, which starts with the sentence:

The defense of Quemoy is not worth risking world war III.

I would like to have him read the entire editorial, then read the joint resolution now before the Senate, and take note of what he clearly knows was the testimony of the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the intention at the present time to defend the islands immediately off the mainland of China.

I say to the editor of the Washington Post and Times Herald that his previous editorial hits the nail right on the head, and with the Nationalist Chinese on Quemoy, there would be a strong probability that American boys would be sacrificed in the defense of the Nationalist Chinese on that island.

Mr. President, I will stand to the last in this debate in voting against the pending resolution until the preventive war objective in the resolution is stricken by a vote on the Humphrey amendment, or the Senate is given some other opportunity to strike it.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the unanimous consent request?

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post and Times Herald of September 11, 1954]

QUESTIONS ON QUEMOY

The defense of Quemoy is not worth risking world war III. That is precisely what the administration will risk, however, if it insists on becoming a little bit pregnant respecting Quemoy; if it envisages a sort of limited defense through support of Chiang Kai-shek. For if the limited defense should fail, as it would in the face of a determined assault, the warhawks would cry defeat, and there would be intense pressure for a direct American tangle with Communist China.

What are the Communist interests in Quemoy? As parties in a civil war the Communist Chinese are, of course, anxious to capture the pair of islands athwart the port of Amoy, islands from which the Nationalists have staged raids and heckling operations. Undoubtedly, too, there is a larger political significance in the threat to Quemoy. In all probability a protected invasion or threat of invasion is designed to lose more face for the United States in Asia to show that here is a situation which the new SEATO pact cannot cope with.

What is the American interest, as distinct from that of Chiang Kai-shek (which is to use the affair as tinder for world war)? Surely our interest is to avoid the trap the Communists have so carefully baited. There is no question of the defense of Formosa, which has become a firm part of national strategy on which almost all Americans can agree. But Quemoy is not essential to the defense of Formosa. It is highly doubtful, given clear evidence of American determination, that the Communists presently contemplate any serious threat to Formosa, since they lack amphibious forces. Quemoy has no place in the pattern of American strategic outposts going from Japan to Okinawa to the Philippines. It is not important at all, except perhaps for a few intelligence operations and considerations of face. But by the same token the successful defense of an island so close to the mainland and within range of Communist jet aircraft would be costly.

Unquestionably the United States will lose some face if the Communists take Quemoy. But we shall assuredly lose less face if we make a hard decision that Quemoy is not essential; if we persuade Chiang Kai-shek to make a thunderous pronouncement and then pull out, than if we march up the hill and then have to back ignominiously down. American strategy must be based on careful consideration of broad objectives, not on the whims of every passing breeze. One of those objectives must be to make our intention absolutely clear to the Communists—and then stick to them. Since Quemoy is not important to larger world strategy, and since we can't defend it, except at unwarranted

cost and risk, it will be far better not to confuse the issue with reckless talk in the first place.

[From the Washington Post and Times Herald of January 28, 1955]

NO PREVENTIVE WAR

President Eisenhower has given some very necessary reassurance about the Formosa resolution. The purpose of the resolution is to authorize the use of American military forces if necessary in the direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores (as well as in direct self-defense) and the President personally will retain the decision on any other use. This does not meet all the questions raised about the ambiguities in the resolution, but it certainly should dispel most apprehensions that the authorization could be a mask for preventive war. The President has set his face firmly against any such course. He has demonstrated under trying circumstances that he is a man of peace and that he is not stampeded by risky advice. No one can doubt that he takes his responsibility on this point very seriously indeed, and that he would exercise the highest discretion in protecting the national interest.

Aggression and preventive war were, in fact, most unfortunate words to describe the situation feared by critics of the resolution. Unquestionably, the Senators who used this language were motivated by the deepest concern and patriotism. They feared a situation in which this country could be maneuvered—by its own zealots or by Chiang Kai-shek—into using Armed Forces against the Chinese mainland to prevent a Communist strike against, say, Quemoy rather than against Formosa. Such an involvement would be extremely perilous. Even so, such unlikely action in the face of direct provocation would not constitute aggression or preventive war in the usual meaning of those terms. And the broad meaning of the resolution is to emphasize that the United States harbors no aggressive designs against China.

All the same, the questioning has served a useful purpose. It has demonstrated a considerable feeling—to which the administration has responded—that the Quemoy and Matsus, whatever their bargaining value, are not essential to the defense of Formosa and are not worth a war. Mr. Eisenhower now has gone about as far as he can in meeting these criticisms without diluting the resolution. The niceties of judgment cannot in any event be fixed by legislation, and Senator GEORGE is right in calling for prompt passage of the resolution. In the circumstances it is necessary for the country to trust the President's broad understanding in the use of his powers, many of which he has had all along.

The important thing now is for Congress and the country to display unity and restraint, both in the unequivocal determination to protect Formosa against invasion and in the invitation to Communist China to settle differences by peaceful means.

Mr. MORSE subsequently said: Mr. President, previously I asked and obtained unanimous consent to have two editorials printed in the body of the RECORD. I now ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD, immediately following those editorials, a brilliant and penetrating article written by Chalmers M. Roberts, and published in the Washington Post and Times Herald of September 11, 1954. The article is entitled "Question for Ike: War for Quemoy?"

Following the printing of that article, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed an exceedingly thought-provoking article on the entire question of the

Asiatic issue, written by Marquis Childs, and appearing in this morning's issue of the Washington Post and Times Herald.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post and Times Herald of September 11, 1954]

QUESTION FOR IKE: WAR FOR QUEMOY? (By Chalmers M. Roberts)

The Quemoy question which will be before the National Security Council when it meets Sunday in Denver is another test of America's ability to handle its ultradifficult relationships with Red China without increasing the strain between Washington and other non-Communist capitals and without leading to a major war.

For Quemoy is certainly another example of the Communist tactic of divide and conquer, of playing on every division of opinion in the West in order to paralyze our ability to stand together against a common threat.

One would have thought that long before now the NSC and President Eisenhower would have decided whether or not American Armed Forces would be used to aid the Chinese Nationalist defense of Quemoy and the eight other groups of Nationalist-held islands ranged for several hundred miles along Red China's coast. But that appears not to have been the case and so this Government must make a decision under the pressure of the battlefield at Quemoy.

In that respect the Quemoy situation is similar to the almost-but-not-quite American intervention in Indochina last spring. The same arguments are being advanced by some of the same people, essentially to the effect that the United States cannot afford to allow a new Communist victory in Asia on top of Korea and Indochina.

It is hard to make much of a case, militarily speaking, for the risk of a major war with Red China over any or all of the Nationalist-held islands. Indeed, the Nationalists have voluntarily evacuated three sets of islands since Chiang Kai-shek was forced back on Formosa, two sets of them after the Truman order to the 7th Fleet to defend Formosa.

But the past fluidity of Nationalist policy, depending on Communist pressure, would be replaced by a rigid American policy if the NSC and the President should decide to defend Quemoy and the other islands, come what may.

It is not hard to imagine the emotional effect in the United States of the loss of American seamen and airmen in the defense of Quemoy. Already Chiang's planes are attacking the China mainland and the pressure would quickly be great for American planes to join in because Nationalist capabilities are limited. Chiang's raids are themselves enough to invite retaliatory raids on Formosa by the Communists. American air attacks on the China mainland would certainly offer the Communists an excuse in the world's eyes.

Much of the frustration of the Korean war, in American eyes, was due to the political wraps put on our military against air strikes across the Yalu. It obviously would be difficult, in the current supercharged political atmosphere in America about Red China, to limit our forces should the Reds strike at our ships or at Formosa. And this time there would be no United Nations allies to lay a restraining hand on Washington.

The Indochina affair convinced most of the non-Communist world that there is a strong faction in Washington which favors war with Red China, regardless of how strongly the President later opposed the preventive-war idea. It is widely known that Adm. Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then talked of striking at communication lines inside Red China and that the Pentagon was discussing use of A-bombs

around Dien Bien Phu. The Quemoy question renews fears in allied capitals that the United States may now be politically incapable of entering into a limited war and that any involvement with Red China would lead to a major conflict.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is fond of saying that this country should make its intentions clear so there will be no misunderstanding on the other side, as the Republicans contended in the 1952 campaign had not been the case with Korea. But we have not done that in relation to Quemoy and the related islands though we have over Formosa itself.

Now the United States is forced to make a decision which can be attacked one way as appeasement and the other way as recklessness. A Red Chinese misreading of our intentions could lead to miscalculations and military maneuvers which might set off a chain reaction.

The problem thus is likely to be how to prevent the Quemoy question from becoming such a matter of face that neither America nor Red China can appear to back down. The time, unfortunately, is very late.

[From the Washington Post and Times Herald for January 28, 1955]

SENATORS DUBIOUS OVER MILITARY ROLE (By Marquis Childs)

Once President Eisenhower had put before Congress the resolution asking authority for American air and sea forces to defend Formosa, its swift and virtually unanimous acceptance was inevitable. Any public difference would have been fatal to the effort to demonstrate American unity behind the resolve to hold not alone Formosa but those offshore islands essential to the defense of Formosa.

But some Senators, both Republicans and Democrats, are distinctly unhappy over the abruptness with which the problem was dumped in the lap of Congress. This sudden action came when, as these same Senators point out, it should have been apparent for months that American responsibility had to be more closely defined.

Nothing was done until Red China's attack on Tachen Islands made a decision urgent. The Nationalists could not hold those islands without American support. Once the Communists launched their attack, the military commanders on the spot had to know how far their authority extended.

There also are grave doubts both in the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Committees of the consequences of this step. While the President insisted it was a move for peace, some Senators feel it can lead to war of indefinite duration and of unforeseeable magnitude.

The attitude of top air and naval commanders is well known. They have talked in the recent past of the inevitability of a showdown and they want that showdown to come as quickly as possible. From the beginning of his tour of duty as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on appointment by President Eisenhower, Adm. Arthur W. Radford has privately urged measures, including a naval blockade, for undermining the power of the Communist regime in China. He has said that America should press such measures even though it might mean an undeclared war of 50 years' duration.

Only a few days before the President asked Congress to act, Radford returned from a swing around the Far East, which included a visit with Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa, and advocated publicly a blockade of China if all other measures for freeing the 11 American fliers should fail. Radford is believed to have been one of those most influential in determining the language of the message to Congress, with its broad scope and the inspired interpretation that it covers the islands of Quemoy and Matsu immediately off the China coast.

But it can be stated with authority that when the Joint Chiefs testified before the Senators in closed session, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Chief of Staff of the Army, did not modify the view he has held from the beginning of the controversy over Chinese intervention. Ridgway reaffirmed his opinion that to permit American bombers to attack airports and points of concentration on the China mainland is to invite a full-scale Asian war in which American ground forces certainly will be involved sooner rather than later.

This was Ridgway's viewpoint last September when Radford and Gen. Nathan Twining, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, were urging attacks by American bombers on mainland air bases. At that time the President sided with Ridgway, holding in the National Security Council that the risk of war involved was too great.

The Senators who heard the Joint Chiefs on the President's resolution felt that Radford had finally had his way. In Radford's interpretation the military commanders in the Formosa Straits will have authority to determine what islands are vital to the defense of Formosa. Before the committee Ridgway was a lonely figure. Adm. Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, sided with Twining and Radford.

Those Senators who fear an incident, or a series of incidents, that will mean all-out war in Asia have a sense of helplessness before the present situation. They are asking questions for which there seem to be no definite answers. If, for example, there are American casualties as a result of American efforts to help the Nationalist Chinese evacuate the Tachen Islands, will American commanders then have the authority to bomb Chinese airbases and naval centers? And will such bombings not precipitate the kind of war that the President said so earnestly in his message he wishes to avoid?

That, in the view of the doubters, is one of the weaknesses of the President's message. It leaves so many undefined areas. And determined men, who know what they want in relation to China policy, can move into those areas and take over.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, in line with my action of yesterday, I wish to state that I have before me some editorials and articles taken from this morning's newspapers which have a direct bearing on the very important joint resolution now pending before the Senate. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the body of the RECORD, in connection with the pending debate, the following articles:

First, an article entitled "Senator GEORGE'S Speech Hailed as Thrilling Show of Spirit," written by David Lawrence and published in today's issue of the New York Herald Tribune.

Second, an editorial entitled "Formosa 'Redeployment,'" which was published in today's issue of the New York Times.

Third, portions of an article entitled "The 'Old Man' Lays It on the Line," written by Arthur Krock and published in today's issue of the New York Times. The title of the article is a very friendly reference to the distinguished President pro tempore of the Senate [Mr. GEORGE], and I wish to have these portions published in the RECORD, in connection with the pending debate.

Finally, Mr. President, let me state there appears in today's issue of the New York Times the text of an important speech by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, de-

livered in Los Angeles, Calif., before the Los Angeles County Council of the American Legion, on the occasion of the dedication of a monument to General MacArthur in MacArthur Park. I consider the speech to be an important contribution to the pending discussion of our world affairs.

I ask unanimous consent to have all these matters printed at this point in the body of the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles, editorials, and speech were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Herald Tribune of January 28, 1955]

TODAY IN WASHINGTON—SENATOR GEORGE'S SPEECH HAILED AS THRILLING SHOW OF SPIRIT

(By David Lawrence)

WASHINGTON, January 27.—Seldom in the history of the United States Senate has there been an address of statesmanship comparable to that delivered by Senator WALTER GEORGE, of Georgia, Democrat, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, as he upheld President Eisenhower's request for unrestricted authority to use the Armed Forces to defend Formosa and the American defense line in the Far East.

In contrast to the petty quibbles of some of his colleagues and the narrow interpretations which they interjected to hamstring the American Armed Forces if they should be attacked from the small islands off the coast of China, the Georgia Senator made clear in his speech that this is not the time to give the enemy a privileged sanctuary of retreat, as was the case in Korea.

THRILLING EXHIBITION

Such Americanism is a thrilling exhibition of the spirit that has governed the Nation in all its past crises. It was especially stimulating to hear this doctrine from the lips of this Senator—a veteran in experience in foreign affairs—as he cast aside all partisanship and focused on the central issue.

For, instead of leading to a "preventive war"—which is the smokescreen raised against all proper defense measures whenever it suits critics to use that term to break down American firmness—Senator GEORGE showed how the American policy could deter the aggressor, prevent a big war from happening, and insure peace.

"I ask each man here," declared Senator GEORGE, "if the Congress of the United States is willing to withhold its moral support from the President of the United States under these circumstances, what is your alternative? I ask each man what is his alternative?"

This was a challenging point addressed to the restrictions—those who would, in effect, notify the enemy that American ships could be fired on and that the American Congress was unwilling to vote the authority to fire back.

Senator GEORGE's most telling point—and one that was persuasively presented, too, by Senator KNOWLAND, Republican leader, in the previous day's debate—is that nobody knows from what point Formosa might be attacked and that it is imperative to notify the Red Chinese there would be unrestricted retaliation.

The effectiveness of the resolution is that it tells the whole world America not only will defend Formosa but will not hesitate to bomb the approaches within a radius of several hundred miles if such a step becomes necessary to protect American ships and military installations.

The same old cry—which has been heard again and again in instances of appeasement or in episodes in which there has been a fateful hesitation—has been repeated this week in the Senate. It is that the passage of the resolution might bring on war. Risks

are always present in the evolution of international policy, but an unwillingness to make a clear statement of what counterforce will be brought to bear against an attacking force can only lead, as it has many times before, to an outbreak of a major war. The London Daily Mail in an editorial says that such a clear warning as President Eisenhower can give by means of the joint resolution might—if issued before 1914 and 1939—have prevented two world wars.

More and more Members of the Senate have begun to see the joint resolution not as a narrow legalistic instrument of international policy but as a pronouncement on a moral issue—to make the aggressors respect the neutrality of Formosa. For Formosa today has not been given to the regime on the mainland because it has violated international obligations, including a flagrant act of aggression in Korea.

The Chiang Kai-shek Government is still the recognized Government of China so far as the United States is concerned. Under international law, any request for military help from a recognized government is granted in accord with tradition and custom.

REQUIREMENTS MET

So the resolution now before Congress meets all the requirements of international law and at the same time confirms the right of the United States to protect its military position in the Far East. Some people in the Senate have forgotten that it was from Formosa that the Japanese planes launched their attack which caused our defeat in the Philippines in 1942. Had America been able to dominate the air a few hundred miles around Formosa, the surrender at Bataan would never have occurred.

The President has wisely assured Congress that he alone, as Commander in Chief, will make the decision as to when measures of retaliation against an attacking force will be ordered. For it will be within his power to order American forces to repel attack and also to go as far out as necessary in pursuit of enemy planes. Had the United States forces been given that right, they would have won a victory in Korea.

[From the New York Times of January 28, 1955]

FORMOSA "REDEPLOYMENT"

In the discussion of Formosa policy the "redeployment" of Chinese Nationalist forces, to which reference has been repeatedly made, means at this stage the evacuation of the Tachen Island group. As matters stand, the Chinese Nationalist Government has apparently given its consent to such a move and naval and air forces of the United States are in position to make it possible.

This seems on the whole to be a wise decision on both sides. The Tachen group is the least important and least defensible of the offshore islands that are held by the Chinese Nationalists. It is more than 200 miles from Formosa. It is less than 15 miles from the Chinese mainland. It is in a peculiarly exposed position because it lies within close striking distance of two important Chinese Communist airbases in Chekiang Province. It is now established that the Communists have had air control over the islands for some time, in spite of the fact that the Nationalists are still raiding against the recently captured island of Yikiang.

The Nationalist garrison on the Tachens, unlike that on Yikiang, which was a "guerilla" group, is a regular division of the Chinese Nationalist Army, well trained and American-equipped. If the Communists decide that their losses in taking the Tachens by military action are worth the gain, such a garrison can be wiped out. It may be wiser to save it for another day.

This situation is not new. The offshore island positions have always been vulner-

able. How wise it was to hold them, from the beginning, is still an open question. An early Communist attempt to overrun one of them, Quemoy, was beaten off early in the contest with heavy losses, but that situation could not continue indefinitely. These positions were and are at best far from invincible redoubts, close to the enemy. They are valuable as information posts and as part of a warning network. They are not part of a line that requires defense at all costs.

Naturally, the Chinese Nationalists have been reluctant to make any sort of withdrawal move. From 1949 to 1954 they held these outposts without Communist challenge. Their retreat had ended. There was no major loss after that of Hainan. It was good for Nationalist morale to be aware of this fact and to know that there were still close offshore positions that the Communists did not choose to attack.

Positions other than that in the Tachens have also had great value in restricting shipping into Amoy and Foochow. Those positions are still held and they are a factor in the pressure that is being brought to bear on the Peiping regime through economic channels. This does not apply, however, to the Tachen group, whose value was almost entirely that of a forward information post.

That the United States should take naval and air action to cover a retirement from the Tachens is certainly not belligerent or aggressive. It is an action closely linked to the ultimate defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, to which we are pledged, since it involves the preservation of a defense force which can be used elsewhere.

Moreover, while Taipei has strongly protested against any linking of this redeployment to the suggestion of a cease-fire, it should be obvious that the United States is committed to confining, rather than enlarging, any possible hostilities in the Formosa Strait. If the Communists choose to try to interfere with any withdrawal move there will probably be shooting, but it will be of their making, not ours. And such shooting, certainly, is not risking "global war."

Another problem arises in connection with any withdrawal on which nothing definitive has thus far been said. In addition to the military garrison on the Tachens there is a small civilian population. It is probable that most of these civilians would prefer to get to Formosa rather than to take a chance on their fate at the hands of Communist "liberators" of the islands. One contingent, in which children seem to have been in the majority, has been taken off and landed in Taipei. There is, however, no policy as yet in regard to the population as a whole. This, surely, is a matter that can and should be clarified both there and here.

The loss of the Tachens, in the long run, will be less serious than their continued presence as a point at which trouble could and undoubtedly would arise. In this sense their value is less than their handicap. Redeployment can make Formosa stronger. It can also lessen the chances of an explosion. In aiding this move we work for peace.

[From the New York Times of January 28, 1955]

IN THE NATION—THE 'OLD MAN' LAYS IT ON THE LINE

(By Arthur Krock)

WASHINGTON, January 27.—The chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, whose affectionate and reverent soubriquet is "the old man," went at once to the heart of the issue today when he opened the formal Senate debate on the Formosa-Pescadores resolution. "I ask each man," he cried, "what is his alternative?" And with that question Senator GEORGE, of Georgia, also put on the defensive his colleagues who were attacking the resolution and seeking either substantially to amend it or write a substitute.

Shall Congress tell the President, before the world, that whatever the Chinese Reds may do in the meantime he must immobilize the 7th Fleet and the Air Force until the United Nations has negotiated a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait or reported its inability to arrange it? Shall Congress tell the President, before the world, that it can approve a defense of Formosa and the Pescadores only with the proviso that in no circumstances shall he order the United States commanders to adjust the strategy of that defense to developments? Shall Congress, by adopting either position, thus notify the Chinese Reds in advance that if the President finds it essential to give such orders the other policy-activating arm of the American Government is aligned with them in opposition and protest?

These questions are implicit in Senator GEORGE's inquiry. And, because they are, a large majority of his Senate colleagues are certain to answer them in the negative. Even though those who would substantially amend or supplant the resolution deny that the questions arise logically from their positions, and regardless of the skill with which their denials are expounded, the above are the only alternatives save one that can serve as answers to GEORGE's inquiry. And that exception—to abandon Formosa and the Pescadores to an attack by the Chinese Reds—is advocated by no Member of Congress.

THE PRESIDENT'S PLEDGE

Before GEORGE spoke the President dealt squarely with an issue raised by sincere congressional critics of the resolution that has troubled many others outside the Capitol who are equally sincere in raising it. This issue is that approval of the resolution by Congress means approval of that preventive war which they see as the possible consequence of the President's Far Eastern policy. General Eisenhower's statement was that, if the military protection of Formosa and the Pescadores is to expand beyond immediate self-defense or direct defense of the islands, he alone as Commander in Chief will make that decision and give that order—not Chiang Kai-shek or any American military commander. He is irrevocably pledged against preventive war, and to support this concept of the effects of approving the resolution the critics now must either dispute his honor or challenge his military capacity to know what is preventive war and what is not.

Senator MORSE yesterday anticipated Senator GEORGE's inquiry by advocating what he said was an alternative to the resolution. "I know," he said, "one of the arguments or rationalizations being used . . . in justifying following the course of action to which this resolution may lead is that we have to run the calculated risks of war. In answer . . . I plead with my Government and with my people also to show a sufficient determination to run the calculated risks of peace. [These] mean, in my opinion, that we must face the calculated risk of the Red Chinese massing forces in China without striking them unless they actually commit an act of war."

WHAT IS "AN ACT OF WAR"?

But the classification of this as an alternate is itself open to two questions. What will be an act of war in the unforeseeable circumstances? And has the President ever advocated that the United States, alone, strike the Chinese Reds until and unless they commit one? A massing of Red forces on the mainland shore opposite Formosa must, in the light of repeated announcements by Peiping, be evaluated as antecedent to obvious attack on the island. But until and unless the purpose is essentially furthered by assaults on the direct approaches to Formosa, the clear indication is that the President would not define it per se as an act of war.

As Senator GEORGE pointed out today, there is no commonsense, or military sense, or any sense at all in giving advance specifications

to a hostile government of exactly where, and on what manifestations, the line of defense will be drawn against its aggression. Consequently the President will not give them. And if this were not commended by every sensible consideration, the grievous history of the public limitations placed on the United Nations forces in Korea would alone be sufficient to commend it. Should the absence of such specifications make it more difficult for Peiping to make plans, and it will, so much the better for our side.

[From the New York Times of January 28, 1955]

TEXT OF GENERAL MACARTHUR'S TALK IN LOS ANGELES

Your excellency, your honor, Judge Pfaff, Commander Goshaw, and all those present tonight in this distinguished assemblage, seldom in history has living man been honored as this famous community of Los Angeles has honored me today. You have etched in my heart an unforgettable memory of patriotic fervor and national devotion. You have aroused an indelible emotion of gratitude that I am unable to express adequately in words. Yet, the reality of life enables me to apply an appraising perspective; to understand that your action springs not so much from a desire to memorialize a personality as to proclaim a people's adherence to ideals long ago fabricated into the warp and woof of what is called the American way of life. That you have chosen me to symbolize this rich heritage of principles is an honor which makes me feel far greater than any just merit; that my name should stand for the millions of unnamed others whose faith and courage built the immortal way from which was fashioned the true greatness of our country creates within me a feeling of humility far in excess of all possible pride. It makes me revere the stars in our flag far more than any stars on my shoulders.

I am so grateful to all who have wished me birthday greetings. I know such expressions of good will would have brightened the eyes of that gentle Virginia lady, my mother, on this her day. Thank you—thank you in her name again and again—and, as "old soldiers never die," I promise to keep on living as though I expected to live forever. That famous barrack-room ballad apparently counts on us, those old soldiers who have escaped the carnage of the battlefield, to find the fountain of youth. And, indeed, we might if we only understood what the poet said, that youth is not entirely a time of life—it is a state of mind. It is not wholly a matter of ripe cheeks, red lips or supple knees. It is a temper of the will, a quality of the imagination, a vigor of the emotions, a freshness of the deep springs of life. It means a temperamental predominance of courage over timidity, of an appetite for adventure over love of ease. Nobody grows old by merely living a number of years. People grow old only by deserting their ideals. Years may wrinkle the skin, but to give up interest wrinkles the soul. Worry, doubt, self-distrust, fear and despair—these are the long, long years that bow the head and turn the growing spirit back to dust. Whatever your years, there is in every being's heart the love of wonder, the undaunted challenge of events, the unflinching childlike appetite for what next, and the joy and the game of life. You are as young as your faith, as old as your doubt; as young as your self-confidence, as old as your fear; as young as your hope, as old as your despair. In the central place of every heart there is a recording chamber; so long as it receives messages of beauty, hope, cheer and courage, so long are you young. When the wires are all down and your heart is covered with the snows of pessimism and the ice of cynicism, then, and then only are you grown old—and

then, indeed, as the ballad says, you just fade away.

TRACES WAR'S HISTORY

Many in this brilliant audience were my comrades-in-arms in the days of used-to-be. They have known war in all its horror and, as veterans, hope against its recurrence. How, we ask ourselves, did such an institution become so integrated with man's life and civilization? How has it grown to be the most vital factor in our existence? It started in a modest enough way as a sort of gladiatorial method of settling disputes between conflicting tribes. One of the oldest and most classical examples is the biblical story of David and Goliath. Each of the two contesting groups selected its champion. They fought and based upon the outcome an agreement resulted. Then, as time went on, small professional groups known as armies replaced the individual champions. And these groups fought in some obscure corner of the world and victory or defeat was accepted as the basis of an ensuing peace. And from then on, down through the ages, the constant record is an increase in the character and strength of the forces with the rate of increase always accelerating. From a small percentage of the populace it finally engulfed all. It is now the nation in arms.

Within the span of my own life I have witnessed this evolution. At the turn of the century, when I entered the Army, the target was one enemy casualty at the end of a rifle or bayonet or sword. Then came the machine gun designed to kill by the dozen. After that, the heavy artillery raining death upon the hundreds. Then the aerial bomb to strike by the thousands—followed by the atom explosion to reach the hundreds of thousands. Now, electronics and other processes of science have raised the destructive potential to encompass millions. And with restless hands we work feverishly in dark laboratories to find the means to destroy all at one blow.

CITES WAR'S BURDEN

But, this very triumph of scientific annihilation—this very success of invention—has destroyed the possibility of war being a medium of practical settlement of international differences. The enormous destruction to both sides of closely matched opponents makes it impossible for the winner to translate it into anything but his own disaster.

The Second World War, even with its now antiquated armaments, clearly demonstrated that the victor had to bear in large part the very injuries inflicted on his foe. Our own country spent billions of dollars and untold energies to heal the wounds of Germany and Japan. War has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. No longer is it the weapon of adventure whereby a shortcut to international power and wealth—a place in the sun—can be gained. If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess the chance of the winner of a duel—it contains rather the germs of double suicide. Science has clearly outmoded it as a feasible arbiter. The great question is—does this mean that war can now be outlawed from the world? If so, it would mark the greatest advance in civilization since the Sermon on the Mount. It would lift at one stroke the darkest shadow which has engulfed mankind from the beginning. It would not only remove fear and bring security—it would not only create new moral and spiritual values—it would produce an economic wave of prosperity that would raise the world's standard of living beyond anything ever dreamed of by man. The hundreds of billions of dollars now spent in mutual preparedness could conceivably abolish poverty from the face of the globe. It would accomplish even more than this; it would at one stroke reduce the international tensions that seem so insurmountable now to matters of more probable solution. For

instance, the complex problems of German rearmament, of preventive war, of satellite dominance by major powers, of universal military service, of unconscionable taxation, of nuclear development for industry, of freer exchange of goods and people, of foreign aid and, indeed, of all issues involving the application of armed force. It would have equally potent political effects. It would reduce immeasurably the power of leaders of Government and thus render more precarious totalitarian or autocratic rule. The growing and dangerous control by an individual over the masses—the socialistic and paternal trends resulting therefrom—is largely by virtue of his influence to induce war or to maintain peace. Abolish this threat and the position of chief magistrate falls into a more proper civic perspective.

HOLDS WAR BAN POSSIBLE

You will say at once that although the abolition of war has been the dream of man for centuries every proposition to that end has been promptly discarded as impossible and fantastic. Every cynic, every pessimist, every adventurer, every swash-buckler in the world has always disclaimed its feasibility. But that was before the science of the past decade made mass destruction a reality. The argument then was that human character has never reached a theological development which would permit the application of pure idealism. In the last 2,000 years its rate of change has been deplorably slow, compared to that of the arts and sciences. But now the tremendous and present evolution of nuclear and other potentials of destruction has suddenly taken the problem away from its primary consideration as a moral and spiritual question and brought it abreast of scientific realism. It is no longer an ethical equation to be pondered solely by learned philosophers and ecclesiastics but a hard core one for the decision of the masses whose survival is the issue. This is as true of the Soviet side of the world as of the free side—as true behind the Iron Curtain as in front of it. The ordinary people of the world, whether free or slave, are all in agreement on this solution; and this perhaps is the only thing in the world they do agree upon. But it is the most vital and determinate of all. The leaders are the laggards. The disease of power seems to confuse and befuddle them. They have not even approached the basic problem, much less evolved a working formula to implement this public demand. They debate and turmoil over a hundred issues—they bring us to the verge of despair or raise our hopes to Utopian heights over the corollary misunderstandings that stem from the threat of war—but never in the chancelleries of the world or the halls of the United Nations is the real problem raised. Never do they dare to state the bald truth, that the next great advance in the evolution of civilization cannot take place until war is abolished. It may take another cataclysm of destruction to prove to them this simple truth. But, strange as it may seem, it is known now by all common men. It is the one issue upon which both sides can agree, for it is the one issue upon which both sides will profit equally. It is the one issue—and the only decisive one—in which the interests of both are completely parallel. It is the one issue which, if settled, might settle all others.

A MATTER OF PROFIT

Time has shown that agreements between modern nations are generally no longer honored as valid unless both profit therefrom. But both sides can be trusted when both do profit. It becomes then no longer a problem based upon relative integrity. It is now no longer convincing to argue, whether true or not, that we cannot trust the other side—that one maverick can destroy the herd. It would no longer be a matter depending upon trust—the self-interest

of each nation outlawing war would keep it true to itself. And there is no influence so potent and powerful as self-interest. It would not necessarily require international inspection of relative armaments—the public opinion of every part of the world would be the great denominator which would insure the issue—each nation would so profit that it could not fail eventually to comply. This would not, of course, mean the abandonment of all armed forces but it would reduce them to the simpler problems of internal order and international police. It would not mean utopia as one fell stroke, but it would mean that the great roadblock now existing to development of the human race would have been cleared.

The present tensions with their threat of national annihilation are kept alive by two great illusions. The one, a complete belief on the part of the Soviet world that the capitalist countries are preparing to attack them; that sooner or later we intend to strike. And the other, a complete belief on the part of the capitalistic countries that the Soviets are preparing to attack us; that sooner or later they intend to strike. Both are wrong. Each side, so far as the masses are concerned, is equally desirous of peace. For either side war with the other would mean nothing but disaster. Both equally dread it. But the constant acceleration of preparation may well, without specific intent, ultimately produce a spontaneous combustion.

I am sure that every pundit in the world, every cynic and hypocrite, every paid brain-washer, every egotist, every troublemaker, and many others of entirely different mold, will tell you with mockery and ridicule that this can be only a dream—that it is but the vague imaginings of a visionary. But, as David Lloyd George once said in Commons at the crisis of the First World War, "We must go on or we will go under." And the great criticism we can make of the world's leaders is their lack of a plan which will enable us to go on. All they propose merely gravitates around but dares not face the real problem. They increase preparedness by alliances, by distributing resources throughout the world, by feverish activity in developing new and deadlier weapons, by applying conscription in times of peace—all of which is instantly matched by the prospective opponent. We are told that this increases the chances of peace—which is doubtful—and increases the chances of victory if war comes—which would be incontestable if the other side did not increase in like proportion. Actually, the truth is that the relative strengths of the two change little with the years. Action by one is promptly matched by reaction from the other.

LOOKS FOR A PURPOSE

We are told we must go on indefinitely as at present—some say 50 years or more. With what at the end? None say—there is no definite objective. They but pass along to those that follow the search for a final solution. And, at the end, the problem will be exactly the same as that which we face now. Must we live for generations under the killing punishment of accelerating preparedness without an announced final purpose or, as an alternative, suicidal war; and trifle in the meanwhile with corollary and indeterminate theses—such as limitation of armament, restriction on the use of nuclear power, adoption of new legal standards as propounded at Nuremberg—all of which are but palliatives and all of which in varying form have been tried in the past with negligible results? Dangerous doctrines, too, appear—doctrines which might result in actual defeat; such doctrines as a limited war, of enemy sanctuary, of failure to protect our fighting men when captured, of national subversive and sabotage agencies, of a substitute for victory on the battlefield—all in the name of peace. Peace, indeed, can be obtained at least temporarily by any nation if it is prepared to yield its freedom principles. But

peace at any price—peace with appeasement—peace which passes the dreadful finality to future generations—is a peace of sham and shame which can end only in war or slavery.

I recall so vividly this problem when it faced the Japanese in their new constitution. They are realists; and they are the only ones that know by dread experience the fearful effect of mass annihilation. They realize in their limited geographical area, caught up as a sort of no-man's land between two great ideologies, that to engage in another war, whether on the winning or the losing side, would spell the probable doom of their race. And their wise old Prime Minister, Shidehara, came to me and urged that to save themselves they should abolish war as an international instrument. When I agreed, he turned to me and said, "The world will laugh and mock us as impractical visionaries, but a hundred years from now we will be called prophets."

Sooner or later the world, if it is to survive, must reach this decision. The only question is, When? Must we fight again before we learn? When will some great figure in power have sufficient imagination and moral courage to translate this universal wish, which is rapidly becoming a universal necessity, into actuality? We are in a new era. The old methods and solutions no longer suffice. We must have new thoughts, new ideas, new concepts, just as did our venerated forefathers when they faced a new world. We must break out of the straitjacket of the past. There must always be one to lead, and we should be that one. We should now proclaim our readiness to abolish war in concert with the great powers of the world. The result would be magical.

URNS TO FAR EAST

This may sound somewhat academic in view of the acuteness of the situation in the Far East. Strategically, the problem there has developed along classical lines—the familiar case of a concentrated enemy in a central position deployed against scattered allies. Red China, inherently weak in industrial output for modern war but strong in manpower, engaged on three fronts—Korea, Indochina, and in civil war with Nationalist China. Fighting on all three simultaneously meant defeat, but individually the chances were excellent. The hope for victory depended on getting a cease-fire on some fronts so that the full potential of its limited military might could be thrown against the remaining one or ones. That is what has happened and is happening. First was the cessation of the civil-war action by the isolation in the Formosa area, which practically immobilized Nationalist China, one of the allies. Red China then concentrated against Korea and Indochina. But even the double front was too much for its strained resources, so a cease-fire was obtained in Korea. This immobilized the so-called United Nations forces and the South Koreans and left Red China free to concentrate on the third front, Indochina and the French.

Successful there, the Reds now turn back to the old first front located in Formosa. As Napoleon Bonaparte once said: "Give me allies as an enemy so that I can defeat them one by one."

Militarily the situation demonstrates the inherent weakness of the theory of collective security—the chain is no stronger than its weakest link, and what is even more vital—its full power can only be utilized when all links are brought simultaneously into action. The diverse interests of allies always tend toward separation rather than unity.

Whatever betides the ultimate fate of the Far East, and indeed of the world, will not be settled by force of arms. We may all be practically annihilated, but war can no longer be an arbiter of survival.

I cannot close without once more thanking this beautiful city of Los Angeles for its

gracious hospitality. It has been an inspiration to be here, where missions once stood as lonely outposts in the advance of our Christian civilization, but where this great metropolis now stands as a monument to American industry and adventure, a symbolic reminder of Californian strength and fortitude. I hate to leave, but, as I once pledged under very different circumstances, I shall return.

Mr. LEHMAN obtained the floor.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York yield to me for the purpose of suggesting the absence of a quorum, with the understanding that he will not lose his right to the floor?

Mr. LEHMAN. I yield for that purpose and with that understanding.

Mr. MORSE. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, at the outset I should like to say, in order to maintain the continuity of my arguments, I shall not yield during the course of my speech.

The decisions we are about to make have a gravity which cannot and should not be concealed from the American people.

The administration desires on the one hand a clear affirmation of congressional support for a policy of calculated risk—an affirmation designed, we are told, to serve notice upon the Chinese Communists that they must not, at their peril, engage in certain aggressive acts. On the other hand, the administration desires to avoid alarming the American people and our allies in Europe and to reassure them that the policy in question is designed to prevent war, rather than to bring it about.

This is a delicate and difficult undertaking at best. I am not sure it has been well done. For its success requires the highest order of confidence by the American people, and by our allies, in the discretion, skill, and ingenuity of those who today conduct our diplomatic and military affairs. It requires of us all that we have an implicit faith that every one of these officials is passionately attached to the quest for peace.

Each of us must search his own heart, mind, and conscience to determine whether both these conditions are fully met today.

We are told that there is an urgent necessity for the passage of this resolution. Yet at the same time the President told us that, in his opinion, he already has all the legal authority he needs to perform the acts he proposes to perform under the terms of the pending resolution.

If this is so—and I do not for a moment dispute his assertion without knowing in complete detail what acts he contemplates—why the rush, why the haste to pass this resolution?

I have heard, Mr. President, assertions by responsible spokesmen for the administration that this resolution is desired

in order to make clear that the Congress stands behind the President in the policy we are pursuing in the Far East. But it is not clear to me, Mr. President, what that policy consists of.

If that policy consists of the determination to defend Formosa and the Pescadores, I am wholeheartedly for it and I am ready to vote for a resolution which gives congressional sanction to that policy.

But that policy includes other things—things which are suggested and inferred in the resolution and which are to be understood only by reference to the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] and the distinguished Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND] on the floor yesterday.

If the policy the Congress is asked to support in this resolution is the policy of defending the Quemoy Island group and the Matsu Island group and the Tachen Island group, right off the mainland of China, I am not for that part of the policy.

Senator KNOWLAND said on the floor yesterday that this is the policy of the United States and that it has already been arranged for United States air and naval forces to assist Chiang Kai-shek in deploying his forces in that area, and that if our planes and ships were fired on, we would undoubtedly fire back. I, myself, with my vote, would not approve activities by our Armed Forces which would involve us in such a situation.

If the President sees fit, on the basis of his own responsibility, to direct the Armed Forces of the United States to engage in such an operation, it is his responsibility, and what happens thereafter is his responsibility, although he may later need to come to Congress to justify its consequences.

But I am not going to support a congressional sanction for these activities. I repeat that I am glad to support a congressional sanction for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. That is the furthest I want to go.

The language of the resolution itself does not specify what further activities the resolution is designed to authorize beyond the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, but it does contain a blank-check provision, to which I shall refer in a moment.

Certainly I have not been told—and the public has not been told, except by Senator KNOWLAND—what the administration contemplates under the terms of the "blank check" it is proposed we write.

It is for this reason, Mr. President, that I want to study this resolution and all the facts and statements concerning this resolution at much greater length and with much greater care than I have thus far had an opportunity to do.

Mr. President, I am being asked as a Member of the Senate, and as a representative in this body of the 15 million people of New York State, to cast my vote for a proposal which is more important than any other proposition which has come before this body in the 6 years I have been a Member.

Surely a resolution so full of significance for our country, so important to every man, woman, and child in this

country, could well be subjected to even more careful scrutiny—line by line and word by word—than has been possible.

I mean no disrespect to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, which have, I know, studied this resolution as diligently and intensively as was possible under the administration's persistent demands for haste.

I mean no disrespect to the distinguished chairmen of these two great committees who, as I understand, gave every opportunity, under the circumstances, for the questioning of the administration spokesmen on this grave matter.

But I, for one, Mr. President, think that every sentence of this resolution could well have been subjected to days of inquiry, as to its meaning. I would have liked to have heard, from official sources, some explanation of what appear to me to be extraordinary contradictions between, first, what is contained in the resolution; second, what is apparently being told our allies abroad about the meaning of the resolution; and, third, what is being told to journalists in this country for background purposes.

Yesterday the great and distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, our eminent colleague, the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE]—for whom no other Senator has higher respect and regard than I have—argued at great length about the necessity of defending Formosa. I do not believe there is a Member of this body—certainly not I—who differs with Senator GEORGE by one iota in this regard. I am strongly in favor of a resolution, since the President has asked for it, that affirms congressional support for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

I am glad that President Eisenhower was so deeply impressed with the questions which I and some of my colleagues have raised that he saw fit to issue a statement reassuring us that a preventive war was not contemplated under the terms of this resolution, that he would not delegate to any other official the blank-check authority contained in this resolution, and that he alone would make whatever decisions are to be made under this authority.

Mr. President, I have great confidence in the personal integrity and patriotism of President Eisenhower. I appreciate his recognition of the fears that some of us have expressed and his desire to quiet these fears. But he has quitted them only in small measure.

He has not reassured me concerning his intentions with regard to the Quemoy group, and the Matsu group, and the Tachen Island group. He has not indicated to me any reason why the blank-check language should be contained in the resolution. Nor has he explained why there should be no reference to the United Nations in the resolution.

Mr. President, there are many aspects to the pending issue—the issue posed by this resolution, which, I, myself, for lack of expert competence, would not undertake to discuss.

For example, there is the problem of the precedent it establishes involving Congress in responsibility for those

aspects of the conduct of military affairs and foreign relations which the Constitution entrusts to the President. As I have said, I do not propose to enter into that discussion. Others are better qualified than I to debate this matter. However, I cannot help but remark that in this aspect, this resolution seems to be an attempt to satisfy those in the Congress who feel that the Congress, and not the President, should conduct our foreign relations and participate in the military decisions of the President as commander in chief.

But, Mr. President, this aspect of the pending matter, while undoubtedly important, does not, for the moment, concern me so much as does the central question: Does this resolution, in its present form, contribute or detract from the maintenance of peace, security, and free world unity?

Mr. President, I would be false to myself if I did not say that this resolution, in its present form, disturbs, troubles and alarms me greatly.

Some of its language inspires grave doubts—the phrase about the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he (the President) judges to be required or appropriate.

Mr. President, what does that language mean?

What is it, other than a blank check, signed by the Congress, for such action as the President or his military advisers should decide to take—action that can or may easily involve us in war.

Now, if the President feels that certain action is necessary to defend the United States and the interests of the United States—action that is within his constitutional powers—let him take that action. That is his duty and his responsibility. It is then up to him to justify it to the Congress, to the country—and to history.

But why should we in the Congress authorize and sanction such unspecified action in advance? Why should we write and sign this blank check?

Are we justified in the discharge of our duties and responsibilities as Senators, in affixing our name and authority to this sweeping grant of unchecked and unlimited power?

Ours is the responsibility to authorize specific action, and to authorize and to appropriate funds for specific and general activities and to judge, after the fact, whether the President acted in accordance with his powers and responsibilities. Surely our duty is not to sanction in advance unspecified acts which are within the implicit powers and responsibilities of the President.

If this portion of the resolution proposes to give the President powers which he does not now have, I want to know for what I am voting.

If this portion of the resolution merely approves in advance actions which the President already has the power to take, I think it is not only unnecessary but unwise.

And, Mr. President, I am further disturbed by the reference in this resolution to the mutual-defense treaty between the United States and the Repub-

lic of China, meaning Chiang Kai-shek. This treaty has not yet been approved by the Senate. It has, as yet, no force and effect. I, myself, have strong reservations about some aspects of that proposed treaty. Yet here in this resolution, this unratified treaty is cited as partial authority for the action proposed to be taken under the terms of this resolution.

Mr. President, I feel that this is wrong. It is like making an appropriation for an activity not yet authorized, regarding which there is doubt and controversy.

Further, Mr. President, this resolution is silent concerning the implementation of that purpose which many of us have urged and which the President has publicly endorsed, namely, to ask the United Nations to take jurisdiction and to direct a cease-fire as between the Communists and the forces of Chiang Kai-shek.

Mr. President, this resolution, in its present form, authorizes and endorses unilateral action in an area and in a situation which calls, above all, for united action—for action by all peace-loving nations, through the organization established to advance the cause of peace and security—the United Nations.

Whatever the difficulties in securing United Nations action, such action is our best and foremost hope. If the Congress is to act in this matter at all, the Congress surely should call for the intervention of the United Nations and ask that the organization designed for just such situations as this—where the peace and security of the world is threatened—assert the moral and physical authority of mankind.

To do otherwise, for Congress to authorize and endorse simply unilateral action, is to turn our backs on the United Nations and to serve notice that we have lost faith in the United Nations. This is, in my judgment, a tragic error, one of the worst committed by this resolution.

Mr. President, we are truly at the crossroads. In one direction lies the firming up of the possibilities of peace. In the other, lies grave danger for the cause of peace.

Not only can one false step—one rash or reckless action—involve us in a war of terrible magnitude; it can also, Mr. President, involve us in a war in which we could be without allies—stripped, isolated, and alone.

We must take the way that points toward peace. In that direction lies the best hope for uniting not only our country, but the entire free world.

We must frankly recognize that our China policy has not had the support of free mankind. We have been out of step with most of the rest of the world. This is not the time to dispute the absolute rightness or wrongness of our policy. It is surely not the time to try to force a military test of that policy.

We can, however, now try to bring free world support to a portion of that policy—the separation of Formosa and the Pescadores from the China mainland, and the maintenance of the security of Formosa and the Pescadores against Communist aggression.

But this cannot and will not, I fear, be done by extending the mantle of our pro-

tection to the very tidelands of the Chinese mainland.

The Congress cannot and must not take the position—actual or implicit—that American blood will flow, if need be, for the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, on the very doorstep of China proper. Those islands, from time immemorial, have been part of China proper. There is no juridical, legal, or historical basis for separating, alienating, or neutralizing those doorstep islands.

We have a legal and historical justification for intervening in behalf of the security of Formosa and the Pescadores which we and our associated allies wrested from Japan by force of arms, and which had belonged to Japan for half a century.

We have no such justification in the case of Quemoy and Matsu. Nor will the free world credit us with any such justification. We can, if we are unwise, save a few islands and lose the friendship and support of the entire free world.

Yesterday, Mr. President, in the British House of Commons, a sharp and vigorous attack was directed against this resolution and against our China policy by the party of the opposition, the Labor Party. This attack was led by the former Prime Minister of Great Britain the Honorable Clement Attlee. Britain's Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, in answering that attack and in defending the policy of the United States, said that the question of Formosa and the question of the offshore islands—Quemoy and Matsu—are separate issues. Sir Anthony Eden said, and I quote from the report of his remarks as they appeared in the press:

The offshore islands have always been regarded, and are now regarded by us, as part of China.

But the British Government, Anthony Eden said, does not regard Formosa and the Pescadores as part of Red China. He said that his Government does not consider America's defense line to include the offshore islands—presumably the Tachens, Matsu, and the Quemoy group. Anthony Eden interpreted the President's message to the Congress to mean that the United States would not enlarge its defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the Pescadores.

I trust that this interpretation is correct. It does not, however, conform with interpretations that are current in this country.

The President's message and the statements by the Secretary of State, especially those delivered abroad, speak of peace as the purpose of our power efforts, and the purpose of this resolution. But there is language in the measure, and there is language in the resolution, which is ambivalent and ambiguous. The words of peace are intertwined with words which suggest war.

We must clear out this malicious underbrush from the resolution. We must speak boldly, in this resolution, of the United Nations, and of our active desire to have the U. N. order a cease-fire, and of our desire that the President urge, in the U. N., such an action.

We must refer to our responsibility, under the terms of the treaty with

Japan, to defend Formosa and the Pescadores from aggression and attack, just as we have a responsibility to defend the mandated islands and Okinawa from aggression and attack.

Such reference in this resolution, excluding the offshore islands from our defense responsibility, would contribute to peace, to security, and to unity with our allies.

There is a clear implication, both in the message and in the resolution—as I read them—that we will regard any attempt on the part of the Communists to capture islands like Quemoy and Matsu—only a few miles off the port cities of China proper—as preparation for an attack on Formosa.

The President's message even suggests that we might take appropriate military action against the concentration or deployment of Communist forces on the mainland in the event that our military leaders should conclude that such concentrations are designed to facilitate an attack upon Formosa.

I will not undertake to pose as a military expert or strategist, yet it is clear to me that as long as the 7th Fleet is in the Formosa Strait—as long as we maintain forces in Formosa and as long as Chiang Kai-shek maintains forces in a state of readiness in Formosa—the Chinese Communist Government can, with some justification, refer to their forces on the mainland as concentrations designed to defend the mainland.

I recognize, too, Mr. President, that Chinese Communist officials have been issuing brash and provocative statements about their intention of conquering Formosa. But Chiang Kai-shek has been uttering equally provocative statements about reconquering the Chinese mainland, with the help of the United States, of course. And both sides have been engaging in nuisance raids.

This situation calls for a cease-fire order to preserve the peace. It calls for the releasing of Chiang Kai-shek and the leashing of the Chinese Communists by order and action of the United Nations.

Our interest—the interest of the free world and the interest of peace—clearly lies in the direction of maintaining, at this time, the separation of Formosa and the Pescadores from China proper, and the neutralization of Formosa and the Pescadores, with an accompanying guaranty of their security and integrity. Our efforts should be in the direction of obtaining U. N. support and sanction for such a policy.

There have been too many rumbles from military and political circles within the United States about the necessity of a preventive war against the Chinese Communists and the desirability of returning Chiang Kai-shek to power on the Chinese mainland by force of arms. I do not suggest that the President of the United States shares this view. I do not even suggest that this resolution is intended to facilitate this purpose.

I do suggest, however, that there are those in positions of influence in the administration and in the country who would not be averse to a series of events leading in that direction.

I suggest, Mr. President, that there is language in this resolution which lends aid and comfort to such a notion.

It may be the purpose as reported in the press, to keep the Communists guessing.

That is the prerogative, and perhaps even the responsibility, of the President within the limits of his constitutional powers. But I do not see how Congress can be asked to join in such a tactic at the expense of keeping the American people and our allies abroad guessing as to our purpose—whether for peace or for war.

In the extraordinary situation many of us in the Senate face today, being without easy access to official sources of information, even as to the testimony of our own Government officials before the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee, we must sometimes turn to newspaper columnists for our information. I am sure that many of us noted the column written by Mr. Stewart Alsop, an unusually well-informed correspondent, which appeared in the Washington Post and Times Herald of January 26. Mr. Alsop is frequently much better informed about what goes on inside the Government than are we in the Senate.

Mr. Alsop wrote that a definite decision has been taken by the administration to defend Quemoy and Matsu and, in pursuit of this purpose, to bomb the mainland of China. Senator KNOWLAND yesterday suggested almost as much.

If this is true, it would mean retaliation and then all-out war with Red China. If this should be the consequence, I fear that this war would be fought without substantial help from our friends and allies in the free world. This prospect is indeed terrifying.

Mr. President, I hope with all my heart that the Kefauver substitute, of which I am a cosponsor, will prevail, or that the Humphrey amendments, of which I am also a cosponsor, will be adopted. But, Mr. President, if this resolution, without changes, is enacted, I still would pray that we may avoid war.

I would pray, Mr. President, that the reported calculations of Admiral Radford are correct and that the Chinese Communists will, if this resolution is passed, refrain from attacking Quemoy and Matsu. I would pray that the Chinese Communists will indeed refrain from any act that would result in war. And woe unto all of us if Admiral Radford turns out to be wrong. But, Mr. President, I am not ready to place in the hands of this raw and savage regime—the Red regime of China—the responsibility for maintaining peace in the world.

I am not for peace at any price. But peace is precious, and peace has a price that I would be willing to pay. That price is prudence and patience, reasonableness and restraint. That price we can and must pay. Rashness and recklessness are no substitutes for persistence and courage.

We will strike no fire in the hearts of mankind with a crusade to restore Chiang Kai-shek to power in China. We may secure the acceptance of the Chiang

regime as the sovereign authority in Formosa and the Pescadores. But the legions of mankind will not rally to our banners if our purpose is to promote not peace, but Chiang Kai-shek, and if our policy is dictated by a desire to serve not the decent opinion of the leading nations of the free world but the prestige and power of the Chiang regime.

The distinguished Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER] has explained in detail the purpose and provisions of our substitute resolution which amends the pending resolution in a way to quiet the fears and to eliminate the defects I have mentioned here today.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute, of which I am, as I have said, a cosponsor, and a detailed analysis thereof be printed at this point in my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MANSFIELD in the chair). Is there objection?

There being no objection, the amendment in the nature of a substitute and the analysis thereof were ordered to be Printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace, and in conformity with that purpose has undertaken as a member of the United Nations to be ready to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered; and

Whereas the treaty of peace between the Allied Powers and Japan, signed September 8, 1951, under which Japan renounced all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, did not specify the ultimate disposition of such islands; and

Whereas the United States has recognized and assumed a responsibility for the peace and security of Formosa and the Pescadores pending definitive settlement of their future status, and pending such settlement has recognized the jurisdiction of the Republic of China over these islands; and

Whereas in China or certain areas thereof there is armed conflict between the Republic of China and the Chinese Communists, and the Chinese Communists are threatening to extend that conflict and endanger international peace by armed attacks on Formosa and the Pescadores; and

Whereas the situation is one appropriate for action by the United Nations for the purpose of ending the present hostilities off the coast of China and their threatened extension in the Formosan Straits which clearly endanger international peace and threaten seriously to dislocate the existing, if unstable, balance of moral, economic, political, and military power upon which the peace of the Pacific depends; and

Whereas the United States would welcome intervention by the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities off the coast of China and in the Formosan Straits, and it is in the interest of the United States and of world peace to facilitate efforts toward peaceful settlement, including a definitive settlement of the future status of Formosa and the Pescadores in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter; and

Whereas pending action by the United Nations the United States has a responsibility to protect and defend the peace and security of Formosa and the Pescadores from armed attack since the peace and security of these islands are essential to the peace and security of the United States and other nations with vital interests in the West Pacific: Therefore be it

Resolved, etc., That it is the sense of the Congress—in light of the above-described situation and so long as it continues, pending effective action by the United Nations to maintain peace and security in the Formosan Straits and the waters surrounding Formosa and the Pescadores—the President has authority to employ the Armed Forces of the United States if and as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of defending and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores from armed attack. Such authority would include the taking of such other measures consistent with international law and our obligations under the United Nations Charter as he judges necessary or appropriate militarily in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

ANALYSIS OF THE KEFAUVER AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE

1. It avoids reference to the unratified defense treaty and other language which recognizes Formosa and the Pescadores as a part of China.

2. It avoids the assumption that the present Communist attacks or threatened attacks on the offshore islands are in aid and preparation for armed attacks on Formosa. This is not necessarily true. At least the Congress is not in a position so to aver and thereby to sanction in advance armed retaliation for any armed attack on the offshore islands. We must guard against becoming involved in a large-scale war, not in defense of Formosa and the Pescadores but in defense of the offshore islands.

3. It defines and explains United States responsibility for the peace and security of Formosa as a result of World War II and describes a basis for action by the President in fulfillment of that responsibility pending U. N. action.

4. It makes clear that the purpose of the United States in committing itself to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores is to keep these areas from being involved in the Chinese civil war.

5. It makes clear that we welcome U. N. intervention and respect our obligations under the charter.

6. The revised language making clear the preexisting responsibility of the United States as a consequence of the war against Japan, for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, makes it possible for the Congress to recognize and affirm the authority of the President to act rather than to purport to authorize the President to act in a field which is the primary if not exclusive responsibility of the President.

7. Reference in the administration proposal securing related positions and territories as necessary to the defense of Formosa is unwise. This reference implies that the offshore islands are necessary to the defense of Formosa. As already stated, this is not necessarily true; to say so gravely increases the risks of war. If it be true it is a military judgment for which the President and not the Congress must take the responsibility. If the President decides that intervention in case of attack against an offshore island is necessary for the defense of Formosa, he can so declare and act accordingly. The inclusion of specific language suggests that the Congress thinks such intervention may be necessary and, in light of the imminent danger of war from such intervention, Congress should not so suggest. Many things may happen before Red China can prepare an all-out attack against Formosa. But hasty intervention to protect the offshore islands may precipitate war much more quickly than is generally realized, and when we are ill-prepared psychologically as well as militarily for it. Moreover, we may in time again free world support for the defense of Formosa but not for defense of the offshore islands. Serving due notice that we will defend Formosa may deter or at least

postpone war. Serving due notice that we will defend the offshore islands is more likely to precipitate than to deter or long defer war. If we are bluffing about the offshore islands, we will lose much more face than need be when our bluff is called, as it is likely to be.

If war comes, not from the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, which can be divorced from the Chinese civil war, but from the defense of the offshore islands like Quemoy and Matsu, which cannot be divorced from the Chinese civil war, we may be without friends and allies in the free world. The defense of the offshore islands necessarily involving us in China's civil war is in its nature calculated to precipitate war with China rather than to forestall armed attack on Formosa. We cannot convince the world that the Communist attacks on the offshore islands are primarily designed in preparation for armed attacks on Formosa. The offshore islands are in truth more necessary to the defense of the mainland than they are to the defense of Formosa. Quemoy and Matsu are nearly as difficult to separate from the mainland as Staten Island. They are as close to the mainland as Alexandria is to the 14th Street Bridge in Washington.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I hope that the proposed substitute resolution will prevail. I think that it will accomplish all our national purposes—all the clear, specified, and constructive purposes expressed by President Eisenhower.

I hope that if the proposed substitute does not prevail, the amendments proposed by the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], and myself will prevail.

This is the way to assure peace and security in the Far East. We must seek no other course.

Mr. HUMPHREY obtained the floor.

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield to permit me to make a very brief statement?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the distinguished Senator from Georgia without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered; and the senior Senator from Georgia may proceed.

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. President, I have no desire to take the Senator from Minnesota off the floor, and my announcement shall be brief. However, I think it is an announcement that should now be made.

First. It is hoped, and there is some substantial ground to believe, that the consummation of the resolution will have a deterrent effect upon the Chinese Communists, who are building up positions of strength, from which they might be more tempted to strike if the resolution were still pending than if the resolution were passed.

Second. The Republic of China is holding military planning in suspense until the United States position is made clear by this resolution. That means that the build-ups by the Chinese Communists are not, while matters are thus in suspense, being matched by corresponding dispositions on the part of the Republic of China.

But the important reason, Mr. President, and the one which I should like especially to bring to the attention of the Senate, is the fact that the debate

on the question in the Security Council of the United Nations is expected to start on Monday at noon. An effort will be made immediately to sponsor such a motion, according to my information, by the representatives of New Zealand and others; but the debate in the Security Council of the United Nations is due to start on Monday. It is therefore important that at the beginning of that debate there should be a position of strength, and not of vacillation, on the part of the United States.

Mr. President, I have made my statement largely as an announcement. I thank the Senator from Minnesota for yielding.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield me half a minute so that I may comment on the statement of the Senator from Georgia, without the Senator from Minnesota losing the right to the floor?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from Oregon for that purpose.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to say I completely agree with the Senator from Georgia that we should proceed to close the debate on the resolution just as rapidly as the speeches can be completed. I think the points which have been brought out are so important that the Senate should remain in session for as many hours into the night as may be necessary in order that a vote may be taken on the resolution. I think it can be done.

I am very happy to join with the Senator from Georgia in urging early action on the resolution. I am glad to say that, Mr. President, because, for some unexplainable reason, there seems to be a rumor abroad that the senior Senator from Oregon seeks to prolong the debate on this matter for such length of time that it may take on the characteristic of a filibuster. There is not a bit of truth in that false charge made against the senior Senator from Oregon. In fact, I plan to make only one more speech, and a short one, on the resolution, by way of summarizing my answer on two points made yesterday in the speech of the Senator from Georgia.

The first point was that the language of the proposal of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] is language of limitation. Saying so does not make it so. As a matter of law, it is not, as I shall show when I discuss the matter this afternoon.

I also propose to answer the Senator from Georgia with respect to an alternative, because there is an alternative, and the provisions of the resolution do not offer, in my judgment, the possibilities of an alternative.

The third point I should like to make is that the proposed language grants power to the President of the United States, no matter how strenuously the Senator from Georgia may maintain to the contrary, to make a strike against the mainland of China, if he so decides to do it before an act of war is committed against the United States.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I wish first to state that as one Member of the Senate it is my hope and desire that, as has been suggested by the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from Oregon, the debate on the joint resolution will be brought to a conclusion as expeditiously as possible, provided that the Members of the Senate who have views to express upon this all-important resolution have an opportunity to express them. I think this debate should come to a conclusion with a resolution of the points some of us have raised and we should agree on language which would signify to the world, to our friends and enemies alike, as well as to those who are not yet committed, the position of our Government, not only the position of our President but the position of the legislative branch of the Government of the United States.

We are faced with a momentous decision, as was described by one of the most able and distinguished officials of the Armed Forces of this Nation in the joint meetings of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services. I think it is fair to say that the Congress of the United States has seldom before, in the history of the Republic, been called upon to make a decision of such great importance as the one it is about to make.

Of course, the Congress has previously been called upon to declare war, or at least to meet the open hostility of an enemy, but that declaration has come after the fact of an attack. I think it is fair to say that we have never before in our history experienced a comparable situation to that which the people of the United States and the people of the world have faced in the postwar years.

We are confronted with a new form or type of adversary, not the old type represented by aristocratic and bourbon systems, but a new type, an international conspiracy, a world conspiracy, which does not abide or live by the rules of international law or of normal conduct between nations. Therefore, it is understandable that we should be faced with an entirely new legislative question, so to speak, and that Congress should be called upon to share in the responsibility of decisions in a manner in which other Congresses have not been called upon to do.

I say to my colleagues these are different days, and we are confronted with a different type of enemy. We are confronted with a kind of treachery, conspiracy, aggression, diversion, infiltration, and the possibility of attack which the people of no other age ever faced. If we will think clearly in the beginning, perhaps we shall better understand the problem we have to face. To be sure, it would be much easier for the Members of Congress if the President alone were to make these decisions. I might say very candidly it is my opinion that the President has the constitutional authority to take whatever action is necessary in the defense of the vital interests of the United States; but, more important, I believe the time has come, in view of the world situation we face, when those of us who are the elected representatives of the people of our respective districts

and States must share the burden of responsibility, not merely of voting money for defense, not merely of passing laws for selective service, not merely of proceeding in terms of overall discussions in the light of so-called briefings by our department heads, but actually of getting down to the hard, arduous, and difficult task of saying that we either join in or reject a policy, which could affect the life of this Nation for time untold.

I wish to say here and now that I do not shrink from doing my duty, and I do not in any way feel constrained or compelled to refrain from publicly expressing my views on this matter. I would be less than candid if I did not say that the 3 days at the beginning of this week—Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday—were among the most difficult ones of my life, and I think they have been difficult days for every Member of the Senate and every Member of the House of Representatives, particularly those who sat in the hearings, where we listened to the testimony of the Secretary of State and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chiefs of Staff of the respective services, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. I can say to those who are within the range of my voice today that I do not recall one smile or one note of jest. It was serious business—serious to the point of literally making one tremble with the responsibilities of the decision which had to be made.

Now I wish to review very briefly the overtones and the overall views which were expressed in those committee hearings. Every Member of the Senate should read the record made there. It is must reading. I honestly believe that no Member of the Senate can really feel secure in his decision without reading that testimony. I think I am correct when I say that the testimony is open and available to every Member of the Senate. It would be well for every Member of the Senate to read what the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, had to say in support of the joint resolution. It is particularly important that Senators read what Admiral Radford had to say; and it is equally important, if not more important, that they read what General Ridgway had to say.

One of the reasons why I advanced my amendment in the committee, in an attempt to restrict the joint resolution—at least, by the intent of the amendment—to the immediate and the direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores Islands, which has been and was until Sunday, last, the policy of the United States, was the testimony of General Ridgway. I suggested the amendment because of what I heard, not because of what I dreamed, and because of what I believe to be the very difficult assignments our forces would be called upon to accept if we went further than the immediate and direct defense of the island of Formosa and the islands of the Pescadores group.

On the committee there are those who disagreed, obviously; but I do not think the disagreement was as to whether the so-called offshore islands of Quemoy and

Matsu are points which are vital and essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. I think the disagreement came just as a matter of what one might call psychology, namely, whether we should in any way, by joint resolution of Congress, implicitly or explicitly restrict or restrain, by congressional enactment, the authority of the President of the United States to use the Armed Forces of the Nation as he deems necessary.

My objection to the language of the joint resolution is that by including the words "the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores," we would perhaps be undertaking an additional responsibility which, in my opinion, as one member of the committee and as one Member of the Senate, is a commitment we should not undertake and one which we might have a very grave and difficult time fulfilling. I point out that those words were not merely "the protection of such related positions"—in other words, not merely to see to it that in case there was an attack upon Quemoy Island, 6 or 7 miles from the coastline of China, we would send planes to help the Chinese Nationalist defenders. That is not what the joint resolution says. It also says that we shall secure that island—and here are the words "for the specific purpose of securing and protecting"—when Congress directs "the securing and protection of such related positions and territories."

So by those words Congress would perhaps be directing, by an act of Congress, and would perhaps be committing the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the Nation, as a matter of national policy—not as a matter of military strategy—to use the forces of the United States to secure the island of Quemoy and the island of Matsu, as objectives in themselves.

I say that is not a matter for legislative determination or joint resolution. It may be entirely necessary for the Commander in Chief or the officers in charge in the theater of military operations to use our ships or our planes, or both to help in the defense of the island of Quemoy. But to authorize, by joint resolution, the securing of such an island may mean what was testified to in the Senate committee, namely, the landing of American forces upon that island. I submit that the burden of proof as to the essentiality of that island for the defense of Formosa rests upon those who ask for this authority. I further submit there is not before the Senate committee one iota of evidence to show that Quemoy and Matsu are essential for the defense of Formosa. They are helpful, but they are not essential.

What is the risk involved? It is simply the taking of American forces that much closer to the area of the Chinese mainland, with the possibility of entrapment and the possibility of a military debacle in a restricted area, and the possibility of furtherance of the war on the Chinese mainland.

I think the record should be clear that I do not recall that any officer of our Government or any officer of the Armed Forces has suggested that it would be desirable to have warfare on the Chinese mainland. I want the record clear on that point, so that no Senator will presume that there were those who testified before the two committees that it was, within their belief, the pattern or the plan of the Government of the United States to advance to the mainland. I think it is clear that it was not the plan. I think it is clear that it was hoped that it would not be necessary. And I think it is also clear that all parties realize the tremendous burden which that would place upon this Nation, and even the possibility of an unsuccessful military activity.

Mr. President, what is the difference between Formosa and the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, for example? We happen to have some allies in this great world struggle. We have some allies who have stood with us throughout the years. One of those allies and, to my mind, the best one we have, or, I should say, one that is firm, strong, and competent, is Great Britain. At times, we have our problems with the British, on matters of policy. But when the chips are down, as the saying goes, the British come through. Again and again they have demonstrated their capacity for resistance, their capacity for strength, their diplomatic knowledge and strategy, and their competence as world leaders.

Anthony Eden, when speaking in the House of Parliament, had this to say:

Formosa in this whole century has never been a part of China. The offshore islands are regarded by us as part of China, and we must be careful to draw a distinction between them and Formosa.

His statement, according to the wire service, implied that Britain was not challenging Red China's claim to such coastal islands as the Tachen and Matsu chain, about 200 miles north of Formosa.

Eden said the first concern of the British Government—

is to stop the fighting. We have therefore continued to urge on all concerned the importance of doing this and of preventing a wider conflagration. . . . The British Government are convinced that the object of the United States administration has also been to reduce the risks of any extension of the fighting.

Mr. President, what I am trying to point out, in further reference to Mr. Eden's comment, is how he differentiates between the Pescadores and the offshore-islands group.

Mr. Eden had this to say:

Eden stressed that the British Government is in constant touch with the United States on this problem. Referring to President Eisenhower's request to the Congress to authorize him to use United States forces to defend Formosa and the Pescadores and related localities, Eden said:

"The British Commonwealth are convinced that the object of the United States administration has been to reduce the risks of extension of the fighting."

Then he goes on to point out that in the eyes of the British Government the offshore islands, particularly Quemoy and the Tachen group, are considered

to be a part of the Chinese mainland, and that Formosa is considered to be separate and distinct, and therefore not involved in the so-called civil war.

I ask my colleagues to look at the map. The island of Taiwan, or Formosa, as has been related during the course of this debate, was at one time a territory of Japan. Prior to that it was a territory of China, with very loose control over it. This island was ceded by Japan, and claims to it were relinquished by Japan following the Japanese Peace Treaty.

To this very hour the legal position of Formosa with respect to jurisdiction has not been determined; but, so far as Quemoy, the Matsu islands, and the so-called northern chain of the Tachen group are concerned, our best allies recognize them as being involved in the Chinese civil war, as a part of the Chinese mainland.

We may have a different point of view. We may say that that is not true, that they are not involved in the Chinese civil war, that they are not a part of the Chinese mainland. But I submit that a nation which is our No. 1 ally says that they are.

The fact of our evacuation of Chinese Nationalists from the Tachen group indicated for all practical purposes that those islands are involved in the so-called Chinese civil war, between the Communist government on the mainland and the Nationalist government on Formosa, and therefore are subject to separate treatment.

The junior Senator from Minnesota believes, and has believed for a long time, that we should confine our military operations and defensive operations directly and immediately to the island of Formosa and the so-called island group of the Pescadores.

Yesterday I listened attentively to the comments of the able and distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE]. I wish to say for the RECORD that I consider his speech historic. It was delivered by a statesman who is second to none in his devotion to his country and to the purposes of this Republic. It was a clarifying speech, a speech which I think will help us to preserve the peace.

In that speech the Senator from Georgia not only brought to our attention his own views as to the purposes of the joint resolution—and those views represent not merely his personal views, but his views as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations—but he also called attention to the statement which was released at the White House by President Eisenhower yesterday. I shall not spend time on that statement, because it was discussed at length yesterday, but in that statement from the White House it was said:

The President made it clear that these (United States) forces were designed purely for defensive purposes and that any decision to use United States forces other than in immediate self-defense or in direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores would be a decision which he would take and the responsibility for which he has not delegated.

Why did the President make that statement? I will tell the Senate why.

It was because of the hearings. The President of the United States need not have made any statement, if the resolution were crystal clear as to its purposes. The President made that statement not merely because of speeches on the floor of the Senate, but because of the testimony of his own Chiefs of Staff and the interrogations in the joint hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations. The President wanted to make it clear to the American people that Chiang Kai-shek, our ally in Formosa, was not to be the theater commander. He wanted to make it clear that he, as President of the United States, would take full responsibility not only for the political decisions, but for the military decisions which were to be made there.

I think it should be told to the Senate and to the American people that there was considerable discussion and considerable concern as to just who would be the leader, the commander, the man in charge of all military and political decisions which were necessary in the area around Formosa and the Formosa Strait. The President has now made it clear that he does not delegate that authority. The President has made it clear that while we may go to the defense of Formosa, we do not intend to allow any other person to direct the forces of the United States, to call the strategy, or to deploy the military forces of this country.

I think this is all to the President's credit. I think his statement should serve to quiet a number of the fears of Members of the Senate and the public. I am convinced that a large group of the American public justifiably believes that the one aim and ambition of the Nationalist Government on Formosa has been—and it has been so stated—the retaking of the mainland of China. I think everyone should know that no reasonably competent military officer of this Government has testified otherwise than that to retake the mainland of China would require American forces.

Let the record be clear. The time for plain talk has arrived. For the past 6 or 7 years we have been hearing the story of the ability and capacity of the Generalissimo on Formosa to retake the mainland. That story is a myth, pure and simple. There is no more possibility of that happening without American aid than there is of flying to the moon this afternoon. For far too long a time we have been led by some propagandists in this country to believe in the myth of the military, political, and economic capacity of the forces upon Formosa to retake the mainland. I regret to say that too many policies have been based upon that illusion. If the mainland is ever to be retaken, it will be retaken with American power, American manhood, American blood, American money, and American armament. The President is assuring the Congress, by his decisions, that no one is to lead us into that trap.

I respectfully submit that I appreciate that assurance. I respectfully submit that such assurance is long overdue. Let the record be clear. While I did not vote in committee as did the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], the record is there for all to see. He justifiably

pointed out that under the terms of the joint resolution it would be possible, within the legal framework of the joint resolution, to strike at the mainland. There can be no doubt about that.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. The power is still there, notwithstanding the White House release of yesterday, is it not?

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is correct.

I do not seek to join issue with the Senator from Oregon. I respect his judgment. I think he knows that it is basically my intention to support the joint resolution. I would appreciate the opportunity to have the language clarified so that it would be specific and precise. I shall vote for the Kefauver substitute because I think it is more desirable; but in the final analysis I shall explain my reason for ultimate support of the resolution.

So far as the joint resolution is concerned, we are finally driven to the point of having to place faith and confidence somewhere. In the area of emergency foreign policy, in the area of emergency defense and security, ultimately, regardless of whether we agree with the President or not, he is the final source of decision and authority.

We must put our trust and confidence somewhere. I grant, when the President comes to Congress with a resolution and asks not only for our consent but for our advice also, we are thoroughly within our rights, once that request has been made of Congress, to do with the resolution whatever we wish to do with it, in line with the security interests of the United States.

What I have said goes back to a statement which was made by the distinguished senior Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] on the floor of the Senate on Wednesday of this week. I shall not read the statement in full, or even quote from it extensively. It is found in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of Wednesday, January 26.

In that statement the senior Senator from Maine made it quite clear that what had actually happened was that the President had sent to Congress a resolution as a statement of policy and, as the Senator from Maine put it, we had no choice in the matter.

Some discussion followed the remarks of the Senator from Maine as to the difference between the pending resolution and a treaty. In a treaty the Senate is asked to give its advice and consent after the negotiations leading to the treaty have been concluded. It is a request after the fact. In this instance an effort was made to indicate that we were asked to give our consent before the fact. I regret to say that in this respect the resolution is almost identically the same as a treaty. However, in a treaty we have a right to add reservations. In a treaty we have a right to call upon our Government to add certain protocols and certain restrictions, as the Secretary of State did recently in connection with the new Formosa treaty, by an exchange of letters between

him and the Foreign Office of the Chinese Nationalist Republic.

To be told in this instance that we cannot in any way modify the resolution, to say that in this instance we cannot even so much as tinker with one word in the resolution, is to deny Congress anything but the right to be a complete rubber stamp. It is not a matter of advice and consent, but merely a matter of consent. I submit that under the constitutional processes of our Government that is an erroneous position to take. In the Constitution itself we find the words "advice and consent" not merely the word "consent."

Regretfully I say—and I say it with all respect—what happened was that once the decision had been reached to send the resolution to Congress, the resolution was not sent up in a cloak of anonymity or secrecy for general discussion, but was sent to Congress in the final words.

The resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services. What is even more important, however, is that it was announced to the world as a public policy on the part of the Government of the United States by the President and the Secretary of State.

In that sense, the senior Senator from Maine [Mrs. SMITH] was correct in saying that once the President has announced the policy to the world, in his capacity as Commander in Chief and principal spokesman of this Nation in foreign affairs, it becomes exceedingly difficult to modify the resolution or in any way to change it.

The President's statement of yesterday should have told us what he was really asking for in the resolution, namely, the immediate and direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. If that is what is wanted, it is available under an amendment which is at the desk. My amendment is designed to clarify his intent.

I know of no Senator who desires to do less than to provide an all-out defense for Formosa and the Pescadores. I hope the record will be manifestly clear to every person throughout the country and the world that I know of not one soul I have talked to in Congress who does not feel that we should commit this Nation, as it has been committed since 1950, and even before then, to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point for a question?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield for a question.

Mr. MORSE. Does not the Senator from Minnesota agree with me that even those of us who have been asking for modification in the resolution, because we believe its language is too broad, have made clear time and time again in the debate that we are in favor of the complete defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, but that we simply do not go along with a program which might involve us in the defense of the Quemoy and Matsu Islands and in that way risk the loss of American life in the defense of the Nationalist Chinese on those islands?

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is the view of the Senator from Minnesota that the language in the resolution pertaining to "such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands" possibly commits Congress to a position which goes far beyond the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

I wish to be as honest as it is humanly possible to be, and I now say that the President of the United States, under his powers as Commander in Chief, if he thought the vital interest of the military personnel of this Government on the island of Quemoy, for example, required the use of airpower in a sortie or attack, I suppose he could use it. However, I say that when we have before us a resolution in which Congress stipulates, or states, that these other areas, or pieces of real estate, so to speak, are to be secured—which means holding them, of course—we are asked to go further than protecting Formosa and the Pescadores, which is the defined policy of this country.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. A few minutes ago the Senator from Minnesota stated some of the differences between this resolution and a treaty. He certainly did not mean that what he said was a complete list of the differences, did he?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Oh, no; I just got started.

Mr. SPARKMAN. The Senator further stated that in his opinion the President, as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, could order sorties or forays, or whatever we may wish to call them, or could send our planes to attack concentrations aimed at those other islands in order to defend them, and could do what he thought was necessary in order to defend Formosa. Is that correct?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct. That is my understanding.

Mr. SPARKMAN. As a matter of fact, is it not the Senator's understanding that the pending resolution has no force of law?

Mr. HUMPHREY. No; the resolution is concurrent, so to speak, with the Executive power.

Mr. SPARKMAN. It is an expression of opinion by Congress, is it not?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. It is a backing of the President in the power he already possesses. Is that correct?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. We cannot add to or take away from the President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. Is that correct?

Mr. HUMPHREY. In legal terms, that is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. By way of a resolution, that is.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Whereas a treaty could.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. A treaty could do it because a treaty is on the same high level as the Constitution, according to the Constitution itself. Is that correct?

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator from Alabama is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, what the resolution amounts to is an expression of approval on the part of Congress, and that, incidentally, is one of the other differences between the resolution and a treaty, in that both Houses of Congress are involved in connection with the pending resolution, whereas in a treaty only the Senate is involved. Is that correct?

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is absolutely right.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Therefore, the resolution constitutes approval by the Congress of a policy which the President stated in sending the resolution to Congress, and which he had a right to state, if he wished to do so, without putting it in the form of a resolution. Is that correct?

Mr. HUMPHREY. The Senator is absolutely correct. The President of the United States, in the case of Formosa and the Pescadores, in view of the established policy of our Government, which has been announced to the world, because of the importance of Formosa to the interests of the United States, could have taken precautionary action and defensive action for the protection of that area.

Mr. SPARKMAN. As a result of the change which has taken place in recent years since the outcome of World War II, and our interest that has developed in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, with the security pacts which have been negotiated, that area has become our western line of defense, has it not?

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is so called. It is called the island chain of defenses in the Pacific, starting with the Aleutians and extending down through Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines, and down through the area covered by the treaties which we have concluded with the ANZAC group, Australia and New Zealand.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And later, when we complete the South Asian treaty, it will apply there. It is what might be called a screen.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I take it the Senator from Minnesota feels that under the Constitution the President has a right to use the Armed Forces, certainly within the area included between our two lines of defense; is that correct?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is my point.

Mr. SPARKMAN. One in the east and one in the west.

Mr. HUMPHREY. My point is that those key areas from the Aleutians down to Korea have been listed clearly for the world to behold. We have concluded a treaty with the Republic of South Korea. With Japan we have a mutual defense pact, and we have military bases in Japan. On Okinawa we have one of the major military installations in the Pacific. Then from Formosa the line extends to the Philippines, and then to the Australian and New Zealand area, where we have treaty commitments. That is the line which we say is our forward wall of defense, established for

only one purpose—the security of the United States of America.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And up to that line the President certainly has the power to use our Armed Forces.

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is my view that under the constitutional powers of the Chief Executive he would have the power to use our Armed Forces.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Without any authorization from Congress whatsoever.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Unless the President deemed it wise, because of a major military operation, to ask Congress for the support he may wish.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That would not be authorization; that would be concurrence.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, if he undertook to engage in a major war, he would be expected to ask Congress for a declaration of war, because, under the Constitution, only Congress can authorize the making of war by this Government.

Mr. HUMPHREY. One of the concerns which I have is that in this line of defense about which we have spoken, which is common knowledge to friend and foe alike, when it comes to Formosa we make an indentation, under this resolution, and we say it goes to within 6 or 7 miles of the Chinese mainland. We take it in and ask to include a broader area than we had before included. I think we should leave our line of defense where it is, and then if the President, as Commander in Chief, in the fulfillment of our obligations in the defense of Formosa, the Pescadores, Okinawa, or the Philippines, should feel that in order, in the case of hostilities, to bring in large-scale American strength, such as our naval or air power, against any outpost, that would be within the defense area.

Mr. SPARKMAN. The Senator remembers, I am sure, that I raised the point in committee—not necessarily about an obligation on our part to cover Quemoy and Matsu—that there was an invitation, as I suggested, to the Chinese Communists to explore the situation and probe it, as they did early, in the Tachens, and then we announced to the world that we were not going to undertake to defend the Tachens, although I think we had been led to believe we were, I am not sure whether the Senator from Minnesota remembers some conversations we have pending the drafting of the Formosa treaty when we were led to believe there might be some of the islands in the Tachens which would be useful and essential to the defense of Formosa. It has seemed to us all along that when we immediately announced to the world that we were not going to defend the Tachens—and that was the effect of the statement which the Secretary of State made almost at the beginning of hostilities there—it gave an incentive to the Chinese Communists to probe and explore, and the farther they explored, the more we withdrew, and the uncertainty remained. I imagine there came into their minds quite logically the question, "Will they stand even on Formosa and the Pescadores?"

So my contention has been that so long as we leave open the question as to

whether we will stand on Quemoy and some of the other islands, to be decided when and if attack comes, we are inviting attack. I am not greatly concerned about Quemoy and the Matsu Islands being left in, provided the Communists know that if they move there, we will hit them.

Mr. HUMPHREY. It is the Senator's view, as I gather, that the language of the resolution says to some that they are in there and to others that they are not.

Mr. SPARKMAN. It leaves it vague and uncertain.

I think it is dangerous in that respect. I felt considerably relieved by the statement which the President made yesterday, because I think many of us had feared that some "trigger-happy" person in a position to do so might be the one to fire the shot that would start things off. But the President gave us assurance yesterday that he, and he alone, would assume that responsibility. In other words, I think his statement made it plain to the Congress, to the country, and to the world that whereas he welcomes the approval of Congress of the policy he has announced, and which he had a right to announce to pursue, yet, at the same time, he recognizes that the manner in which he pursues that policy, the manner in which he carries it out, is his responsibility, as the Constitution makes it, and not the responsibility of Congress. Does the Senator agree with me in that statement?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I certainly do.

Mr. SPARKMAN. If the Senator will yield further, because I shall have to leave the floor in a few minutes, I wish him to know that I commend him for the very able speech he is making, and I wish to thank him for giving me this opportunity to participate. There is one point, which perhaps the Senator will cover before he finishes his speech, but since I shall probably not be present when he concludes his remarks I hope he will let me ask him this question now.

Would the Senator from Minnesota not feel much better if the President would go further and give Congress assurance that he intends to utilize, so far as practicable, the good offices of the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire and try to work out a peaceful solution of the trouble in that whole area?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Let me say that under date of Wednesday, January 26, I submitted an amendment to the preamble of the resolution, which reads as follows:

Whereas the United States would welcome intervention by the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities off the coast of China and in the Formosa Straits, and it is in the interest of the United States and of world peace to facilitate efforts toward peaceful settlement including a definitive settlement of the future status of Formosa and the Pescadores in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

In my judgment, one of the real weaknesses of the resolution is the failure of the Congress of the United States, as it authorizes the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States, not with equal clarity, equal vigor, and equal determination to say to the President, to the Secretary of State, and to the world,

as the people's representatives of this great Republic, that we welcome action by the United Nations. We not only welcome it, but we beseech them to proceed, and call upon them to act. We should incorporate in the resolution language along the lines I have outlined. In any language which would commit Congress to searching and seeking for United Nations participation and action, we would show to the peoples of the world two things: First, that we Americans will not be the victims of appeasement; and, second, that we long for, search for, and pray for peace, and recognize that sometimes it takes more courage to seek peace than it does to get into a war.

I say that is one of the real weaknesses of the resolution. The message from the President called, again and again, for United Nations action. The President in his message to Congress placed great emphasis upon the United Nations and its usefulness in this tragic situation.

But I call upon my colleagues to examine the resolution. What the resolution does is to authorize the President to employ our Armed Forces not only for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores but also of other areas in friendly hands, and then yields itself to a very weak position in reference to the United Nations.

I shall press for this amendment, whether the other language can be changed or not. I shall call upon my colleagues in the Senate to say to the world, and especially to the people of America, particularly now, in view of what we know to be true, that in the United Nations one of our friends is seeking some solution. Let us tell our friends in the United Nations that the Congress of the United States seeks not only to commit manpower to a possible war but also seeks to commit the United States to peace.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield for one more question? Then I shall have finished.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am grateful to the Senator for yielding. I have been told within the last few minutes that an item has appeared on the news tickers that there will be introduced in the United Nations a resolution for the use of the good offices of the United Nations in seeking a cease fire, and that the sponsors of such a resolution—and this especially is what I want the Senator to hear—will be the United States, Great Britain, and New Zealand.

I believe the Senator from Minnesota will agree with me that that gives some hope of carrying out the wish that was expressed by the President in his message, if not too strongly in the resolution, that the United Nations would be used.

Mr. HUMPHREY. In view of this statement about another dramatic announcement, in a dramatic period of history, that our own Government, and the Governments of Great Britain and New Zealand and Australia—

Mr. SPARKMAN. The United States, Great Britain, and New Zealand. To be frank with the Senator, when I was told of this announcement, I questioned that

the United States was one of the sponsors. I insisted that it must have been Australia, as I had understood that the three sponsors would be Great Britain, New Zealand, and Australia. But I was told that the notice carried the United States as one of the sponsors, and did not include Australia.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Then I ask my colleague this very fair and frank question: If that be the situation as of this hour—not the situation as it might be in the future, but as it is now—would it not be wise and prudent for the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, in a resolution which supports the hand of the President in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, also to support the hand of the President and the good name of this Republic by incorporating into the resolution a proviso calling upon our Government to commend the United Nations for its activities?

Mr. DOUGLAS and Mr. CAPEHART addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BARKLEY in the chair). Does the Senator from Minnesota yield; and, if so, to whom?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I shall yield in a moment to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. President, I shall very shortly call up for consideration my amendment to the preamble. I understand that to conform with the parliamentary situation, if I am not mistaken, an amendment of the preamble must be acted upon following the action upon the resolution. I would appreciate a ruling from the Chair on that point.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Minnesota is correct.

Mr. HUMPHREY. At the appropriate time, I shall ask to amend the preamble by inserting the following:

Whereas the United States would welcome intervention by the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities off the coast of China and in the Formosa Straits, and it is in the interest of the United States and of world peace to facilitate efforts toward peaceful settlement including a definitive settlement of the future status of Formosa and the Pescadores in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

In my opinion, such a declaration is just as ready now for congressional action as is any possible statement of principles the Senate could make. I hope that word will spread among our colleagues that as we take action to strengthen the hand of our Government in a possible situation of hostilities—I say "possible situation," because that emergency is not exactly on the doorstep as of this hour—at least we ought to back up our representations in the United Nations by action on the part of Congress at this particular hour, as we come to a decision on the resolution.

I now yield to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. DOUGLAS. In view of the apparent policy of the Government to work for a cease-fire in the Strait of Formosa, which also is advocated by the Senator from Minnesota, would it not be well to probe some of the implications of such an order to cease fire? A cease-fire order, of course, would prevent any movement by Chiang Kai-shek and the

Nationalist Chinese forces against the mainland of China. Is that not correct?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Therefore it would mean in effect that any hope of reconquering China by military forces from the outside would have to be abandoned.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Would that not almost inevitably lead to the admission of Red China to the United Nations? Could such recognition be denied to a government which was in possession of the country, and which was recognized by the United Nations as being in possession; and would not such recognition, in effect, be a statement to the government on Formosa that they could not try to upset the government on the mainland? Would that not lead rather quickly to the admission of Red China into the United Nations?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I do not exactly think so, I may say to the Senator from Illinois. If the Senator is talking about recognition, that is one thing.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am speaking of admission to the United Nations.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I may point out to my good friend from Illinois that while the United States of America does not either recognize Red China or admit her anywhere, our Secretary of State joined with other representatives to invite Red China to the conference which finally disposed of the aspect of the problem which related to Indochina, even though I do not believe that problem is anywhere nearly settled.

In other words, we did not recognize Red China as a legal government, nor did we seek to sponsor her admission; in fact, we opposed the admission of Red China to the United Nations. But that did not prevent the highest Cabinet officer of the United States of America from extending an invitation to Red China to a meeting which ultimately arrived at the Indochinese truce.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Would not the Senator from Minnesota say, however, that a cease-fire order would increase the likelihood that Red China would be admitted to the United Nations?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think it would certainly increase the possibility of Red China pressing her action more effectively. However, I think it should be noted that Red China has never asked to be admitted to the United Nations. She has never asked, although she has had a very powerful spokesman.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Would that not increase the prestige of Red China in southeast Asia?

Mr. HUMPHREY. The admission of Red China to the United Nations?

Mr. DOUGLAS. No; to have a cease-fire in the Straits of Formosa.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think that is possible.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Would it not also reduce any military pressure which the forces of Nationalist China on Formosa might exert? Probably a large number of Red Chinese troops are deployed immediately opposite Formosa, and, if any possibility of invasion were removed, they could then be deployed southward, thus strengthening the Communist push in Southeast Asia?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think there is some truth in that suggestion. The number of troops which are on the offshore islands, while this is not open to public discussion, are limited. I am of the opinion that if there is to be a cease-fire anywhere, some kind of price will have to be paid for it. I would be less than candid if I did not say that. But I remind my distinguished colleague that if there is not to be a cease-fire, and we are to have open fire, we shall pay a big price for that.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I understand that. I am simply trying to appraise the situation. In times past, I have been inclined to oppose a cease-fire, so long as there was solid hope that Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists might be able to invade the mainland. Like virtually all other Members of this body, I do not like the present Communist Chinese government; I should like to see it replaced.

We have been told by various Members of this body who visited Formosa that there were large numbers of well-trained troops on Formosa, and that all that was needed was to take the leash off, and that Chiang Kai-shek would then move on to the mainland, where large groups would rally behind him, and that in a relatively short time the Communist government of China would be overthrown. So long as that is a strong possibility, it would seem to be inadvisable to encourage a cease-fire agreement.

Does the Senator from Minnesota interpret the action of the State Department, or perhaps the action of the Government, mentioned by the Senator from Alabama, to mean that our Government has written off any possibility of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists invading the mainland, and that it now believes that Chiang Kai-shek cannot do so?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That question was discussed quite completely in the joint meetings of the two committees. I think I would be in error to say our Government had officially written off that possibility. The Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART] is present in the Chamber. He listened to the testimony in the hearings. I think it was the position of our Government that if the mainland of China were to be successfully invaded, it could be done only with American forces, not only with air and sea forces, but obviously with large commitments of American manpower.

Mr. DOUGLAS. In other words, is it the general opinion of the military officials and of the Government that Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists do not have sufficient military strength successfully to invade the mainland?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I say that is the probable view. That does not mean, however, that our Government thinks that Chiang Kai-shek's forces should not be strong.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I understand.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Nor does it mean that his government should not be supported, because there is the possibility, though I think it is a remote possibility, that there may be some form of upheaval on the mainland of China.

Therefore, there ought to be forces ready to move into China, and there ought to be a government ready to take over.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I understand. Does not the Senator from Minnesota feel, then, that if that be true, some of the information which has been brought to us, and upon which our recent policy presumably has been based, has been incorrect, namely, that Chiang Kai-shek had strong, virile forces which, if fully unleashed, would take over China?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I wish to say to my friend, the Senator from Illinois, as I said earlier, that I felt we had been under some misapprehension and that there had been for too long a period a myth indulged, as to the possibility of Chiang Kai-shek's retaking the mainland. Very candidly, I want to restrain myself in this debate, and I made a sort of personal pledge to do that. I think the time has arrived when we as Americans should face up to some of the mistakes and miscalculations we have made, and misinformation we have been given. The time has come, in view of the momentous decision we shall have to make, to evaluate our entire policy in the Far East, to ascertain where we stand with our allies, and to find out where we stand in terms of the facts of the situation, rather than in terms of hopes, myths, and beliefs. When we decide to do that, then I think we shall get somewhere.

I believe the Senator from Illinois will be interested in hearing a London dispatch from the Associated Press which was just handed to me:

Official British informants said today Britain and the United States have agreed to invite Communist China to a United Nations Security Council meeting for discussion of a cease-fire in the China fighting.

These responsible informants said New Zealand, in agreement with Britain and the United States, will ask the Security Council to meet Monday to consider extending the invitation to the Peiping regime.

The United States and Nationalist China were reported ready to participate in the discussions with the Chinese Reds.

Mr. President, I wish to say what the Government is planning to do is all to the good, provided we have a program, and provided we know what we want to do. I am of the opinion, and I say this respectfully, that one of the reasons why the President desires Congress to pass the resolution is that it would give to the President, who is our chief spokesman—and this is no time for politics—a strong arm, so to speak, a firm position, and a solid commitment.

I think the Senator from Illinois has said many times, as I know I have said, that we cannot negotiate with the Communists if we are in a position of weakness or uncertainty. If one sits down at a table with a Communist nation, he had better sit down prepared to meet any eventuality, and to proceed from a position of strength, firmness, and preciseness. That is why I personally believe that we should clarify the situation during the course of the debate, come to a decision, and pass a resolution which will join with the President in stating our unequivocal position on the defense of

Formosa and the Pescadores, so the whole world may know where we stand.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Minnesota yield to the Senator from Illinois?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Prefatory to the question, the senior Senator from Illinois desires to say that so long as there is even a slight possibility or a reasonable chance that Chiang Kai-shek could successfully invade the mainland, I would be opposed to a cease-fire agreement. What I wish to ascertain is whether the administration and the military authorities have in fact virtually given up most of the hope of such a successful invasion, which in times past apparently they held?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I can speak only for myself, and I know the Senator from Illinois would not expect me or desire me to attempt to speak for the administration. I speak only from what I understand to be the facts.

I ask the Senator from Illinois to examine carefully the record which was made in the joint meetings of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services. Although it is a secret or highly confidential record, it is available for Members of Congress to read. That record will reveal beyond a shadow of a doubt that the official position of the Government is that the Nationalists cannot invade the mainland of China without all-out support from the United States.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield first to the Senator from Illinois. Then I shall yield to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I have not seen the press dispatch to which the Senator from Minnesota referred, but a previous statement of the President was that he would welcome intervention by the United Nations in order to bring about a cease-fire agreement. If such a desire is backed up by a declaration by the United States that a cease-fire agreement should be entered into, that would in effect be chaining Chiang Kai-shek; would it not?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think it is fair to say that the position of the Government officials is that an invasion of the mainland by Nationalist forces would fail unless it had the full support of the United States, and that the talk of leashing and unleashing is only talk. I think the sooner we get down to the fact that we have in Nationalist China an ally to whom we are committed, and the sooner we get down to recognizing the military possibilities of that nation, we will be a lot better off.

The record is manifestly clear, and many Members of the Senate have read it, that there are trained troops on Formosa. Our Government has expended much money in training and maintaining those troops. The Nationalist Chinese Government has made great efforts to expand its forces. We are grateful to it for those efforts. Without such Nationalist troops in that area there would be immediate need for

hundreds of thousands of American men. So we should be grateful for the forces that are in that area, and we should do all in our power to support them. Let us admit that we are committed to that ally, but let us not fool ourselves or our friends, because we are not fooling the enemy.

The truth is that the only possible way there could be a successful defense of Formosa would be with our help, and the only way there could be a successful invasion of the mainland of China by the Nationalists would be with the help of the Armed Forces and the economic assistance of the United States of America. I think it is fair to say that no responsible official of the Government who is speaking for the administration recognizes that such an invasion could otherwise be successful.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Does the Senator from Minnesota agree with me that if a cease-fire agreement were proposed by our Government to the United Nations, in effect our Government would have decided that Chiang Kai-shek could not successfully invade the mainland?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I would say that or I would say the cost would be so terrible in terms of goods, bloodshed, and human resources, that such a venture would, in the view of responsible men and women, be out of order.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the Senator from Indiana, and then I shall yield to the Senator from Idaho [Mr. WELKER].

Mr. CAPEHART. Would not the proper answer to the question of the able Senator from Illinois be that this administration is anxious to stop wars and to stop shooting and to stop killing people, and is anxious to try to bring about peace throughout the world and to settle all these international matters with that objective in view? Would not that be the proper answer to the question of the Senator from Illinois?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I may say to the Senator from Indiana that I am not going to indulge at all in any partisanship in connection with this matter.

Mr. CAPEHART. I am sure of that.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I have resolved that I will not engage or indulge in any partisanship in connection with it. Later on, we can go on the stump and can make partisan speeches, if we wish.

Mr. CAPEHART. Let me say that I have been in the Chamber for 20 minutes, and I have observed that the Senator from Minnesota has not indulged in any partisanship.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I believe the President of the United States and those of his official family are committed by his policy and by the policy of Congress to one purpose, and only one purpose, namely, peace with honor. I point out that has been true of other administrations, too.

Mr. CAPEHART. That is correct.

The question asked of the Senator from Minnesota was whether it was the purpose of the pending measure to stop

the Chinese Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek from going to the mainland of China. That was the question of the Senator from Illinois; was it not?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes.

Mr. CAPEHART. I think the proper answer to that question is that this administration—and I am sure of this—would like to stop all wars and would like to stop all shooting all over the world, and would like to bring about universal peace and would like to have matters settled with that idea in view. I think that is the proper answer, regardless of whether there is a belief that the administration wants or does not want Chiang Kai-shek to get to the mainland of China.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield further to me?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. DOUGLAS. The Senator from Indiana has been putting in my mouth words I did not utter. I did not say that the primary purpose of the administration was to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from getting to the mainland. I said that the effect of a cease-fire would be to prevent him from getting to the mainland; and if the administration purposes a cease-fire, it would be because in their judgment the cost of getting Chiang Kai-shek to the mainland and of overturning the Red government would be too great. So they are proposing the placing of a strict leash or, perhaps, a chain upon Chiang Kai-shek. This is in sharp contrast to their claim 2 years ago that they were unleashing Chiang Kai-shek for an attack upon Red China.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield further to me?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. CAPEHART. My statement was in regard to the effect of what the Senator from Illinois said. But regardless of whether the administration believes that Chiang Kai-shek can or cannot get to the mainland, or even though the administration might feel that he could get to the mainland, I still say the correct answer is that this administration is trying to put a stop to fighting and the killing of people, is trying to obtain peace, and to have the world's problems settled in a peaceful manner. Regardless of whether it feels that Chiang Kai-shek is or is not strong enough to invade the mainland, it would like to get this whole matter settled. That is the proper answer; and no other answer is proper, if I may speak for this administration; and I believe I can. The reason for its attitude is that the administration wants to stop killing, to stop fighting, to stop hostilities, and it wants to bring about a cease-fire, and to have an end put to wars all over the world. I am sure the administration wants that just as much as all Senators do.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield to me at this time?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Idaho.

Mr. WELKER. I thank the Senator from Minnesota very much.

Let me say, by way of preface, that I was interested in the remark or observation of the Senator from Minnesota to the effect that perhaps the dilemma with respect to Formosa could be solved by having Red China's Communists come into the United Nations and agree to a cease-fire or an armistice.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, let me make the record perfectly clear. I never under any circumstances intimated that Red China should be or would be admitted to the United Nations at this time.

Mr. WELKER. I did not say that. I referred to their coming into the United Nations for the purpose of a cease-fire agreement.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Oh, yes.

Mr. WELKER. Will the distinguished Senator from Minnesota tell me one time when the Red Communists have ever kept any agreement they have made, either at Panmunjom or anywhere else?

Mr. HUMPHREY. The President of the United States deemed it wise to conclude a truce in Korea. There were those who disagreed with that conclusion. I was one who supported the President. There were those who felt that the Indochinese war should be brought to a conclusion; and our Government, in at least a partial sense, cooperated in the conclusion of that war.

I think it is the view, as the Senator from Indiana pointed out, that cease-fire agreements and truces are better than continuation of warfare. I am of the opinion that the responsible heads of this Government, both now and in the past, have believed and now believe that there is a better chance to work out difficulties when there is not the sacrifice of war and when there is not the suffering incident to fatalities, casualties, and hostilities, and that therefore the Government of the United States has sought at all times to bring the contesting forces to agreement. I commend our Government for that. It is not a sign of weakness. I have said to the Senator and to this entire Chamber that the passage of a joint resolution which clearly commits this Government to a strong position of defense and, on the other hand, the putting of the stamp of congressional approval upon United Nations' participation to bring about some peace and order, constitute the kind of twin-edged sword that is needed in this particular instance.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield further to me?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. WELKER. I certainly know of no Senator who advocates war or the killing of human beings. I ask the Senator from Minnesota whether it is a fact that the sensible way to handle this matter is to let the Red Chinese and, in fact, all Communists, wherever they may exist, not only in Formosa, but throughout the world, know that we have sufficient force to compel adherence to any agreement they may make, even though they have wilfully violated their agreements for many, many years. Is that not the conclusion of the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I believe the only way we can possibly live in this world, in view of the international Communist conspiracy and the powerful forces which are arrayed against us, is to be strong and to be committed to a position of strength; and when we make commitments, we must be willing to fulfill them, or else not to make them in the first place.

In this instance, we have made a commitment to Formosa. That commitment has been made, not only by the present administration, but by the prior administration. It is a nonpartisan commitment. We have made the commitment, and we must show the world that we will not back down from it, that we will not yield—or, in other words, that there will be no appeasement, no backtracking.

But on the other hand, we must also recognize that the solution of these difficulties may be worked out peacefully.

Mr. WELKER. By agreement?

Mr. HUMPHREY. By agreement, if our Nation is strong enough, so that the agreement it makes can be kept.

Mr. WELKER. Very well.

Let me ask a concluding question: Is it not a fact that our President, the Commander in Chief—and I refer to our President as the President of all of us, without regard to politics—wants, and it is exactly what he wants, an agreement which may be kept, so as to stop war among these nations and in these lands; but he also wants, based upon his military genius and knowledge of military science, a sufficient force to enable him to compel the carrying out of any agreement the Communists may make—so that for once, if you please, in the long, long era of the Communist aggression, they will keep an agreement they make, instead of doing as they have done in the past, namely, violate those agreements.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I would hope that is his position, and I believe it to be.

Mr. WELKER. Then, let me say in conclusion, I beg my friend, the Senator from Minnesota, to go down the line with us and let the President of the United States—who, after all, was elected by the American people—let him, the supreme commander of our forces, advocate what is right and just.

I thank my distinguished friend.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the Senator from Idaho. I do not think there is any great, basic disagreement here at all.

In a moment I shall elaborate on my position, and then I shall yield the floor.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I now hold in my hand the press dispatch to which the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN] referred. The salient paragraph is as follows:

An official British informant said today Britain and the United States have agreed to invite Communist China to the United Nations Security Council meeting for discussion of a cease-fire in the China fighting.

Does not the Senator from Minnesota believe that it would be very helpful if this body this afternoon, when we are

discussing this issue, could have from the United States Government itself either a confirmation or a denial of the truth of this report?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think it would be very helpful. I will say to the Senator that in the hearings we asked the Secretary of State a number of times whether or not the United States was proceeding at the United Nations. He indicated to us that we were taking steps in the United Nations to arrive at such an understanding as has been referred to. I happen to be one of those who believe that this is all to the good, but I think it would be of great assistance in this Chamber and among the American public if there were a definitive statement on the part of responsible officers of our Government, to the effect that we are proceeding forthwith, in good faith, to try to arrive at some understanding at the United Nations.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Is it not somewhat embarrassing for Members of the United States Senate, when they are discussing this question, to get information on this vital point from London rather than from the State Department which is only a mile from here?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I will say to my friend from Illinois that earlier on the day the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] made a brief announcement in reference to the possibility of action in the United Nations.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Did he make a definitive statement?

Mr. HUMPHREY. He made that announcement on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and I believe also on behalf of the State Department. The announcement was merely to the effect that negotiations were underway.

Mr. DOUGLAS. But the statement to which I refer is a definite statement that Britain and the United States have agreed to invite Communist China to the United Nations Security Council meeting for the purpose of discussing a ceasefire in the China fighting. This is not a statement that negotiations are under way or a statement that something is about to happen, but it is the definite policy. Would it not be much better if we obtained definite information on this point from the State Department itself, rather than to have it bootlegged to us through London?

Mr. HUMPHREY. Yes; it would. I hope, before the day is out, that there will be official confirmation of this report. I say to the Senator that the State Department did inform me of this development this morning.

Mr. DOUGLAS. Does not the Senator feel that it might be unwise to proceed to a final vote until we have such an official confirmation? Let me say, as a preface to that question, that I think the discussions of the two preceding days have been very helpful in obtaining assurance from the President that no military commander in the field would have authority to initiate an attack upon the Chinese mainland, and that if such a decision were to be made, it would be made by him. That clarified the issue to a degree which was not present when the House of Representatives passed the

resolution. But would not further clarification on this point be extremely important?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think it would be, and I expect it to be forthcoming during the remaining hours of the day. It is our hope to reach a decision on the joint resolution with the factors which the Senator has brought out fully clarified for the public mind.

Mr. President, lest there be any misinterpretation of the purposes of this discussion, let me set the record straight. First, in the Asian area the greatest menace today to the peace of the world and the peace of its neighbors is the Communist Government of China. This we know.

We also know that the Communist Chinese forces are supported economically, politically, and militarily by the Soviet Union.

We also know that the Soviet Union and the Communist Government of China are in alliance, or have a treaty arrangement for mutual defense.

These things we, as Americans, know; and we ought clearly to understand them as we proceed in the consideration of questions of policy.

As a Member of the Senate I have believed very strongly in powerful defense forces for our Nation. I have not been one of those who wanted those forces reduced, nor have I been one of those who thought the air power of this Nation should be reduced. In fact, I have joined with my colleagues, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS], the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG], and others, in one effort after another to increase the military strength of this Nation, including the Army, last year, and 2 years ago the Air Force. Yet at the very hour when we are considering a resolution which would commit this Nation unequivocally to a strong position in the Far East, the news services tell us that representatives of the Department of Defense are before the House Committee on Armed Services recommending a reduction in the Marine Corps, a reduction in the Navy, and a reduction in the Army. I say that we cannot, on the one hand, have a program and a policy of strength, of determination, of unequivocal commitment not only with respect to Formosa and the Pescadores, but with respect to the offshore islands, and, on the other hand, come before committees of Congress and suggest a reduction in the military strength of this Nation.

I am of the opinion that the Soviet Union has been hoping that we would be lulled into a false sense of security. That almost happened to us on a previous occasion. If there was one thing that came out of the Korean war to the benefit of this Nation is was that it aroused us to the menace at large in the world. It committed this country to a program of strength, armament, and defense.

In recent months I have been afraid that we were being lulled back into a false sense of security. Only a few months ago statements were made to the effect that the international scene was much more peaceful. That is what some would have us believe. The truth is that

it is not peaceful. I would not be in the least surprised if at this very hour in the Kremlin there is deep concern, not because of what we are doing alone, but because of the action of the Chinese Communists in shelling and occupying certain islands and thereby again reminding us of the Communist threat to world peace. In my judgment, there is real concern in the Kremlin because again, as Americans, and as Members of Congress, we are going to see to it that our defenses are not weak. There is nothing the Soviet Union wants less than that. It wants to be sure that we are weak; and we must be sure that we are strong.

So, Mr. President, as we conclude this debate, it is my hope that we shall be able to clarify the language of the joint resolution by making it read as follows:

That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack.

That is the commitment which Congress should make. That is the policy statement which we should support. It tells the whole world that we in the Congress stand alongside our President in the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores. It leaves no doubt as to where we stand.

Secondly, I think we should amend the joint resolution by a reference in the preamble to the United Nations. Let us stand before the peoples of the world as a strong nation, both militarily and economically. Let us not boast about it. Let us be sure about it.

Equally important, let us stand before the world as peacemakers. Let us tell the world that we want peace with honor, peace with justice. If we are to be peacemakers we must be confident, calm, and poised. We must have persevering patience and confident courage, and we must have continuing strength.

I am of the opinion that what we are about to do in the United Nations, according to the announcements which have been made, will strengthen us in the eyes of the world—at least among the nations of the world—even if that effort should not be successful. In my judgment, however, the effort may very well be successful, because one of the sore points between this country and other countries has been our far eastern policy. That is not to say that we have been wrong and that they have been right, but there has been a difference between the United States and its allies on this issue. It is certainly fair to say that the Formosan area is a land of legal uncertainty as to who owns it, as to who has jurisdiction, and where it rightfully belongs in the society of nations.

If we can come out of the negotiations in the United Nations with a solution to this dilemma, wherein we and other nations will guarantee the integrity and independence and freedom of Formosa, which may require relinquishing some of the offshore islands, I would say that we shall have made progress toward peace; provided, of course, that we do not then proceed in the belief that peace will endure of itself and that the nations of the

free world may pursue their respective courses without any effort to maintain their strength.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. LONG. I wonder whether the Senator from Minnesota agrees with me that the effect of the resolution is that Congress declares to the world that we are ready to stand with the President in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, and that if those islands are attacked we are ready to go to war with Red China in the defense of those islands; in other words, that we are ready to take whatever risk goes with that declaration? I say that because to say anything less or not to make it as clear as that is only to leave doubt as to our intentions. This Nation should be willing to make decisions even if those decisions could lead to war with Red China, knowing that China would undoubtedly call on Russia for assistance. When we vote for the resolution we must accept that risk. Is that the Senator's feeling?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I do not believe there is any doubt about it. I think that was made crystal clear by the junior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] in the first interview following the hearings before the two committees. There is no easy way out. Let me make it clear beyond peradventure that whenever the Soviet Union or Communist China feel they want to make war, they know how to make it.

We could have a resolution or no resolution and still have war. Our feeling is that we should have a firm commitment on the part of our Government, and we feel that if we make that commitment clear and state what we will defend, and what we consider to be our line of defense, the probability of war or hostilities is less. That is my belief. I grant that it is only a valued judgment of responsible men.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. LONG. If this situation results in war, of course all Americans will stand together. Nevertheless, questions will be asked by the nations of the world, particularly by the neutral nations, and questions will be asked among historians as to who started the war, who hit the first blow, who was the aggressor, and so forth.

Of course our side will argue that the enemy was the aggressor, and the enemy will argue that we were the aggressor. They will say we started the war, and we will say they started it. However, so far as history is concerned, some of us prefer to make very clear that our position was reasonable, that we were willing to have a peaceful settlement made of the problem, and that we offered to make a peaceful settlement of it, but that nevertheless the enemy started the war.

Some of us feel it would be better to make perfectly clear who started the war by attacking Formosa and the Pescadores, rather than that the enemy started the war by shelling the Quemoy Island, for example. That is the difference of opinion that some of us have. Is that correct?

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct. Some of us feel that a firm commitment, such as is contained in the resolution with reference to Quemoy, involves ourselves in greater risk of getting into war and the possibility of being called the aggressor. In other words, we would like to diminish that risk. We would like to have the language clarified. As I said yesterday, I believe the President went a long way to mollify our concern by indicating what his purpose was, namely, the immediate and direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

It is my opinion that one reason for the language in the pending resolution which refers to the offshore islands is what is transpiring in the United Nations. That language is a bargaining point. I would suggest that we watch very carefully what transpires at the U. N.

If we are to have a chance to get an agreement in the U. N. we must have something to give away, if we ask the other side to give up something also.

As I stated already, and now repeat, although the resolution involves a firm commitment—and we must realize that it could lead to war—I believe that basically it represents high diplomacy backed up by strength.

It is not sufficient to have only diplomacy when we deal with the Communists. In dealing with them we can argue and can use logic and reason, and be filled with loving kindness, but if we do not have the tools and the strength to back up our diplomacy, we might just as well not go into any meeting with them.

If the resolution is modified, as I hope it will be, there will be no doubt as to our position, and it will give us the strength and sense of direction that are needed, and I believe we shall have made a substantial gain toward world peace.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. LONG. It is just as well that we also face this fact, that when the decision is made, our enemies might as well take notice of and fully realize the possible consequences, and that we are prepared to face them.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is correct.

Mr. LONG. It is not the type of decision that was made when we entered Korea, when we did not anticipate that we would finally find Russia an intervenor in that situation. On the contrary, in making this decision we fully realize that if Russia wants to force the world into war, she can take a position that will do that. Is that correct?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I wish to say to the Senator from Louisiana that I think that possibility does exist, and I think it exists whether we have a resolution or no resolution. However, with the resolution we make it crystal clear that there will be no more being pushed around, that there will be no more backtracking, and that there will be no more indecisiveness.

Frankly, I believe that could have been done in a much more simple fashion, but that was not my choice.

I believe if we keep in mind what commitments we make, we will be a little more careful, as we go through the ses-

sion, as to how we cut the budget at the expense of security.

As one Member of the Senate, I serve notice now that if the Government is going to say, "We will defend this," and "We will defend that"—and we have made commitments under SEATO and other commitments all over the world, and we are now making a commitment under the pending resolution—if we make these commitments we must keep them, and before we make commitments we must be sure we can keep them. We cannot keep commitments with a paper army. We cannot keep commitments with planes that are on the drawing boards. We ought to have the force in being, or stop making commitments. We should do one or the other. Otherwise, someone, some day, will call our bluff. In this instance, we ought to recognize that this is not a bluff. If it is a bluff, it will result in a major disaster for the United States. This is real business, and we ought to let everyone know it is real business. It seems to me we ought to make sure how far that business goes.

I say we ought to include in the resolution the island chain that has been staked out as the defense line, and we ought not to make any unnecessary commitments with respect to islands which are 4 or 5 or 6 miles off the China mainland, in territory which is in legal contest and indefensible from a military point of view. If we do, we shall be running a calculated risk far beyond ordinary and prudent judgment.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. LONG. Inasmuch as our real purpose is peace in the world, does it not seem to the Senator from Minnesota that it makes better sense to tell the enemy not to attempt to take an area that we know we can prevent him from taking, than telling him not to try to take something that we are not certain we can prevent him from taking?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I surely believe that to be true.

Unless there are further questions, I shall yield the floor. Does the Senator from Illinois wish to ask me a question?

Mr. DOUGLAS. There is one question which I should like to ask. I have felt all along that there were possibilities that this resolution would stand not merely on the determination to defend these islands, but, as the Senator from Minnesota has suggested, on its availability as a trading point, so that the islands could be given up in return for a cease fire.

Mr. HUMPHREY. That is strictly my personal opinion, not confirmed by anything else but my personal view.

Mr. DOUGLAS. If that be true, do we not take away the trading point from the administration by saying we shall defend only Formosa?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I think that is a valid point. I considered, in view of my own personal attitude, that the gamble and the risk were too great. I personally felt that it was a risk we should not take. I feel much better about it today than I felt yesterday. As I have stated publicly, I felt the President actually rewrote, in a sense, the resolution. He gave

his own positive interpretation of what it contains. There have been several rewritings. We had, first of all, the Formosa treaty, which still lies in the Foreign Relations Committee. That treaty, in its essence, would be amended by the resolution which is before the Senate, because the treaty would limit the area of defense to the Pescadores and Formosa, unless there should be mutual consent between the parties with reference to other areas. That would require both parties to give consent. Then came the resolution, which includes in other areas without mutual consent—unilaterally on our part.

Then came the President's statement, that the purpose is to provide for the immediate and direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, and that if there is to be any further military action, the President himself will personally take the responsibility, thereby allaying the doubts and fears of some persons.

Then came the U. N. announcement of today.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. LONG. I am sure the Senator realizes that there is not complete unanimity even in the United States regarding a cease-fire and an honorable peace based on the status quo. There are some elements in this country that want this Nation to continue to support Chiang Kai-shek, even with our Air Force, our Navy, and our Army, until the Communist regime is eventually overthrown. The Senator knows that, I am sure.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I do know that.

Mr. LONG. Life magazine, one of the most influential magazines in this Nation, contained an editorial recently, this week, I think, saying the President was not an appeaser because he had suggested a cease-fire. The editorial suggested that perhaps he was an appeaser for permitting the Tachens to fall under Communist control, and stating that only a small force could have prevented that from happening. There is an indication that he would accept a cease-fire.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I realize that, and I think there are some elements, some even in the President's own party, that will cut right across political parties. My own feeling about it is that so long as there is an opportunity for peace we should honestly and honorably pursue it, and that hostilities or war—call it what you will—may be forced upon us. If so, we should be ready to meet that situation. We should not seek it, but we should do everything we can to avert it, and, at the same time, try to use all the strength at our command to bring about not simply an agreement, but some advancement of the cause of human freedom.

There are many things that could be settled, even in the Far Eastern area, if we could but get people to agree. I think the only way we will get an agreement is to have a close-working relationship with strong allies, on the one hand, and plenty of strength on the part of ourselves.

I am speaking for myself. I have been most unhappy and disturbed about this

resolution, because of what it might result in, as has been truly set forth in the debate. The authority under the resolution, not the resolution itself, could lead to war. On the other hand, it could very well lead to a great period of peace. There is a calculated risk.

But, as I said in the beginning, we have one President at a time in this country. There are others who would like to be President, but there is only one President at a time. When the President of the United States sends a message to Congress, as he did in this instance, with a resolution, it is not comparable to a situation in which the Prime Minister of Great Britain makes a statement to the Parliament on policy matters, because, in Great Britain, if the Prime Minister delivers a policy statement and puts it up for a vote of confidence, if the vote of confidence is not given, the Prime Minister goes out and a new government comes in.

In the present situation, under our doctrine of the separation of powers, when the President has announced a policy and delivered his message and laid a resolution before the Congress, to repudiate it would not mean a change in the Government. The Government would merely be immobilized. It would literally mean taking away from the President as a public official, as the Chief Executive, the full support of the people of the United States, leaving him without power to act, or, at least, without the confidence of the people in his actions. So, I say there is a great deal of difference. It is not like laying before Parliament a policy statement, as Mendes-France did, for example, in connection with the London agreement, and saying, "Support this agreement. If you fail to support it, the Government falls and a new Prime Minister must come in."

That is not what we have in this country. Once the President has made and announced his decision, actually what we are left to do, in terms of our discussion, is to support it, hoping we may modify certain wide areas of authority, areas which are not precisely drawn. But the truth is that if the resolution should be defeated by the Congress, Mr. Eisenhower would still be President of the United States, still be Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, still be the chief spokesman of the American foreign policy, but denied the confidence of the representatives of the people; and, to the Communist world, that would be a great day.

Therefore, Mr. President, as a member of this body and as a citizen, I have no effective choice, I frankly state, but to support the resolution. Even though the amendments which I hope will be accepted should be defeated, I would still feel that I owed the obligation to the Chief Executive, in view of his commitments, to go along with him.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, the pending joint resolution is one of paramount importance not only to the citizens of the United States, but to the entire world. It is my opinion that prompt enactment of the joint resolution will promote the purposes behind its introduction, and in the remarks I am

making, my first to the Senate, I shall limit my presentation to 6 minutes.

Passage of the joint resolution would mean that the Congress was supporting the firm stand being taken by the administration. Since 1950 the United Nations and the United States have given the Communists every opportunity to demonstrate their friendship in the Far East and in other parts of the world. These opportunities have been disregarded by the Reds as so tragically illustrated by the imprisonment of the 11 American airmen in China.

The actions of the Communists indicate they have mistaken patience as a sign of appeasement. Although this resolution in nowise casts aside our patience, it does remove any doubt the Communists may entertain that the United States is an appeaser. It evidences our firmness.

This statement of firmness simply demonstrates solidarity, that the American people, through their elected representatives in the Congress, are unified and dedicated to freedom and democracy against the degradation of communism. The statement makes clear to all the world that the United States is willing to meet its solemn obligations to our allies.

The fear which permeates the world today comes not as a result of the efforts of the United States to maintain peaceful relations with the other nations of the world. That fear is the result of the aggressive and warlike actions of the Communists in the Far East and elsewhere.

This resolution is not an act of aggression. Rather it is a step toward the preservation of peace.

If the Communists continue their encroachments against the Pescadores and Formosa after passage of this resolution, it will not be because of the resolution, but in spite of it. By that I mean to say that, in my opinion, the Communists will not attack in the Formosa area or elsewhere unless they believe themselves strong enough to conquer, or unless they believe us weak enough to submit.

I have advocated publicly a strong Defense Establishment because I believe it to be our best means of assuring continued peace. Appeasement promotes aggression and weakness invites attack.

As I have advocated strength in our military preparedness, I advocate firmness in our relations with aggressor nations.

Our earnest prayer is for peace. If war should come, it would not be the result of any aggressive act on the part of the United States. But war might come as the result of any display of weakness, of disunity, or of hesitation.

I shall cast my vote on the side of firmness, for unity and for decision.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, it is my intention to support the pending resolution.

I do so because I interpret it as a demonstration to the world that the American people are united in their resistance to Communist aggression. We do not propose to compromise with the naked brute force of the Red tyranny.

The resolution does not confer any new powers upon the President. It does not

grant him any authority he does not possess. It is not a move which shapes American foreign policy in any form other than that which it will take when we approve the Formosan Treaty.

The responsibility for action will still be upon the President—and I do not envy him that responsibility. We must still hope and pray that God will guide his hand in setting a course that will protect and preserve our basic freedoms and our cherished institutions.

To my mind, the resolution is merely congressional recognition of the tremendous burdens the President must carry during the days of peril which lie ahead of us. On that basis, I freely and willingly grant him my support—and I am confident that this is the sentiment of the overwhelming majority of Congress.

We cannot, through this resolution, make decisions of high military strategy. That is the prerogative of the President. It is his prerogative because there is no one else in a position to exercise it.

We cannot, through this resolution, lay down blueprints that will guide the United States for all time to come. In these swiftly changing times, the blueprints of today may be entirely inadequate for tomorrow.

We cannot, through this resolution, instruct all the Presidents of the future to take a certain course of action whenever a given set of circumstances arises. None of us can see clearly through the dark mists that shroud the days before us.

But we can express the unity of American opposition to Communist imperialism. We can express our understanding of the grave crisis which confronts all humanity. We can express our determination to stand firm for the preservation of the cherished values of our civilization.

Above all, we can express our assurances that, as responsible men, we will help the President to the utmost of our ability. We will try to meet this crisis in the spirit of Americans, not partisans, dedicated to the salvation of our country through a firm unification of our people against the enemy of liberty.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I call up my amendment "1-26-55—A" and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment for the information of the Senate.

The CHIEF CLERK. It is proposed to add at the end of the resolution the following paragraph:

Nothing in this resolution shall be construed to authorize the President to use our Armed Forces on the mainland of China, or to intervene in defense of any islands controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Government within 12 miles of the coast of China except for the specific purpose of helping to withdraw Nationalist troops and civilians from such islands.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, for the sake of continuity in the Record, I desire to read from the resolution which is under discussion. It reads:

Resolved, etc., That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for

the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Mr. President, I have not heard a single argument on this floor that was not voiced before we got into World War II. The Senators who have spoken upon the resolution are apparently just as patriotic as were those who stated, before World War II, that Hitler was going to Africa, to Brazil, coming up to Mexico through South America, and then coming into the United States of America. I sat here through all that debate, and many things were afterward done by the President of the United States which various Senators thought never would be done.

I sat here on the floor of the Senate when \$2 billion were voted for China. Some of us who were opposed to giving that money to China said that a part of, if not all, the \$2 billion would go into the hands of Communist China. We were hopelessly outvoted. Indeed, those who voted against that amendment were charged with being Communists or as favoring communism. Yet only a few months later the then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, admitted that 90 percent of the \$2 billion worth of supplies was in the hands of the Communists in China.

Mr. President, what I am interested in knowing about the pending joint resolution is whether, if the Communists were to concentrate their forces five, six, seven, or eight hundred miles inside the mainland of China, and were concentrating airplanes, ammunition, and whatever else they might concentrate in that area, allegedly, perhaps, to attack Formosa, the Senate of the United States would have given authority to the President of this country to send armed forces into that area that far inland, in order to wipe out such concentrations.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. LANGER. I yield to the distinguished Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. In a conversation I had with the distinguished Senator a few days ago, I told him I hoped to have the yeas and nays ordered on his amendment. If the Senator will permit an interruption, I request the yeas and nays on the amendment of the Senator from North Dakota.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished minority leader for his request.

Mr. President, I wish to read a part of the resolution again:

That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa.

What the Senator from North Dakota is interested in knowing is whether, under the resolution, the Senate would in advance give the President of the United

States a blank check to send armed forces 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, or 1,000 miles inside the mainland of China, in order to wipe out concentrations of airplanes or whatever other kinds of military weapons the Communists may have concentrated.

My amendment simply provides that:

Nothing in this resolution shall be construed to authorize the President to use our Armed Forces on the mainland of China, or to intervene in defense of any islands controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Government within 12 miles of the coast of China except for the specific purpose of helping to withdraw Nationalist troops and civilians from such islands.

Mr. President, the amendment speaks for itself. It is very simple and very plain. It is simply a question of whether the Senate, in advance, is going to authorize our President to send forces into the mainland of China, or whether it is not. That is all there is to the question. If the President were to send such forces into the mainland of China, it would be an act of war. Therefore, for the first time in all the history of America, the United States would be the aggressor. If that were to be true, the United States, in the court of world opinion, would not be in so favorable a light as it would be if my amendment to the resolution were adopted.

It may be said that the President already has authority to send our Armed Forces anywhere in the world in order to protect Formosa, but certainly the Senate, if the amendment of the Senator from North Dakota were agreed to, would not have given the President that authority.

I might add, Mr. President, that so far as I am concerned, at this time I certainly shall not vote to send American boys to the mainland of China. I do not want them over there, to fight perhaps for years and years and years where, as the late Senator Taft said in a speech on the floor of the Senate, they would be hopelessly outnumbered.

Mr. President, I was very much interested in the speech made by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], in which he referred to the psychological effect the passage of the resolution would have, and said the passage of the resolution was being sought in order to secure the moral support of the people. As a result of many letters, telegrams, and telephone calls which I have received, I am entirely satisfied that the people of this country do not want American boys sent hundreds and hundreds of miles into the mainland of China any more than they want them sent into the swamps and jungles of Asia.

Mr. President, I was interested a few days ago at a hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee in a paper filed by Hamilton Fish, who for 20 years was on the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives when he was a Member of the Congress.

I may say in passing that Hamilton Fish's cousin, a Columbia University man, was the first man killed in World War I; and I may also say in passing that Hamilton Fish's family, in my opin-

ion, yields to no other family in America in patriotism and love of this country.

At this time I wish to state the substance—I shall not use his exact words—of some of the things Hamilton Fish said in testifying before the Foreign Relations Committee in connection with the Asiatic treaty, which he opposed at the public hearing:

I charge that this joint resolution is a war-provoking measure, and not, as claimed, a resolution to keep this country out of war.

Mr. President, I well remember when the lend-lease bill was passed and when we turned over destroyers to Great Britain. It was said that would keep us out of war, and that that measure was a peace measure. How well I remember what the distinguished late Senator Tobey said on that occasion. He said that measure and that action meant war. As all of us know, the prophecy of the late Senator Tobey was correct.

Mr. President, I read further from my version of the substance of the statement filed by Hamilton Fish:

I charge that this joint resolution is based on the same fallacious and false argument advanced in support of the lend-lease bill as a peace measure, whereas even its proponents admit today that it was a war measure. I charge that a bipartisan foreign policy is the most dangerous, warlike innovation in the last 10 years. Franklin Delano Roosevelt tried to establish it prior to World War II by appointing Colonel Knox, a Republican, as Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. Stimson, another Republican, as Secretary of War. But it failed lamentably in stifling the strong public sentiment in opposition to our entering World War II before the Jap attack on Pearl Harbor. Once more they declare there has to be unity and cooperation.

In time of peace, a bipartisan foreign policy is contrary to our two-party system and stifles criticism when it is most needed.

Just think, Mr. President, that the House of Representatives debated this measure for only 2 hours.

I read further:

It amounts to a gigantic coverup and virtually a fraud upon the American people.

Why not consult the free, sovereign American citizens on our foreign policy, involving the lives of their sons, the destruction of their wealth and resources, and the security of their Republic? That should be openly debated throughout the Nation. It is far greater and more vital to the American people than any other issue.

But, Mr. President, I do not believe that today one-half of 1 percent of the American people realize what the Senate is debating or what it means to the American people.

I read further:

No blank check should be given to any President or Secretary of State to involve us in war. Congress should never surrender to anyone its constitutional power to declare war. That is a sacred authority conferred on Congress by the American people and the founders of our Nation—to hold in check any warmongering, autocratic, or Fascist President.

Mind you, Mr. President, I am a friend of the President of the United States. I am not criticizing him at all. But when I think of what happened at Yalta and Teheran and some of the other places where President Franklin D.

Roosevelt had a blank check to do almost anything he wanted to do, then certainly the Senator from North Dakota wants to protect the people of the United States against any deal of any kind made by that kind of a President.

I read further:

Only elected public officials can actually circumvent the Constitution, the supreme law of the land. It is in the Halls of Government that actual subversion may be taking place far more dangerous to the people and destiny of our country than all the propaganda of the Communists and their dupes in the United States. The Constitution is not a plaything to be bandied about by the Senate, the Congress, or the President.

Mr. President, we know what the Constitution provides in regard to declaring war; we know it provides that only the Congress can declare war.

I read further:

Our foreign policy, if it exists at all, is of the tweedledee and tweedledum variety. Under Mr. Truman, it was the Truman-Acheson-Dulles brand; and under Mr. Eisenhower it is the Dulles-Marshall-Acheson type of one worldism.

There is little or no difference between the internationalism of the New Dealers and the me-too Republicans. President Eisenhower is just as internationalistic as Franklin D. Roosevelt or Harry Truman.

The tragic death of Senator Taft has made it possible for President Eisenhower to assume the international mantle of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Truman, Marshall, and Acheson.

Mr. President, only 2 years ago we had a national election for President of the United States. I leave it to any Senator on this floor to state whether I am correct when I say that the greatest argument in favor of the election of Dwight Eisenhower, when he was a candidate, was the pledge he made to the fathers and mothers of this country that, if elected President, he would go to Korea. When he made that announcement over the radio, almost immediately all over the land there was a great wave of sentiment in favor of the Republican Party. The people of the United States do not want their boys on the mainland of China, thousands of miles from their homes, fighting 4 million men. Under my amendment, that would not be possible unless the President did it upon his own responsibility.

Mr. President, I charge that a bipartisan foreign policy in time of peace deprives the American people of any voice in the determination of the greatest of all issues, namely, that of maintenance of peace or involvement in war.

I charge that a bipartisan foreign policy of tweedledum and tweedledee internationalism, and the policing of the world singlehanded, will involve us in a disastrous war in southeast Asia if the SEATO treaty is ratified—and in my opinion it will be, as will the treaty with China, in all probability.

I do not profess to be a great prophet, but I remember very well when we were debating the United Nations. Newspapers all over the country said that if a Senator voted against the United Nations he was voting for war, and if he voted for the United Nations he was voting for peace. I listened to that debate. I heard one of our most distin-

guished Senators say that the United Nations was similar to the Thirteen Colonies, which organized the United States of America. I believe that the Senator to whom I refer was sincere when he said that. He is still a Member of this body. On at least one occasion he has said that he regretted that vote.

I said upon that occasion that the United Nations was entirely dissimilar from the Thirteen Colonies, and that if at the time of the Thirteen Colonies the State of New York or any other State had the right of veto over the other 12 States, certainly Virginia, for example, would not have joined the Union.

Mr. President, I wish to read a portion of the very brief speech which I delivered at the time of the approval of the United Nations Charter by this body. At that time I said:

Mr. President, during my service in the Senate in behalf of the common people, I have never sold the truth to serve the hour. I have no quarrel with the vote of any honest Senator upon this floor. Each one took the same oath that I took, namely, to defend and uphold the Constitution of the United States of America.

Practically all Members of this body have indicated that they will vote for the charter. Under my oath, Mr. President, and under my conscience, I cannot so vote. If I did I would feel that I was betraying the hundreds of thousands who have died in this war for the United States, and the hundreds of thousands who have sacrificed their loved ones and their treasure. I would be willing to vote for the appropriation of the last dollar in the United States Treasury, and the last dollar that we could borrow if, by spending that money, we could eliminate war, which we all abhor and hate. I would unhesitatingly vote for the charter if I felt that it offered even the tiniest hope of a permanent peace. But, in spite of that, Mr. President, I feel from the bottom of my heart that the adoption of the charter—and, make sure, we are going to implement it—will mean perpetuating war.

What have we had since the adoption of that charter, Mr. President, except one war after another, and trouble all over the world? So far as I can see, the only benefit to flow from the United Nations Charter has been that when Malik, of Russia, presided over the United Nations in New York, he had an opportunity to talk and spread the propaganda of communism all over the United States by radio.

At that time I said:

I feel that it will mean the enslavement of millions of people from Poland to India, from Korea to Java, as well as people in many other places on this earth.

I was correct with respect to Korea and Java. Perhaps it will yet appear that I was correct also with respect to Poland and India.

I said further:

Mr. President, I feel that the adoption of the charter will be one step more toward compulsory and military conscription, and all that goes with war.

Only 18 months after I delivered that speech, a bill was introduced providing for universal military conscription. I never could understand why the advice of George Washington, to keep America from becoming involved with almost every other country on the globe, has not been heeded.

I continued:

In my opinion, the charter is not at all similar to the Constitution of the United States which was adopted by the original colonies. I may say at this point that I agree with what the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire, Mr. BRIDGES, said earlier in the day, when he stated:

"Most important of all, the American Constitution went to great length to guarantee genuine equality to States entering into the Union. Neither Ben Franklin nor the other members of the Constitutional Convention would have tolerated a constitution by which 2 or 3 or 5 of the States were given a veto power over all of the rest."

Mr. President, I hold in my hand a copy of the charter which was adopted. Let me make it clear that from the day the Senate voted to approve the United Nations Charter, no Senator has been more loyal or more honest in carrying out the theory of the United Nations than has the Senator from North Dakota. So long as the experiment was to be tried, I was for it. Only one other Senator, Senator Shipstead, of Minnesota, voted against it. Hiram Johnson, on his deathbed in the hospital, was paired against the United Nations Charter.

Mr. President, have we not the right to wonder, in considering the pending joint resolution, who is to help us if we get into war on the mainland of China? Who is to send troops over there?

Who signed this charter? It was signed by China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, France, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippine Commonwealth, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.

That is a list of 51 countries, if I have counted correctly. Yet, when we became involved in the so-called police action in Korea, where were all these countries that had signed this high-sounding charter?

Is it not true that the United States paid 95 percent of the cost? Is it not true that 95 percent of the casualties of the United Nations forces in Korea were American boys?

I want to say, in passing, that my vote against the United Nations Charter is one vote I have never regretted.

If the resolution is passed, if 500 or 1,000 miles inside the mainland of China there is a concentration of hundreds of planes, or a concentration of trainloads of ammunition, or a concentration of troops in training, is the United States going to sit idly by?

We have a President who said yesterday that he is perfectly willing to assume the responsibility. However, I repeat I do not believe that the United States Senate ought now to give him a blank

check, without coming back to the Senate, if he wants to come back, to involve our country in war with 400 million people on the mainland of China, a country that never has been defeated in all its history.

Mr. President, I for one by my vote do not intend to send a single American boy to the slaughter fields of the mainland of China.

I wish to come back to the resolution. The resolution provides:

The President of the United States be and he is hereby authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures—

I repeat—

and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

In other words, we are authorizing the President to do anything he wants to do with the approval of the Senate, and we are authorizing him to do it in advance. If a war should come, how would any Senator be able to criticize the President several months from now for something he did?

Certainly now is the time to say that we do not want to become involved in any war on the mainland of China.

Mr. President, our State Department is a funny kind of organization. I voted on the floor of the Senate about 4 or 5 years ago to give the State Department millions of dollars, because it was said by the State Department that it wanted to set up a school to train diplomats. The spokesmen for the Department said that some of the other countries had such schools, some of which were 300 years old. They said, "Now we were going to see to it that our diplomats are just as smart as those of any other country."

The State Department has those millions of dollars. Yet, Mr. President, who have been appointed as diplomats under this administration? The vice president of the Chase National Bank; the son of John D. Rockefeller; a partner of Dillon-Reed, who knew no more about diplomacy when he was appointed than I do. We have a very fine lady, Clare Boothe Luce, in Italy, who had as much experience in diplomacy as I had. Mr. Guggenheim, the millionaire, represents us in Portugal. There are others.

Of course, I have forgotten Nelson Rockefeller, who was appointed a few weeks ago as some kind of roving Ambassador. Yet we appropriated millions of dollars to get trained diplomats.

I hold in my hand an article which appeared in the Washington Daily News a few days ago. The title of the article is "Five Years Ago Formosa Was Thought 'Worthless'." It was written by R. H. Shackford, a Scripps-Howard staff writer. I shall read a portion of the article:

There is no stranger case in modern American political and military "diplomacy" than the postwar policy toward Formosa.

Less than 5 years ago the United States considered Formosa worthless. Today it is

considered vital to the defense of the free world.

Now that President Eisenhower has pledged to keep Formosa out of Communist hands, the State Department's Special Guidance No. 28 to its personnel on Formosa, dated December 23, 1949, makes strange reading today. It said in part:

"Loss of the island (Formosa) is widely anticipated. . . .

"All material should be used best to counter the false impression that its loss would seriously damage the interests of either the United States or of other countries opposing communism; that the United States is responsible for or committed in any way to act to save Formosa. . . .

"Emphasize as appropriate (that) . . . Formosa has no special military significance . . . the island is of no special strategic advantage to the Chinese Communist armed forces."

That is not BILL LANGER talking; that is the State Department of the United States of America, for which Congress appropriates hundreds of millions of dollars a year. Only a short time ago Formosa was said to be of no use; now it is of great importance.

It reminds me of World War I. Senator after Senator who upon this floor voted for World War I afterwards said we made a mistake, that we should never have become involved in World War I. That can be found in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Today, when we talk with almost any Senator, he says, "How nice it would have been if we had let Germany and Russia fight each other and we had not been involved."

In conclusion, Mr. President, I simply wish to repeat that every Senator who votes for this resolution is authorizing the President of the United States, with the consent of the Senate, to send troops anywhere, possibly thousands of miles into the mainland of China. It may be desirable to do that as time goes on; I would not know about that; but, certainly, so far as the senior Senator from North Dakota is concerned, he is not going to vote at this time to give a blank check to the President of the United States to use "any and all other means"—to quote from the resolution—to do as he pleases.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, following my remarks on my amendment, certain representative telegrams which I have received from various parts of the country.

There being no objection, the telegrams were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

HON. WILLIAM LANGER,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

American Political Action Committee, a nationwide, nonpartisan political committee opposed to communism, socialism, and internationalism, favors the defense of Formosa and Pescadores, but urges amendment that nothing contained in resolution shall be construed as empowering President to send a single American soldier to mainland of China or to defend islands within 12 miles of Chinese coast. Former Senator Taft, in last public message, specifically warned against sending American troops to mainland of China.

HAMILTON FISH,
President, American Political Action
Committee.

HOT SPRINGS, ARK., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Washington, D. C.:

As a Republican voter and campaigner for Eisenhower I hope—certainly with millions of other Americans—that you will not submit to pressure for hysteria because your courage can still save the lives of millions of American men, women, and children.

Dr. K. KAUFFMANN-GRINSTEAD.

SHAWANO, WIS., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Washington, D. C.:

Fight this malarkey staff. Be all-American.

M. E. BLACK.

LAFAYETTE, IND., January 26, 1955.

Hon. WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Thank you for working against Chinese war. Keep debate going for few more days and even Washington will hear people's prayers for peace.

JOHN SCHUDER.

SYRACUSE, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Hearty congratulations on vote against the defend Formosa resolution in committee. Continue fight in Senate.

HORACE A. EATON.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We support your opposition to the resolution on Formosa which will serve only to start a third world war. To maintain peace this resolution must be defeated.

IRVIN and BEATRICE SCHREIBMAN.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., January 26, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Endorse your opposition to Formosa resolution. Urge you make every effort to get Senate to return resolution to your committee for purpose of holding public hearings so that people's sentiment can be heard.

MAX R. MILLMAN.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., January 26, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your opposition to involvement of our country in preventative war. The lives of our sons should not be sacrificed to promote the Chiang Kai-shek gang in China civil war. As parents we believe that you express the will of the American people.

DAVID and SOPHIE DAVIS.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 26, 1955.

Hon. WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Vital you oppose war over Formosa. Thank you.

CHED VUCKOVIC.

MOUNT VERNON, N. Y., January 26, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We support your stand opposing sending of United States troops to Chinese mainland.

Mr. and Mrs. JOHN PRATT.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., January 26, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Strongly urge opposition to Eisenhower's Formosa proposal a serious threat to world peace.

Mrs. ROSE SMUKLER.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., January 26, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Thank you for opposing the President's proposals regarding Formosa. Please keep up the fight.

Mrs. T. SURIAN.

DETROIT, MICH., January 26, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

I applaud your decision not to support another Korean adventure, this time in Formosa. Congratulations. Millions of people agree with you.

JOHN CONLEY.

DETROIT, MICH., January 26, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Commend you on courageous stand to protect American lives. No winner when the atom bomb falls.

Mr. and Mrs. AERON KRASNER.

MOUNT VERNON, N. Y., January 26, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations for your opposition to send United States troops to China.

LOU PRATT.

DETROIT, MICH., January 26, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

DEAR BILL: Encouraged by your TV analysis to believe that some Members of Senate will avoid emotional and blind following of trap set by China lobby. Thank you and more power to you.

IRVING RICHTER.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

I support your opposition to Eisenhower's resolution on Formosa. We must not risk war to support interventions in Chinese affairs.

JOSEPH SCHWARTZ.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulate your stand against preventative war resolution. Urge your continued opposition and urge holding of vote until sentiment of American public fully registered.

W. B. MORTON.

DETROIT, MICH., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Commend your position on Formosa. For the sake of our children let's not rush into a war. There is time for open hearings and work through the United Nations.

MARY ANN DOOHA.

PRESCOTT, ARIZ., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

Millions of honest and loyal Americans are hoping and praying today that your behavior on the Senate floor will not discourage faithful Americans from performing wholeheartedly their duty to home and country, nor lend courage and comfort to our treacherous enemy. Ponder this seriously lest you fall victim to your own conceit.

Dr. S. H. ROBINSON.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Strongly and fervently urge Formosa question be taken to U. N. immediately. President's plan, especially protection of Quemoy and Matsu certain to involve us in war. This will be the saddest hour in our Nation's history if we permit ourselves to be sucked into this horrible situation. It will mean all-out war.

MONICA HALLER.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Hon. WILLIAM LANGER,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

In considering Formosa resolution, following facts must be weighed: No Communist leader to date threatened invasion of Formosa by surface forces, which in presence of 7th Fleet, impossible. Communist threats alluded to liberation of Formosa and could be accomplished by aerial destruction of physical assets of Chiang Kai-shek regime and its complete elimination as political factor in world affairs. Threat to Formosa not Chinese army but Chinese air force. President's statement "We must be alert to any concentration or employment of Chinese Communist forces obviously undertaken to facilitate attack upon Formosa and be prepared to take appropriate military action." would give him power to attack any and all Chinese air force, a concentration of Chinese air force anywhere in China appears to constitute threat to Formosa. Such action by us would mean full-scale atomic global war with China and Russia—without participation of our allies—war for which, in my opinion, we are utterly unprepared. Since we have reached atomic stalemate in which both sides have necessary nuclear weapons and aircraft with which to destroy each other completely, our ability to survive enemy surprise air attack depends primarily on capability of our continental air defense to destroy the invading air force. We were officially informed throughout recent years that Russia was building powerful defensive air force. Yet our own effort in this direction has been meager. Today we have only 2,000 appropriate aircraft with which to defend continental United States, from Alaska to Florida, California to Maine. This means that regardless of superiority of our Strategic Air Force, if Russia's air armada, including even obsolescent propeller bombers, launch atomic attack against us, they could saturate our meager air defenses. Total destruction of United States under such circumstances is possibility. I suggest therefore that continental air defense of United States be given A-1 priority over and above any military expenditures for any other purpose whatsoever.

ALEXANDER P. DE SEVERSKY.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Washington, D. C.:

Warmest congratulations on your opposition to Formosa resolution. We believe resolution greatest war danger and should be killed and not amended.

JOSEPH and CHARLOTTE SCHATZ.

CHICAGO, ILL., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Your opposition to our involvement Chinese conflict deserves highest commendation. Please clarify issues on Senate floor; bring facts to people. They rally to your support. Great majority American people will bless your fight against involvement. Please accept our support.
God bless you.

EDWIN JOHNSON,
Chairman,
Northwest Peace Committee.

MARIN CITY, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Wish to congratulate you on your stand against the Eisenhower Formosa resolution.

Mr. and Mrs. MALLOUF.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Earnestly urge you vote no power to President to arbitrarily make war with China. This is invitation to all-out war, which would open door to nuclear destruction. World is sick of war. Cannot survive devastation of modern warfare.

PAULINE WATKINS.

SAUSALITO, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your opposition to Formosa resolution. Hope you will continue your efforts.

A. P. SAXTON.

LINDSBORG, KANS., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations. I am glad you had the courage to speak out as you did.

MARGARET S. GREENOUGH.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Appreciate your stand against war-power resolution. Urge you to filibuster or delay action any possible way so as to give people time to speak to their Senators. When they do, this monstrous measure will never pass. Yours for peace and the honor of America.
MALCOLM and LILLIAN CALDWELL.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 26, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

As patriotic American longtime former resident Far East, urge determined opposition administration policy Quemoy aspect Formosan issue. Radford should be able intercept Communist amphibious attack by deploying fleet off coast near Amoy without our holding the island, which has same relation to city of Amoy as Staten Island to New York. Question, Would the United States tolerate comparable situation? Radford not infallible; Joint Staffs declared only few years ago that even Formosa was not essential to defense our country. This is a political decision, and recall remark Clemenceau that war is too important to be directed by generals.

EDGAR SALINGER.

CHICAGO, ILL., January 26, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

DEAR BILL: Your opposition to Eisenhower request for more undeclared war has enhanced your already tremendous standing in the country as an honorable, courageous, true-speaking Senator, deserving to be President. As soon as you appear Chicago you will see direct proof you speak for American people.

BURR McCLOSKEY.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM E. LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

This is to express our appreciation at your efforts to remove the blank-check aspects of the Formosa resolution. Certainly this is no time for such ambiguity as this resolution contains regarding the coastal islands and possible military action. Every effort should be made to reach a solution to this tense situation through the United Nations rather than through unilateral action.

E. RAYMOND WILSON,
Friends Committee on National
Legislation.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 27, 1955.

HON. WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Hope fight will be continued for amendments, excluding Quemoy and Matsu from Formosa resolution. President's assuming responsibility for decision regarding scope of military action does not legalize our moving into islands which are clearly China's. Why must resolution be rushed through? People just beginning to realize possible dangers of action authorized by resolution. Time should be given for expression of public opinion. Appreciate stand you have taken. Please keep on fighting.

MABLE VERNON,
Chairman, Peoples Mandate Com-
mittee, Boston House.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 28, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Washington, D. C.:

We heartily approve the position you have taken in the Formosa question.

Mr. and Mrs. ALLAN M. FERRES.

EVANSTON, ILL., January 28, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your courageous position regarding Formosan resolution. Urge you insist on referral of problem to United Nations for permanent solution.

FLORENCE ZINER.

BREWSTER, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Washington, D. C.:

Commend your stand and urge continued opposition to China lobby and preventive war.

CARL DREHER.

VAN NUYS, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Keep the power to declare war in hands of Congress. Urge we stay out of Formosa. It is a territory of China which we recognized at Potsdam and Cairo. Let's not risk our boys' lives and provoke a dangerous war. Admire your always watchful and courageous stand.

FREDA MALLEN.

HIGHTSTOWN, N. J., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

We support your stand against the President's Formosa policy resolution. We urge you to act to defeat it.

Mr. and Mrs. A. LINOWITZ.

OBERLIN, OHIO, January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We wholeheartedly support your views on the Formosa situation. We hope the resolution will be defeated by the Senate.

GERALD LEHMAN
(For Eugent V. Debs Club, Oberlin
Pacifist Fellowship, Oberlin Chap-
ter, Students for Democratic
Action, and 54 others).

SEATTLE, WASH., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Fight and stop the President's resolution on Formosa.

W. D. ANDERSON.

DETROIT, MICH., January 28, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Deeply appreciative of your courageous intelligent opposition to the war drive. I urge you to continue your good work for peaceful settlement of world tensions.

HELGA HERZ.

DETROIT, MICH., January 28, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Your and your colleagues stand against possible third world war is a fortress of inspiration to us. You are leading the tide of reversal against leaders who are laggard in the abolition of war. The vast majority are with you.

DETROIT AMERICAN RALLY.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 27, 1955.

HON. WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Public only now learning implications of United States commitments in Far East. Please fight for time to reach all the people. Urge acceptance of amendment which will restrict United States obligations to defense of jurisdictional line. We want continued support of our allies and also U. N. solution of Formosa problem. Want no war with China. Grateful for all your efforts to maintain peace.

EDITH J. GOODE.

DAVENPORT, IOWA, January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
United States Senate:

This is no preventive war but the best hope to prevent war. I beg you not to give aid and comfort to the Communists and destroy hope that clear and decisive statement of our intentions may deter aggression. We who have sons of military age must hold you partly responsible for the issue.

EDWIN B. LINDSAY.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on the courage and wisdom you have shown on the China resolution. With kindest personal regards.

JOSEPH LYNCH.

LONG BEACH, CALIF., January 28, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building:

Congratulations on fight against preventive war resolution. American lives should not be risked to maintain Chiang. MacArthur proposal we abolish war should receive consideration.

Regards.

GEORGE E. SHIBLEY.

SAN DIEGO, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Work as you never have before. The heart and hopes of those who share similar ethical first principles are with you.

THOMAS F. WRIGLEY.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations your fight for peace against Eisenhower war proposals. Urge continuous fight until American people able realize fully true meaning Eisenhower-Knowland war now program. War against China would mean devastating worldwide atom-hydrogen bomb war.

WILLIAM KELLY.

WHITESTONE, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

DEAR SENATOR: We were heartened by your courageous and independent stand on the crucial issue of Formosa. We are hoping that you can clearly and forcefully carry your argument through the committee in favor of presenting the case to the United Nations.

SEYMOUR CUKER.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Thank you for your deep concern for peace as evidenced by your position against preventive on other war in current discussions on China.

BENJAMIN SEGAL, M. D.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., January 26, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Strong opposition to Eisenhower's Formosa proposal. A serious threat to world peace.

WILLIAM SMUKLER.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building:

Congratulations on your courage and statesmanship in Formosa debate.

Mr. and Mrs. HERBERT SHUGER.

FARGO, N. DAK., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building:

Bravo. Strongly support your Formosa stand. Glad someone thinks of boys who have to do the dying.

Dr. and Mrs. L. E. HUSCHKA.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
Senate Office Building:

We support your opposition against President Eisenhower's proposal to defend Formosa which could precipitate war.

Mr. and Mrs. LOUIS KATZ.

ALBION, MICH., January 27, 1955.

Senator WILLIAM LANGER,
United States Senate:

Congratulations on opposition to President's Formosan policy. Peaceful solution imperative.

ARTHUR W. MUNK,
Albion College.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BIBLE in the chair). The Senator will state it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. What is the pending question before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER].

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Aiken	Fulbright	McClellan
Allott	George	McNamara
Anderson	Goldwater	Millikin
Barkley	Gore	Monroney
Barrett	Green	Morse
Beall	Hayden	Mundt
Bender	Hennings	Murray
Bennett	Hickenlooper	Neuberger
Bible	Hill	O'Mahoney
Bricker	Holland	Pastore
Bridges	Hruska	Payne
Bush	Humphrey	Purtell
Butler	Ives	Robertson
Byrd	Jackson	Russell
Capehart	Jenner	Saltonstall
Carlson	Johnston, S. C.	Schoepfel
Case, N. J.	Kefauver	Scott
Case, S. Dak.	Kerr	Smathers
Chavez	Kilgore	Smith, Maine
Clements	Knowland	Smith, N. J.
Cotton	Kuchel	Sparkman
Curtis	Langer	Stennis
Daniel	Lehman	Symington
Dirksen	Long	Thurmond
Douglas	Magnuson	Thye
Duff	Malone	Watkins
Dworshak	Mansfield	Welker
Eastland	Martin, Iowa	Wiley
Ellender	Martin, Pa.	Williams
Ervin	McCarthy	Young

Mr. CLEMENTS. I announce that the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR] and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY] are absent on official business.

The Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON] and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] are absent by leave of the Senate because of illness.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS] is necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. PORTER] is absent on official business as a member of the American delegation attending the 10th anniversary of the World War II Battle of Alsace, at Colmar, France.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BIBLE in the chair). A quorum is present.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, the question before the Senate is on the amendment offered by the senior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER], numbered 1-26-55A, to Senate Joint Resolution 28, or its companion, House Joint Resolution 159.

First, I wish to say that at no point in any of the testimony which I heard before the combined committees, or, in fact, in no discussion at any conference

I have ever attended, either during this session of Congress or at any prior session of Congress, and in no conversation I have ever had with any of our commanders in the Far East, beginning with General MacArthur and since that time, have I ever heard a responsible military official or a responsible civilian official of the United States suggest that there was any intent or desire to land American ground troops in China. So I think the RECORD should be very clear that that issue is not involved.

The amendment offered by the senior Senator from North Dakota reads as follows:

Nothing in this resolution shall be construed to authorize the President to use our Armed Forces on the mainland of China, or to intervene in defense of any islands controlled by the Chinese Nationalist Government within 12 miles of the coast of China except for the specific purpose of helping to withdraw Nationalist troops and civilians from such islands.

Mr. President, if the amendment were agreed to by the Senate, and were concurred in by the House, while, of course, it could not affect in any way whatever the constitutional power of the President as Commander in Chief, nevertheless it would be a negative moral action by the Senate and, in effect, would at least morally, if not legally, constitutionally tie the hands of the Commander in Chief, regardless of what the circumstances might be.

While it is true and quite proper, as I think every Member of the Senate recognizes, that under the Constitution only Congress can declare war, nevertheless I believe that every Member of this body realizes that in this day and age of the airplane and atomic weapons, conditions have changed considerably from those which existed at the time the Constitutional Convention was held at Philadelphia. I merely wish to cite a practical problem.

Suppose that on a given day in the future—and we all hope that such a situation will never confront the people or the Government of the United States, or any president of the United States, regardless of his party—the outer chain of radar stations in far northern Canada and Alaska should disclose that a thousand Soviet planes were over Canada, headed for the United States and that intelligence prior to that time had indicated a great build-up of Soviet power and a stockpiling of weapons at the forward Soviet bases.

Does any Member of the Senate or any citizen of the United States, assuming that Congress was not in session, or even assuming that Congress was in session but had recessed over the weekend, or, indeed, even assuming that Congress was in session and had some matters under debate, believe that, under those circumstances, the President of the United States would wait until the first of those bombers were over North Dakota, Minnesota, Illinois, Washington, Oregon, or California, and had dropped their first bombs, before it would be considered that an act of war had been declared upon us? Of course, the answer is "No."

Would any Member of Congress wish to debate for 5 days whether, perhaps, that was merely an exercise by the Soviet air force to see how close they could come to the Canadian-United States frontier before turning around and going back? I think not. Any President of the United States who, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, did not exercise his responsibilities under such conditions to defend the basic security interests of the United States probably would be subject to impeachment, if anyone was left in Washington, under those circumstances, to impeach him.

So, for better or for worse, the conditions under which we now live make it obvious that situations might arise in which Congress would not have an opportunity actually to make a declaration of war. Yet up to a certain point, at least, though there would be an obvious threat to the vital security of the Nation, there might not be a foot of United States territory invaded.

The President of the United States, as has been pointed out on several occasions, has made it very clear that his desire, in this resolution, is to stabilize conditions in the Pacific and to bring about a condition of peace in the world. He recognizes the fact that we cannot constantly back up without bringing on a greater danger of war. Thus, if a line were to be drawn, we could not continually retreat and allow island after island, and area after area, to be taken over by the Communist world without endangering the security of the basic defense line in the Pacific.

The amendment offered by the senior Senator from North Dakota would not tie the hands of the President, constitutionally, because nothing we could do by resolution would, in my opinion, add even one iota to or take away in the slightest any of his constitutional powers as Commander in Chief. But morally such action would tend to say to the President that though we recognize he has a responsibility, though we, as a Senate, place certain additional responsibilities upon him under the resolution, still, if the Chinese Communists attack our forces, we shall, to this extent at least, morally tie the hands of the President as Commander in Chief.

To take another practical example, what would the effect of the amendment of the Senator from North Dakota be? Suppose that on a mission of mercy, advance notice having been given to the entire world, as the President has given, after an agreement, if such an agreement be entered into with the Government of the Republic of China, there is to be a redeployment of certain Chinese Nationalist forces on the Tachen Islands. Let us assume that our naval vessels are acting as a screen; that our naval planes or Air Force planes from Okinawa, or elsewhere, are also present as a cover. Suppose that at that point the Chinese Communists send some of their Soviet-built MIG planes to attack the cover and to attack the American screen. Under those circumstances, do we want to say, even morally, though constitutionally it would have no effect, that when they have attempted to at-

tack us, and have attacked us, with our planes fighting and firing back, as they would—and I do not think there is a single Member in the Chamber who would expect our forces to be present as sitting ducks, to be fired upon, and not permitted to fire back—that we could pursue them only to—where? Only to within 12 miles of the China coast, and that then we were to stop? Would we not be declaring publicly that the attackers would have a sanctuary at that point? A sanctuary for what? To fly perhaps a few miles inland, or, perhaps, as the Senator from North Dakota says, a hundred miles inland. To do what? To build up their air forces, to refuel their planes with jet fuel, to take on additional bombs, to fill their magazines with ammunition. For what purpose? So they could turn around and attack the American fleets and the American air units again. In other words, we would be building another Yalu sanctuary, and would be asking our men to fight in fact with one hand, if not both hands, tied behind their backs.

The President has made that aspect of the question very clear. This is a resolution designed to preserve the peace. There will be no war, under the resolution, unless the Chinese Communists elect to make war. But if they should elect to make war, then it seems to me we should not tie the hands of the Commander in Chief, either legally or morally.

For these reasons I ask that the amendment offered by the Senator from North Dakota be rejected.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, if the Senator from California yields the floor, I should like to make a statement.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, the amendment which has been offered by the Senator from North Dakota is an amendment which, taken alone, would commend itself to many people throughout the country. Because I do not expect to vote for the amendment, I wish to make a few brief statements about it, and to make clear that if the amendment should be rejected, as I think it will be, that rejection should not be construed by indirection to say that the intent of the pending resolution is to give the President a directive to use forces on the mainland of China. It does not do that. Many people, however, may get the wrong impression from various speculations that are being made.

Mr. President, I wish to give point to this situation by reading a part of Ned Calmer's broadcast as reported on the CBS World News Roundup this morning. It was Bob Schackne's report from Tokyo. I was startled by it when I heard it on the radio this morning. I had my staff call the CBS office in New York to get a transcript of the broadcast, and I have in my hand what they furnished me. I read now from Bob Schackne's report from Tokyo at 8 o'clock this morning:

The Air Force has rushed war planes to Korea to meet the crisis in the Formosa

Straits. Fifty planes, half sabrejets, and half propeller-driven bombers, were sent to Korea at the same time they were ordered to Formosa. A glance at the map explains why. South Korea is closer than any other territory in the Allied hands to Shanghai, only 365 miles. It is in the Shanghai area that the Communists have concentrated twelve to fourteen hundred planes, including some 250 MIG's, and possibly some hundreds of IL-28 twin jet bombers. These are the planes that threaten the United States 7th Fleet and Formosa. In standard Air Force tactics, the best way to counter this threat is to strike directly and destroy the Red airbase. The best weapon to use is a tactical atomic bomb. The Air Force has the plane to do the job—the F-84 Thunder Jet, which can fly great distances and refuel in midair.

Whether this will be done is a decision President Eisenhower has not yet made. What the Air Force is doing is positioning itself in case the order is issued.

Mr. President, I do not believe that the President of the United States is going to decide on any move such as this commentator suggests. If I did, I would support the pending amendment, because I do not believe in starting war under the guise of preventing war.

The resolution is intended, I believe, only to give congressional approval to defensive military action.

Nor do I believe that the illustration which the able and distinguished Senator from California suggested accurately describes the situation which would exist if the amendment offered by the Senator from North Dakota were to be adopted. If a group of foreign planes were to appear over Alaska or over Canada or over the North Dakota border, such action would violate the sovereignty of the territory of Alaska, Canada, or the United States as soon as the planes crossed the border. Even before they crossed the border defense would be in action.

To be able to resist attack or even to strike in another quarter after hostilities have begun is quite different than increasing the number of planes in South Korea, with the described intent of being in a position to strike preventively at Shanghai with a tactical atomic bomb to destroy a Red air base 365 miles beyond Korea—if that were the intent, which I do not believe.

Now, I do not know what the effect of this broadcast was when it was heard in other places of the world today, but I suspect it has created some suspicion of the intent of the resolution. It may add to unhealthy fears that do exist.

Mr. President, I was impressed by the speech of Gen. Douglas MacArthur yesterday at Los Angeles. On the occasion of his birthday memorial at Los Angeles General MacArthur was quoted as saying:

Present tensions with their threat of national annihilations are kept alive by two great illusions. "The one a complete belief on the part of the Soviet world that the capitalist countries are preparing to attack them, * * * and the other a complete belief on the part of the capitalistic countries that the Soviets are preparing to attack us."

Both are wrong, he said. For either side war with the other would mean nothing but disaster. "But the constant acceleration of preparation may well, without specific intent, ultimately produce a spontaneous combustion."

The wisdom of General MacArthur was attested no later than a few days ago, when the Subcommittee on Internal Security, by unanimous vote of Senators on both sides, as I understand, said that five commanders who had been in Korea applauded the wisdom of General MacArthur.

Mr. President, when a broadcast from Tokyo tells of a buildup in Korea of our planes and a concentration of Red planes in Shanghai, and says that the best way to counter this threat is to strike directly and destroy the Red air base and that the best weapon to use is a tactical atomic bomb, I do not wonder that fears are being generated.

Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I yield to the Senator from Vermont.

Mr. AIKEN. As I understand him, the Senator from South Dakota has read from the opinion of a radio broadcaster in Japan, who referred to a buildup of 1,200 or 1,400 planes in Shanghai. Does it not make sense for us to warn the Chinese Government that if it uses those 1,200 or 1,400 warplanes in attacking Formosa, or in violating the armistice in Korea, or in any other friendly country, we shall do our utmost to blow them off the map in China?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Yes, but the premise of the Senator from Vermont does not conform to the broadcast. I wholly endorse the idea of saying to the Red Chinese, "Come no farther," but I do not endorse the idea of saying that we are increasing planes in Korea to make a preventive strike at Shanghai before there is an attack or movement from that quarter, and that we are going to use an atomic tactical weapon. I do not believe that the President will sanction any such first move on our part.

Mr. AIKEN. Is it not fair to the Chinese, to the American people, and to the rest of the world, to tell them that if the Chinese Communists use those 1,200 or 1,400 planes against us or our allies, we shall take action?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. If they use them, yes, but the Senator begs the question. The suggestion of the broadcast was not if the Reds used them, but if they concentrated them and build them up at Shanghai, "the best way to counter this threat is to strike directly and destroy the Red air force." To my mind, that is starting the war. As long as those planes are on the ground there is a possibility that hostilities may be averted.

Mr. AIKEN. Is the Senator from South Dakota in favor of waiting until any or all of the 1,200 or 1,400 planes drop bombs on Korea?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. No; I am not suggesting that we wait until they strike Korea or until they hit Formosa; but I am suggesting that it does not make for a solution of a very difficult problem if we suggest that the purpose of the resolution is to give the President a directive to make a preventive strike at Shanghai, 365 miles beyond Korea.

Mr. AIKEN. I, for one, cannot see the sense of letting them strike first. If they are warned, as the President is warning

them, and as the Congress should warn them, the chances of their striking us are much less than if we draw a line and say, "Do all you want behind this line, but do not cross it." That simply does not make sense, from a defensive standpoint.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Well, until hostilities begin, they have as much right to do what they want on their own soil as we do. I do not want the Reds to limit what we do in our area. The Senator from Vermont must not misunderstand my position in regard to the Langer amendment. I have said I shall not vote for the Langer amendment, but I do not want my position in that connection to be interpreted as indicating that I believe the joint resolution carries a directive to the President to use our troops on the mainland of China in advance of any attack by the Chinese Communists.

Mr. AIKEN. But in the event the Red Chinese were to attack our planes in the air, or our ships on the waters around Formosa, and if we had instructed the President not to send our Armed Forces closer than 12 miles to the mainland of China, and then assuming that 1,200 or 1,400 planes from Shanghai were to make a diversionary attack upon Korea, would not the islands of Quemoy and Matsu assume tremendous importance to us at that time?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I think so.

Mr. AIKEN. And should not the President be authorized to use our forces to hold them, and thus bottle up the harbors of Amoy and Foochow?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Yes, because the Senator includes in his hypothetical situation the attack upon Korea. I think the Senator from Vermont has pointed out one of the difficulties under the amendment of the Senator from North Dakota, the adoption of which I am not advocating. I do say, however, that if we fail to adopt it, there should not be read into the joint resolution a directive calling for a preventive strike before there is action on the part of a potential enemy.

Mr. AIKEN. No, and I do not think so.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. In the assumptions the Senator from Vermont used—when he assumed they had struck, and so forth—of course he assumed a different situation.

Mr. AIKEN. Assuming that our intelligence were to advise us they were preparing for an attack at 5 o'clock tomorrow morning—

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Of course if our intelligence had advised us that the Japanese fleet was steaming toward Pearl Harbor and intended to attack it, I think we should have struck before the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor.

Mr. AIKEN. Let me say I do not understand anything in the joint resolution to be a directive to the President to use our Armed Forces to engage in a preventive war.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I share the interpretation of the Senator from Vermont that nothing in the joint resolution authorizes the making of a preventive strike or a preventive war.

The Senator from Vermont may remember, however, that when the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] was placing an interpretation upon the statement made yesterday by the President of the United States, I expressly reserved the right to make a different interpretation from the one I thought the Senator from New Jersey was making.

I thought the President's statement of yesterday, taken as it was intended, was helpful. I did not like any interpretation of it which sought to read into it a directive to make a preventive strike.

Mr. AIKEN. But does not the Senator from South Dakota believe that we should warn the Chinese Communists that if they make a strike at Korea or Formosa or at any other place vital to us, we will strike back wherever we can do so most effectively, so as to make sure—

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I think that is the intent of the joint resolution.

Mr. AIKEN. So as to make sure that our defenses will be protected.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I think that is the intent of the joint resolution.

Mr. AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. My only feeling of hesitancy about the joint resolution really is that, because of some of the indefinite phraseology it contains, Chou En-lai's declaration or ultimatum of a few days ago in regard to his intent regarding Formosa may lead him to probing around to determine the undefined position at which the trigger is pulled, and that he might touch off the spark. I am not anxious to have it touched off.

Mr. AIKEN. That is right; he has virtually served notice on us that he intends to take this territory, which has not as yet been declared as belonging to China; and that if we try to prevent his doing so, he will shoot at our forces on sight. But I think, insofar as I am concerned, there is nothing in the joint resolution, which authorizes a preventive war.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I share that view of the Senator from Vermont.

On the point of title to Formosa let me say my understanding is that when the Japanese surrender was ordered by the Japanese Government, it was agreed among the allies that the surrender in China and the surrender in Formosa should be taken by the Chinese troops. In our memorandum to the Far Eastern Commission in connection with the peace treaty for Japan, we indicated we thought the United Nations should make a final recommendation with respect to the jurisdiction over Formosa. But because of the circumstances, Nationalist China took the surrender in Formosa, as it took the surrender on the continent of China, which he was then occupying; and, naturally, Chiang Kai-shek established his headquarters of government on Formosa, when he was forced from the mainland.

Mr. AIKEN. Does not the Senator from South Dakota believe that the weakness of relying upon a United Nations' decision as to the ultimate disposition of Formosa lies in the fact that the

Chinese Communists have already registered a healthy disregard for the decisions of the United Nations, particularly in the case of Korea?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. They have; but I do not expect any head of either Chinese state to recognize the sovereignty until he has to do it. I do not see how any ruler of Nationalist China at this time could publicly take any position other than that which Chiang Kai-shek has taken, namely, that he intends to return to the mainland of China; nor do I see how any ruler of Red China could take any position, publicly, other than that Chou En-lai has taken—namely, that he expects to restore Formosa and the Pescadores to the control of mainland China. I think that during the years China has had a feeling that once a Chinaman, always a Chinaman; that once a national of China, always a national of China.

Mr. AIKEN. Is it not a vital essential that we rely upon all means at our command, including our own Armed Forces, until such time as the United Nations has acquired the means to enforce its own decisions?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. When it comes to a matter of forces, yes. But I wish to affirm very definitely that the part of the message of the President in which he stated he would welcome action by the United Nations to obtain a ceasefire in the Formosa Straits was an integral part of his proposal.

Mr. AIKEN. That is true.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Furthermore, in my own thinking, I also place a good deal of reliance upon the fact that the authority the President requested would terminate when he reported to the Congress that the peace and security of the area had reasonably been assured through action taken by the United Nations or otherwise. The last sentence of the joint resolution includes specific language to that effect.

Mr. AIKEN. That is true. We must rely upon the United Nations as a great moral force. But we must also realize that at present the United Nations does not have the strength to enforce its own decisions, especially against a country the size of China or Russia.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Yes. There is no disagreement on that score.

Mr. AIKEN. Yes.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. But, for the RECORD—since the United Nations has been brought into the discussion—I should like to call attention to the fact that the last paragraph of the joint resolution reads as follows:

This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.

I also call attention to that provision, Mr. President, because amendments have been suggested which would seek to spell out an appeal to the United Nations in more detail. It is important for the Senate and the country to realize that the President's message requesting this action stated he would welcome a ceasefire effort by the United Nations; and

that in the precise text of the joint resolution itself, providing for termination of the authority proposed to be granted, there appears what the President himself requested, the specification that the authority granted under the joint resolution will expire "when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress."

Inasmuch as the United Nations has been brought into the colloquy, I take the opportunity at this time to say that this language of the resolution itself is why I do not think we are called upon to adopt any of the amendments which have been proposed for more elaborate reference to the United Nations. I think that is implicit in the resolution.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I wish to yield first to the Senator from Idaho [Mr. WELKER], who was first on his feet, if he wishes to ask a question. If not, I will yield to the Senator from Utah.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, I am grateful to my distinguished colleague from South Dakota. I should like to ask him a question.

Does the Senator happen to know where the commentator received the information which he broadcast to America and all the rest of the world by way of radio or television this morning?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. No; I do not. However, I have in my hand a dispatch from the news ticker in the lobby. I think it is the United Press report. It is a dispatch from Taipei, dated Saturday, but received here at 2:34 p. m. Of course, Taipei time is a day ahead of our time. The dispatch reports that:

United States Saberjets, flying from their new Formosan bases, joined the powerfully reinforced 7th Fleet in the anti-Communist patrol.

The dispatch contains more on the buildup in that general area, and also discloses that a Chinese pilot bailed out from a Saberjet over Formosa yesterday. The dispatch further refers to action around the Tachens, and seems to be thoroughly consistent with the one factual statement in the broadcast from Tokyo, to the effect that the number of our planes in Korea is being increased. However, the observations and the speculation obviously were those of the commentator.

Mr. WELKER. That leads me to a further—and perhaps final—question. I am certain that my distinguished colleague, who is a member of the Armed Services Committee, does not know of his own knowledge, nor has he heard through the medium of any competent evidence, that the jets allegedly flying from Japan to Korea are for the purpose of an attack on Shanghai, or are for the purpose of a defensive measure in the event that the North Korean Communists desire to try once more to take South Korea.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I think the implication of the Senator's question

is correct. We do not know. The last two sentences I read were:

Whether this will be done is a decision President Eisenhower has not yet made. What the Air Force is doing is positioning itself in case the order is issued.

Again, I appreciate and welcome the statement which came from the White House yesterday, that the decision would be the decision of the President, and not the chance decision of a local commander, without direct approval by the President.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a final brief question?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I yield.

Mr. WELKER. I am certain that in the hearings which we had the honor to attend and the sadness of listening to, the distinguished junior Senator from South Dakota and the junior Senator from Idaho did not base their decision upon some military science or tactics broadcast by a radio commentator, but upon the opinions of the greatest military leaders in our Government today. Is that a correct conclusion?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Certainly the committee did not take testimony from radio commentators or outside experts. However, I think in all fairness it ought to be said—

Mr. President, I refrain from making the statement I was about to make, because I do not wish to make statements which might add fuel to certain fires and rumors which have been burning around the city during the last day or two.

Let me say, however, that it has been the privilege of the junior Senator from South Dakota to listen to military testimony for a great many years.

During many of the years when I was a member of the House of Representatives, and during all the years of World War II, and for sometime prior thereto, I was a member of the subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations which made the original appropriations for the Manhattan District, the atomic bomb project, and appropriations for the War Department, and the old Air Corps. So, I have heard a great deal of military testimony since 1940, when I first joined that particular subcommittee, as well as in the Armed Services Subcommittee of the Senate.

While I pose as no expert, I have come to recognize that sometimes we obtain different advice from different experts; and it becomes the responsibility of Members of the Senate eventually to use their own judgment when they receive evidence which reflects differences in opinions of the experts. The judgments which the junior Senator from South Dakota ventures to exercise will be those based upon a melding of the several opinions he has heard expressed.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I promised to yield first to the Senator from Utah [Mr. WATKINS].

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, let me say to the distinguished Senator from South Dakota that the question which the Senator from Idaho [Mr. WELKER]

just asked was one which I intended to ask.

Is there any other means of knowing whether the statements made in the radio broadcast are accurate? I refer to statements with respect to the buildup in Shanghai, and also statements with respect to the number of planes which have been sent into the area.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. The dispatch to which I alluded was a United Press dispatch. It has some further data in it. I do not know that it is quite so specific as the broadcast was. I read further from the dispatch:

Two more American flotillas were reported on the way to the Formosa area to join the already reinforced 7th Fleet and the 75 Sabrejets sent to Formosa in the defense of the islands.

One, composed of cruisers and destroyers, had left the west coast of the United States. The other, including the carrier *Midway*, was hurrying north from Singapore.

The 7th Fleet already had 4 carriers, 7 cruisers, and 50 destroyers massed north of Formosa, awaiting Washington orders for the evacuation of the Tachens.

Mr. WATKINS. Mr. President, if the Senator from South Dakota will further yield, it seems to me that we cannot take notice of all the speculation indulged in between now and the time of final action, as reasons for our voting one way or the other upon the amendments or upon final passage of the joint resolution itself. Not all the queer things come out of China. I am wondering if this broadcast could not be classed in the realm of something that is rather queer.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I would not so classify it. I think the speculation of the commentator is not the kind of speculation which would be unexpected when he is witnessing such a buildup as he is witnessing. I regret it, but it was on the radio this morning in the 8 o'clock World News Roundup. I say, I regret it, because I think it is bound to create some suspicion and fear, and add to a very difficult, tense situation, at best, but I do not blame the reporter for telling us what he sees.

Yet I think it does explain why many people in the United States will wonder why we do not adopt such an amendment as that offered by the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER]. That is why I venture to make reference to it here. I do not want the rejection of the amendment offered by the Senator from North Dakota to imply that the joint resolution carries a directive to the President to make a preventive strike, using atomic weapons. It does no such thing.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I yield to the Senator from Florida.

Mr. HOLLAND. I appreciate the courtesy of the distinguished Senator from South Dakota in yielding to me in order that, first, I may compliment him and join him strongly in his statement, which I think very ably covers not only his position, but the position of many other Senators, including the Senator from Florida.

It seems to me that, rather than pay too much attention to the sensational

statements of radio broadcasters and the like, it is much more important to realize that our strongest ally and our most cautious ally, who has repeatedly shown great nervousness heretofore whenever we did anything in the Far East which even looked as though it might tend to promote violence, has in this matter spoken out in strong approval of the message of the President and of the pending resolution. Senators will remember that twice since the President's message, Mr. Anthony Eden has found occasion to speak very strongly in support of the President's message.

At this time, with the indulgence of the Senator from South Dakota, I should like to read into the RECORD additional evidence of the fact that Great Britain is strongly with us in this position, and is not as nervous as was the broadcaster from Tokyo who was just mentioned by the Senator.

The statement of the British Ambassador I am about to quote was made by him when he called today on Governor Leroy Collins, of Florida, at Tallahassee. He made the statement while he was being interviewed by the Associated Press. The dispatch reads:

British Ambassador Sir Roger Makins today expressed the view that tension in the Far East will be lessened when the United States intentions under President Eisenhower's Formosa policy announcement are fully understood.

Now I quote directly the Ambassador's statement in the interview:

"The Chinese Communists have reacted rather sharply against the President's message but when its essential meaning is understood it should contribute to a lessening of tension," he said at a news conference.

"My personal view is that while we do not deny the dangers existing in the situation, when it is realized, as it should be, that the United States intentions are purely pacific and that it has no design against the Chinese mainland but at the same time it will maintain its essential interests in the Pacific, the effect will be good."

I ask the distinguished Senator from South Dakota if he does not feel that the Senate and the apprehensive people of the United States can repose great confidence in the interpretation contained in the official pronouncements of our strongest and most cautious ally, Great Britain, such as the statements made by Britain's distinguished Foreign Minister and its distinguished Ambassador, its spokesman in our country?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I do. I agree with the Senator from Florida. I appreciate very much his reading the dispatch into the RECORD at this point. If it is clearly understood, that our intentions are solely for peace, and that we are not seeking to invade the mainland of China or to use this opportunity to provide a springboard for invading the mainland of China, I believe we will have an opportunity to work out the whole situation.

In closing, I wish to read again from the statement issued by the White House yesterday:

The President made it clear that these (United States) forces were designed purely for defensive purposes and that any decision to use United States forces other than in im-

mediate self-defense or in direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores would be a decision which he would take and the responsibility for which he has not delegated.

Mr. President, I have unbounded confidence in the expressed desire of President Dwight D. Eisenhower to create conditions in which the people of the world can live in peace, without fear of another world war, particularly an atomic war. I have heard him in public and in private express himself with great feeling on that point. I am convinced that by reserving these decisions to himself, he has protected us against the possible action of some person, who might be impelled, after seeing only a small segment of the total picture, to engage in action which could trigger the whole world into a terrific holocaust.

The President understands as few men in the world do the tremendous implication of starting a war with modern weapons. He understands as few people do the attitudes of the nations with whom we have been associating.

The very fact that the Senator from Florida was able to read the statement from a responsible British authority suggests another reason for confidence. Testimony at the hearings conducted by the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, sitting jointly, indicated that there have been consultations between our Government and other governments. If now representatives of other responsible governments give assurance that they do not misunderstand our intentions, if they clearly state that they know our intentions are purely in behalf of peace, that will help to maintain confidence both here and abroad.

Therefore, Mr. President, I shall vote against the pending amendment, and I shall vote against the other amendments which have been proposed. I shall vote for the resolution. I do so in the belief that the President will use the power conferred by the resolution for the purpose of preserving the peace of the world.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. I yield.

Mr. LEHMAN. I heard the distinguished Senator from Florida speak about the approval that has been expressed by Great Britain. I fully share the feeling of the Senator from Florida that Great Britain is our most dependable and most powerful ally. Great Britain has always been a great tower of strength in the defense of what we must always strive for in connection with freedom and the maintenance of liberty throughout the world.

However, my understanding of the position taken in Great Britain, both by the party in opposition, namely, the Labor Party, and by the distinguished Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, is that, while they fully approve of the position we have taken with regard to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, it has been emphasized very strongly that they consider there are two separate issues involved in the subject. They consider that one issue is the immediate defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, and that the other is the

attitude which we should take with regard to the Chinese mainland and the islands immediately adjacent to the Chinese mainland, notably Quemoy and Matsu and the Tachens.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. What is the Senator's question?

Mr. LEHMAN. As I recall the statement, it was very clearly set forth that Britain would support us strongly in the position which we have assumed with regard to Formosa and the Pescadores. Of course every Member of the Senate takes exactly the same position. We are all in favor of the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. However, the British have had a very strong question, and to some degree of opposition, with respect to the open-end powers which are being given to the President in the resolution, with regard to our attitude concerning the Chinese mainland and the islands adjacent to the mainland which, as the Senator I am sure will agree, are only 4 or 5 miles from the Chinese mainland.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, I am not quite clear as to what the Senator's question is. However, in view of his statement about the position of Great Britain, let me say that I do not accept the idea that the question is the legal status of the Pescadores and Formosa, as against the coastal islands and the mainland. And if we did, we would find that involves three different areas. The jurisdictional question is somewhat different with respect to the three—the mainland, the offshore islands over which Chiang Kai-shek retains control, and the Pescadores and Formosa.

I think there are three jurisdictional questions, but I do not think we shall solve the problem immediately before the Senate by looking at the jurisdictional questions. There is a practical situation facing us. I am hopeful that the efforts of Australia, New Zealand, and Great Britain, all three of whom, I understand, are endeavoring to induce the United Nations to endeavor to obtain a cease-fire, will be successful. In my opinion, someone who is not a party to the immediate issues must take the lead right now. We might propose the action to the United Nations, but we are in a delicate position. So someone who is not a party must take the lead. The initiative will have to be carried by someone else and if Australia or New Zealand or the Prime Minister of Great Britain, by their representatives, are able to initiate action, I wish them success.

I hope the expectation and the prayer of our President that some way may be found to avoid conflict may be wholly achieved, and it is in that hope that I am supporting the resolution.

Mr. DUFF obtained the floor.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, the pending question is the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER]. I was wondering if it would be agreeable to the Senator from Pennsylvania, if he would not thereby lose his right to the floor, and if it would be agreeable to the Senate to have a rollover on the Langer amendment before the Senator from Pennsylvania makes his remarks, which

I understand are on the general resolution rather than on the pending amendment.

Mr. DUFF. Mr. President, I shall be very glad to yield, with the understanding that I may have the floor immediately after the vote.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Oregon desires to speak on the pending amendment.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Then I think, Mr. President, that the Senator from Pennsylvania may as well proceed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MANSFIELD in the chair). The Senator from Pennsylvania may proceed.

Mr. DUFF. Mr. President, as the adoption of the pending joint resolution may prove of momentous consequence in our further dealings with the communistic world, I feel impelled to make of record a short summary of my reasons for supporting it.

The leaders of imperialistic Soviet communism, their satellites and allies, makes no secret of their boasts to overrun and conquer the entire world.

Since the end of World War II there has been such a continuous advance of communism in power, in influence, and in territory subjugated, that in this short period the Communists have already brought under their control a vast portion of the surface of the earth and a considerable proportion of the whole human race.

The failure of the free nations to unite with a common purpose and intention, and the lack of a firm determination and policy of affirmative opposition, have made the success of this advance more rapid and effective than otherwise it possibly could have been.

To date the military power of the United States, our vast industrial complex, our financial resources, our military leadership, and our will as a people not to be overcome by this vicious and fanatical and evil force, have made the United States the main roadblock between communistic ambition and their goal of world dominion.

Our responsibility as leader of the free world has cast some of our lines in dangerous and faraway places. Abhorrent as it is to the average American to have our Nation in conflict with strange peoples half way around the world from home, nevertheless those places are where our obligation calls us if we are to preserve for ourselves and transmit to those who will come after us the liberties of which we have been the heirs, and which we have up to now so bountifully enjoyed.

At the moment the most serious point of conflict with the communistic world is at the Straits of Formosa and the surrounding islands. Chou En-lai has announced his intention to conquer Formosa and the Pescadores, to drive us and our allies away from the Straits of Formosa, and to erect in that area further bastions of communistic might so as to make the whole west Pacific untenable for us and the other free nations of the world.

The island of Formosa is only 725 miles from Manila in the Philippines; 830 miles from Pusan in Korea; 1,300 miles

from Tokyo in Japan; 1,690 miles from the island of Guam; and from our strong base at Okinawa the distance is relatively the same as the short distance from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

If Formosa is permitted to fall, a great and vital gap will have been torn in our western Pacific defense line. Eventually this great hole in our defenses will render untenable Okinawa, Korea, Japan, Guam, and the Philippines, and at the same time render immensely more vulnerable the whole of Indonesia, and eventually even New Zealand, Australia, and the Hawaiian Islands. Surely the magnitude of such a potential disaster is entirely beyond comprehension if the free world is to survive against this worldwide drive of communism.

Consequently it would seem that Formosa and the Pescadores are a "must" to be held unless the whole Far East is eventually to fall and collapse into the hands of the Communists. And, in the light of the announced intentions of Communist China, the same applies, within the President's sound discretion, in respect to the adjacent islands dominating the approaches thereto.

The pending resolution recommended for adoption is clearly based upon the assumption of a calculated risk that Russia is unwilling at this time to undertake an all-out war, and since Red China's action is predicated upon Russian approval or veto that consequently Red China is not ready at this time for all-out war.

It has been pointed out that this calculated risk may prove a bad calculation, and that is possible. But if the risk so calculated and assumed should bring on a major conflict, such a conflict would start, in any event, only at a time when even further communistic advances would have made more difficult an already difficult defense.

At a time of great decision, confidence must be reposed in someone somewhere. On this occasion it happens to fall upon the President of the United States. As Americans we are fortunate that the President of the United States has character, experience, and capacity that are known worldwide, even to his berating and abusive communistic critics. President Eisenhower is known to be a hater of war and a man devoted in every fiber of his being to the establishment of world peace.

The President has given the whole world assurance that the United States desires peace, not war, and that he will accept the personal responsibility of deciding whether our Armed Forces in the Far East are to be used for any purposes other than the defense of this vitally important stronghold in the Western Pacific defense line of the free world.

The time has surely come when we must say at last to the Communist world in the Far East, "So far, but from now on no farther." The drawing of that line affords the greatest possible prospect of settling the differences in that area by peace rather than by a resort to war.

The decision confronting us is a decision requiring the decisive action which the pending resolution calls for, and I shall vote for it as proposed.

Mr. WELKER. Mr. President, the resolution before the Senate is of a nature to give pause to any prudent man. No one who has any knowledge of the situation with which the resolution seeks to deal—or who is aware of the enormous increase in the destructive power of modern weapons—can contemplate with prudence the use of military force. However, I think it vital that in considering this resolution we do not let a human reluctance to assume the great risks inherent in this decision blind us to the urgent need for its approval.

I believe that if we examine this proposal in the context of the situation to which it is to be applied, the appearance of risk is far greater than the actuality. Moreover, I am convinced that if we fail to act with boldness and decision, we will invite losses more grievous than those we might otherwise encounter.

We are committed to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. This is a commitment of long standing, and is an expression of our association with the Government of Free China in the struggle to balk Communist expansion. We are confronted, then, with both a moral and a material obligation to an important ally. But the obligation of this country to keep the Island of Formosa in friendly hands is more binding even than that. It is directly linked to our own security and to the security of the free world because the island of Formosa is a component of our and the free world's line of defense in the Pacific. For us, therefore, and for our associates, it is vital that Formosa be kept out of Communist hands.

I make no pretense to expertness in the field of military strategy; but it seems to me that if there is nearly universal agreement that a position must be defended, we cannot logically ignore the possibility that force might be required in the conduct of that defense. I place stress on the word "possibility," because I am convinced that it is not as serious a possibility as some would have us believe. In my opinion, if we in the Senate vigorously affirm the power of the Chief Executive and Commander in Chief in this regard, we will have taken a step which will assist in resolving the issue without resort to violence.

Before elaborating on the premises that lead me to this conclusion, I shall review briefly the situation which confronts us. Since 1950, the Communist conspirators in Peiping have pursued a continuous, belligerent, constantly aggressive course. In Korea they were open aggressors. They sponsored and supplied the Communist Viet Minh in the guerrilla campaign in Indochina. They have waged economic war throughout southeast Asia. They have supported subversive elements in every nation of the Orient, from Japan to Indonesia. In this whole criminal course they have drawn back but once—when they were met with force on the Korean peninsula.

It may be asserted that calling the Communist suit for truce in Korea a withdrawal strains the meaning of the term; that in Korea the Reds were driven back. In a military sense, that is true. I regret that we did not go on to win.

But it is too late now to make plans for something which I consider to have been a grievous mistake. We must now plan for the future, profiting by the mistake of the past. Let me emphasize that point.

But the abandonment of the conquest of the Korean Peninsula was a Red policy decision, taken, I am convinced, not only because of the defeats they had suffered in the field, but because they faced the certain prospect of an unyielding defense of South Korea, which made the achievement of the Red objective impossible. In fact, there is now reason to believe that if the Red strategists had known that their attack on the Republic of Korea was going to evoke a prompt response from the free nations, particularly the United States, the Communist armies never would have crossed the 38th parallel.

What analysis, then, can be made of this? If this were the only instance of this kind of Communist reaction, an analysis of any sort would be worth little. But it is not a single occurrence. It is one of a series which reaches back to 1946, when the Reds withdrew from northern Iran in the face of opposition from a freedom-loving people. It will be recalled, perhaps, that when the United States and Great Britain countered the blockade of Berlin with the airlift, the Communists became conciliatory and lifted the blockade. When the Red conspirators met strong opposition in their fight to bring down a freely elected Greek Government, they cut off the insurgents from support. Several Soviet efforts to pressure Turkey have been dropped when a courageous Turkish administration and army stood firm, ready to fight.

In view of this experience, I think it safe to conclude that it is against Communist policy to risk major trouble.

In the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, of which I have been a member for the past 2 years, under the chairmanship of the distinguished junior Senator from Indiana [Mr. JENNER], we have heard the testimony of some of our great senior command officers to the effect that what the Communists are afraid of is the use of force.

Here we find the kernel of this resolution. For some time the Chinese Communists have been rattling the saber about Formosa. The Red propaganda line has noisily pronounced the determination of the so-called People's Republic to liberate the island.

In accompaniment, there have been military actions against the offshore islands. They have been bombed. Quemoy has been brought under artillery attack from Communist shore guns. Ichang, off the coast of the mainland in the vicinity of the Tachens, was assaulted and captured despite bitter resistance from a small garrison of Nationalist irregulars. The Tachens themselves, some 200 miles north of Formosa, have been brought under pressure, threatening their sources of supply and reinforcement. As a result, it has become necessary to redeploy the military forces in the area for the better defense of the main redoubt—Formosa and the Pesca-

dores. In effect, what the Chinese Reds have been doing is putting out a line of bellicose propaganda, and at the same time nibbling at the fringe of our Chinese ally's strategic line of defense. I specify the fringe because we are told that neither Ichang nor the Tachens are essential to the defense of the Formosa complex.

It would appear, therefore, that the immediate purpose of the Chinese Communists is to probe. They are conducting a testing action to determine whether or not we mean business in defending Formosa. And to my way of thinking the pending resolution embodies the correct response. We do mean business, and I think it important that we make our intentions clear, so that the Chinese Communists can in no way misconstrue our intentions. The resolution under consideration does just that.

In essence, the main impact of this measure is not military. That by no means indicates that it is propaganda. It does not, and its psychological importance comes solely from the fact that we mean what we say. It draws a line that needs drawing—not a geographic line, to be sure—but one of position that is just as effective and far more practicable. In so doing we are telling the Communists what they need to know, although I am sure it is not what they wanted to hear. And I venture to predict that the Reds will not press the issue to provocative lengths.

There have been allegations that the pending measure is aggressive in nature; an assertion which overlooks a second psychological fact of the resolution which is of a consequence equal to the first.

This is a matter to which I have given much thought, and I cannot see that military action on the part of the United States, in these circumstances, could, in even small measure, be regarded as aggressive. I have examined every element, and it is my unqualified conviction that there can be no proper basis for labeling any action that might develop as anything but defensive in character. Further, I am satisfied that failure to act within the specified range would be imprudent to the point of folly.

Mr. President, on the floor of the Senate I have heard discussion as to what is or what is not self-defense. As my colleagues well know, self-defense is a fundamental law of nature. Should my neighbor say to me, "I desire to take your farm, on which your daughter and husband live, and which is located only 2 miles from my place, and you and the other members of your family can live a hundred miles away," I would resist such action with force and might. Chou En-lai has repeatedly made such a threat, and the Peiping government has broadcast the threat to all the world.

Mr. President, we all know that in the field of law, whether domestic or international law, such a statement would be a communicated threat, and the receiver of such a threat could take such action or such recourse as he saw fit. I am convinced that if a person who received communicated threats such as have been made were to defend himself, based upon reasonable judgment—and in this case

action would be based on the reasonable judgment of our Commander in Chief, who is one of the greatest military men in history—then certainly the judgment of a jury or of the people of the world could not be raised against such a man, even if he were accused of murder, or against defensive actions taken by this country.

When a friend and supporter is threatened with assault, one does not wait for him to be struck down. The intelligent, the necessary thing is to stand by him and let the assailant know that his assault will be met. Certainly if I saw a thug lifting a blackjack against any friend of mine, I would engage to defend him—and no decent person would call me an aggressor. By any code of ethics, my behavior would be commendable.

There is a very practical—if you will, a selfish—motive for defending my friend. In the first place, if I let him be struck down, his assailant may blackjack me next. I would not only have lost a friend, but I would have also deprived myself of his services in defending me. In the second place, when other friends would learn of my cowardice—for so they would rightly interpret my failure; at best they would call it indecision—they would lose confidence in me. They would not care to be in a position of dependence on a man who could not make up his mind about a vital matter. And, very understandably, they might look for a more reliable partner. They might, if they were small and not very strong, yield everything they possessed to avoid being blackjacked.

There is another aspect to friendship, and one that it would be perilous to ignore. Just as no man can afford to take a friend for granted, regardless of his own behavior, so no nation can afford to do so.

Some nations, particularly some Asian nations, very much desire to be our friends, and we greatly desire to count them as such. But a number of those nations, for their own safety, must exercise great care to avoid antagonizing the towering Communist bullies that stand so close at hand. Discretion requires that these nations refrain from an open acknowledgment of friendly attitude toward us—that is, they maintain, or try to maintain, a neutral position between us and the Communist bullies. Several of them—and let us recognize the distasteful truth—even though they fear communism, lack complete confidence in us and our motives and intentions.

If we fail to make our intentions clear, if we fail to convince them that they can trust us, if we fail to assure them that we want strong and independent friends, and not subservient followers, we risk losing them entirely. In despair, they may turn to the Communists, and may accept harsh protectors in lieu of unpredictable, and, hence, undependable, friends.

To this I must add the very serious thought that even our avowed friends—friends who have stood up and resisted the Communists—friends who depend for

their lives upon us—cannot be counted upon to stand up forever against unrelenting and ever-increasing pressure. Foremost in this group is free China.

But where, one may ask, could free China turn but to us? The answer is simply that free China could turn to the Communists. She would then have to turn to the Communists, because she would have nowhere else to go. In the event of that dilemma, Mr. President, let us be realistic as to what would happen to the rest of Asia and what would happen to that bastion of defense, which protects the shoreline of our own country.

Do we talk about isolationism. No; never. But in the event of that tragic happening, there would be only one thing left for us to do, namely, to pick up our Armed Forces and try, if we could, to bring them home, and there try to defend the small part we would have left.

Mr. President, it is my hope and prayer that out of this matter will come peace, not war.

It is my hope and my prayer that when America draws a line and stands firm, as it has stood firm in the days of old, the sneaking, cowardly Red Chinese will soon know that we mean business, and that never again will they intimidate the weak, the poor, and the depressed.

Mr. President, I have nothing further to say. You were there, Mr. President, and you heard the testimony.

I pray to God that my decision to vote in favor of passage of the joint resolution is a correct one.

Mr. JENNER. Mr. President, I shall vote for the joint resolution expressing congressional support of President Eisenhower's plan to protect Formosa, and the islands essential to its defense against the threatened Communist assault. I shall vote for it, without amendments, in the form in which it was reported by the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services.

This proposal does not solve all of the problems of Asian policy. There is no good reason why it should solve all the problems, which have been growing steadily worse under the mismanagement of 15 years or more.

I favor the joint resolution because it solves the most important problem. It tells the Chinese Communists and their Soviet allies that their bluff and bluster and bullying must stop. It tells them that the United States will not permit them to breach the borders of free Asia and add to their slave empire.

The Communist Chinese Armies invaded free Korea and made North Korea a wasteland. They invaded Vietnam. They hid North Vietnam behind their curtain of silence, and pocket-marked South Vietnam with their guerrilla strongholds. Now they threaten to invade Formosa, and capture the anchor which holds the line from Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia.

We have fought once over that vast world of seas and islands, and we do not wish to fight over it again. We have told the Red Chinese they will enter it at their peril.

President Eisenhower's message meets first things first, because it sets military action as the only answer to Communist military action. It puts the responsibility for choosing war entirely on the Reds. Their territory will not be attacked unless they choose war. But if they strike, they will have no sanctuaries within range of our ships where they can assemble their armies and equipment, shout warlike threats, and fire with impunity, as they did from the sanctuaries from which they killed our defenseless fighting men at the Yalu.

We know the Communists dare not attack. Let us not forget the military function of the Iron Curtain—or, if you like, the Bamboo Curtain. Its military function is to hide from the enemy the extent of the rebellion within, which eats away at the base of Communist strength. The Communists hold China much as the Japanese held it—by occupying cities and railroads and pushing out as far as they dare. South China is the weakest sector of Red China. South China has always been the foothold of Chinese rebellion against domination from invaders in the north.

The Red Chinese are, in Stalin's phrase, drunk with success, but they are not fools. Unless fear and violence have driven them mad, there is no smallest danger of war, when they know resistance is waiting.

Some of the amendments are important, but I am going to vote against them.

I am in full sympathy with the amendments offered by the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY] and the Senator from Nevada [Mr. MALONE]. As a matter of fact, I sent to the two committees a message regarding an idea which I thought should be incorporated in the joint resolution. But it arrived too late for any formal action. Therefore, I prepared an amendment, and I was going to offer it. But I have not presented it, and I do not intend to do so.

The problem before us now is the problem met by this message. That part of the world which is governed by respect for God and man, by law and reason, has been in retreat before the rulers of the slave empire of communism, for 9 long years. The Communists will never stop the attack, and we will never cease retreating if we do nothing.

President Eisenhower's message proposes that we draw a militarily defensible line about the free world, a line which protects the coast of California, Washington, and Oregon, as truly as it protects the coast of Formosa. He proposes that we warn the Communists that that line, that frontier of freedom, is inviolate. If they cross it, this time we shall not retreat. We shall hold that line, and shall hold it by the only means the Communists accept, namely the military power to bring their bold adventures to an inglorious end.

Mr. MORSE obtained the floor.

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield to me for perhaps 3 or 4 minutes at this time, if I am able to obtain unanimous consent that he may yield to me for that purpose, without losing his right to the floor?

Mr. MORSE. I shall yield under those circumstances, if such consent can be obtained.

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, I request such unanimous consent.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from New Hampshire? Without objection, it is so ordered; and the Senator from New Hampshire may proceed.

Mr. BRIDGES. Mr. President, on Monday of this week the President, taking full recognition of the seriousness of the Formosan situation, sent to the Congress a message asking authorization to use our Armed Forces in the defense of Formosa and the neighboring Pescadores. Today, the joint resolution granting that authorization is before us for debate, having successfully passed the House and having received a favorable report from our own Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. While this may not set a record for rapid progress, nevertheless the joint resolution has moved along with rapidity, for one involving so grave a question. Grave as the question may be, nevertheless, I rise to ask that all of us do our utmost to expedite the debate on it, so that the joint resolution may be finally passed by the Senate today, or certainly not later than tomorrow.

The President knows full well the horrors of war as only a former professional soldier like himself can know it. For that reason perhaps if for no other he has been foremost in seeking every avenue for peace in this troubled world and in his message to us, besides asking for authority in the defense of Formosa, he made a clear, strong plea for the United Nations to take action in this latest act of aggression. His action clearly indicates that, although he will utilize all methods for the peaceful negotiation of the present situation, nevertheless, he recognizes the defense of Formosa as so vital to our own national security that he has made this unprecedented peacetime request; and his evaluation of the situation is unanimously confirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There may be those among us who would question the need for the authority proposed to be granted in the joint resolution, stating, not without some reason, that sufficient authority now reposes in the Executive for him to make the commitment with respect to which he seeks authorization. For myself, I am pleased and proud that the President has adopted the course of asking the Congress to share in the responsibility of the grave step he proposes to undertake. In a matter so vital to our national security that branch of the Government which closely represents the people has a proper participation. Such joint action also will be a heartening sight for the eyes of the free world which are upon us. What a contrast to the Iron Curtain world of the Soviet aggressor, where whole peoples may be committed to the utter devastation of total war at the whim of one individual.

It has long been my position that we must determine through our Joint Chiefs of Staff what areas are vital to our national security, and then we should have the courage to take the calculated risk

of making a firm stand on those lines. It is my deep conviction that world peace is more likely to be maintained by such determination. It will serve both as reassurance and as a rallying point for those with the will to maintain freedom of self-determination. It means, in short, a clear serving of notice of our intention, which should give serious pause to those planning a course of further aggression. The only alternative to such a stand would be more piecemeal attrition such as we have witnessed during the past decade. The end result of such a course would find us in complete isolation—the last remnant of the free world at the complete mercy of the final stroke of the Communist aggressor.

As I have already pointed out, the President, in seeking the authorization to defend Formosa, continues to seek to have the situation handled through the machinery of the United Nations. Imperfect as that machinery may be in some respects, I agree with his effort to continue to try to use its facilities as long as we are a member nation and as long as it offers the only facilities for concerted international negotiation. However, in the present time of emergency when quick action is called for, the President is fully justified in asking that as a matter of national security we be ready to take action alone, else the situation might be irretrievably lost while it was being debated.

I hope that we may shortly vote favorably on this resolution and that the vote may be unanimous, because the security of this Nation is truly a matter of bipartisan concern. I hope the amendments which have been proposed to the joint resolution will be rejected.

I thank the distinguished Senator from Oregon for his courtesy in yielding to me.

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield to me in order that I may propound a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. MORSE. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Ohio, provided I do not lose the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. BRICKER. Mr. President, I have prepared a statement in support of the joint resolution authorizing the President to use the Armed Forces as he requested. Because of pressure of time, and because I do not wish to delay the final vote on the joint resolution, which I think is imperative at this time, and also because my name is not on the list at the desk, I ask unanimous consent that the statement which I have prepared may be printed in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BRICKER

I shall vote for the joint resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 28, authorizing the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States to protect Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack. My vote will be cast prayerfully, with full appreciation of the consequences that may ensue, but without any mental reservation whatsoever.

There is going to be no appeasement, no policy of vacillation in meeting the Communist threat in the Pacific. That is the

clear import of the pending resolution. I commend the President for the firm stand he has taken. I should also like to commend the distinguished minority leader for the patriotic service he has rendered in focusing public opinion on the threat to our security in the Pacific area.

When the roll is called on passage of the pending resolution, no illusions should exist in regard to its meaning. It is, in fact, an ultimatum. It involves a calculated risk of war. Nevertheless, I sincerely believe that the policy of firmness embodied in the pending resolution is far more likely to prevent war in the Pacific than a vague policy of waiting for the dust to settle.

In the interest of prompt action by the Senate, I will say no more about the need for drawing a line around Formosa and adjacent islands. I would end my remarks at this point except for the fact that the legal significance of the pending resolution has been distorted in the press and in the Congress.

The junior Senator from Montana contends that the pending resolution is wholly unnecessary; that the President has full constitutional power to meet any emergency or to resist any sudden attack on Formosa. These sentiments have been echoed by the junior Senator from Arkansas and by the senior Senator from Missouri. A small reactionary number of editors and commentators contend that this joint resolution should not be construed as a precedent; that the President needs no authorization by the Congress to employ the Armed Forces of the United States in the defense of any foreign country.

Passage of Senate Joint Resolution 28 will not create any new precedent. It will, however, restore a long line of precedents which, over the past 10 years, have been disregarded, unconstitutionally in my judgment. If the crisis which has inspired this resolution were not so serious, I would find much pleasure in watching the advocates of omnipotent executive power back and fill to meet their unsound position. As I shall demonstrate, the joint resolution before the Senate fully vindicates the constitutional arguments of Bob Taft, myself, and others when the Senate debated the legality of the intervention in Korea and the sending of troops to Europe.

Senate Joint Resolution 28 authorizes the President "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack."

This is not a simple or concurrent resolution which merely expresses the sense of the Senate or of the Congress. We are not called on here to express a purely advisory opinion. A joint resolution, unlike a simple or concurrent resolution, has legal force and effect. The Congress is authorizing the President to take certain action—action which may make a declaration of war a mere formality.

If there is any Senator who sincerely believes that the President needs no authority from the Congress in this situation, then he must vote against the joint resolution. Otherwise, he would be casting his vote for a resolution which, in his judgment, the Congress under the Constitution has no right to pass.

Let there be no misunderstanding about the constitutional significance of the step we are about to take. By approving this joint resolution we demolish, I hope for all time to come, the fallacious theory that the President, as Commander in Chief, has exclusive power to send Armed Forces of the United States anywhere in the world for the defense of any possible victim of aggression.

I can think of no action by President Eisenhower more praiseworthy than his seeking the approval of the Congress in this

Formosa matter. The framers of the Constitution expressly provided that only the Congress shall have the power—article I, section 8:

"To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;

"To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than 2 years;

"To provide and maintain a Navy;

"To make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

"To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions."

The President's relation to the Armed Forces is stated in section 2 of article II:

"The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into actual service of the United States."

But this power is limited by the 18th paragraph of article I, section 8, vesting in Congress power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof."

Almost a year ago President Eisenhower pledged himself to respect the constitutional provisions just quoted. In his press conferences of March 10 and 17, 1954, he said that the United States would not be plunged into war without the approval of the Congress. He did not limit his pledge to the Indochina crisis then pending. As reported in the New York Times, the President said at his March 10, 1954, press conference:

"There is going to be no involvement of America in war unless it is a result of the constitutional process that is placed upon Congress to declare it. Now, let us have that clear. And that is the answer."

On March 17, 1954, President Eisenhower was reported to have said "that this country would not be carried into war without the approval of Congress." He also indicated that, in his judgment, there had been time to go to the Congress following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The President then stated two propositions to which no responsible person takes exception. The President must act without waiting for Congress if (1) the United States is under actual or imminent attack, and (2) the lives of American citizens abroad are in immediate jeopardy. Again I congratulate the President for demonstrating in a concrete situation his scrupulous respect for the constitutional distribution of war powers.

The Congress has received from the Washington Post and Times Herald (January 25, 1955) this editorial injunction:

"Care should be taken, however, to avoid any assumption that repetition of this procedure would be necessary in case of an attack upon our allies in Europe or in the Western Hemisphere."

The rationalizations of the Post and Times Herald are in vain. The joint resolution before us repudiates lock, stock, and barrel any theory that the Congress' power to declare war is only a ministerial function—an act involving little more discretion than that of the recorder of deeds in recording a sale of real estate in the District of Columbia. The distinguished chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has steadfastly and cogently maintained that each and every provision of the North Atlantic Treaty must be implemented in strict compliance with the constitutional processes of the parties to the treaty.

The pending joint resolution reaffirms the principle embodied in the United Nations Participation Act. Section 6 of that act provides that agreements for the use of

armed forces by the United Nations under article 43 of the charter shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appropriate act or joint resolution.

The difference between a joint resolution on the one hand and a simple or concurrent resolution on the other is a matter of critical importance. I opposed the simple resolution relative to the sending of ground forces to Europe because, in my judgment, it confirmed President Truman's theory that he had absolute discretion in the matter regardless of what the Congress might or might not do. The late Senator Taft held the same view. He said in the troops-to-Europe debate:

"Any other view means that the President today would have power to involve the United States in war in any section of the world in his unlimited and arbitrary discretion, and that Congress in creating a great American armed force of 3,500,000 men and drafting every boy of 18 for that purpose is completely without power to limit the President's arbitrary discretion. Merely to state this proposition should arouse the undying opposition of every man who believes in the maintenance in this country of government by the people." (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, volume 97, part 1, page 1119.)

Though I disagree with them, I can at least understand the thinking of people outside the Congress who seek to make the President omniscient. What I cannot understand is why some Members of the Congress are so eager to deny that we have any right to participate in this momentous decision. They are honorable men, and in most cases, able lawyers. It is hard for me to believe that they seek to defend past usurpations of power by the Executive for political reasons. Equally hard to believe is that these Members of Congress, also for political reasons, would like to duck the issue and thus be free to criticize the administration with the advantage of hindsight. Advocacy of congressional impotence by Members of the Congress is something I cannot fathom.

Last year the opponents of my proposed constitutional amendment trotted out Prof. Edward S. Corwin as a preeminent constitutional authority. It is, therefore, with some satisfaction that I quote Professor Corwin in support of the statements I have made. In his book, *The President: Office and Powers*, 1948, Professor Corwin says:

"In brief, the controlling theory of the [United Nations participation] act is that American participation in United Nations shall rest on the principle of departmental collaboration, and not on an exclusive Presidential prerogative in the diplomatic field. Not only is this a sound constitutional principle in that it can claim a great deal of support from the history of the conduct of American foreign relations, especially in the period prior to the war with Mexico, it is the only practicable principle unless we wish to establish outright Presidential dictatorship" (pp. 270, 271).

In addition to the constitutional question involved, a number of practical considerations attest the wisdom of President Eisenhower's action in coming to the Congress.

First, why should men of good will insist that the President make this terrifying decision all by himself? This is not strictly a military problem. It is a political question of the first magnitude.

Second, it is certainly desirable to show not only the Communists but also our allies that the President and the Congress have united in the making of this grave decision.

Third, it is certainly true that the redeployment of naval forces and certain other action that will be taken by the President requires no authorization by the Congress. It is equally true that the President will assume responsibilities which go far beyond those of military strategy and tactics. How utterly foolish it is to insist that the Presi-

dent have a constitutional lawyer at his elbow to check the legality of any action he deems necessary to meet the danger. When the power of the Congress is joined with that of the President, he can proceed in full confidence that his acts are constitutional.

And, finally, this decision to defend Formosa against attack should reflect not merely the judgment of one man but the combined judgment of all the elected representatives of the people. The end objective of the President's proposal is to preserve free institutions, not only in the Far East but throughout the world. Surely it is paradoxical to seek that end by reducing the Congress of the United States to the level of Hitler's Reichstag or Malenkov's Presidium.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I expect this to be my last major speech in opposition to the joint resolution. In the course of the remainder of the debate I may deem it necessary to make a few rebuttal statements in connection with certain amendments of which I am a co-sponsor and which will be voted upon later. However, I do not propose, after this speech, to make another major speech on this issue.

The position taken by the Senator from Oregon throughout this debate has not been an easy one, but it has been one which my conscience and convictions have compelled me to take. In the course of this speech I shall devote myself primarily to referring to certain arguments made by one of the most distinguished Members of the Senate, the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], and comments on an argument or two made by the distinguished Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND]. Then I shall summarize my arguments in opposition to the joint resolution, and make that the closing of my case in opposition.

I am perfectly willing to allow history to judge whether or not my position was a sound one. Therefore I shall not yield in the course of these remarks to any Senator save and except the Senator from Georgia or the Senator from California, because it would be only courteous and proper to do so if they decided they had any questions they wished to ask me during the course of my remarks.

I am as eager as are the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from California to bring this debate to an early close, so that the Senate may reach a vote at the earliest possible moment.

There has been some discussion during the course of the debate about psychological advantages for the United States in this resolution. There have been statements to the effect that great psychological advantages are to be obtained by our taking action on the joint resolution, either in its present form or some modified form, and doing so at an early hour.

As I indicated earlier in the day, I am in complete agreement with the Senator from Georgia and the Senator from California that we ought to vote on the joint resolution today or tonight. In my 10 years in the Senate I do not know when there was a greater duty and responsibility resting upon Members of this body to remain in their seats until a measure was finally disposed of than there is in the case of the pending measure, even if it is not voted upon until 5 o'clock tomorrow morning.

From the standpoint of psychological factors, I think our recognition of the importance of action on the joint resolution, and the importance of remaining in the Chamber for whatever number of hours may be necessary to finish the job, would be clear notice to the world that, although there are differences of opinion among us as to the particular language which ought to be contained in the joint resolution, we are a united legislative body so far as concerns unity of opposition to the Communist segment of the world.

I do not expect ever to be able to catch up with the implications, the innuendoes, and downright misrepresentations which are appearing in some segments of the press against the Senator from Oregon, including one which appears in this evening's Washington Star. As I said the other day, I have no intention of answering irresponsible criticisms or ad hominem attacks on the Senator from Oregon. I wish to make sure, so that at least my descendants may read this statement when they come to read the Record long after I have passed from this earth, that there is not a man or woman in the Senate who is more opposed to communism and everything it stands for than is the Senator from Oregon.

However, I believe that freedom in the United States will be in jeopardy if we ever reach the point where a Member of the United States Senate, with a deep conviction, cannot express a disagreement with the President of the United States and with his colleagues in the Senate with respect to the form a resolution should take without being subjected to personal abuse and vilification. No other Member of the Senate is more insistent than I am that we make clear to Red China and to Red Russia that we have no intention of standing by and letting them take Formosa and the Pescadores. However I do not favor the pending resolution because I think it is very likely to be provocative of war.

With those introductory remarks, I turn to the able speech delivered by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] yesterday.

I well know that when one crosses swords with the senior Senator from Georgia in a legal argument, he crosses swords with a legal Hercules. However, I disagree with the senior Senator from Georgia with regard to the legal interpretation he made yesterday of certain language in the resolution. I am satisfied that, from the standpoint of legal construction he is completely wrong in the legal theory he enunciated on the floor of the Senate yesterday. It is the same argument he made in committee. It is the same argument he has made in conversations with some of us since the close of the committee hearings. It is the argument that the language from line 7 through line 11 on page 2 of the resolution constitutes language of limitation, and is subject to the old legal construction that language of limitation modifies the general power granted elsewhere in a document, and subjects the general power to the restrictions of language of limitation.

Mr. President, there is not one word in the language from line 7 through line

11 on page 2 of the resolution which is subject to the interpretation that it is language of limitation. I shall now set forth the reasons for that statement.

First, I should like to quote from the speech of the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia at page 821 of the Record:

What does that mean? It means that the President is asking Congress to say to him, "You cannot take, secure, and hold any area on the mainland of China, because it is not in friendly hands." The authority can refer only to those islands lying not too far off the coast which, in some way or other, the Nationalist Republic of China has been enabled to hold, and which it now holds.

So what the President himself is asking is that we agree, so far as we can agree, to give him support, not to go onto the mainland, and not to take any lands which are held by any people other than those who are friends of ours. He is asking that he be given the right, in this area, to secure and protect those lands that are now in friendly hands.

The Senator from Georgia greatly stresses in his argument the words "in friendly hands."

I continue to quote from the speech of the Senator from Georgia:

That is what the President has asked for. It is a limitation upon his authority and power, from the point of view of those who believe the President has absolute power to reach as far back as he wishes in order to protect Formosa and the Pescadores. But he is asking for this authority, and I think he is asking it for a good reason and a good purpose.

I can see no reason why Congress should hesitate to grant him that power, which is a probable limitation upon the power which, under the Constitution, he might exercise, but as to which assuredly he feels justified, by implication at least as strong as death, in saying to Congress: "I do not want the authority to go beyond the areas which are now in friendly hands. I want you to give me the authority to secure and protect lands now in friendly hands, and that only."

I respectfully say that the difficulty with the Senator's argument is that the language in the resolution referring to territories in friendly hands has absolutely nothing to do with the power granted in the resolution to the President to defend Formosa and the Pescadores.

Let us look at that language, because it is the language which would be stricken from the resolution by the Humphrey amendment, which now, I understand, will be offered by the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] and the Senator from Oregon.

This is the language which it is proposed to strike out:

this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

I discussed that language at some length last night. I reiterate my position by saying I do not know how the senior Senator from Georgia or any other Senator could draft language broader in scope than the language which says "and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in

assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores."

I always try to be exceedingly fair in legal arguments, as in all other matters. Therefore let me say there is other language in the resolution, not touched by the Humphrey amendment, which reads:

That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores.

The clause "as he deems necessary" in my judgment is also very broad, too.

I now come to the heart of the difference which exists on the floor of the Senate on this very fundamental issue. In my judgment the language to which I have been objecting is language which, read in line with testimony given before the committees in executive session, would authorize in advance, and, in effect, would predate approval by the Congress of the United States, of an order by the President of the United States to strike against the mainland of China, if he should decide that such an act was required to defend Formosa and the Pescadores.

There is no language of limitation to that power anywhere in the resolution. There is not one word of limitation to that power from line 7 to line 11 on page 2 of the resolution. On the contrary, it is the very language which makes perfectly clear that the President of the United States will have the authority to take such other measures as he judges to be necessary. Those other measures could include a preventive war strike against the mainland of China.

Here again we are involved in the very delicate point as to what the attitudes of the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff happen to be in regard to the exercise of a decision to make a strike on the mainland of China.

I shall not say more on that point than I have already said, except to refer to the essence of it. It is, as the transcript will show, that both the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their testimony before the committee—and I can say it now because there has been a discussion of it in the press, and that discussion in the press found no source in the Senator from Oregon, let me say—was to the effect that it may be necessary to make a strike against the mainland of China before a strike or act of war could be made by the Red Chinese against the United States in our defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

We cannot escape the conclusion, in my judgment, that if that is done it will constitute an act of war on the part of the United States against Red China before Red China commits an act of war against the United States. In examination of these two responsible officials of our Government, there was no denial by them that a strike by our forces against the mainland of China under such circumstances would be an act of war. That is what I am talking about, Mr. President. That is the position I have taken throughout this debate. And in closing my case on this point, I reiterate that

never in the Senate of the United States shall I vote for language in a resolution which, in my judgment, cannot be reconciled with the glorious history of the United States in regard to our devotion to peace and the proof of our devotion to peace by a record which shows we never committed an act of war against a nation until that nation first committed an act of war against us.

One of the most dangerous implications of this resolution is that for the first time in our history we now enunciate a threat of aggression against a nation not now at war with us. What does the Senate think the effects of that will be all over Asia? One effect will be terrifying fear on the part of millions that war is imminent. The Asiatic peoples are becoming more and more alarmed over the potential threat on the part of the United States, that the United States will decide whether it will make a strike against another nation before that nation has made war against us. This threat of aggression is a departure from the great principles of the long established historic foreign policy of the United States. This is a closing of the book on that great record and the writing of a new chapter which, in my judgment, will be a black chapter in the pages of American history if we do not modify the language of the pending resolution.

So long as that language remains in the resolution, let me say, Mr. President, I am not going to accept the argument that there is any language of limitation upon the powers of the President of the United States to order a strike against the mainland of China if he should decide that such a strike should be made, because of military events occurring on the mainland of China.

Mr. President, let us consider some of the operative facts in this picture. It is perfectly clear that those who know me know how I hate the Communist regime of Red China. But there has been a great deal of discussion about a common hypothetical which has run through many of the speeches, which goes something like this: Suppose the Red Chinese start building jet airfields or airfields capable of accommodating jet planes in the area of the port of Amoy, or in that part of the mainland of China which is off the Quemoy Islands. Suppose they concentrate large military forces there, not only planes, but manpower. Suppose they also start congregating or assembling submarines and naval craft. Are we going to wait until some overt act of aggression against us is committed, or are we going to strike them first?

It is thought that by raising that hypothetical question, Mr. President, any of us who do not agree that we should strike first are soft toward communism, or that for some reason we are following the Communist line. That is one of the charges made against the senior Senator from Oregon in the press today.

As I said on the floor of the Senate, the Supreme Court of the United States has rendered my decision on this matter many times in our past history in great cases where it has held that in the hour of great crisis we should hold fast to our constitutional processes. I say, Mr.

President, let us hold fast to them now in this critical hour. Let us not put ourselves into such a position that we will be judged by the world as a Nation that has said, "We will decide for ourselves whether we should commit an aggression first." If we make that decision, I fear, Mr. President, the judgment that will rest upon the heads of generations of Americans 50 or 100 years from today will be to the great discredit of America.

Let Senators figuratively put themselves on the mainland of China for a moment. Knowing what we know about the viciousness of the police state and the totalitarian methods of Red China, it is easy for us to look at the picture only from our side and not have any understanding of the Chinese attitude. Although I hate the Red Chinese leaders, Mr. President, and although I despise the acceptance of communism by China, I, nevertheless, cannot get away from my early conditioning. I remember that as a little boy, on Sunday after Sunday after Sunday, in my Sunday-school class, I divided up the small amount of the contribution I was able to make each week into two parts. One part for the church, and the other for missionary work in China. That was true of millions of other American boys and girls, because the history of the United States is a history of great Christian understanding and charity toward the Chinese people. We have got to win this fight in the decades immediately ahead, Mr. President, for the hearts and the minds of the people behind the Iron Curtain, or freedom will not prevail in the world.

I say we must take a look at the picture from the standpoint of what the Chinese people, by the millions, see, and also from the standpoint of how their thinking is being poisoned by the vicious, lying propaganda of the Red leaders.

So, Mr. President, with the United States still claiming it should defend Quemoy and the Matsu, what do the Chinese see? They see an opponent in a civil war, the Nationalist Chinese, occupying those islands which they say, from the standpoint of their sovereign rights, belong to China. Sir Anthony Eden said so yesterday. The heads of free states around the world today are telling us that those islands belong not to the Nationalist Chinese, but to China.

The answer may be made, "We do not recognize China as a sovereign power." But most of our allies do, and we cannot escape the fact that her diplomatic relations with us are those of a de facto government. We seem to be willing to have conversations with her on some matters. But she is a de facto government, and there is a civil war going on between the Red Chinese and the Nationalist Chinese over Quemoy and the Matsu.

It would be a bad historic precedent if we should involve ourselves in a civil war over Quemoy and the Matsu.

That is why I said before, and repeat in this final argument, that I would rather walk out of the Senate of the United States; I would rather be defeated tomorrow than to cast a vote which I think may lead to the sacrifice

of American boys in defense of the Nationalist Chinese on Quemoy or the Matsu. I fear that will be one of the results of passing this resolution, unless we are exceedingly lucky. If it shall not be one of the results, it will be because we will be protected in accordance with that great motto of our country, "In God we trust." I am afraid that if this resolution is passed, the only thing that will reduce the strong probabilities of war will be God Almighty directing human destiny from His throne in the high heavens.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield to the Senator from California.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Will not the Senator from Oregon admit, historically speaking, that had the United States not intervened in the Greek civil war, all of Greece today would be communistic?

Mr. MORSE. I do not believe the United States intervened in the Greek civil war in the sense that we are arguing the point here. I think that what happened in connection with the Greek war was an aftermath of the whole European problem following World War II, and that we still had an obligation to settle that war in the interests of peace, and that was what we did in Greece.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. MORSE. I may say further, if the Senator from California will pardon me for a moment, that if we had not intervened, I think all of Europe today would be communistic.

The Senator may recall that as we walked back from the joint session of Congress, at which President Truman laid down the Truman doctrine, I happened to be the first to rise in the Senate, at my desk on the other side of the aisle, and pledge to the President of the United States my support of the Truman doctrine. I did so because at that hour it seemed to me that he was, symbolically, the great strength that stopped communism from marching across all of Europe. But that was directly connected, I may say, with our obligations still growing out of World War II to maintain peace in Europe.

In this instance, we have no rights in Quemoy or Matsu. We never have had. Those islands always have been sovereign territory of China. Were we to go into those islands and try to make them available to the Nationalist Chinese, we would be taking sides in a war which, in my judgment, we should stay out of; and also, in my judgment, we would be taking sides on an issue in which we do not have to become involved in order to defend and protect Formosa, which is many, many miles away from Quemoy and Matsu.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Is it not a fact that so far as the Communist world is concerned, they considered the operation in Korea on June 25, 1950, as a civil war between the North Korean Communists and the South Korean Republic?

Mr. MORSE. There is no question about that.

Mr. KNOWLAND. We intervened in that civil war. Had we not intervened, probably today ail of Korea, and perhaps even Japan and more of Asia, would be behind the Iron Curtain.

Mr. MORSE. Let me tell the Senator from California what I believe our clear international law obligation was in regard to Korea, which not only justified our going into Korea but which dictated our doing so. The United States and Russia, in the first instance, partitioned Korea. That was not a United Nations decision. That was a military decision, first recommended by military advisers of our Government, and then sanctioned and entered into by civil officials of our Government. We did it; the United Nations did not do it.

When we did it, and when that understanding was entered into, then, let me say, we had an obligation to continue to protect the people of South Korea when the Russians, acting through their puppets, the Red Chinese, launched their attack across the 38th parallel. But that had already become an international law obligation of the United States.

We have no legal obligation to protect the islands of Quemoy and Matsu; to the contrary, in my judgment, we ought to get out of those islands, and get out quickly.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield for a question?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Is it not a fact that the question involved has to do with securing Quemoy and Matsu for the Government of the Republic of China, in whose possession those islands are now and have been historically for a long time? Furthermore, the Government of the Republic of China is a member of the United Nations, recognized by a majority of the members of the United Nations as being the legal government of the territory whose area is now occupied by the Government of the Republic of China.

Mr. MORSE. I understand that argument, but I do not accept its premise, from this standpoint: It is a civil war area, and we owe no obligation to the Nationalist Government of China to reestablish it on the mainland of China or to reestablish it on any island it may lose, or to keep it on Quemoy or Matsu. I say that because, in my judgment, if we were to do that, we would be clearly interfering with and trying to direct the internal affairs of a country involved in a civil war.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Is not the Senator from Oregon familiar with the fact that the Chinese Communist regime admittedly, despite the fact that the United Nations itself called upon all member states and other nations of the world to resist the original Communist North Korean aggression in Korea, across the 38th parallel, sent into Korea, across the Yalu River, more than a million men, armed with weapons of war, either by Chinese Communist or Soviet Communist, to make war upon the United Nations and upon the United States, which was bearing 90 percent of the manpower burden,

and more than 90 percent of the resource burden; that they continued that war and helped to inflict 140,000 casualties upon us, including some 35,000 dead; and that that war, which the Chinese Reds themselves initiated, and which they themselves carried on, has been terminated only by armistice terms, which the same Communist regime has violated, not only to the extent of building up their armed forces in North Korea, their air bases in North Korea, and their equipment in North Korea, but to the additional extent that they are now admittedly holding at least 15 American airmen, wearing the uniform of the United States, and perhaps as many as 800 additional American GI's?

Under those circumstances, the Chinese Reds have made war upon the United States and the other civilized nations of the world.

So does not the Senator believe, considering that historical background, that both the United Nations and the United States of America have some interest in seeing to it, as the Senator from Oregon himself has quite well pointed out, that a ruthless, godless regime, uninterested in decency and international law and order is prevented from moving out into the Pacific and putting itself in a better position, ultimately, to gain control of Formosa, as they have threatened to do?

Does not the Senator recognize that we are not discussing an innocent nation on the mainland, a nation which has not committed an act of aggression, but, to the contrary, a nation which stands condemned as an aggressor by the United Nations itself.

Does not that give us some purpose, some legality, in taking a stand, which we might not take if the situation related, let us say, to India or to some other nation, which had not such a history of aggression?

Mr. MORSE. I respond by saying, most respectfully, that if the conclusion of the Senator from California, as I have listened to the particulars he has listed in his statement, is that Red China is at war with the United States, then the Senator from California ought to have at the desk a proposed declaration of war against Red China. But he does not have one there.

I think it is generally recognized that the United States is not at war with Red China. We are at peace with Red China.

The argument of the Senator from California in which he calls the attention of the Senate and of the Senator from Oregon to the Korean situation is quite irrelevant and immaterial to the issue before us, as to whether or not we ought to defend the Nationalist Chinese on Quemoy and Matsu.

If the Senator from California thinks that I am at all happy about or am approving of what has happened in Korea, he is mistaken, because I think he knows that he and I agree on more phases of that situation than we disagree on.

But I wish to say, in answer to his argument, that we are not at war with Red China today; and I think we ought to try to see if we can win a peace with honor in the Pacific without becoming involved in a war with Red China. If we

become involved in one, I think we shall be on our way to total war.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think the key to the Senator's statement is that we should have peace with honor; but the question is, Where are we to draw the line between a peace with honor and peace at any price.

Mr. MORSE. I hate to think of the judgment which the Asiatic peoples are going to pronounce upon us if we get into a war by making a strike against a nation with whom we are not at war at the time a preventive war strike is made by us.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I do not wish to encroach upon the time of the Senator from Oregon unduly.

Mr. MORSE. The Senator from California has been very patient toward me in the past, and I am glad to yield to him.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I think the issue involved in the resolution and the statement by the President is not that we will make a strike against the Red Chinese, or that we might engage in preventive war or aggression against them. I think the resolution unties our hands in case an act of aggression shall be made upon us while we are carrying out certain of our obligations or certain of our desires to help redeploy the forces of the Republic of China, which is the legal government of China.

However, I shall drop that point and say to the Senator that I, too, as a youngster, contributed pennies to the Chinese; and I say I have a very strong conviction that there may be, behind the Iron Curtain of China, as I think, indeed, there may be behind the Iron Curtain of Eastern Europe, literally tens, if not hundreds, of millions of people who pray that in the not-too-distant future the tyranny which the Senator from Oregon has so clearly depicted may come to an end. The Senator pointed out the other day that in the enslaved labor camps literally millions of laborers are being worked to death, and those persons may be praying that they may not have to live under that tyranny much longer. Instead of the people of China feeling that the adoption of this resolution would be a threat to them, they may feel that the Republic of China, holding the coastal islands, continues to be the only reasonable hope that some day they may be free.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I should like to interrupt the Senator, before he goes to the next point, to say that I certainly agree with his observation we have many friends among the many millions of people in China; but one of my fears is that we shall lose them quickly if we give them proof that we will make war before war is made upon us. I ask the Senator not to forget that Asiatic boys and girls have been brought up on the conditioning and the folklore that the great threat to Asia is western domination. Let us not give them any proof of our intention of dominating Asia and making war against them. It would be good communistic propaganda to proclaim that such was our intention.

I realize that, from a military standpoint, the Senator and I do not agree. My belief is that we do not have to hold

Matsu and Quemoy in order to defend Formosa. As I interpret a report over the wire of what the Senator said earlier today the Senator seems to think that the resolution in effect draws a line of demarcation in the Formosa Strait area. One of my objections to the resolution is that I do not think it draws a line of demarcation, but, on the contrary, makes the whole thing ambiguous. The resolution would result in putting us in the position of contending that, in order to defend islands, along the coast of China which are in possession of one side in a civil war, we will commit a preventive-war act if we think it would be to our military advantage. However, Mr. President, we have argued that point previously. We simply do not agree that preventive war is one of the dangers of the resolution.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I think many people in China, both behind and in front of the Iron Curtain, recognize that a free country cannot coexist, in the Communist interpretation of the word, with communism, because Communist governments coexist only until they can subvert a free country from within or destroy it by overt aggression from without.

Since the Senator from Oregon has referred to Christian teachings, I should like to bring to the attention of the Senate the fact that a minister of the gospel, whose parents spent many years in China, wrote me, strongly protesting the idea of coexistence with the Communist world, in the sense that I think a great many persons both in the Kremlin and in Peiping refer to it, and I should like to bring that passage of the Bible to the attention of the Senate. It is from Second Corinthians:

Be ye not unequally yoked together with unbelievers: For what fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? and what communion hath light with darkness?

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I would reply to that good minister of the Gospel by suggesting to him that we would not get very far in our great Christian missionary movements in the world if we did not try to convert the infidels. After all, we have to mingle among them; we have to associate with them in order to lead them into the paths of righteousness.

Mr. President, I use that as the springboard for the observation that we ought to make the plea to the United Nations that it become the great evangelistic leader of political conversion in Asia. That is why I think this resolution ought not contain a provision which authorizes the President to exercise, if he desires to do so, such broad, sweeping power permitting of a preventive war act, but should contain language which will make it perfectly clear that if Communist China engages in aggressive action against Formosa, it will be at war with the United States. At the same time, we should try to prevail upon the United Nations to offer its good offices in an effort to settle the troubles in the Pacific by peaceful means. I think that is the Christian approach.

Mr. KNOWLAND. The difficulty is that while from time to time in the past

the infidels would take violent measures against those who would preach the Gospel, at least the missionaries were allowed to preach it. The trouble with communism is that when persons enter the Communist countries either to preach the Gospel or to preach democracy and freedom, they are liquidated in an NKVD prison. That is the difference.

Mr. MORSE. I am not blind to the ugly realities which confront us in this situation. I disagree with the Senator from California that the way to meet those ugly realities is to give the President authorization under the terms of the resolution to make an aggressive threat against Asia. Let me repeat what I said last night. There was not a word in the White House release yesterday which in any way modified the language in the resolution. All the President said, in effect, was that if it should be decided to do more than engage in direct self-defense of Formosa, he, the President of the United States, would make the decision. Of course, I would want him to be the one to make the decision, if it is to be made, although I think such a decision should never be made by any President of the United States. I do not believe we ought to violate our historic peace policy.

However, there was nothing in the White House release of yesterday which changed the authorization in the resolution to strike against the mainland of China. Let me repeat to my friends in the Senate who believe that the release justifies their voting for the resolution that there is nothing in the release which in any way modifies the extraordinary power which it is sought by the resolution to give to the President.

I would not vote to give such authorization to any President, because we cannot get away from the fact that if a President, whether it be this President or any other President, would ever exercise such a power, in effect what we would be doing, by voting for such a resolution, would be predating a declaration of war, as was stated by a great Member of this body in conversation with some of us some days ago. That is what the adoption of the resolution would do.

A great many Senators who are supporting the resolution take refuge in the assumption that the President will never make a decision to use such power, the authorization of which I am protesting. I do not know whether he will or not. He is human. He may be persuaded to do it. If he should make such a decision he would not make it in a vacuum. He would make it on the basis of representations made to him. Who would make such representations to the President? Military advisers would have much to say about it. The Secretary of State would have much to say about it. In the kind of government under which we operate, a President would take such advice unless it could be shown that the advisers were wrong.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THURMOND in the chair). Does the Sen-

ator from Oregon yield to the Senator from South Dakota?

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I have said—and I shall keep my commitment—that I shall yield only to the two Senators whose remarks I am commenting upon, because if I do not proceed on that basis, in view of my position in this debate, I may be speaking here until 7 p. m. I wish to get through in a few minutes, and it will take me only a few minutes to make my case if I do not yield to others than the two Senators I have mentioned.

Mr. President, I wish to say the President is going to rely upon his military advisers; he is bound to rely upon them. That brings about in the Senate a split which is rather vital. There are some Senators who have complete confidence in the advisers of the President, and there are some of us who do not. Some of us are very much concerned about the fact that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has given clear evidence that he leans heavily toward a preventive-war policy. I have said I believe the difference of opinions within the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and there are differences—have arisen because some of our military leaders are afraid that if we get into a war situation on the mainland of China we do not have in being the Armed Forces required to successfully prosecute a war there.

Despite the fact that there are those who seek to give the impression that the arguments I have made in the course of this debate have not been in the interest of my country, I believe the fight that those of us who are opposed to the joint resolution have made during the debate already has resulted in some change in the Executive attitude. I do not think we can explain on any other basis the White House release of yesterday. I hope at least the debate will help make clear to the administration that in this country there is great concern about the danger that military advisers of the preventive-war school may succeed in persuading the Executive to take what some of us think would be a very unfortunate course of action if he were to authorize a strike against the mainland of China before an act of war was committed against us.

Now, Mr. President, I move to my next point by way of summary of my arguments against the joint resolution. It is that I think the uncertainty of the joint resolution increases, and does not decrease, the risk of war. The joint resolution is said to be based on the premise that miscalculation is a major cause of war. The argument is made that if the Kaiser and Hitler and Mussolini had known we would engage in the recent wars in which we have been involved—World War I and World War II—those wars would not have occurred. I think that is a correct premise. However, the joint resolution, instead of decreasing the area of possible miscalculation, increases it. The joint resolution does this both so far as the United States is concerned and so far as the Chinese Communists are concerned.

The joint resolution clearly contemplates that United States forces may be

used to attack Communist concentrations of shipping or airpower which are being assembled in preparation for an assault upon Formosa, the Pescadores, or related territories. Such an action on our part must be based upon a determination of Communist intentions. This is an area in which allowance must be made for a large margin of error.

Mr. President, I return to my discussion of what our attitude would be if we were Chinese and we saw powerful American military forces concentrated in areas close to China's shores. We say we have no right to assume that if the Red Chinese concentrate airplanes on an airfield which may be built near Amoy Harbor their intentions toward us are peaceful. However, if we were Chinese, would we think the concentration of American military forces so close to the Chinese coast, as in the area of Quemoy, would represent a very peaceful intention on the part of America toward these Chinese? What makes us think they are going to assume that our intentions are peaceful merely because we say they are? Because of the hysteria and the emotionalism which are involved in the public attitudes toward this problem, it is difficult for us to pause long enough, in calm reflection, to try to understand the workings of the oriental mind in circumstances such as these.

As I have said in previous speeches, I believe that as a matter of international law and right we are in a strong position when we say, "If you approach Formosa or the Pescadores, the areas regarding which we have international obligations, you will be at war with us." But I cannot think that when we include Quemoy and Matsu as areas to defend we are in the same position. Instead, in that case we shall be in a very different position.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from Oregon yield to me?

Mr. MORSE. I yield.

Mr. KNOWLAND. This is the only interruption I shall make. The Senator from Oregon asks, "What would be our thinking if we were Chinese and if American military concentrations were occurring on China's borders, and if there were a free government on Formosa?" Assuming that the Chinese Communists, as a tyranny, are slightly confused themselves, if there were any hope of such an effort being successful, if we were Chinese we might be glad to join in rebellion and try to throw off the Red tyranny.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I know that has been the theory of some; but I cannot get away from the fact that the Chinese Communists drove off the Nationalist Chinese, and have not allowed them to come back. I think it is fairly well agreed among most of us that the Nationalist Chinese do not have any chance of getting back to the mainland unless we give them the support which will put them back; and if we do that, and if we put them back on the mainland of China, we shall be at war. Then, Mr. President, it seems to me we are caught on the other horn of the dilemma.

No, Mr. President; I think we must make the tough decision—this is my view, although I know most of my colleagues disagree with me, and I respect

their disagreement—I think we must make the tough decision that under international law we have no business of having our forces 8 or 10 miles from the coastline of China, trying to support Chinese Nationalist forces, parties to the civil war, on those islands. Our own obligations end with Formosa and the Pescadores. Our obligations to defend Formosa and the Pescadores grow out of the situation following World War II and grow out of the Japanese peace treaty.

Mr. President, I repeat that the joint resolution clearly contemplates that United States forces may be used to attack Communist concentrations of shipping or air power which are being assembled in preparation for an assault on Formosa, the Pescadores, or related territories. Such an action on our part must be based on a determination of Communist intentions. This is an area in which as I have said allowance must be made for a large margin of error.

At the same time, the joint resolution, of course, puts the Chinese Communists on notice that they may be attacked, without any overt act on their part, through an American misinterpretation of Communist ship movements or airfield construction. As a consequence, the Communists may misinterpret our own ship movements, and may thereby be led to launch an attack which otherwise they would hold in abeyance.

The joint resolution thereby creates an intolerable uncertainty. If we had conducted our affairs in Europe on the same basis, we might very well have been plunged into war there long ago, on the theory—which has not yet been borne out by the facts—that the Communist build-up in East Germany was a preliminary to an attack by them on Western Europe.

My next point is that the joint resolution weakens our worldwide political position. One of the primary sources of the strength of our position throughout the world has been that our military activities have been purely defensive. We have said to the Soviet bloc, in effect, "If you attack, we will beat you to death."

But now we are saying—or we are appearing to say, which amounts to the same thing—"If we think you are going to attack, we will beat you to death." We thereby lend a color of credence to the Soviet and the Chinese Communist propaganda which portrays the United States as an aggressor—either a potential aggressor or a threatener of aggression. Therefore I say, as my second summary point, that the resolution weakens our worldwide political position.

In the third place, I think the resolution would increase the temptation of Chiang Kai-shek to provoke an attack by Chinese Communists. The Chinese Nationalists are obsessed with the desire to return to the mainland. Newspaper reports that we have written off this desire may serve only to increase their desperation. The result may well be Nationalist attacks upon the Communists so that when the Communists retaliate upon Formosa, the United States will be forced to retaliate upon the mainland. We would then be involved in a full-scale war in China.

There is another danger of involvement in mainland war inherent in the language of this joint resolution as I read it.

I should like to invite the attention of Senators to an Associated Press dispatch which appeared in the *China World* of January 1, 1955. A longer dispatch was published in the *New York Times*. Both of them I shall place in the *RECORD* momentarily. The one in the *China World* reads as follows:

CHIANG PREDICTS EARLY OUTBREAK OF FULL-SCALE WAR

TAIPEH, January 1.—Chiang Kai-shek Friday declared the Red attacks on Nationalist offshore islands were "the overture to the battle of Taiwan (Formosa) Strait."

"A full-scale war may break out at any time," Chiang declared in a New Year's statement to the people.

Chiang spoke after conferences with Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is here for a series of meetings, presumably on the defense of Formosa.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the *RECORD* at this point as a part of my remarks the longer story, which is listed as a special dispatch to the *New York Times*, having been published in the *New York Times* for January 1, 1955. The article is entitled "Chiang Foresees War at Any Time."

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the *RECORD*, as follows:

CHIANG FORESEES WAR AT ANY TIME—NEW YEAR MESSAGE CALLS RED ATTACKS ON ISLES OVERTURE TO FORMOSA STRAIT BATTLE

TAIPEH, FORMOSA, December 31.—A full-scale war between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists may break out at "any time," Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, president of Nationalist China, said today in a New Year's message. He declared that Communist attacks against the Nationalist island outposts of Quemoy and the Tachens in the last 3 months were overtures to the battle for the Strait of Formosa.

This statement in a New Year message was regarded as significant, since Generalissimo Chiang earlier had contended, as he did again today, that Communist invasion of Formosa would be the beginning of the destruction of the Communist regime on the Chinese mainland.

He also warned the world that "1955 will witness the further deterioration of international relations." He did not elaborate this statement.

For the first time the Generalissimo commented on the United States-Formosa mutual-defense treaty in his message. He said the treaty not only completes a necessary link nearest the fighting front but also strengthens our bastion for counterattack and increases our combat potential.

But the Generalissimo immediately added that in a Nationalist counterattack against the mainland "we do not ask for their [friendly nations'] active participation." He also added "in the final analysis we must realize that the future of China can be decided only by ourselves."

Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is in Formosa for a 4-day visit, held a top-level secret military conference this morning with key Nationalist military leaders, including Gen. Chou Chih-jou, secretary general of the National Security Conference; Gen. Sun Li-jen, Presidential Chief of Staff, who was educated at Virginia Military Institute, and Gen. Peng Meng-chi, Acting

Chief of the General Staff. Generalissimo Chiang presided at the 2-hour conference.

Well-informed sources felt certain that Admiral Radford had gone over the entire Formosan defense plan with the Nationalist generals.

Admiral Radford has conferred officially with the Generalissimo twice since his arrival yesterday afternoon. Another purpose of Admiral Radford's visit is believed to obtain data for testimony before a Senate committee on the mutual defense treaty. He may also intend to bring back to the Senate Generalissimo Chiang's assurance that the Nationalists would not undertake any actions that might increase the danger of a third world war.

The admiral is expected to leave Formosa Monday after spending the New Year's holiday with Generalissimo Chiang.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, we have discussed this point backward and forward, and thrashed it over, so that all I need to say in behalf of the opponents of the joint resolution is that we feel that one of the great dangers in this situation, because of what we believe are the commitments of defense which will be undertaken under it, is that it increases the possibility, the probability, and the danger of Chiang involving the United States in war because of some overt act he may commit along the coastline of China, either on the Quemoy or Matsu Islands, or at some other point.

I repeat that I do not propose to vote for a joint resolution which, in my judgment, would increase the probability of the danger of the Nationalist Chinese getting us involved in a war on the mainland of China, because of our defense of Quemoy or Matsu.

The evidence on this point is already beginning to pile up. The Washington Star of January 27 printed an Associated Press story from Taipei which included these two significant paragraphs:

Emboldened by the rising concentration of United States air and sea strength around troubled Formosa, the Nationalists today staged an air raid in broad daylight on Yikiangshan Island. . . .

Yikiangshan has been raided only in early morning hours, but with Sabres on Formosa and powerful units of the United States 7th Fleet standing by, the Nationalists attacked possible Red invasion buildups on Yikiangshan in midafternoon.

I say that if the Nationalists were emboldened to attack this island, they may be sufficiently emboldened to attack Quemoy or Foochow tomorrow; and if the Communists should then retaliate from the mainland, we would be committing ourselves to carry the attack to the mainland. I do not see how we could avoid such a situation.

Fourth, by way of summary, I should say that the joint resolution insufficiently emphasizes the role of the United Nations. I have already commented on it, but I will say this in conclusion:

Our worldwide position would be immeasurably strengthened if we proceeded in this matter through the United Nations instead of projecting ourselves unilaterally into the situation. Formosa is no more important to the defense of the Western Pacific than is Korea. We could have made an equally good case for the unilateral defense of South Korea, from the viewpoint strictly of

protecting vital United States interests in Japan. But our position throughout the world was greatly strengthened because the defense of South Korea was made a United Nations enterprise instead of a United States enterprise.

That is why I shall support with great enthusiasm the amendment of the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], which proposes to amend the "whereas" or preamble section of the joint resolution so as to make it perfectly clear to the world that we are inviting, urging, and asking for United Nations participation in an attempt to settle this very troublous potential war situation in the Formosa area.

Fifth, I think the joint resolution is more likely to encourage additional fighting than to promote stability. The testimony and argument in committee were to the effect that the resolution was necessary to stabilize conditions in the area. In my opinion, the opposite would be the effect of the joint resolution. I do not believe it would produce stability, but instability. I do not believe it would produce peace, but would threaten war. If we really want to stabilize the situation in the Formosa area, then I think we ought to face the fact that until the United Nations really steps in and, by some sort of trusteeship, mandate, or protectorate—I care not what label may be applied to it—assumes jurisdiction under the obligations of the United Nations charter to maintain peace in the Pacific, we must defend Formosa and the Pescadores. We must make clear that we will defend Formosa and the Pescadores at least up until the time the United Nations works out some peaceful solution of the problem. We should make clear that we will use the 7th Fleet to prevent—from Formosa, at least—attacks on the mainland of China; and that we will use the 7th Fleet to prevent attacks from the mainland of China on Formosa. That leaves out of our jurisdiction entirely whatever the Chinese Nationalists want to do off Quemoy or off the Matsu Islands, on their own. I think we all know that they cannot do much on their own, without our logistic support, our military support, and our coverage and backing up.

It might be argued that such a course would encourage the Chinese Communists in their aggressions and subversions elsewhere in Asia. On the contrary, however, it would put us in a better position to counter their activities elsewhere.

China's future does not lie with either Chou En-lai or Chiang Kai-shek, and the more we disassociate ourselves from both, the better the position we will be in to take advantage of opportunities which may present themselves to help the Chinese people achieve the freedom which they deserve, and which all of us want to see them have.

On this point, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record at this point as a part of my remarks an article entitled "United States Saberjets Fly to Formosa for 'Any Mission in Reason,'" published in the Washington Star of January 27, 1955.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

UNITED STATES SABERJETS FLY TO FORMOSA FOR "ANY MISSION IN REASON"—EMBOLDENED NATIONALISTS STAGE RAID ON YIKIANGSHAN IN BROAD DAYLIGHT

TAIPEI, FORMOSA, January 27.—Saberjets from Okinawa and the Philippines—possibly 75 strong, flew to Formosa today prepared "within reason to handle any mission."

The words were those of Lt. Gen. Roger Ramey, 5th Air Force commander, who flew from headquarters in Japan for the transfer operation, which showed the mobility of the Far East Air Forces.

Emboldened by the rising concentration of United States air and sea strength around troubled Formosa, the Nationalists today staged an air raid in broad daylight on Yikiangshan Island.

General Ramey told a news conference he did not know how long the Sabres of the 16th Fighter-Bomber Wing would remain here, nor would he discuss any possible missions.

United States planes and warships are expected to cover the expected Nationalist evacuation of the Tachens, 200 miles north of Formosa, but General Ramey would not even say if the wing had been assigned any mission.

The 18th brought its own ground crews and by afternoon Sabrejets were flying practice missions off Formosan fields. The jets have been modified to carry bomb loads.

The arrival of the United States jets, which outclassed the best Russian-made MIGs in the Korean war, served to underscore United States determination to fight for Formosa if necessary and raised Nationalist spirits.

Yikiangshan has been raided only in early morning hours, but with Sabres on Formosa and powerful units of the United States 7th Fleet standing by, the Nationalists attacked possible Red invasion buildups on Yikiangshan in midafternoon.

The Defense Ministry did not give the type of bombers involved, but it said that three Communist landing craft on the beach at Yikiangshan were strafed and heavily damaged. This indicated that light bombers, which can hit the deck, also were in on the raids. Military installations were reported hit and large fires started.

The Nationalists have been pounding Yikiangshan with four-engine bombers since the Communists seized the island last week. The big bombers attacked the island last night and again today.

The Sabres landed at a Nationalist airforce base as reports from elsewhere indicated the 7th Fleet—already given the additional muscle of three more aircraft carriers—was being reinforced further.

The jets would add tremendous striking power to the United States 7th Fleet, now gathered near here and ready for action if ordered.

(A report from Singapore said the fleet itself apparently would be beefed up by the addition of the aircraft carrier *Midway*. The 45,000-ton flatop was due there February 4 but United States Navy officials said she is now heading north. Four other United States carriers, the *Essex*, *Yorktown*, *Kearsarge*, and *Wasp*, are in Formosa waters with the fleet.)

(Four United States destroyers cut short a courtesy call to Singapore and sailed from there today. American naval sources said they were presumably continuing their voyage to the United States, but their abrupt departure stirred speculation they, too, were headed for the Formosa area.)

(United States naval sources in Hong Kong said a scheduled call there by the cruiser *Pittsburgh* had been canceled and the ship diverted to other areas.)

In Taipei, the best guess was that Chinese Nationalist naval forces would carry out the actual evacuation of the Tachens, screened and covered by the gathering United States air and sea power.

(Gen. Earle E. Partridge, Far East Air Forces commander, said in Tokyo other FEAF offensive units are being redeployed to forward bases. He said the transfer exemplifies the global capability of United States Air Force units to move at jet speeds to any trouble spot.)

(This could mean that long-range bombers were being moved closer to the troubled Formosa area, possibly Okinawa.)

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD representative communications which I have received from various parts of the country with regard to the joint resolution. I think it is very true that the American people are concerned and disturbed over the joint resolution. I happen to think that in a free political society they have the right to raise their voices, expressing their opinions and their viewpoint, because if war should come they, along with us here in the Congress, would be the ones who would do the dying. The chances are great, as our military briefings show, that death will befall millions of individuals in our own country.

So, as we come to take this historic course of action on this resolution, which each of us knows will be taken by an overwhelming vote in the Senate, I think it is particularly appropriate that the viewpoint of a cross-section of American grass-roots opinion be placed in the RECORD. I therefore ask unanimous consent to insert in the RECORD at this point as a part of my remarks representative communications which I have received on the subject.

There being no objection, the communications were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SALEM, OREG., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We applaud your stand on Formosan resolution in Foreign Relations Committee. We urge a United Nations trusteeship for Formosa, pending a plebiscite by the inhabitants. Strong Senate minority vote against resolution would give encouragement to United Nations supporters in all parts of the world. Count on us for help.

Arthur H. Bone, Rev. Julian J. Keiser, J. W. Brasher, Guy Jonas Violet, N. Nettleton, J. E. Hyatt, Helen Jonas, Esther Hyatt, Laura B. Smith, David Stall, V. S. Andie, Hamet and Hayden Smithson, Alice H. Stoll, Cecil Wickline, Harold E. L. Barton, Marvin Nettleton, Corine K. Smith, Ruth O'Day, John W. Bollinger, John A. Rademaker, Elizabeth Rademaker, Lucy and Thomas Bennett, Margaret and Murco Ringnald, H. Ivan Lovell, Cecil Monk, Alan B. Berg, T. J. Shipler.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.:

Am proud of Oregon for having sent you to Senate to serve America in this crisis. You are real statesman with sanity, courage, leadership of the highest quality, and keen insight into realities of situation. With you there is some hope of avoiding war. Much support here for your position.

HOWARD WILLITS.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We are in full agreement with your position on the Formosa resolution. Ask that you do all in your power to get this very dangerous development before the United Nations. We trust that you and Senator NEUBERGER will do everything possible to prevent world war III.

GEORGE BREWSTER and FAMILY.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

During 25 years of interest in national politics, this is the first time I have felt compelled to wire my protest to Washington over the impending action on Formosa. I hope you will do your best to prevent Congress from making the biggest mistake of its history.

JAMES S. FANTZ.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Glad you voted against China war resolution. Fully support your views. Hope Senate will go on record that it cannot by resolution either enlarge President's constitutional power nor share his constitutional duty. Senate should insist we play ball with U. N. team and not go it alone.

ERNEST BONYHADI.

MONMOUTH, OREG., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

I commend your stand as reported on radio tonight on President's resolution. I strongly urge that Senate does not allow leeway for preventive war philosophy to prevail.

R. C. MORGAN.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Deepest heartfelt congratulations your stand regarding Eisenhower's provocative war moves. War danger great at this time. Compare present economic situation, unemployment, lower farm prices, stock-market fluctuation, etc., with period prior to Korean war. Not you but Eisenhower is committing political suicide. May your courage be contagious.

HERBERT SIMPSON.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Continue opposing the new resolution, which means certain war. We will be without allies if we act on our own outside the United Nations.

Mr. and Mrs. M. DRAGOON.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE:
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.:
Sincere congratulations on your Formosan stand. May you thus always have the courage of your convictions. This time Eisenhower is dead wrong. Please mark us as two of your campaign workers for 1956.

KATHLEEN and ROBERT EVANS.

ESTACADA, OREG., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE:
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.:
I heartily approve your statement urging us to run the calculated risks of peace. Your

efforts to counsel patience are splendid. Keep it up.

JOHN L. WALLEN.

ALBANY, OREG., January 26, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE:
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.:
Stand firm against the interests and congressional representatives who are willing to sacrifice American lives in this Chinese civil war. Try to stop this reckless action of our Government that could start a world war and possibly destroy all of us. This message for Senator NEUBERGER also.

HARLIN TALBERT.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 26, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE:
Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.:
Congratulations on your stand on Formosa policy resolution.

LEO SAMS.

SALEM, OREG., January 26, 1955.
United States Senator MORSE,
Washington, D. C.:
Congratulations on your courageous vote against Ike's Formosa plan. More power to you.

A. M. VISTICA.

WOODBURN, OREG.

JUNCTION CITY, OREG., January 26, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building:

Very proud of you Wednesday. Expect you to retain right to decide on war at time of incident, not to rubber-stamp blank-check authority for President or military to use at their discretion. We favor diplomacy, not military to ease tension. Hold you morally accountable to reserve right to make final decision. Saving world's peace more important than saving our face. Be cautious these days of impetuous actions.

Mr. and Mrs. MARVIN G. PURSINGER.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We applaud and admire your stand on armed forces in Asia. It takes real courage to take a stand on this issue and we trust more Americans will voice their support of your stand.

Sincerely,

JOHN W. BOLLINGER,
Bollinger's Farm and City Supply,
Salem, Oreg.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations—courage against fight against war. Interference in internal affairs of China lost American boys for profits.

H. S. MACKAY.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 26, 1955.
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I see by tonight's paper you are against any resolution that might get us into world war III. Congratulations. Thank you.

Why can't the United States of America mind its own business and let China fight out its own problems?

If Chiang hadn't let inflation get out of hand, which starved the loyal Chinese, he would not have been deposed.

I have friends who lived in China and the plight of the poor was terrible.

Sincerely yours,

VIVIAN STRATTON.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 25, 1955.
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I am so very much opposed to President Eisenhower's request for special powers to order the attack on the mainland of China as a preventive war measure. This, I fear, would turn into its opposite, and be the beginning of a world war and not its prevention.

Hitler's attacks against the many European nations were also claimed by him as being preventive measures, but where did it lead to? Why or how can we expect any adventure of this nature by us to bring about any better ending?

Very truly yours,

NORMAN HAALAND.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 26, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR: I am impelled to send you a note to congratulate you on your stand on the bill to bomb China. That's the greatest thing you've done to date in my way of thinking.

Very truly,

LARRY SUPOVE.

WILSHIRE METHODIST CHURCH,

Portland, Oreg., January 27, 1955.

The Honorable WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. MORSE: I was happy to see that you were more cognizant than some of our representatives at Washington of some of the problems involved in giving the President almost dictatorial powers in the possible commitment of our Nation into a war with China.

It behooves the representatives of the people to keep the control of the Nation in its own hands.

Certainly the solution of the problems involved in the western Pacific can only be through the United Nations and China, no matter what its government, cannot finally be ignored by that body.

I feel sure that your influence will be on the side of a peaceful United Nations approach to the solution of the problems involved in the Pacific areas.

Sincerely yours,

EVERETT H. GARDNER.

NEWBERG, OREG., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We are glad that you voted against President Eisenhower's plan to use direct military intervention in the Formosa area. As yet, we do not know your reasons for so voting, but we feel it safe to assume you believed the danger of world war would be increased.

If the United States continues to stay in Chinese territories and interfere in what is a civil war, world war will be very close. Only by turning the Formosa territory over to the United Nations, can war be averted.

We hope you will continue your strong and courageous stand against those who would plunge us into a hopeless war.

Yours truly,

DONN SCHRODER.

EDITH M. SCHRODER.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

We are terribly concerned about Eisenhower's new war proposals. Keep up the good work and vote against it. We want no third world war.

ROSE and BERNARD LEOPOLD.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington D. C.:

Keep up the good work. Time is needed to rally support.

JOHN MACKENZIE.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

My congratulations for your courageous and correct opposition to the war program

advocated by our President. Keep the fight up. I feel the forces of peace are just beginning to get vocal on this issue.

NORMAN HAALAND.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Washington D. C.:

We're with you in fight to maintain Congress' constitutional position. Effort to prevent a standing declaration of war commendable. Urge filibuster to give other Americans chance to see consequences of this precedent-setting measure.

HARRY FUCIS, DAWN TOMLINSON, BODON ANDERSON, ANNE LUNT, BRUCE GRAY, BILL HUNT,
Reed College.

GRESHAM, OREG., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Washington, D. C.:

By all means continue your stand against the United States becoming involved in another major conflict.

LEWIS N. LEVY.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

Your courageous stand against administration's aggressive war policy, China-Formosa area has earned deep gratitude of all peace-minded Americans. Congress must not make greatest blunder in American history. People here solidly support your efforts to defeat administration proposal in Senate. Keep up the good fight.

Mr. and Mrs. MELVIN N. LONDON.

PORTLAND, OREG., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations strong opposition Eisenhower's predated declaration war. Urge effort to extend debate to give time for more to become informed.

Mr. and Mrs. H. M. NEWMAN.

CHESTER, PA., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

The Senate, the Capitol:

Do not let this Formosa folly pass unaltered. This moment of hysteria needs your strong conviction.

THEODORE OLSAN.

VAN NUYS, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

Urge you oppose congressional approval of any action that will involve us in war with China. Let Chinese settle their own problems.

ESTELLE BRISKER.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE:

Thanks for the courage to dissent.

J. SCHULMAN.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

More power to your fight to preserve America's honor and peace of world.

PHILIP ALLEN.

WOODSIDE, N. Y.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your stand against interfering in another country's affairs at the grave risk of war. Highly gratified to see you remain firm and courageous in face of the

blind hysteria prevalent in Congress. Peace-loving Americans urge you to keep up the good work.

Mr. and Mrs. S. SCHMERLER.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 28, 1955.

WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building:

Your position in current Formosa debate entirely proper. However, I have grave misgivings in going even as far as you propose. An affirmative and armed stand against Communist aggression is needed, but I do not feel support of Chinese Nationalist Government, because of what it represents, is the best place to make such a stand. This is my personal view as a fellow Oregonian.

J. HOWARD HICKS,

Secretary-Treasurer, Office Employees International Union.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

Wholeheartedly back your position against preventive war drive. President Eisenhower's request for deployment of forces in Far East inevitable lead to world war. Wish you success in stopping this maneuver.

MILTON and GERTRUDE SEIF.

BREWSTER, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Washington, D. C.:

Commend your stand and urge continued opposition to China lobby and preventive war.

CARL DREHER.

NORTH CONWAY, N. H., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

The Capitol, Washington, D. C.:

I applaud your valiant and clear-sighted opposition to the Formosa resolution and pray that you may continue strong and confident until the sober, good sense of Congress returns. The Formosa resolution is dangerously unwise, it does not offer the Chinese Communists an opportunity for retreat, and it presents the Russians with a precise formula for provoking us to conflict, which they may speedily do, because their policy aims at getting us snarled up in Asia. We must take a resolute stand against Communist subversion and aggression, but let us not give away military secrets by announcing where and when, and let us choose our ground wisely in defense of genuine democracy.

Yours truly,

ROBERT P. BRUNDAGE.

CLEVELAND, OHIO, January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building:

Support your stand against intervention in Formosa. No more Koreans.

PAUL ALBERT.

PALO ALTO, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

United States Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

We strongly urge that you do your utmost to prevent the further involvement in Chinese affairs now being contemplated by our Government. We consider the proposed measures with respect to Formosa to be dangerously contrary to the best interests of our Nation.

Mr. and Mrs. DAVID E. ALLEN, Jr.

FIRST CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH,
Lakeview, Mich., January 26, 1955.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I am confident that you will do everything in your power to induce the Senate to act with caution and restraint in the matter of the administration's request for broad powers to defend Chiang Kai-shek. This looks like a headlong plunge into world

catastrophe and national ruin. Senator LONG is quoted as demanding caution. Senator KEFAUVER is demanding U. N. action and not unilateral action on our part. The prayers for peace were meant to lull us to sleep. Why should American boys die for the Formosa dictator? Why should we precipitate a world war to defend this man who betrayed us and his own people in World War II?

Sincerely yours,
Rev. A. W. KAUFFMAN.

McGUIRE-JOHNSON, PUBLISHERS,
Wadsworth, Ill., January 27, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Thank you for your courageous and farsighted stand in defense of the American people, of justice, and of morality. I refer to your opposition to giving a carte blanche go-ahead in this Far Eastern crisis. But I could say the same thing to you on numerous other matters, for your leadership and brilliance in guidance during these difficult days is one of the great bright hopes that perhaps ultimately some order can come to civilized society and nations can act maturely and with justice.

Why does our Government not make clear that we will defend only those lands lying east of the jurisdictional line released to us by Japan? What possible justification do we have for defending any other lands of China or what madness could prompt us to even thinking of bombing concentrations on the Chinese mainland?

What is the magic hold that Chiang and the China lobby has on our Government? What possible moral justification would we have for "pushing" Chiang and his corrupt and despotic government upon the Chinese people when they have once cast him out?

In the long run, what madness could prompt our Government to risk war now? Do we possibly think that Russia with her atomic bombs would stand idly by while we bombed China's mainland?

Please go on and try to bring some sort of enlightenment to our Government and our people in this hysteria-beclouded moment of our history.

May we again thank you for your strong leadership and clarity of thought and highly principled actions. You vindicate and justify the people's faith in democratic government. God bless you.

Faithfully yours,

MYRA C. JOHNSON and MARCELLA McGUIRE.
P. S.—Why can't we work through the United Nations on this Far Eastern matter?

WILMETTE, ILL., January 27, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I hope you will continue to oppose President Eisenhower's plan, which includes interference in China's affairs and the very real chance of war.

The program which at first glance seemed to be for peace now seems to include approval by the Senate of a preventive war.

Thank you for your courageous fight for liberal views.

GLENN L. ANDERSON.

BIG RUN, W. VA., January 26, 1955.

GENTLEMEN OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE,
Washington, D. C.

SIRS: Call it what you may, but it should be clear to anyone whose memory is as long as his shortest finger that the American people do not care for police actions or preventive war. They do not care for gag rule nor dictators under any disguise or exegesis. Their voices ring the theme that Chiang and all his filthy henchmen are not worth the spilling of American blood. They are not so concerned about aims as they are about effects. The stray bullet is just as deadly as the deliberately aimed one.

This game of ostrich, ostrich, who will be next, is now growing threadbare. We cannot dictate to, nor police, the Orient; to attempt it is to be swallowed by it. Five thousand years of history attest that the central Orient

conquers its conquerors by swallowing them. The writer proposes that we tempt not the quagmire.

Very respectfully yours,
J. HERBERT HIGGINBOTHAM.

Thank you, Senator, for a voice of wisdom and reason. It is a premium commodity these days, even in the United States Senate.

INDIANAPOLIS, IND., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your courageous stand. Continue the fight for peace.

MERLE H. MILLER.

JANUARY 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: May I express to you my wholehearted support and admiration for your position in regard to the President's resolution on the Formosa defense. I feel there is no moral or historical reason for our involvement in a civil war of the Chinese. We are endangering the entire world with all-out conflict when we act so irresponsibly.

Thank you for your position of sanity. American lives and morals are at stake, and I feel you are serving both when you oppose our involvement in China.

Respectfully yours,

MARY HORTATSAS.

CHICAGO, ILL.

NEW MILFORD, CONN., January 27, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR: We were glad to hear by radio that you oppose the President's demand for the power to make war without further recourse to Congress. Maybe he would never use it, but we think to give that power to any one single man is dangerous, as well as totally against the American way.

We wrote our own Senators to oppose this move, and we hope the House of Representatives will reconsider its rash and too-hasty action.

We note on this morning's broadcast that General MacArthur states that "we cannot get what we want by war." That is of course how we feel.

We hope you will be able to stem the tide of hysteria and stop the indecent rushing of our country into an adventure that might prove fatal to us and to the entire world.

We are grateful to you and are praying that you and those who think like you will prevail in this crisis.

Sincerely,

ELEANOR STEVENSON.
RUTH ERICKSON.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 26, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE:
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We wholeheartedly support and appreciate your sane, principled, and courageous stand against President Eisenhower's Formosa policy. Your voice has already stemmed the prevailing war mood and brought before the American people at least an alternative to armed threats as an instrument of national policy.

Very truly yours,

HENRY and SHIRLEY MARK.
Mr. and Mrs. Henry Mark.

HARTFORD, CONN., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE:
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations; again congratulations. History will record that you performed great national service by your courage, your opposition to Eisenhower Formosan resolution. You speak for people of Connecticut and throughout America.

House of Representatives, as well as President Eisenhower, will soon realize they are victims of gigantic hoax. Ignore false charge of softness to communism and lead American people to peace. One month ago Secretary Dulles stated Red China had nothing with which to capture Formosa. Chiang Kai-shek must go. I lived throughout China off and on for 35 years including 6 years as consul in Foochow, 3 years in Swatow, and 3 years in Canton. Hence, I have particularly intimate knowledge of south China coast. Please give copy of this telegram to Senator SPARKMAN.

GORDON L. BURKE,
United States Foreign Service Office,
Retired.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 28, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your stand on Formosa. May you be able to bring sanity to those who would rush our boys to war.

Mr. and Mrs. LOUIS SHUB.

ERIE, PA., January 27, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Thank you for your courageous stand on this Formosa business.

There are many people who feel that this resolution is too broad to be entrusted to the discretion of Dulles, Knowland, Radford, et al.

We could easily be blundered into an all-out war with Red China.

You will recall that Winston Churchill just a short time ago warned "that it would be the greatest tragedy that could befall the United States of America."

With best of regards,

ROBERT M. FINNELL.

MODESTO, CALIF., January 28, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your stand. Must not give any person power to involve us in war on China mainland.

TED KALSEEN.

BROOKLYN, N. Y., January 26, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Chamber,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: Thank God for your courage and wisdom in voting against the proposal to defend Formosa. We are very much distressed to see the President's action rushing the American people into a war. We applaud your stand to safeguard our country from a catastrophic war with the Chinese. We depend upon you to alert the other Senators to the great peril of the President's proposal.

Respectfully yours,

Mr. and Mrs. IRVING WALLACH.

SOUTH HADLEY, MASS., January 27, 1955.

DEAR MR. MORSE: As a college senior and a Democrat who has followed your career of bipartisanship with pleasure, I want to thank you for a sound evaluation of the far-eastern situation and the Formosan dynamite. Your speech was earnest and forthright; we need you and the Senators like you in our Congress. I hope, at least, on the Senate floor the clause permitting United States bombing of mainland ports in any eventuality will be struck out.

Having lived in China till 1949, I keenly feel your point that the mainland, for all the evil of the Communist dictatorship, has a sovereign right to Formosa; and agree with Senator Long that Chiang Kai-shek has "no more certain purpose than to have the United States fully involved in an all-out war with Red China."

May God bless you in your continued dedication to your work and to your country.

Sincerely yours,

BEVERLY LINDHOLM.

MILL VALLEY, CALIF., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

Peace-loving citizens here stand against administration resolution for sweeping war powers in Formosa Straits. Continue to oppose war drive and urge coworkers to join you. Appreciate your courageous stand for peace.

MARGUERITE EDISES.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 27, 1955.
 DEAR SENATOR MORSE: As always, your words, which came to me over WRC this morning, were enlightening.

May you and those helping you be able to hold off the decision until all of us can see this situation clearly and with understanding.

Sincerely,

MAY FRANK RHOADS.

OAKLAND, CALIF., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

We heartily endorse your noble stand against granting warmaking powers to the President. Keep up the fight against those who would plunge us into catastrophe on the hollow pretext of defending Formosa.

Mr. and Mrs. IRWIN LUCKMAN.

VAN NUYS, CALIF., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

We urge you to oppose giving away Congress' right to declare war as provided in our Constitution. Our Senators and Representatives reflect more thinking and conscience than is embodied in one man. We also feel our position regarding Formosa is unwarranted, as it is an internal Chinese affair.

LOUIS COSSAK.
 JULIA COSSAK.
 FRANCES KLEIN.

LONG BEACH, CALIF., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE:

Congratulations on fight against preventive war resolution. Lives should not be risked to maintain Chiang-MacArthur proposal. We who hope to abolish war should receive consideration.

Regards,

GEORGE E. SHIBLEY.

BOSTON, MASS., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building:

President's resolution is tantamount to declaration of war no matter how amended, and can mean war of attrition worse than 10 Koreas, if not a nuclear destruction of mankind. United States will only further alienate Asian countries. Ask you vote down this resolution.

LEON RABIN.

BRONX, N. Y., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Having just read a partial account of your speech concerning the Formosa question to the Senate, I wish to say that I regret that I am not a resident of the State of Oregon. How much prouder of you I could be, were that to be the case. Since it is not, I must content myself with the lesser satisfaction it is to know that if I can't vote for you, I can at least root for you.

I am, in profound respect, and with the hope that I am one of a very great many who have been inspired and moved to respond because of your display of courage and integrity.

HARRY GRANT.

ALLENTOWN, PA., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Congratulations on your fine stand on the Formosa question. Those are not our islands, and the more we act as if they were, the more friends this country loses in the world.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD W. REICHARD.

OAKLAND, CALIF., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

Keep up good work. Battle of Formosa is not our fight.

FRANCES TANDY.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 United States Senate,
 Washington, D. C.:

Strongly support your stand to defeat President Eisenhower's request for blank check to make war against China. Let no American life be lost to maintain reactionary unpopular Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa. I do not believe Formosa vital to defense of United States or territory.

THOMAS JACOBS.

LAKE FOREST, ILL., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

As long time former residents of China, we heartily commend your stand on the current debate on the President's request regarding the Formosan crisis. We hope you and others of like minds will continue to urge an amendment limiting authorization to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores against actual attack.

Mr. and Mrs. R. B. FULTON.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Building:

You are to be commended on your stand on Formosa.

MABEL CHAPMAN.

BERKELEY, CALIF., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 United States Senate,
 Washington, D. C.:

Urge you use all efforts possible to defeat the Eisenhower resolution on Formosa.

WILLIAM LOWE.

QUEENS VILLAGE, N. Y., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 United States Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your courageous statesmanlike stand on Formosa.

Mr. and Mrs. MORRIS SCHEFFLER.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your courageous peace stand. You and colleagues opposing war-now group arguing patriotic service. You speak for majority of Americans.

MILTON BATES.

CHICAGO, ILL., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

Thank you for raising a sane voice during the stampede. Good luck.

MARIANNE MCGEEHAN.

VILLA PARK, ILL., January 27, 1955
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 United States Senate,
 Washington, D. C.:

In full accord with your view on the Formosa matter. Hope your usual wise judgment prevents a preventive war.

LEWIS ORLOW.

GEORGETOWN, LA., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your standing up against KNOWLAND and RADFORD. Please do not let them lead us into war with China which might result in world war and destruction of us all.

M. PHILLIPS.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

We approve of your speech on the Formosa question.

C. L. DORN and N. C. DORN.

BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

Please, please, please keep it up. Firmly behind you.

ROBERT LEWIN.

CLEVELAND, OHIO, January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

Thank God for your sane voice in Senate. Keep on speaking against preventive war.

EDITH GAINES.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

We women listed below who work together urge you to vote against the resolution on Formosa which calls for preventive war and a suicidal policy of intervening in favor of Chiang Kai-shek and using armed forces for provocations against the mainland of China strongly urge you vote no.

JANET TOBIN,
 JEAN MOORE,
 SUSAN KING,
 FLORENCE PARTON,
 ELISE FOX,
 VERA FAURE,
 MAYONE GOLDEN,
 LA MAR LEWIS,

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

I am delighted with your courageous stand in regard to the China situation. You are not alone, but I believe represent the thinking of a large majority of people who have great hope that commonsense will prevail.

FRANK E. KARELSEN.

SCHENECTADY, N. Y., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Independent, Oregon,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

Congratulate you on your patriotic stand on the Formosa issue. Keep up the good work.

IRVING HOROWITZ.

NAPA, CALIF., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations for your courageous stand against war resolution.

LOUISE C. HEWITT.

ELGIN, ILL., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We strongly support your criticism of Ike's Formosa resolution as meaning preventive war. Please fight hard to restrict its terms.
RALPH and MARY SMELTZER.

PALO ALTO, CALIF., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

The undersigned active Democrats warmly support your courageous stand against administration preventive war plans. We stand solidly behind you in opposition to beginning world war III.

Miss A. CARNEY,
JOSEPH F. LEWIS,
EDWARD A. ROSS,
DONALD STOFFLE,
ELLIOTT H. WILSON.

SANTA MONICA, CALIF., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We strongly support your action in resisting proposed legislation to give a free hand to our President to enter into war on behalf of Formosa. We urge working out peaceful solutions of world conflicts through the U. N. Alex Muldavin, Jane Thiermann, Arthur Rose, Ethel Rose, Lorraine Anagos, Herbert Gutman, Sidney Moldofsky, Imagard Linel, Aris Anagos, Dorothy Palmer, Lena Mayers, Ian Thiermann.

BOSTON, MASS., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Commend your courageous stand against war. Please keep it up.
Mr. and Mrs. I. M. BUCKMAN.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We support your courageous stand on Formosa issue.
ROBERT and JANET LIEBOWITZ.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your stand. Many people I have talked to, teachers, parents, social workers, are behind you. Save our children.

Nursery schoolteacher ALICE MASTERS.

EVANSTON, ILL., January 27, 1955.

WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your sane, courageous Formosa stand. A true independent, you have again put statesmanship over politics and expediency.

Admirably,

SARA and FELIX POLLAK.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Heartily endorse your stand against the President's recommendation, and urge you continue action against preventive war.

ROSE and MARTIN BROWN.

HIGHTSTOWN, N. J., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We support your stand against the President's Formosa policy resolution. We urge you to act to defeat it.

Mr. and Mrs. A. LINOWITZ.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 27, 1955.

Senator MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

The proposal advanced by President Eisenhower, I am in agreement with Senator MORSE.

MARSHALL W. JONES.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Support completely your speech on Formosa.

EDWARD YEOMAN, JR.
JEAN DOUGLAS YEOMAN.
ANN ABBOTT YEOMAN.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Your opposition to administration's measure in Chinese situation is most heartening. Hasty action could plunge us into atomic world war, which would destroy all of us. Time for discussion and debate is imperative. Do not be deterred in your forthright position for peace.

MARCELLA AVNET.

NEW HAVEN, CONN., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Heartily appreciate the significant questions you raised on the Formosan issue. Our thanks to you, Senator FLANDERS, and supporting colleagues.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. ED HUMMEL,
MRS. STANLEY HARRISON,
Mr. and Mrs. FRANK COOLEY,
Mr. and Mrs. J. ANDERSON,

Yale Divinity School, New Haven, Conn.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We heartily congratulate you on the stand you are taking to keep us out of war. Also many of our neighbors feel the same way as we do.

Mr. and Mrs. HENRY GREENBERG.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

This is to support your courageous, patriotic stand against the Formosa resolution that would risk world war III. You must continue your great fight. The hopes of the American people for our country itself rests with you and those valiant Senators who are with you.

GLORIA GRAVES.

BROOKLYN, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

I applaud your courageous position. Your voice in the Senate is indeed hopeful. We are with you.

AARON RASHKIN.

PALO ALTO, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Strongly support your opposition to President Eisenhower's resolution which could lead to preventive war. Why should Congress abrogate its constitutional authority to declare war and allow one man the power to plunge the world into atomic destruction?

Mrs. S. F. BRYANT.
ALICE RICHARDS,
DAVID MEIGS,
VALEDA BRYANT.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office, Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your intelligent, courageous stand in interest of peace, morality, and sanity.

JOHN DOBBS.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Chambers,
Washington, D. C.:

Support your stand on Formosa issue. Please do everything in your power to prevent dangerous situation.

DR. ALBERT PARETS.

VAN NUYS, CALIF., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your courageous stand on the Eisenhower resolution. We do not want our boys to die to maintain Kai-shek in Formosa, nor do we want to give the President a blank check to involve us in world war III.

Mr. and Mrs. GLEN G. GIESLER.

AMBLER, PA., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Power to your courageous effort to halt the march to war. Keep talking until the people can be aroused. Inconceivable that Formosa should be a defensive necessity to us. Let the U. N. mediate. Protect Eisenhower from the pressures he faces by withholding the extraordinary power he asks.

MARK DEIBLER, Jr.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We oppose hasty acceptance of the President's proposal on Formosa. Our country must avoid action that may provoke war. Let us not send warships but work instead for a United Nations cease-fire.

SAM and EDNA LEGG.

SEATTLE, WASH., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Fight and stop the President's resolution on Formosa.

W. D. ANDERSON.

BALTIMORE, MD., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Support your stand in opposition to preventive war policy being urged by Eisenhower. Hope that your fight against the adoption of this most dangerous policy will be successful and we are certain that it has the support of all the peace-minded people throughout the land.

JOAN and GUNTHER WERTHEIMER.

PRINCETON, N. J., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

I warmly support your efforts to prevent our country from making major blunder in Far East. Keep it up. We should negotiate, not make military threats.

MARY FOLSOM.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

HONORABLE SIR: Your awareness of the situation in China is reflected in your vote of today.

Very sincerely,

SAUSALITO, CALIF. Mrs. JOAN H. PERA.

MENLO PARK, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Permit me to commend your stand on the Formosa issue. It is obvious Congress will grant the desired powers, for your view is not the popular one. Let us hope that this action not prove to be a tragic error.

In the furtherance of what we deem to be our national interests, it seems we propose to take a unilateral action outside the U. N. which, in effect, can result in an open invitation to both sides to solve matters through force rather than by peaceful negotiation. Whatever the merits of our case, whether we are right or wrong, such a policy leaves small choice to the People's Republic of China and her friends. It is difficult to see but one reaction from her, the Soviets, and the Asian nations. Nor will the Arab bloc, the neutrals, and even some of our own friends regard it anything but an aggressive move.

Following World War I, in which I was wounded, I spent over 10 years in constant travel over most of the world and gained some understanding of its varied peoples and cultures. For many centuries, more than half of them have been conditioned by economic, social, political, and religious environments vastly different from those of the West. They will not change quickly or without great difficulty. That our way of life may be more conducive to human progress is beside the point, for these peoples must, in the very nature of things, in the last analysis, change by themselves, for themselves, and in their own way. If we cannot find a way to live with them more or less peacefully while these changes are taking place, there is nothing left but force—and all that implies for them and, let us not forget, for us as well.

In my opinion, Senator, you have taken the long view, the historical perspective, on these matters but, unfortunately, our people are an impatient one, and our affairs are in the hands of the military to a greater extent than is wise. And on top of it all is the sad fact that man is not yet a fully rational animal and war is his most irrational act. Best luck to your efforts.

Respectfully yours,

JAMES ARMSTRONG.

JANUARY 26, 1955.

DEAR SIR: We would like you to know that we are in complete agreement with your expressed views on the administration's save-Formosa resolution.

This Nation is badly and sadly in need of more statesmen of your caliber.

Very sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. FRANK NARDI, Jr.
CLINTON, IND.

JANUARY 27, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR: Wonderful, brilliant, courageous speech. I'm glad we have some Senators who can still think clearly.

Sincerely,

Dr. I. A. JAFFE.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

BROOKLYN, N. Y., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: We witnessed your telecast this morning and we wish to express our approval of your stand. Although you do not represent the State of New York, we feel that we are all involved in a higher loyalty that transcends narrow State interests.

Therefore, we take this opportunity to write to voice our agreement with you and also our gratitude.

The greatest assets our country has in these troubled times are public-spirited men

of courage like yourself who place the welfare of country above partisan politics.

Respectfully,

HAROLD L. SCHICK and FAMILY.

NEW BEDFORD, MASS., January 27, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I believe most Americans are with you. How can we win those people on the mainland of China by bombing them? Let them see we want peace with them. I think we are making more and more enemies.

Good luck to you.

NANCY E. BARON.

SEATTLE, WASH., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Keep up the fight.

L. C. WALKER.

LAWRENCE, MASS., January 26, 1955.

The Honorable WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MORSE: May I commend you on your foresight for voting against the resolution giving President Eisenhower the power to defend Formosa.

If the United Nations is to continue to function, as all freemen pray that it will, certainly the United States should have enough faith in it to bring this before this world organization rather than make a mistake even more tragic than Korea and try to "save the world" singlehanded.

May God bless your efforts in the interests of our country, and give you the continuing courage and strength to aid your fellow Senators in choosing the unity of the U. N. rather than international disaster.

Very truly yours,

JEAN P. CONSTANTINEAN
(Mrs. Norman).

LAWRENCE, MASS., January 26, 1955.

The Honorable WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I wish to commend you on your vote against giving the President full war powers regarding the situation in Formosa. I think this Nation and the world should remember Korea before hasty action is again taken. I feel that we should show our faith in the United Nations by at least trying to reach agreement through it instead of being ready to go to war, or risk going to war, in trying to solve things by hasty actions.

I think also that we, a supposed Christian nation, should show our faith in God in dealing with world problems. We could help accomplish this by stepping up our relief program. I feel that more aid properly administered would do more to effectively combat communism than would a stockpile of H-bombs and arms. History has proved that stockpiling leads to an arms race which inevitably leads to war. There is much evil to overcome in this world, but we should not forget the teachings of Christ in trying to overcome it.

Sincerely,

NORMAN CONSTANTINEAN.

SPRING VALLEY DAIRY FARM,

Fincastle, Va., January 27, 1955.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senator,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I listened to your talk this morning over TV channel 10, Roanoke, Va., discussing the resolution before Congress concerning China mainland, and I agree with you wholeheartedly and I wish that all Americans could have heard you. Oregon should certainly keep you as their

Senator as long as you wish to remain as such.

Very respectfully,

F. W. BRUGH.

JANUARY 27, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: You are 100-percent right. Stick to it on this China-Formosa affair. Formosa ought to be a U. N. trusteeship. We must not have a preventive war. Chiang is a dictator—Formosa is not "free" China, nor is Red China, but war is not the answer.

W. WYDAL.

BOSTON, MASS., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Congratulations on your speech of yesterday. I think you took exactly the right line.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE R. WALKER.

MONTCLAIR, N. J., January 28, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR: Mary thanks on your stand on the Formosa resolution. As a citizen, I think war for such a cause is barbaric.

Wishing you the best.

JESSE MORSE.

LEWISBURG, PA., January 27, 1955.

MY DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Can we demand conduct of Peiping which the United States of America would not observe? Quemoy is China. A war started over Quemoy would find us fighting alone and deservedly. We must expect greater wisdom from the Senators.

Sincerely yours,

DESSA HARRIMAN
(Mrs. P. L.).

SCITUATE, MASS., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Congratulations on your vote against giving the President power to wage war to save Formosa. Your courage is to be admired.

President Eisenhower should remember that he was elected because of his promise to end the mess in Korea, and should not involve our Nation in backing up Chiang Kai-shek.

Very truly yours,

MARY W. CARLSON.
CLARE M. CARLSON.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Wholeheartedly agree your reservations concerning Formosa resolution. Hope you will join with FLANDERS and LANGER in voting against it and urge others to do same.

MARY H. HICHS.

NEW MARKET, VA., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate:

Congratulations. Keep on fighting war moves. People with you.

RALPH and LOUISE GALT.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Heartily endorse your position on Formosa.

W. ROSENBAUM.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Congratulations on your stand on Formosa.

Involvement might lead to war.

Very respectfully yours,

ETTA GOLDBAUM.

NEW YORK CITY, N. Y.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 United States Senate,
 Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: My family and I heard you this morning on the Today TV program on the interpretation of the implications of the Formosa resolution.

We want you to know that we wholeheartedly agree with your position and applaud you for your courageous outspokenness. We want more of your insightful patriotism that is good for our country and its real security.

Keep up the good work of letting the people know.

Very truly yours,

SAMUEL FISHZOHN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 United States Senate,
 Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I have very much admired your position on the Formosa situation and your forthright statement of it in the current Senate debate. I believe it would be a great mistake for the United States to risk being triggered into a mainland war with China by an Asian leader who commands little respect anywhere in the world outside the United States. Certainly if the picture can be painted in perspective Americans will realize that we have no moral right, nor moral and political support from the rest of the world, in establishing no man's land at a distance of 4 miles from the Chinese coast. That we must not tolerate aggression is clear; that aggression consists of eliminating actively hostile military bases 4 miles off one's coast is very far from clear. Where is our sense of proportion?

Sincerely,

ROBERT A. DUDLEY.

TWIN LIONS MOTOR SERVICE,
 Pasadena, Calif., January 27, 1955.
 Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Congratulations on your fight against the war resolution. The silent people are behind you.

Very truly yours,

KING TELLESON.

ST. PAUL, MINN., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I want to congratulate you on your courageous stand on the question of Formosa.

I believe we should leave the Chinese people alone to settle their own problems. We can't expect a big sovereign nation like China to submit to pushing around by us, any more than we would submit to any big power from halfway round the world setting up bases just off our coast and threatening our security. If the shooting ever starts, who can say where it will end?

It takes real courage to be one of the few standing up for the right. Thanks to you, and keep fighting.

Very truly yours,

JUSTINE C. O'CONNOR.

MILWAUKEE, WIS., January 27, 1955.
 Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Your intelligent approach to the Eisenhower resolution on the Formosa situation lifted the hearts of millions of people in our country.

We support you and hope and pray that your approach to this problem will have wide support among your fellow Senators.

Sincerely,

ADELE V. HOLTZ.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I am deeply grateful to you for opposing provocative action in the Far East. To risk war in today's world seems madness.

The problem of Formosa will never be settled right by violence or under duress of either side. It should be settled in the U. N. by the world community, including all parties to the conflict.

With appreciation of your courageous stand on so many issues,

Yours respectfully,

HELEN M. BEARDSLEY.

CHICAGO, ILL., January 28, 1955.
 DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Thank you for what you are doing on the Formosa situation. Please keep on trying.

All my admiration for your courage. I hope other Senators will join you before it is too late.

Sincerely,

ESTHER LINDAN.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 28, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.:
 Heartily endorse your position on Formosa.
 M. GERSMAN.

GALE HOUSE FARM,
 Pennsburg, Pa., January 26, 1955.
 The Honorable WAYNE MORSE,
 United States Senate,
 Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: When you say the bill is a blank check I believe you are completely accurate. I am wholly with you on this point of view. One of the conditions, unless I am entirely wrong, granting Presidential authority to act is that should any unusual buildup be detected on the Chinese mainland, that condition alone would be sufficient reason to bomb such areas.

Under such conditions it would seem that some one or a group may with malicious intent advise falsely or greatly exaggerate almost any patrol or normal military activity that goes on along the coast.

Who is to say this is it? It looks far too dangerous and undefined.

Very truly yours,

MICHAEL FRYE.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.
 Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
 United States Senator,
 Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I have always admired the firm and liberal stand which you have taken on most important issues.

It was only this week that I have heard you speak on television, once on the Edward R. Murrow program, and this morning, on the Dave Garraway show.

I agree wholeheartedly with your realistic attitude on the resolution now before the Senate on the Chinese issue. The wonder is that more of our legislators do not hold views coinciding with yours. Keep up your good fight and others will be influenced by your good example.

Yours sincerely,

Mrs. ROSE M. SOYBEL.

PITTSBURGH, N. J., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I just wish to inform you I support your stand regarding the Formosan issue and am so informing the Senators from New Jersey.

Yours truly,

AUGUSTA W. DOWLING
 Mrs. Arnold G. Dowling.

CORONA, N. Y., January 26, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: We are in full agreement with your position in regard to the President's resolution on Formosa and have written Senators LEHMAN and IVES urging them to join you in your courageous fight to avert the dangers of war with China.

We have also asked them to support the Kefauver amendment in regard to Formosa believing that this is a matter for the United Nations to handle.

Sincerely yours,

ELIZABETH and IRVING MERKELSON.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 26, 1955.
 SENATOR WAYNE MORSE: I was very glad to hear tonight the newscaster reporting your stand on the power demand of the President. I agree with you that only Congress should decide peace or war and hope you keep up the fight in defense of peace. I urge you to stay in this fight for the interest of all the people the whole world over.

Sincerely yours,

GARY ALEXANDER.

BROOKLYN, N. Y., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 United States Senate,
 Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I feel impelled to write and thank you for your courageous stand in the Senate yesterday. Not only did you vote against a measure which seems likely to force this country into a war which the majority of us do not want, but you defended your position forcefully and openly in the Senate.

It is doubtless futile to hope that your words will sway the outcome of the Senate vote. Please be assured, however, that a great many Americans like myself join you in your belief that the fall of Formosa would not be so grave a disaster as the outbreak of a general war and that there is no justification for a policy which contradicts our traditional morality.

Very sincerely yours,

RUTH DOSSICK.

LANSING, MICH., January 27, 1955.
 Senator WAYNE MORSE,
 Senate Office Building,
 Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: This morning I saw and heard you on the Today television program from the Capitol. I was greatly encouraged to learn that there was at least one man in the Senate with sufficient intelligence and courage to speak out clearly and unequivocally on this terribly important issue. I strongly support your position, as described by you this morning, and hope you will keep up what may seem to be a hopeless fight against the current tide of mass unreason. I am sure that I speak for millions who would share my view if they could but realize the threat and the danger. You are carrying on in the highest American political tradition. More power to you.

WORRIED CITIZEN.

JANUARY 28, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I applaud your stand about the Presidential war powers. Formosa is not worth war. Let's not send men and arms there.

C. KOPP.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

NORWICH, CONN., January 27, 1955.
 DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Good for you. Have just heard you on TV this morning. I am just an obscure person living in this small New England city, but I believe I express the sentiment of thousands of folks situated similarly. I am thankful that there is someone around Washington like you. The world cannot afford another war.

Congratulations for your courage to speak your mind.

Sincerely,

Mrs. LOU M. ARMSTRONG.

JOSEPH BRODY & BROS., INC.,
Chicago, Ill., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I am writing this letter to congratulate you on your refusing to rubber stamp approve the President's Formosa resolution. This is a very serious matter, and many of us throughout the country are not convinced that what is being done is entirely right, and such a matter as this should be given the careful study and consideration that you are giving it.

Regardless of the outcome of this matter, I am sure that you will be pleased to know that there are many who will long remember favorably your sincere actions in this respect.

Sincerely yours,

STANTON BRODY.

MORRIS PLAINS, N. J.,
January 27, 1955.

DEAR SIR: It's an effort for most people to write letters and I undoubtedly fall into that category.

I've unwittingly neglected to write you about past controversies; however, this latest issue before Congress; namely, the Formosa question, is of such import and could result in catastrophic consequences to us all, that my sense of responsibility has been sufficiently aroused to write this letter. At least it may afford some moral support.

When the people's welfare hangs in the balance you always vigorously defend their rights. My associates and I wish to pass on a few words of praise. All too often we do not give credit where it is deserved.

We think your type of sound leadership and astute judgment is rare but highly desirable in Congress of late. You have the sense to analyze this complex problem and see it in its true perspective. We wish you good luck in the future and want you to know that there are more supporting you, than most people realize. Keep up the good fight.

Auspiciously yours,

T. TENHENGEL.

FIRST UNIVERSALIST CHURCH,
Rochester, Minn., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I wish to commend you for both your courage and honesty in facing the serious issues involved in the resolution submitted by the Eisenhower administration to both Houses of Congress. I especially appreciated your willingness to be in a minority both within the committee and on the floor of the Senate and respect the consistency and sound analysis upon which your position is based. It is my hope that you will continue to oppose this resolution and use your best efforts to persuade the Senate to utilize increasingly the instrumentalities of the United Nations in the solution of international problems.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE M. LAPOINT.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.
Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Like most Americans, it is very unusual for me to take the time to write to "one of you politicians." Yet your statement in the Senate yesterday against preventive war impels me to write to congratulate you for your honesty, courage, and true representation of the desires and interests of all Americans.

I am a careful newspaper reader and have taken the trouble to go through the President's message, the text of the joint resolution, and the newspaper reports of congressional statements on the Formosa issue, as well as the reports of the reaction to this United States move overseas.

What is this crisis all about? Yesterday's New York Times report on the House passage of the Formosa resolution concludes with the observation that one of the oddest aspects of the crisis is that congressional galleries were less than half filled. The truth is that one feels no spirit of crisis, of emergency, of sudden need to go marching off to war, in this city, and I am of firm belief that no such spirit exists in other cities, or in villages and towns or countryside. There are no mass meetings, no demonstrations, no calls for action to save Formosa. Everyone seems to be going about his or her business sanely and calmly, with the only feeling of anxiety being that those politicians in Washington will get us into war again.

What is the reason for our becoming so involved in Formosa? The only justification offered in the joint resolution is that any nation in or bordering on the Pacific has a stake in the kind of government that exists in Formosa. This seems to me to boil down to our justifying our action by the geographic argument that we are on one side the Pacific and the Chinese Communists are on the other; to put it another way, "What is China doing on the other side of the Pacific, anyway?"

This seems to me to be a fight between 2 Chinese groups, 1 led by Chiang, 1 led by Mao. Let's not lose another 100,000 American boys in a police action which might this time turn into world war III.

For myself, a veteran of World War II; for my wife; and for my son.

Respectfully,

GEORGE F. NELSON.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Thank God there are people like you, and a few others, in our Senate, who oppose President Eisenhower's policy on Formosa, with its threat of military action (including the mainland of China), to safeguard Formosa and Chiang Kai-shek's government.

Plain common sense and an open mind, undistorted by the sense of overbearing self-righteousness, would seem to indicate that the Chinese Government (even though it is a Communist one) and the hundreds of millions of Chinese people have a right to their little islands. How can they take this new United States move otherwise than as an aggression by a foreign power? Would not we, Americans, think so if some foreign country told us to keep out of Long Island?

What sort of distortion of mentality can make our Government think that this move is in the interest of peace? I think it is a definite provocation and a warlike move, and no virtuous words can hide the fact.

The distress I felt on reading the news yesterday is weighing a little less heavily on my mind (and there are many others who feel likewise) now that I know that you have enough vision and courage to oppose President Eisenhower's new policy. May the opposition of you few in the Senate yet avert a terrible error in our foreign policy.

With deep appreciation.

Yours respectfully,

GALIA BODDE.

TRINIDAD, CALIF., January 22, 1955.
Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We are pleased to learn that you have been assigned to membership in important committees of your

choice. Your considerable abilities certainly entitle you to corresponding responsibilities in our Government.

We note that President Eisenhower is requesting approval by the Congress of his projected removal of Nationalist Chinese armed forces from the Tachen Islands and from other islands considered to be too close to the Chinese mainland to be justifiable as necessary for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

We are very much concerned about the risk of a general war that this operation would entail, and feel that such evacuations should be carried out strictly under the auspices of the United Nations. Our country under the Republican administration has been far too openly partisan on the Nationalist side for the Chinese Communists to permit our forces to intervene actively in their behalf, without attacking us.

This Republican administration must accept a very large share of responsibility for the present dilemma, since their vaunted "unleashing of Chiang Kai-shek" has had much to do with bringing it upon us. Neither do the Chinese Nationalists seem to act as responsible members of the United Nations when they warn that they would not accept a U. N. agreement for a cease-fire; this, despite the fact that they occupy and have long occupied an important seat in the United Nations, purportedly representing all of China.

We are confident that you will join other conscientious Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee in examining thoroughly the booby-traps in Secretary Dulles' treaty with the Chinese Nationalists that could bring us into war at the whim of Chiang Kai-shek.

Yours very sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. FRED COLEMAN.

JANUARY 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I am completely in accord with your policies about the defense of Formosa, it is the only solution and the only attitude the ordinary American parent can possibly agree with. I hope you will fight for us and succeed in bringing your views into being. In such a critical situation our only salvation is in men of wisdom and foresight holding their ground in spite of all odds. My gratitude is boundless to you.

Sincerely,

Mrs. L. J. KELLER.

BIRMINGHAM, MICH.

FREEPORT, PA., January 27, 1955.

DEAR SIR: After seeing and hearing you on the Today program this morning, I felt I should write and tell you I agree 100 percent on all the things you talked about. I hope that you will be able to do something so that these things will work out.

I feel they must be worked out in this way if we are to stay out of war and we must.

I pray our leaders will find a peaceful way to settle this troubled spot in the Far East.

We must have faith that we will come out on top if we continue to carry on as we have in the past.

We must believe we can find a peaceful way even if it does look hopeless, for then we will still have God as our guide.

I pray we can continue to have peace the world out.

Yours truly,

Mrs. ANNA BARRAGE.

TOLEDO, OHIO, January 26, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I applaud your courageous opposition to the President's request for extraordinary powers to defend Formosa.

Including related territories and positions, meaning Quemoy, and so forth, it is assumed

is unjustifiable and a provocation that could lead to war.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM B. GREENE.

JANUARY 26, 1955.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: You are to be congratulated on your courageous stand against those who would involve us in another war. If they succeed, one thing is certain: our democratic, free-enterprise system will be changed beyond recognition.

A saner age will honor you along with "Old Bob" La Follette and others of the handful who dared face the hysteria of their times.

Sincerely,

RODNEY R. ADLER.

MOUNT VERNON, N. Y.

CATONSVILLE, MD., January 27, 1955.

DEAR SIR: I am writing you to express my appreciation and thanks over the way you are fighting the request the President has put up to the Senate regarding the Chinese question. It is a pleasure to know that there are still some men about with courage and convictions. I am quite sure that there are millions of Americans who feel the same as you. Keep up the good work. I regret that I cannot cast a vote for you in future elections.

Sincerely,

ANDREW J. BICKEL.

PILOT POINT, MAINE, January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: It is indeed heartening to find a man of character like yourself in the Senate who feels, and rightly, that it is his duty as a Senator to thoroughly question such unequivocal actions as President Eisenhower would wish to carry out in regard to Formosa and the islands.

Please continue working against this needless involvement into war with China.

"By three things will a nation endure: Truth, justice, and peace."

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. MARTIN R. HAASE.

HOUGHTON, CLUCK, COUGHLIN & HENRY,
Seattle, Wash., January 26, 1955.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I was very much concerned on reading what little there was in our Seattle Times Monday night about the President's message on Formosa.

I suppose that under the circumstances which now exist, it is proper to draw a clear line which the Chinese Communists are to cross at peril of war. Even that is quite debatable.

But to do what I understand the President proposes, to go out with our ships and planes and bring back to home plate some of Chiang's soldiers who have been caught off base, and who need our help in a military retreat—that seems to me not only abstractly improper but also very dangerous, in that it will justify Communist resistance or retaliation directly against United States forces, which would be an actual state of war. Surely we should not so invite conflict. Nor, I think, can we defend such a course of action before either American or world opinion.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL COUGHLIN.

BROOKLYN, N. Y., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: May God bless you and give you strength and courage to fight the noble cause of universal peace.

Keep it up and God bless you.

W. R. WILLIAMS.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Congratulations on your keen insight into the Formosa resolution and the moral courage you are showing. It is my studied opinion that you are right in insisting on clarifying debate and even defeat of the measure if the facts indicate enlarging the conflict.

Keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

FRANK TUNGLIN.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Congratulations and many thanks for your magnificent attack on the plan to defend Formosa.

At a time like this tremendous courage is needed to voice such an unpopular opinion, even though it's right, but those who think carefully about the situation are forever grateful for your bravery.

Best regards.

STUART SANKEY.

MARYLAND LINE, MD.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate, Washington,
D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: Too often, we citizens let go unrecognized many of the things for which we are grateful. Let me say, on behalf of many citizens across the Nation that we are grateful for an independent voice in the United States Senate. We do not always agree with you; but we appreciate hearing a viewpoint that is not colored by party policy or political necessity.

Specifically today, we are grateful for your very fine expression of your opposition to giving the President the power to wage war in the Orient. It was our privilege this morning to hear you give voice to the dangers of a preventive war on the mainland of China.

Our hopes, our interest, and our prayers follow you as you continue your statesmanship in the United States Senate.

We are grateful for your unselfish statesmanship.

Sincerely yours,

Rev. ROBERT E. MITZEL.

JERSEY CITY, N. J., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I do very much want to express my gratitude to you for your courageous, honest appraisal of President Eisenhower's request to Congress on the matter of Formosa and Red China.

If our country is to remain in a state of peace, the American people will have legislators and men of good will like yourself to thank for it.

I have absolutely no liking for Communist totalitarian governments and it is particularly for this reason that I dread the tendency for us to take on the characteristics of our traditional political opposites.

Sincerely,

JACOB H. JAFFE.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 26, 1955.

HON. WAYNE L. MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: I am writing to say that your efforts to preserve peace have not

gone unappreciated by the people of the United States. We stand at a perilous point, and look to those who have the wisdom and courage to act against the politically opportune and who can discern that we must not accept the Communist doctrine that the ends justify the means—the highest philosophy teaches that the means are the ends.

We commend you, pray for you, and urge that you keep up the fight to protect us from any act not morally justified, even though it may seem politically expedient. We do not want communism, but we feel that faith, prayer, and courage are more potent than the sword, and particularly when we have to go to the other side of the world to use it. If we would be justified in using it in case China sent military forces to South America, it seems the answer is obvious as to whether we should do so if China tries to protect her own shores and claim her own islands.

I wish to thank you personally for your continuous fine record in the Senate and all the work you have done in protecting the interests of the people and of our country. Your intelligent approach to our many complex problems and your courage and integrity in the presence of much self-seeking are indeed an inspiration.

Sincerely yours,

MIRIAM HOLMES.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I am encouraged by your opposition to the Formosa resolution and can see that by hammering away at the plain and inevitable result of favorable action upon it you can bring home to the Senate the absolute necessity of rejecting it.

Never a truer word was spoken than that war is no longer a practical alternative. When are our leaders going to be realistic and face this fact and embark on a program based on the absolute necessity of never under any circumstances going to war again?

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES B. FINCH.

JACKSON HEIGHTS, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

HONORABLE SIR: As a private citizen, I wish to express my gratification over your address denouncing the resolution of President Eisenhower, in its present form, on the grounds that it implies the losing of an aggressive war.

I have confidence that you will use your good office to appreciably amend this resolution.

Yours truly,

BEVERLY SILVERMAN.

MOUNT HOLLY SPRINGS, PA.,
January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I listened to your telecast on "Today's show."

I appreciate your informing the public of the possible hazards involved if the President's proposal in its present form is passed.

I admire your independent thinking and stand in this issue and hope that you continue to express your straight forward views to the American people.

Respectfully,

EDGAR J. STEINBERGER.

NEW YORK CITY, January 26, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Every time I hear you speak over radio or read something you have said in Washington, I thank God for you. Long may you live, and long may you

serve in the Senate to protect American liberty and our interests, and the welfare of the whole world.

Sincerely yours,

MARY S. POWELSON.

BLOOMINGTON, IND., January 26, 1955.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR WAYNE: I was proud to hear over the radio this noon that you have cast a negative vote in committee on the Formosa defense resolution. There seems to me to be need for much closer scrutiny of this proposal than has yet been given to it.

One thought that may need stressing is that any bombing of China by this country, especially with nuclear weapons, is likely to bring upon us the undying hatred of all of the people of Asia. We cannot afford to cast aside their possible friendship in such a manner. I think, therefore, that no authorization should be given for the use of force, except defensively against an actual attack on Formosa or the Pescadores. This is a matter in which moral and political factors ought strongly to outweigh immediate military considerations in determining tactics.

I am writing this same thought to Senators HENNINGS and KEFAUVER.
Best personal regards.

Sincerely,

RALPH FUCHS.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE L. MORSE,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

Approve your stand against United States aggressive war with China urge peaceful settlement of Formosa dispute through United Nations.

SYLVIA BUCHHOLZ.

DETROIT, MICH., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

I deeply appreciate your courageous unyielding stand against the drive to war and urge you to continue your good work to save this Nation and the world from being driven into ultimate disaster.

HELGA HERZ.

BOZEMAN, MONT., January 28, 1955.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

We urge you to continue your opposition to any resolution that would empower the President to take this Nation into war over Formosa.

We think that if the Formosa problem were turned over to the United Nations there would be a greater chance for a peaceful settlement.

Mr. and Mrs. E. W. ANACKER.

WOODSIDE, CALIF., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Commend you most highly for your courageous effort to preserve for Congress sole power to declare war. Formosa is a menace to peace of the world and should be handled through United Nations not unilaterally by the United States. War against China would solve nothing and might destroy us all.

Dr. and Mrs. HENRY MAYER.

EVANSTON, ILL., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your courageous position regarding Formosan resolution. Urge you insist on referral of problem to United Nations for permanent solution.

FLORENCE ZINER.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Thirty-five Los Angeles Democrats support you wholeheartedly in your fight against Eisenhower's call for war declaration rights. We must ask you to keep up the great fight. God bless you.

ARTHUR SKARET.

RESEDA, CALIF., January 28, 1955.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Please continue to urge the Senate to uphold the Constitution by retaining their right to declare war, this right not to be abrogated to the President.

JEROME RASKIN.

SAN JOSE, CALIF., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Heartily support your stand against President's request re Formosa.

Mrs. HELEN ROMERO.

PASADENA, MD., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE L. MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Opposing Formosa resolution echoes President Washington. Paragraph 32, Farewell Address, gives detailed reasoning how our Republic can lose peace, perhaps liberty, by taking sides between nations while the generals take military view of defending America. We depend on our Senators to defend Americanism.

THOMAS L. CHRISTIAN,
Editor, Maryland Farmer.

PALO ALTO, CALIF., January 28, 1955.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

In my judgment Formosa question should be referred to United Nations and not for unilateral action on part of our Government. War or peace is not merely an issue of foreign policy of anyone's survival on this planet. Please debate fully.

Thank you.

J. KEARNS PLAUCHE.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.:

We heartily approve the position you have taken in the Formosa question.

Mr. and Mrs. ALLAN M. FERRES.

BOSTON, MASS., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Whole Nation indebted to you for magnificent courageous stand against plunge toward war with China. We rely on you to fight to prevent railroad resolution through against wishes of American people who want peace.

Irma Otto, Sue Ainslie Clark, Louise Frye, Florence Luscomb, James Billings, Frances Siegel, Elizabeth Raymond, Jean Marcotte, Ruth Hills Grove, and Marlon Alexonian.

BOSTON, MASS., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Commend you on courageous, principled stand against preventive war. Urge you continue to defend best interests of our country now as in past.

Mr. and Mrs. CHARLES WOJCHOWSKI,
DORCHESTER, MASS.

SAN ANTONIO, TEX., January 27, 1955.

HON. WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.:

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Please vote against the amendment. It is too vague and dangerous. In my opinion, the proper body to handle the Formosa problem is the United Nations.

Sincerely yours,

O. H. VOGEL.

PLULA, PA., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.:

DEAR SIR: Millions of people in this country are counting upon you to see that wisdom and intelligence are used to keep this great and wonderful country out of an atomic war. You have a great responsibility.

Appreciatively,

Mrs. D. SCHATZ.

BROOKLYN, N. Y., January 28, 1955.

DEAR SIR: You are speaking for many Americans when you oppose this lavish grant of power to President Eisenhower. We do not want any part of a preventive war at this time.

Very truly yours,

ALFRED D. SUAHN.

RICHMOND, IND., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We look to the Senate for badly needed statesmanship. We rejoice that you think it a case for the U. N. Our allies will not go along with us on a commitment as to "other islands and concentrations on the mainland," which makes it look like a preventive war of the Knowland type. Do push for consideration by U. N.

Sincerely,

Mrs. C. L. CHARLES.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Washington, D. C.:

Keep up the good work; we do not want world war three started by our trigger-happy admirals in the Pacific.

LEON J. ARNOLD.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on the courage and wisdom you have shown on the China resolution. With kindest personal regards,

JOSEPH LYNCH.

PEORIA, ILL., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Congratulations on your stand regards Formosa resolution. You can always be depended on to take the right attitude in time of confusion and timidity such as this.

Dr. HARRY COSTEFF.

SEATTLE, WASH., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Continue to point out the dangers of giving the President sole authority to use our military forces as he sees fit. United Nations should be used to negotiate a cease-fire.

Mr. and Mrs. CHESTER KINGSBURY.

CLEVELAND, OHIO, January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Urge you resist with every power at your command any action that might involve us

in hostilities in Chinese waters. We cannot arbitrarily alter historical facts by attempting to demonstrate, through force of arms, that China rightfully belongs to Formosa. Chiang is not worth one drop of American blood.

Mr. and Mrs. NORMAN BERMAN.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 26, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: Congratulations on your forthright and courageous opposition to the Formosa proposal.

I would like to urge you to continue to fight against it, and to encourage other Senators to do the same.

Sincerely,

ROBERT FRIEDMAN.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Just heard over the air what you tell the American people regarding the secret testimony. I accept your word of honor, and so do countless more.

If necessary, you should, and I hope you will, deliver another 23-plus-hour speech. This offshore preventive war is far more vital than even the offshore oil to millions of us.

Sincerely yours,

JOSEPH RATNER.

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA,
Charlottesville, Va., January 27, 1955.
Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: From what I have read in the papers this morning of your reaction to President Eisenhower's request for authority to attack China's mainland, "if necessary" to "assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores," I wish to congratulate you on your courageous stand. It is not easy in our present hysteria for anyone in conspicuous public office, or in teaching, for that matter, to question the wisdom of the new belligerency of the United States. Our people seem to have been stampeded somehow into a belief that we must fight the Communist Chinese over islands historically and ethnically Chinese, on China's very doorstep, and in an Asian theater that is predominantly hostile to United States interference and without any prospect of substantial support from any other country in the world, despite the certainty of support to China from Russia at least.

Have we all gone nuts or are only a few of us crazy enough to wonder where we will come out, not in 1956 but, say, in 1965 or 1975, if we go into almost certain war with Communist China? To believe that Formosa is "only a ripple" is inconceivable. I spent some weeks working with Chiang Kai-shek's Government in Formosa (1952-53), and I know that they survive only because of their dream to reconquer the mainland, and that they know this is inconceivable unless the United States is fully involved on their side. Surely we can and must take Chou En-lai at his word that the People's Republic of China must and will incorporate Formosa and all the Chinese offshore islands into their domain. Yet, in view of these crystal-clear portents and admitted "warning signals," we blithely throw down an ultimatum, and yet say we can do this gargantuan task with no military buildup. In this fantastic muddle, the administration seems to have lost all sight of where we want, or ought to want, to be in our relations with Communist China and all the Asian states that have recognized Mao and written Chiang off as a "dead duck."

May you have the stamina to continue to raise the basic question, Is it "the serious and unified intention of our Government, our Congress, and our people" to "assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores" by

"whatever operations may be required to carry out that purpose." If this war is what the majority want, then in the name of all that is sensible let us prepare for it immediately and adequately.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN GRANGE,
Director, Woodrow Wilson Department
of Foreign Affairs.

TUCSON, ARIZ., January 26, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: Knowing your fearlessness, I am sure you do not need advice from anyone on the Formosa situation and how to deal with it. I do think, however, that most of our Congressmen like to know the views of their public.

I am intensely concerned over the pending legislation, feeling that hasty wrong action may cause another Korea. The Chinese Communists made good their threat to come to the defense of the North Koreans if we continued to come north of the 38th parallel toward Manchuria, and I think the threats they are making now are not idle ones.

I believe friends of the Chinese Nationalists have forced the President into advocating a provocative policy, and think that an amendment such as that proposed by Senator LANGER should be adopted and that power of commitment should be limited.

Faithfully,

EDITH LOTT.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: More power to you in your courageous stand on the urgent question of Formosa. This is too vital a question to be rushed through without discussion. I hope you continue to fight for peace and against total destruction of all of us. Congratulations.

Sincerely yours,

MRS. GAIL GASTON.

JANUARY 26, 1955.
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: It was heartening to me to read of your decision on the China situation.

I had felt that we were going to have an era of peace after the settlement of the Korean war. To me, the most horrible thought is another war.

The actions in the past few days of our public representatives in Washington seem very warlike and frighten me.

It, therefore, gave some heart to me to learn that by your recent actions that you are helping to further the road to peace.

Good luck and be assured of my support.

Sincerely,

MRS. SARAH BLANKEN.

BRIARCLIFF MANOR, N. Y., January 28, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate:

We are grateful for your courageous stand against a risky commitment.

ROBERT AND ANITA STEIN.

BOSTON, MASS., January 28, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building:

Millions of loyal Americans commend your cautious stand. If military staff is allowed to determine our foreign policy, global war is inevitable. We stand behind you.

MARGARET WELCH.

JANUARY 26, 1955.
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I wish to congratulate you on your fine stand of the Formosa issue.

Truly this is a time of crisis, for if this granting of war power to President Eisenhower is granted I feel that everyone in this country will be sorry.

Let's not have American boys go over to other countries to die and be maimed in.

Sincerely,

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

Mrs. EVA GATES.

JANUARY 26, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I wish to commend you on your stand against the resolution bestowing war powers on President Eisenhower to touch off a preventive war.

We have had enough of bloodshed, etc., throughout the world. Some peace talks among great world powers are in order.

Mine is the voice of many friends and neighbors. Continue your efforts in the interests of peace.

Sincerely,

Mrs. RACHEL CHESTER.
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

WILMINGTON, DEL., January 27, 1955.
Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR: I heartily endorse your stand on the Formosa defense bill as presented to the television audience on the program Today on Thursday morning, January 27. I have written to my Senators asking them to consider your arguments against the bill before voting.

Although I am not always in accord with your point of view, it is wonderful to know that there are still men in public life who are farsighted enough to risk their personal and political futures for the good of their country.

Continued success for your rugged individual attitude.

Sincerely,

MARY H. STREET.

MOORESTOWN, N. J., January 27, 1955.
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

SIR: I have just seen and heard you express your views on the Today program. Please understand that a large part of American opinion is with you completely. If the Congress would just understand that we haven't had time to express opinion, everything has moved too quickly.

I am a housewife with limited contacts, but I do deem it significant that in discussing this with neighbors and delivery men, etc., not one person has agreed with the Formosan proposal and all have expressed views similar to yours. All loyal, patriotic Americans in the war generations (30 to 40 age group), we have fought before, but never aggressively, and such a policy is beyond our understanding.

Please continue your fight. Don't give in until at least more of our opinion can be heard and felt in Washington.

Thank you for your stand and courage.
Respectfully,

ANN S. HEDGES.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 26, 1955.
HONORABLE SIR: Hearty gratitude for your stand against our threatening entanglement in the Formosa mess. Keep up your good work. Heartiest support.

JEAN KASS,
A Mother.

LOS ANGELES, January 25, 1955.
DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I wish to congratulate you on your position of opposing our being involved in a war in Formosa.

All our neighbors are shocked at the turn of events which seem to be moving too swiftly, which may plunge us into a world war.

Please continue to oppose our participation in a war.

Very truly yours,

Mrs. HANNAH HORNE.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Congratulations on your patriotic stand for peace, for the American people. I, too, am against spilling blood to prevent spilling blood.

Yours respectfully,

HENRY HORNE.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 27, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Wish to congratulate you on your stand regarding Formosa. My friends and I are wholeheartedly behind you in the stopping of the war of prevention before it begins.

(Mrs.) RICKIE TAREY.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF., January 26, 1955.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: My grateful thanks to you for your magnificent and patriotic stand against this horrible attempt to involve us in a war. Please, please continue to do everything in your power to prevent this. You are speaking for the American people.

Sincerely,

Mrs. MADELYNE GERLACH.

MOUNT KISCO, N. Y., January 27, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,

United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: Congratulations on your present stand against giving the President more powers in the Formosa situation. I do not know who the administration thinks they are fooling, but I am 100 percent behind your position and hope that you will continue your good fight.

Sincerely,

MILFORD H. WISE.

HIGHTSTOWN, N. J., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building;

Saw you on television. Agree completely. Keep up the fight.

NATALIE OSER.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building;

We salute and support your brave fight to amend resolution.

Mr. and Mrs. ALFRED BERMAN.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building;

We support you against granting illegal war powers to President.

EDITH HUNTINGTON SNOW.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE:

Accept our respect and admiration for your courageous stand against possible global war.

B. DRUCKMAN AND FAMILY.

NEWARK, N. J., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building;

You speak for us in opposing the administration's war policy. Keep it up.

MURIEL AND RUSSELL DAVIS.

CLEVELAND, OHIO, January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

I do not believe that the Formosa resolution now in Senate hands would be helpful.

I believe it would be dangerous. The right of declaring war ought not to be in any one man's hands. May God guide you in your vote.

FLORENCE OGDEN ASHLEY.

NEW YORK, N. Y., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building;

Urge no hasty action on China resolution which could end in world annihilation.

H. WEG.

KELSEYVILLE, CALIF., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

Appreciate your stand on Formosa question. Continue efforts to bring problem before United Nations.

Mr. and Mrs. ROSS FIELD.

MADISON, WIS., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

Approve your opposition President's demand for war power. Urge conciliation, not force, toward solution of tensions.

ELSA FAUERBACH.

BOSTON, MASS., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.:

I congratulate you on your stand on the China situation. Eisenhower proposals bring war too close for comfort. Why not hold public hearings? Why the rush?

Cordially,

JEROME GROSSMAN.

CHICAGO, ILL., January 28, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building;

Congratulations on your good fights against the President's resolution. Keep on with the good work.

PETER LEVINE.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 27, 1955.

Hon. WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I wish to express my thankfulness, as an American citizen, for your courageous, outspoken statement when voting against the resolution which, if passed, will threaten to make us an aggressive nation in the eyes of the rest of the world—including most of our allies. Imagining how devastating and ugly an all-out war would be in this atomic age, I certainly am amazed that the President and large majority of Congressmen favor such resolution which may result in our starting a third world war without careful study and consideration for the possible seriousness of its effect.

Sincerely yours,

(Mrs.) DOLORES K. EBERT.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., January 26, 1955.

DEAR SIR: We are pleased with your decision about the President's request. All of us are much concerned about the situation in the Far East. Hoping that there is other solution aside of any war.

Sincerely,

Mr. and Mrs. H. HOUGHTON.

MADISON, WIS., January 26, 1955.

Senator WAYNE MORSE,
United States Senate,

Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: I was glad to hear that you and several other Senators had spoken in opposition to the President's proposal that Congress give him a blank check to issue an ultimatum to China.

It seems to me that the President possesses the power and authority to do everything

needful in conducting our foreign policy, and it looks almost as if he were asking Congress in effect to declare war on a contingent basis. This does not seem to me to be a line of action that would be at all helpful in promoting a peaceful settlement. In fact, it looks like an extremely dangerous step toward war.

I hope that you will continue to oppose this request of the President's, and that the Senate will show sufficient prudence and foresight to reject it, after thorough discussion.

Respectfully yours,

(Mrs.) JOSEPHINE RENTZ.

Mr. MORSE. I may say to my good friend from California—and I say this in all good humor, because even in tragic hours I believe we should keep our sense of humor—that he supported the tide-lands bill not so long ago because he did not want any territorial limitations put on California. He claimed there was an offshore area to which California was entitled. I recall that he wanted certain islands included as State property of California. Therefore I assume it might help him to better understand why Red China feels that the islands, which are just about as close to the mainland of Red China as the islands referred to by the Senator from California were to California, ought to be included in the territorial sovereignty of Red China.

As I stated, I say this good naturedly. It illustrates the point that when we start dealing with the shoreline of a country we cannot escape the fact that its sovereignty extends a distance out into the ocean. I believe that the sovereign rights of Red China certainly encompass Quemoy and Matsu.

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. I have almost concluded. I stated at the outset of my remarks that I would not yield, except to two Senators. I shall not make any exception.

Mr. President, I finish with this restatement of my major attitude. It is the restatement of the point I made at the very beginning of my first speech. After the decision of our Government is made, after the position of the flag behind the Presiding Officer's chair is determined by this Government in respect to this issue, the Senator from Oregon will support that position. Under the democratic processes of Congress, after the policy is determined, and the President of the United States as Commander in Chief renders his decision, there will be no voice of dissent raised by the Senator from Oregon.

Now is the time to dissent. Now is the time to dissent, before legislation is passed which authorizes this sweeping power. It is a sweeping power. It is a dangerous power. There is not a word of limitation in the resolution with respect to the power. It is a preventive war power.

I believe it greatly increases the probabilities of war. It tends too much in the direction of our running calculated risks of war, and ignores the calculated risks of peace.

I hope that history will prove all my fears are unfounded. I hope history will prove that I am dead wrong in the posi-

tion I have taken in this case. For God help America if events prove that I am right.

Because I feel I am right, Mr. President, I have raised my voice in the course of these speeches in opposition to the resolution in its present form, and I have tried to answer the challenge of the Senator from Georgia—"What alternative do the opponents propose?" We have proposed alternatives in a series of amendments. We have proposed alternatives in our insistence that a line of demarcation be drawn.

If it is unity the President wants, as the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER] said the other day, we can have unity, because we are in complete unison on the proposal that we should defend to the limit Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. However, we are not in agreement that we should defend Quemoy and Matsu, because we fear that would lead to world war III. As I close this argument I have no regrets over following the dictates of my conscience. I believe so much in winning permanent peace if we will only follow the moral teachings of our history and Christian faith that I cannot bring myself to support the language of war provocation which I believe characterizes the resolution. Therefore I prefer to be on the losing rather than the winning side of the vote which we all know is about to be cast on this preventive war resolution.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I wish to congratulate the Senator from Oregon on another fine speech, and I very happily associate myself with it.

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. President, I rise not so much to reply to the Senator from Oregon. He is a learned lawyer, and he seems to be content with his interpretation of the resolution. I am certainly content with my interpretation of it.

I have never asserted that the resolution gave power to the President to strike wherever he may wish to strike. I distinctly said in my argument yesterday that under the Constitution the President had power outside the resolution. I was not discussing that point, and I said it was entirely immaterial so far as the resolution was concerned. I said that all the power the President may have, and all the power the Congress could give him, short of a declaration of war, which would confer on the President an unlimited right to act, is in this resolution.

What I said—and what the distinguished Senator from Oregon has misapprehended—was that Congress was by the resolution giving its sanction to the President to use only the authority "to include the security and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands."

I said that was a limitation. It undoubtedly is a limitation, because it could not apply to any territories or positions in unfriendly or hostile hands. It is not strictly a limitation. I was not speaking technically. I should not like to get into that habit too much.

It is a restriction upon the authority which the President may have, insofar as we express our judgment on it. I have not said that the President did not have authority to employ the Armed Forces

of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of protecting Formosa. He may have that power under the Constitution, and I conceded that.

The distinguished Senator from Oregon speaks of Formosa and the Pescadores as having a status in international law which justifies our action in defending those islands against attack. I think that is true, and it is true for other reasons than those already given. Congress may very well say, "We authorized the President to use armed forces to do this, but in defining the President's authority we restricted it by saying, 'This authority, this power, which we, the Congress, are now conferring'—not what the President has or may have under the Constitution—is to include securing the protection of such related positions and territories of that area which are now in friendly hands." We would not take Hong Kong away from the British, of course. I know that is a restriction upon the President's authority under the resolution. It is just common sense. The services of a lawyer are not required to show that that is true.

Also, Mr. President, there is a word of limitation in the sentence below. In the amendment originally offered by the distinguished Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY] he moved to strike out the word "other" in line 9. The authority includes the taking of such other measures as the President judges to be required or appropriate. It was proposed to strike out the word "other." I objected to that, because "other" undoubtedly applies to something other than taking a territory or holding any particular position. I said the President asked for this authority, and we should give it to him. As to whether it limits his power under the Constitution is an altogether different question. It is one with which I am not concerned here, and I do not think the Senate should be concerned with it.

Let us look at a few facts, Mr. President. I think if we consider facts, we will get further in an argument of this character. What are the facts?

Formosa and the Pescadores were held by Japan for 50 years or longer. They were adversely held. Japan may have stolen them, but that is beside the question. They were held by Japan after the Sino-Japanese War, when Formosa and the Pescadores fell to Japan. Very generally throughout that area the United States was the power actually carrying the long end of the task after World War II, if, indeed, it was not carrying the whole task.

So we took them over. The other allies left them in our hands. The distinguished Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] says that gives us an international law status for holding those islands.

Let us use a little bit of commonsense, Mr. President. That is all I ask. Let us use a little bit of commonsense.

China was beset by an internal war which was waged in China for many years. Finally, the President of China representing the organized Government, which we recognized, went over to Formosa and also held some of the islands

between the China coast and the island of Formosa on which he took refuge.

We recognized the Nationalist Government. We never have recognized the Red government. If there is any legal government which has any status in morals or in international law, so far as we in the United States are concerned, it is Nationalist China. It makes no difference what we may now think about Nationalist China, or whether we think it is wise, that is the fact.

What is proposed by the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota and defended by the legal argument of my friend from Oregon, for whom I have great respect? It is proposed that we simply get off, and, to use his language, "get off quickly," from the islands lying between the mainland and the large island on which the President of China has taken refuge. What are we going to do with them when we get off? I ask any sensible man or woman in America, What is meant by that? Should we turn them over to the Reds, or get off quickly and turn them over to Peiping, a government which we never have recognized, and take them away from the government which we have recognized and to which we have obligations? If we have any obligations to defend Formosa and the Pescadores—and everyone says we have; it is even said that this resolution is wholly unnecessary, because that burden rests upon the President, under the Constitution—we have authority, in the language of the resolution, under international law, and under our own Constitution, to defend Formosa and the Pescadores.

How shall we defend them? By getting off the islands that lie between the Pescadores and Formosa and the mainland? On Formosa and the islands in that immediate vicinity, or between Formosa and the mainland, there are some 350,000 to 400,000 trained soldiers. If we pulled back from the islands because they are close to the China coast—and the distinguished Senator from North Dakota wants us to get off—those islands would go to the Reds.

I am under no such obligation to Communist China, Mr. President. What would happen to the soldiers of the Republic of China on Formosa? The very heart would be taken out of them. They could not fight.

Why do we not look at things in a proper way? Why do we not look at the facts? Here we are with an obligation under international law to defend Formosa, and yet we are asked to take action which can only benefit the enemy of Formosa and which can only result in destroying the will to fight of every single soldier on Formosa. Is that not a beautiful way to keep our international obligations? Is that not a marvelous way to measure up to the high responsibility which has been imposed on us by virtue of those islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, coming to us as a result of war?

I undertake to say that no person in America when he understands this issue, would for one moment say that we would be justified in walking off those islands and saying that we will have nothing

to do with them simply because there was civil war in that area.

We would be saying, in effect, "It is true that we are under an obligation to defend Formosa, but we are going to let you fight this out. We are going to get off, and get off quickly, and leave every soldier on Formosa faced with the stark fact that he has no friend and no support."

The Chinese Nationalists would then look across the broad Pacific and say, "Yonder is the great Nation which recognized our Government. Yonder is the great Nation which recognizes its responsibility to defend us, and which has, under the international charter, known as the United Nations Charter, predicated its whole course upon resistance to armed aggression."

What are we going to do? Under that set of facts and circumstances, which always will stand on the pages of history, we propose to walk off of every island that reaches out to the Pescadores and to Formosa, and to say, "We will not have anything to do with them. It is true that your troops are there, and we do not know what will happen to them. It is true that your troops on the island will lose the heart and the will to fight."

The disintegration that would come to those islands would be swift, final, and complete, and they would have no friend there at all, unless when the Chinese Reds got there they should have a sudden change of heart, as did Paul on the Damascus Road, and should say, "We love those fellows across the sea with whom we have been fussing."

I cannot justify such a course of action. I know that Americans will not justify it when they understand the facts as they are.

It is true that some risk may be involved, but on that point I spoke yesterday, and I do not care to repeat what I said then. I am now merely speaking to the amendment offered by my very good friend the distinguished senior Senator from North Dakota [Mr. Langer], which wants us to say that nothing in the resolution shall be construed as justifying the defense of any island within 12 miles of the shores of China.

If that is all the amendment meant, it would be a different story. Actually it means that we would be handing over on a silver platter to Red China all the troops of Chiang Kai-shek and all the inhabitants of those islands. It means that we would be cutting the very heart out of every armed soldier on the very islands which we are obligated to defend, namely, Formosa and the Pescadores.

Such a course of action cannot be justified. No legalism in the world can justify it. No kind of legalistic reasoning can justify such an occurrence. The United States would stand condemned before the world as unworthy of its trust. We would be accused of a willingness to fight only against a power that we thought we could whip; and when the fellow on the other side was big enough really to give us some concern, we would find some way out of our obligation.

I shall not vote for the amendment offered by the Senator from North Dakota. I propose to vote for the resolution with full confidence, as I said yesterday, in

the good faith, prudence, patience, and experience of the President of the United States, who has said that the power that came to him would not be delegated—nondelegable, in fact, is what he meant—and that he would exercise the power himself.

I earnestly hope that the amendment offered by the Senator from North Dakota will be rejected, because if it should be adopted, in my opinion, it would destroy the effect of the resolution.

Mr. MANSFIELD obtained the floor.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President—

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The junior Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] has the floor.

Mr. MANSFIELD. How long does the Senator from North Dakota wish to speak?

Mr. LANGER. I desire to answer the argument made by the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. MANSFIELD. If the distinguished Senator from North Dakota will confine his remarks to 1 minute, I shall be glad to yield for 1 minute.

Mr. LANGER. I thank the Senator. Ten minutes, did the Senator say?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana has yielded 1 minute to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. LANGER. I shall ask for the floor in due course of time in my own right to answer the argument made by the distinguished Senator from Georgia.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I should be delighted to yield for 1 minute; but I have been waiting all day for an opportunity to speak, and the Senator from North Dakota has had the floor previously.

Mr. President, the support which the President of the United States needs, which he must have, in the conduct of the foreign relations of the Nation is not to be measured by the feverishness of our actions. It is not to be measured by an enthusiasm which burns hot today and grows cold tomorrow. It is to be measured rather by the depth of our understanding of what we do and our capacity to stay with whatever decision we may reach as a Nation.

The President bears a particularly heavy burden of responsibility at this time. But so too does every Member of the Senate. For what we are dealing with here is not solely a matter of a few islands off the China coast. We are dealing with questions which weigh the safety of the Nation in the delicate balance of peace or war. What we decide today may well have to stay with our consciences for the rest of our lives.

Questions of this kind are not to be disposed of with light words or loud words.

Never, in almost a decade and a half of service in the Congress of the United States, have I been confronted with a more difficult decision than the one which now must be made. I have been a member of many committees of Congress. This resolution marks the first occasion in my years here that, while joining in reporting a measure favorably out of committee, I found it necessary to reserve the right to alter my position before the final vote.

What is there in the resolution which compelled me to take this course? To withhold final decision until the final hour?

The difficulty does not lie in the principal purposes of the resolution. They are clearly stated to be a just peace for all and the preservation of the vital interests of the United States and other friendly nations in the Western Pacific. I do not believe there is a Member of the Senate who disagrees with these purposes. I would go further and say that in pursuit of these purposes there is general, overwhelming agreement in the executive branch and in Congress that the Chinese Communists must not be permitted to seize Formosa and the Pescadores, and, if necessary, that American Armed Forces shall be used to prevent that from happening. That has been the policy of this Nation for almost 5 years and few, if any, objections have ever been raised against it.

The difficulty in decision, then, does not lie in what this resolution purports to do. On that we can generally agree, and the overwhelming vote in the House of Representatives is evidence of the extent of the agreement.

The difficulty is to be found in the clause which calls on Congress "to authorize"—and that is the word used, "authorize." Congress is called upon to authorize the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States to protect Formosa and the Pescadores by various means.

The Armed Forces of the United States, in the form of the 7th Fleet, have been protecting Formosa and the Pescadores for almost 5 years without specific authorization of Congress. The vessels of that fleet have been ordered there and kept there by two Presidents, under the powers of their office.

By this resolution, we are now asked to authorize what has in fact been done by two Presidents, without authorization and without objection from Congress for many years.

In stationing the 7th Fleet in the Formosa Strait, both President Truman and President Eisenhower were assuming great risks in the exercise of their constitutional powers as Commanders in Chief of the Armed Forces. At any moment during the past 5 years the Chinese Communists might have launched an attack on the vessels plying those waters. To take such risks in the vital interest of the United States, however, is a part of the heavy burdens of the Presidency. Only the President can decide when to take those risks, because only he has access to all the information on which such decisions must be based. When a President so acts, resolutely, and in full awareness of the consequences of his acts, he deserves, and will have, the unhesitating support of Congress and the American people.

It is one thing to support the President in his exercise of the powers of the Presidency. It is another to attempt to share his powers. In my judgment those powers cannot be diluted, obscured, transferred, or divided, resolutions of Congress to the contrary notwithstanding. To do so is to invite the irresponsible usage of those powers by both the

executive and the legislative branches of the Government.

It may be reassuring and comforting to Members of this body to be asked by the President to authorize him to act. But the power to authorize carries with it responsibilities for the action, taken pursuant to the authorization.

We cannot tell at this moment precisely what actions the President will take or will be taken in his name in consequence of this resolution. We can foresee, however, some of the possibilities that are developing in the Formosa Strait. Which of them, if any, actually develop will depend partly on what the Communists do or do not do. They will also depend on how the President exercises or delegates the powers of his office.

I review these possibilities because I believe that, resolution or not, they are inherent in the Formosan situation, and in passing this measure Congress would be subscribing in advance to any one of them. Members of the Senate ought to be aware of the range of consequences which we may be endorsing.

There may be a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait. It is clear from the President's message that he hopes fervently that hostilities will come to an end in that area. How he expects to achieve that result I do not know, but press reports suggest that what may be involved is a permanent division of China into two separate entities and a cease-fire between them, if it can be arranged by the United Nations. I do not say that this is desirable, but it is certainly a possibility in present circumstances, since the President is seeking a peaceful solution of the problem.

Mr. President, it appears to me that, at this juncture in our history, we are appraising and reappraising—agonizingly—our Far Eastern policy. We are appraising our position in the light of our commitments in Korea, in Formosa, and our mutual defense agreements with Asiatic and Pacific powers.

We are, as a matter of fact, in a quiescent state of war with Communist China. An armistice in Korea is not the same as a peace treaty. The Formosa area is the opposite flank to Korea. The loss of Formosa would strengthen the forces against us in Korea, break the island barrier chain of defense, weaken our Pacific alliances, and make sizable portions of southeastern Asia an easy prey to Chinese communism.

It appears that we are reappraising our policy in the Far East by seeking to obtain, if possible, a peaceful solution. It appears that we recognize that Chiang Kai-shek cannot return to the mainland without our help.

President Eisenhower, in his message to the Congress last Monday, invited the United Nations to bring an end to active hostilities in the Formosa Strait, and he has by this invitation indirectly recognized that there are two Chinas.

I hope the President and the Secretary of State realize what is being done by this resolution. I hope they recognize the possible consequences. If this resolution has the effect of preventing war, it may well be because we have in effect struck a bargain. It may well be that

we will not let Chiang try to go back to the mainland in exchange for Communist China's agreeing not to attack Formosa. China will be split as definitively as Germany and Korea have been. It may well be that Communist China will gain support throughout the world for membership in the United Nations and that Nationalist China may lose her seat on the Security Council.

In another vein, the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, under the terms of this resolution, may require military action by American forces within a dozen miles of the Chinese mainland. It may call for the bombing of transport facilities or airfields on the Chinese mainland. It may lead to a resumption of hostilities in Korea, full-scale war with Communist China, or war with Communist China and Soviet Russia if their treaty of alliance of 1950 is brought into play. We may have allies or we may not, in any of these potential conflicts. Almost any one of them would call for a vast expansion in our Armed Forces.

I do not know which, if any, of these contingencies may develop. No one knows at this time. I believe firmly, however, that Congress and the American people must recognize clearly what the reasonable possibilities are in the situation. Let us not wake up tomorrow and confront ourselves with the questions: "How did this happen? Who is responsible?"

Whatever the faults of the joint resolution, in its origin and content, however, I do not see how it can be rejected. In the words of the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and a truly great American, "What is the alternative?" The Communists throughout the world are waiting for any indication of division among us which they can exploit for propaganda purpose. The morale of friendly nations, particularly in the Far East, may be adversely affected if there is any suggestion that the President does not have the power to use the forces of this country to defend the vital interests of this country. The Chinese Communists may assume, mistakenly, that they have been given a free hand in the Formosa Straits, and so may precipitate the very conflict we are trying to prevent.

I am glad that the President chose to come to Congress in a time of crisis. I regret, however, that the joint resolution is phrased in a manner that raises grave constitutional questions. The phraseology may have the effect of obscuring responsibility for some of the most important actions this Government can take. A simple affirmation by Congress of support for the President in this crisis, and a reaffirmation of our policy that Formosa and the Pescadores shall remain in friendly hands, in my opinion, would have accomplished all of the good that can come from this joint resolution, and would have avoided all of the potential evils.

It is, however, too late for that now. An adverse vote at this time, a failure to uphold the President, can only be interpreted throughout the world as a faltering in our resolve, with disastrous

consequences to peace and to the free nations.

The desirability of supporting the President, particularly in vital matters of peace or war, is not open to question. The President is the leader of the Nation. He holds his office by vote of the people. The people and the Congress must inevitably place every reasonable and deserving trust in him; and as they trust him, they have every right to expect that trust to be well placed and their best interests protected accordingly by his official acts.

Mr. President, I shall vote for the joint resolution because circumstances leave us no other choice. In so doing, however, I want it clearly understood for the record that I regard my vote only as a reaffirmation of our policy of the past 5 years with regard to Formosa and the Pescadores. I regard it, too, as an expression of confidence, that the President will see to it that the powers of his office are exercised by his subordinates in the interests of this Nation and, as far as possible, in the interests of the preservation of world peace.

The President has now settled the question of responsibility which had been raised in the joint resolution before us. I am glad he emphasized that he alone had responsibility to decide whether American forces in the vicinity of Formosa should be used for purposes "other than immediate self-defense or in direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores."

He further stated that the responsibility had been delegated to no one. This would mean of course that this authority had not been delegated to the Congress of the United States, but that the President in the maintenance of his own constitutional authority as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States would continue, as previous Presidents had done and future Presidents should, to exercise this responsibility.

I do not regard the term "authorize," as used in the joint resolution, as conferring additional powers on the President or as detracting from his constitutional powers. I most emphatically do not regard it as assigning to the President the power of Congress to declare war.

Responsibility for what happens in the Formosa Strait from here on, as it has until now, rests with the President. Responsibility must be lodged where, under the Constitution, power lies. The two are inseparable, and any dilution of the bond between them is an invitation to irresponsibility and to the destruction of the Republic.

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 159 AND PLANNED MILITARY STRENGTH

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, based on the grave condition of the world today, it would seem imperative for us to have a united front in our resistance to the growing Communist aggression. Therefore, I will vote for the joint resolution requested by the President.

Having taken this position, I now make certain observations.

The letters and telegrams coming to my office are running heavily against this

request of the President. I do not believe that would be the case if the people knew the truth about the danger which now literally hangs over this country as the result of the possession, by the Communists, of both the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb, and also of the means of delivering them.

Only recently the distinguished former chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee said:

Today, atomic and hydrogen bombs exist in growing numbers on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Today—not next year, or the year after, but today—the Soviets have both the bombs and the planes needed to launch a devastating nuclear attack against the cities of North America.

Mr. President, a bomb we have already dropped would cause complete annihilation of people and buildings—and I mean complete—in an area of some 30 square miles, and would cause flash fires and the burning of such substances as wood, along with the destruction of some people, some 700 square miles.

It may be the Communists already have bombs of greater destruction than have we, just as it may be they are ahead of us in the development of guided and ballistic missiles. After extensive study, I believe they are ahead on missiles.

Because both the free world and the Communists now may have the capacity to destroy each other, there is a growing belief among military experts that we now may have reached a nuclear stalemate—a stalemate created by the fact that the originator of a hydrogen attack might, in turn, be destroyed.

With this knowledge, our Government has continued its earnest search for peace. That is not true of the Communists.

The free world no longer has a nuclear monopoly; and we should note that the Communists attacked in Korea and Indochina when it was generally believed we did have such a monopoly.

As stated, I want to support the President in this, his request, because I believe he is trying to achieve peace.

But I also believe this administration is making a grave mistake in not telling the people all the truth about the present danger to their survival as a result of the hydrogen bomb.

How can this administration expect the American people to rally behind this unprecedented request without reservation unless the facts are known? And how can the administration justify at this time a further reduction in some of our Armed Forces?

It is true that the new budget partially atones for the serious mistake made in early 1953, when the "budget-firsters" succeeded in cutting out of the development of our Air Force more than \$5 billion. I say "partially atones" because in the new budget the administration asks for some \$2.5 billion more for the Air Forces, as against last year.

If there now is atomic stalemate, then it is certain that any new hostilities will result in fighting on land—and I for one have always believed that any war of any kind will involve fighting on land. They always have, and they always will.

With that premise, look at the almost unbelievable differences between the size of our Army and the size of the Russian and Chinese armies. In both cases I have left out allies of the United States and satellites of the Soviet and the Chinese Communists. The Russian and Chinese armies now consist of some 575 divisions, 400 Chinese and 175 Russian, each with some 10,000 men.

The United States now has about 20 divisions, depending on how regimental combat teams are handled, of 17,500 men, and under the proposed new administration budget this tiny number as compared to the possible enemy will be still further reduced.

Interesting in this overall pattern of "strength through weakness," it is now planned to cut the Marines, an organization composed entirely of volunteers who enlisted because of a desire to defend their country, by 32,000.

There was considerable commotion, and rightly so, about cutting the Air Force more than \$5 billion in the fiscal year 1954 budget.

In the fiscal year 1955 budget appropriations for the Army were reduced more than \$5 billion, and in the new budget request for 1956, despite the fact that the President now is asking the Congress to share with him a policy which admittedly may result in action on the mainland of China, the already heavily reduced Army is being further reduced.

When the distinguished senior Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. BRIDGES] and I were in Europe last spring, it appeared to me that the heavy reductions in our military appropriations were one of the reasons for the rapid rise of neutralism in some of those countries, and the extent of Communist infiltration in others.

Who can assert that there would have been a Korea if we had maintained our military strength, or a Dien Bien Phu if the strength of the free world had been respected?

I mention the latter because not long before the fall of Dien Bien Phu we were told that the preservation of Indochina for the free world was vital to our position in southeast Asia; that our position in southeast Asia was vital to our position in Asia; that our position in Asia was vital to the future security of the free world.

Who can be sure that the contemptuously aggressive policies of Chou En-lai, before and after Geneva, were not affected by these reductions?

But now, as we apparently plan to stiffen against further aggression, we are also asked further to reduce our already seriously weakened Army and Marine Corps.

The Communists have shown they were not afraid of us when we had the atomic deterrent. Why should they be afraid when we have not? And if that is a fair premise, why should we not build up our Army and Marines, instead of continuing to tear them down?

In recent months there have been press stories to the effect that the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Matthew Ridgway, objected to certain military policies which might commit the Army.

If that is true, those of us who know this American general and his great battle record also know that he must believe that his Army, shortly to be further weakened, is not strong enough to carry out missions which might be involved.

We have had sad comparable situations in the not too distant past. In 1950 the late great Hoyt Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, protested his "shoestring" Air Force: and when it became known that in order to defend Korea this country was forced to borrow fighter planes from Canada, people understood what General Vandenberg meant by the term "shoestring."

Korea was fought with both obsolescent and obsolete airplanes, in insufficient quantities. Under Secretary Talbott we have improved our Air Force, but the strength of our Army has continued to decline.

Recently the President was quoted as approving the following statement:

From other sources, it was learned yesterday that the administration is counting on airlift of Army or Marine units as an important part of the mobile forces along with naval carrier and Air Force units.

But I have studied the airlift over recent weeks, and believe the airlift available to the Army is inadequate; and General Ridgway must know that.

In addition General Ridgway must also know that if we had real trouble which required ground action, the tragedy of ammunition shortage in Korea would be repeated because of the current plans for reserve ammunition.

There are some who assert that this country cannot afford adequate defense against Communist aggression because the cost of such defense would jeopardize our economy.

In the first place, I have said, and say again, that there is little merit in being the richest man in the graveyard; and in the second place, I do not believe that the assertion that we cannot afford adequate strength is true.

In his recent outstanding book, Mr. Thomas K. Finletter, former Secretary of the Air Force, and former Chairman of the President's Air Policy Commission, states the findings of a nonpartisan organization as follows:

The National Planning Association in a report of October 1953 has said that additional annual defense expenditures of \$10 billion over the administration's projected outlays would not interfere with further business expansion, would not prevent a continuing increase in the standard of living, and would even allow for tax reductions; that an increase in defense expenditures of \$20 billion annually over the projected 1956 levels could be made and still permit a continuing increase in investment and a moderate increase in the standard of living, with no change in tax rates; and that only when the increase reached \$33 billion annually over the presently projected rate of expenditures would the United States be brought close to the point where we would have to approach the issue of "guns or butter." Even at this point there would still be enough resources for some small increases in investments and in the standard of living.

The question, considered only in fiscal terms, is not at all what we can afford to spend but what it is wise to spend in order to avoid the massive expenditures in man-

power, materials, and dollars we would be forced to make if we became engaged in general war.

There may be some who will dispute that statement, but I have full faith there is no American who is not willing to pay whatever the price may be for preserving our freedom.

Much has been said about the unfairness of the Chinese Government in imprisoning, as spies, the 11 American flyers who were shot down. Not much has been said, however, about the unfairness of this Government in sending them out in a plane designed before 1940, a plane obsolete before the Korean war.

I was just told this plane may have been designed shortly after 1940, and I will check the facts for the RECORD. I do know the plane was flown in 1943, and that such planes were flown in large numbers in 1944. It usually requires around 7 years to develop a bomber, design through production. But this ship was rushed.

If our Government has the right to draft men and send them out to fight and die for the protection of our country, then it also has the duty to see that these men are given the best possible training and have the best possible equipment.

In closing, may I again emphasize that I vote for this resolution to uphold the position of the President in taking this apparent stand against further Communist aggression.

But I believe that if this administration now thinks a showdown with the Communists in the interest of our security may be as close as this resolution request would seem to imply, the concurrent military appropriation request should involve improving the strength and mobility of all our forces instead of adding only to the strength of one, and reducing the two others.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, following the most impressive testimony I have heard on any measure during my service in the Senate, I shall vote for the joint resolution without amendment, because I am convinced that the defense line of our Nation is threatened in the Pacific; and, of course, it must be maintained.

I am not voting for the joint resolution as a military alliance in any way with Nationalist China, nor as a police action against the spread of Asiatic communism.

We do not have the manpower, the natural resources, nor the economic resources which can indefinitely plug all the weak spots in the spread of Asiatic communism. For emphasis, I say that we should support the resolution because the Pacific line of defense of the United States of America is threatened and we must protect it.

This policy of defending Formosa as a part of our own defense line is well developed over the years. The resolution has now been spread out before the world. The Chief Executive of the Nation has made his stand upon it and I think that it should be passed. I do not close my eyes to the fact that this action is a sharing by the Chief Executive with the Congress of certain execu-

tive power invested in him by the Constitution; that it is the taking over of certain power by the Congress and is the signing of a blank check by the Congress for military action that could involve actual war. This precedent may plague us in the future, but future conditions will have to be faced when they develop. It should be made clear now that this resolution is passed to meet an extraordinary situation.

With many others, I was greatly concerned at the hearings about the inclusion of certain islands near the China coastline as an area of security and protection. From my own viewpoint, I believe the small advantages of holding the islands is far less in importance than the harm that can come in international affairs from such a course, but when the entire case is considered I believe that this is a matter which we will have to leave to the judgment of the President after he has considered advice from both political and military sources.

The American people are relying on President Eisenhower and his firm statements that he will personally direct these activities and that he alone will give the final command as to any and all action. The Members of the Congress are personally relying upon this same assurance which precludes any military alliance or joint responsibility of the President and the leaders of any other nations.

I think, Mr. President, that we should also clearly recognize that this action can well involve both the early increase and the expansion of our military forces. This resolution could cause military action at an early date and instead of decreasing the size of our Army, I personally think that we should be increasing it. The American people ought to be warned now that this action may involve larger calls by the Selective Service and larger expenditures of money for the military program. I also think we ought to face the fact that this action clearly involves the possibility of the use of our own ground forces in Formosa, or on the mainland of China itself. I think we ought to squarely face the issue of this possibility now, and as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I see this step as one that may be involved in carrying out this resolution. I do not think that it is enough to merely say that this action does not call for an increase in our Armed Forces.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator from Mississippi yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Does not the Senator believe there is a possibility that some of the recent aggressions from behind the Iron Curtain resulted or were influenced by the heavy reductions in our Armed Forces in recent years?

Mr. STENNIS. That could well be.

Mr. SYMINGTON. I was interested in the Senator's statement that he believed we should increase the size of our Armed Forces, instead of reducing them. I am sure the Senator from Mississippi knows that the Army appropriation request was reduced more than \$5 billion last year, and despite that it is now

planned to cut the Army appropriation even further this year.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Mississippi has not seen any proof that would justify such a reduction, based on world conditions or based on technical advances or on improvements in machinery, or otherwise.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield further?

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield further.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Today there are no draftees in the Marine Corps. Nevertheless the present plan of this administration is to cut the Marine Corps by 32,000 men, or about 15 percent of its total strength. We are now talking in terms of amphibious warfare, at which the Marine Corps is particularly expert. Does not the Senator consider unfortunate this planned further reduction in Marine Corps strength?

Mr. STENNIS. I wholeheartedly agree with the distinguished Senator from Missouri. I was greatly surprised when he brought out that fact, that the Marine Corps, that fine amphibious force, is faced with a reduction of 32,000 men, who are all volunteers in this special type of armed service.

Mr. President, I shall not detain the Senate much longer.

The real basis of what hope I have for the eventual peaceful settlement of this Formosan question is for Formosa to be under at least partial jurisdiction of the United Nations with protection for us against the island being used as a springboard for military action against our defense line. These matters are for decision in the future. The present demands are for a firm, positive policy by us; and for this reason I shall support the resolution without amendments, and urge my colleagues to do the same. I hope it passes by a large vote.

I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. THURMOND in the chair). The senior Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART] had asked for the floor, but he is not in the Chamber. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER].

Mr. CLEMENTS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the call of the roll be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER].

SEVERAL SENATORS. Vote! Vote!

Mr. CAPEHART. Mr. President, I do not wish to delay the Senate, but I do desire to say a few words.

I am a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, and I sat through every minute of the 2 days of hearings, and heard the testimony of all the witnesses. I believe I can say without fear of successful contradiction that I was the first

to bring up the question of whether the Nationalist Government of China might in any way involve us in a war on the mainland of China. I know other Senators were thinking about it; but in the committee we take turns in questioning, and I think I was the first to indulge in that line of questioning, because I was a little fearful at the time that Chiang Kai-shek might involve the United States in a war with Red China, and I did not wish to be a party to any resolution which might enable Chiang Kai-shek to involve us in such a war. So I asked questions about it. I became completely, 100 percent, satisfied as a result of the answers given the committee by Secretary of State Dulles, by Admiral Radford, and by other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President of the United States made the statement yesterday that the purpose of this resolution is to defend and protect Formosa, and nothing else, and, in the discretion of the President, to take whatever measures he feels are in the best interests of the United States in defending Formosa.

At no time was I convinced as a result of any testimony or of anything that I have read in the newspapers or of any statements made by the President or anyone else that the purpose of the resolution is to do anything else than to defend Formosa. Period. That is all. There is nothing else to it.

I have been listening to debate on the part of the able Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] and other Senators regarding the sovereignty of the mainland of China and to assertions that we would be violating international law if we permitted certain things to happen to the mainland of China. It is said that the Communists have sovereignty over the mainland of China, and that Great Britain and other nations have recognized the Chinese Red government.

Are we more interested in Communist China and what the British have done than we are in our own Government and our own people? We have not recognized the Chinese Communists.

Mr. THYE. Mr. President, may we have order? The Senator from Indiana is making a very able address, and it is almost impossible to hear him.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Let there be order in the Senate. The Senator from Indiana may proceed.

Mr. CAPEHART. Are we more interested in Communist China than in the Chinese Nationalists? Is it the argument of some Senators that the Chinese Communists have more right to a foot of land on the mainland of China than have the Chinese Nationalists? Is that the argument? We have not recognized the Chinese Communists. We recognized the Chinese Nationalists. They have just as much right to the islands which are in dispute as have the Chinese Communists. They have just as much right to the mainland as have the Chinese Communists. How did the Chinese Communists acquire control? By overthrowing, by force, the Chinese Nationalist Government. They did it with the aid of Communist Russia. They have no legal right to the mainland of China. We have not recognized them as the Government

of China, notwithstanding the fact that the English have so recognized them.

As to the offshore islands which the Chinese Nationalists now control and upon which they have troops, are Senators going to stand on the floor of the Senate and say they are not entitled to them, that they belong to the Chinese Communists? What sort of reasoning is that?

I remember, Mr. President, that during the Korean war I engaged in colloquies on the floor of the Senate and listened to the same sort of propaganda and arguments to which we have been listening in the past few days. I remember that Chiang Kai-shek offered to furnish a couple of divisions to help us fight in Korea.

The same able Senators at that time said, "No, it cannot be done, because if we permit them to fight in Korea, we shall have to transport them from Formosa to Korea, and the Chinese Communists will not like that. That might involve us in a war with the Chinese Communists."

I remember that very distinctly. That was the argument which was used. It was said that Nationalist troops could not be used in Korea because they had no ships and could not get from Formosa to Korea, unless they were transported in United States ships, and to do that might offend the Chinese Communists and might involve us in a third world war. So we were told we had better not attempt to do that.

Then I remember some arguments coming from the same sources along this line: Then when the Chinese Communists attacked our boys up at the Yalu River, we should not attack anyone north of the Yalu River. The argument was that, regardless of the amount of damage done or the number of American boys killed or wounded south of the Yalu River, we must not dare to send an airplane north of the Yalu River. We must not dare to bomb any of the airports or materiel depots in Communist-controlled territory, because if we did, the Communists might not like it; they might consider it an act of war and might retaliate.

So someone said to our generals, "You must stay south of the Yalu River."

We hear the same voices now saying, "We are for defending Formosa." I have even heard them say, "At any cost, we are for defending Formosa. But in defending Formosa, regardless of the amount of build-up on one of the offshore islands, of which the Nationalists have now lost control to the Communists from the mainland of China, regardless of the number of airplanes which may be assembled there, regardless of the amount of materiel which may be stored there, regardless of the number of troops who may be assembled there for the specific purpose of attacking Formosa, we dare not do anything about it until they have sent their airplanes over Formosa." To do what? To kill American boys who may be stationed on Formosa in order to defend it. That is what it amounts to. That is how simple the proposition is.

We are told that we must not attack the Chinese Communists on the mainland because they have sovereignty

there. I say they do not have sovereignty, in the eyes of the United States Government. Since when have we become more interested in the Chinese Communists than we are in the Chinese Nationalists?

The purpose of the resolution is to defend Formosa. In passing the resolution, we shall be giving to the President of the United States the power really to defend Formosa. The Chinese Communists, not once, but many times within the past few days, have told us in no uncertain terms that they intend to capture Formosa. What more assurance of their intention do we want? They have told us that they plan to capture Formosa. Who is so naive as to believe that if they start to build up a great force opposite Formosa, on one of the offshore islands, or even on the mainland, for the purpose of taking Formosa, they will not attempt to carry out their objective? The President of the United States has told us that he will have the last word about that.

What American, knowing that we might have 50,000, 100,000, or 200,000 American boys on the island of Formosa, would deny the President of the United States the right to stop the Red Chinese before they started, rather than to wait until they came over Formosa, dropped their bombs, and killed great numbers of Americans?

What sort of thinking prevails among us? I am just as much opposed as is anyone else to engaging in a war. The able senior Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD] discussed this matter at great length in the committee, as did all other members, because we are all opposed to permitting Chiang Kai-shek or anyone connected with any other government to trigger us into a war with Red China or any other country.

We satisfied ourselves in the committee by the testimony that that simply would not happen. I know I was convinced; I cannot, of course, speak for any other Senator. Oh, yes, it might happen, but it will not happen. We are not going to permit it to happen. There can be no question about that.

The question of our attacking the mainland came about in this way. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was asked what he would do if the Red Chinese built up a tremendous force, and a supply of airplanes, materiel, guns, and so forth, on the mainland, and he knew it was being done for one purpose, namely, to attack Formosa. He was asked, "What do you think you would have the right to do, or what should you do, under the resolution?"

He could give only one answer. If that admiral had given any other answer than the one he gave, that he would protect American boys by stopping the Red Chinese before they had a chance to shoot down American boys, he should have been impeached.

What right have we to send American boys to the island of Formosa, and then to say to the President of the United States, "Even though you are convinced that those Red devils are building up an army a hundred miles away, with a thousand airplanes intended to fly over Formosa and to shoot down our boys, with-

out even giving them a chance to stop that kind of build-up, you cannot defend them?"

I put it up to the American people when I say that, in all fairness, we have no right to say that to the President.

Perhaps we should not be defending Formosa. Perhaps we should not be over there at all. Perhaps we ought to withdraw and get completely out of the far eastern Pacific. But that is not the question. The question is, if we are committed to defending Formosa, which means possibly placing American boys on Formosa, why should we want to tie the hands of the President of the United States and our commanders by requiring them to sit there like ducks, and wait until the Red Chinese fly over them and drop their bombs?

Those who take the position that we should not attack the Communists because they have sovereignty over the mainland of China are the same group who argued that we should not use any of the Chinese Nationalist troops in the Korean war, the same group who argued that we should not fly across the Yalu River.

How can we be in favor of defending Formosa, how could we have favored winning the Korean war, and then be against having our commanders follow the enemy? In what kind of thinking are we indulging?

We talk about international law and the attacking of a sovereign nation. We shall not be attacking a nation at all, if we are required to attack—and we are not going to do it under this resolution. The President of the United States is not going to do it. There is nothing in the resolution which says that he should do it, unless he is thoroughly convinced that the Communist Chinese are building up a force on the offshore islands or on the mainland of China to attack our boys and our friends on Formosa.

To me that is how simple this matter is. The Red Chinese have no sovereignty in China. They took China by force. We have never recognized the Red Chinese government. It is not the government of China. So far as we are concerned, the Nationalists government is the government of China.

Mr. President, as I have said, I sat through all the hearings. I assure my colleagues one cannot read into those hearings anything other than that every witness testified that the purpose of the resolution is to defend Formosa. The witnesses testified that the intention is to act only if, in the best judgment of the proper authorities, the Red Chinese should do something which would be detrimental to our defense of Formosa. One cannot read anything else into the hearings. There were present at those hearings the able Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL], the able Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD], the able Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER], and the able Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND] as well as other Senators.

Yesterday the President went so far as to say that if at any time we should engage in any act outside what might be called the scope of defending Formosa and the surrounding islands, the Presi-

dent alone would be responsible for the decision.

Why is it that some of us are more interested in Red China than in Nationalist China? Where does one get the facts from which to arrive at the conclusion that we ought to be more considerate of the Chinese Communists than of the Chinese Nationalists? What are the facts that would dictate to any man that we ought to be more careful with the Chinese Communists, and that we ought to permit them to do what they please?

The Chinese Communists have told us repeatedly that they are going to take Formosa. I do not know whether they will or not. I know that one able Senator today said he thought the Chinese Communists were bluffing and that they do not mean it. I do not know whether they are bluffing or not. They certainly were not bluffing in Korea. They certainly were not bluffing in Indochina. They certainly were not bluffing in many other areas. I again repeat my question, Where are the facts which would dictate any American to determine that we ought to be more considerate of Red China than of Nationalist China? What are the acts and actions of Red China which would indicate that we ought to be more considerate of the Chinese Communists than we are of the Chinese Nationalists?

If I remember correctly, it was the Red Chinese who attacked our armies and the United Nations armies in Korea. If I remember correctly, it was their armies that made it possible for us to be so unfortunate as to suffer 150,000 casualties, including about 35,000 deaths. If I remember correctly, it is the Red Chinese that are holding 11 American airmen against international law and in violation of the Korean truce agreements.

Are those facts on which one can come to the conclusion that we ought to be more considerate of the Chinese Communists than of the Chinese Nationalists? I do not think those are facts which would convince me of that. Although I am not a lawyer, I see nothing that would justify such preference under international law, and I feel certain we have not recognized the Chinese Communist Government as the Government of China. The Chinese Communists may be occupying China, but how did they get there? They took China from the Chinese Nationalists by force. There can be no question about that. So I do not see what the debate is all about. I do not understand the reasoning which has been set forth. I do not find the facts based on which one can stand up and say, "I am against the Chinese Communists. I am against communism; I am for defending Formosa at any cost, but—but—be nice to the Chinese Communists. They are nice fellows. They might provoke something, you know. Be nice to them. Under international law we must not do certain things."

We listened to the same kind of arguments during the Korean war. I do not understand that sort of reasoning. I do not understand how one can arrive at such conclusions, or on what facts one can come to such a conclusion. How can one say to an American boy, "We are going to send you over to Formosa to de-

fend Formosa," and then say to his commanders that they must be as careful and as certain as human beings can be to observe certain precautions? We have been assured, by witnesses who are in a position to know of what the intention of the resolution is, and the President has also told us. Yet we delay while the Communists build up a great army, build up installations where many airplanes are concentrated, and get ready for aggression.

We hear statements made, and they may be right, that some of these days Russia may fly many airplanes to this country and bomb Washington, New York, and other cities, and that we should do something to prevent such an occurrence, and that our defense line is in the Pacific. I agree that that is where it is. Yet when it comes to the question of defending Formosa and sending our boys over there, the same persons refuse to permit the President of the United States to engage in a buildup of defense on one of the offshore islands, when those persons know that the Communists are building up their own forces for the specific purpose of attacking Formosa.

Mr. President, I was concerned over one aspect about which I am no longer concerned. One can never be certain about anything in this life, but I am thoroughly convinced that the purpose of the resolution is not to do anything except to defend Formosa. I am likewise thoroughly convinced that the President of the United States does not intend to permit Chiang Kai-shek or anybody else to "trigger" us into a war. If we get into a war, we shall do it on our own initiative. I am thoroughly convinced that our officials are not going to permit Chiang Kai-shek to get us into a war. I was concerned about that question in the beginning. The question was debated and discussed in the committee hearings and has been referred to in newspapers, and broadcast by radio and television networks.

I stood on this very spot last Monday and congratulated the President of the United States for sending to the Congress a message which, in effect, asked for a resolution. I thought at that time we ought to have hearings and thoroughly consider the matter, and that we should go into the question from every possible viewpoint. We have done that. I have satisfied myself that this is the best thing and the only thing we can do under existing circumstances.

I cannot find, anywhere, any facts which either were developed in the past, or were developed in the committee meeting the other day, or any facts which have been developed on the floor of the Senate, which would justify a Member of Congress in saying he is in favor of the defense of Formosa, but that he does not wish to give the President the power and authority to strike at a buildup 100 miles or less away from Formosa, which the President knows would, if permitted to continue and grow, would make it impossible for him to defend Formosa, and thus perhaps cause the loss of 100,000 or 200,000 American boys. I cannot be a party to that sort of thing.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from California will state it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. What is the pending question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER].

Mr. KNOWLAND. The yeas and nays have been ordered on this question, have they not?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct; the yeas and nays have been ordered.

Mr. LANGER. Mr. President, before answering the distinguished Senator from Georgia, I wish to take only half a minute to answer the argument of the distinguished Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART].

If his theory of sovereignty were correct, the Indians would still be controlling the United States of America, because the white people took this country away from the Indians by force. However, I do not wish to argue that point.

I am interested chiefly in the joint resolution and in the amendment I have submitted.

Mr. President, in my service in the Senate, I am never worried about having to vote alone. I remember that I stood on this floor for 3 hours, arguing against confirmation of the nomination of Mr. Stettinius to be Secretary of State. I voted alone against confirmation of that nomination. A little later I looked at a picture in Life magazine, and there I saw portrayed a scene at the San Francisco conference, where Alger Hiss was representing the Secretary of State, and was greeting President Truman.

I also remember that when Woodrow Wilson was running for office, time and time and time again he said he was running on the platform of keeping this country out of war.

Then I remember when another President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, said in a speech:

I say again and again and again I am not going to send our boys to any foreign country.

And then I remember that after President Truman sent our boys to Korea, and when he was calling it "a police action," Senator after Senator after Senator rose and said, "I never voted for any measure of that kind; but the boys are over there now and are we not going to appropriate money to see that they get good guns and the protection to which they are entitled?"

Mr. President, I also remember that in the last political campaign, Republican Senator after Republican Senator said on the radio, "I never voted for the war in Korea; I have no responsibility at all for it. That was the action of Harry Truman, who never came to the Senate to request such authority before he sent the boys to Korea."

Mr. President, what does my amendment do? I am perfectly willing to accept a part of the joint resolution—the part which says:

That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the

Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack.

I wish to state to my friend, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART], that he will never find the Senator from North Dakota unwilling to protect our soldiers who may be on Formosa, whether their number be 50,000 or 100,000. But the entire tradition and history of the United States are that we have never attacked another nation. To that part of the joint resolution I have absolutely no objection.

If Senators wish to declare war, let them declare it. But what would we be doing by passing the joint resolution as it now reads? We would be saying that the President can take "such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores."

In other words, under the joint resolution, as it now reads, if the President were to deem it essential to send our troops to southeast Asia, in order to divert some of the Communist troops, he could send our troops there, without ever coming back to the Congress for authority, because we would have given him a blank check to do so. Or if the President wished to send American troops to Egypt or to Africa or to anywhere in South America, he could send them there, for Congress would have given him a blank check; and the Senator from Indiana will have voted for it, if he votes in favor of the passage of the joint resolution as it now stands.

Mr. President, if the joint resolution as now written is passed and is enacted into law, what will we say if the President sends our troops to the jungles or swamps of southeast Asia, 3 or 4 years from now? France was fighting in that area for some 7 long years. The distinguished Senator from Georgia asked, today, "Are we going to surrender the 350,000 people on those islands?" Well, Mr. President, after 7 years, France surrendered a million people and I notice that our State Department apparently did not have any objection. After a war lasting 7 or 8 years, the French surrendered a million people in Indochina.

Under the joint resolution as it now reads, build-ups on the few islands 12 miles from the coastline of China are dealt with. On the other hand, there may be military buildups 100 miles or 500 miles or 1,000 miles away from the coastline. Are we going to have the President use our Armed Forces to go that far and to attack the forces of the government of China before those forces attack us? That, in simple language, is what the joint resolution amounts to. If, 5, 6, 7, or 8 years from now, we find that our troops are still on the mainland of China, and if at that time the American people ask various Senators, "Did you vote to send our boys there?" the only answer Senators will be able to give will be "Yes," if they vote in favor of the passage of the pending joint resolution, for that is what may be its effect if it is enacted into law.

So far as I am concerned, I will never vote to send our boys there, under a joint resolution of this kind, ambiguous as it

is, because if the President were to decide that he wanted to send our boys there, all he would have to do would be to come before the Congress and obtain authority for that purpose—just as the proposal now before us is one to give him authority to use our forces to defend Formosa. He could come to Congress and could say, "I want to send our troops to some of these foreign countries." If the President said he wanted authority to do that, I do not think there would be a single vote against it.

So, Mr. President, I request a vote on my amendment because I think that by adopting the amendment we shall be protecting the lives of the youth of America—the boys who will have to do the fighting. If we wish to send our troops to all these foreign countries later on, and if the President finds it is necessary for that to be done, he will be able to come to Congress and ask Congress for authority to take that action, and Congress can give him the authority. But certainly this is a blanket or blank-check resolution. Just read it, Mr. President:

Resolved, etc., That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands.

Mr. President, those who prepared the joint resolution could have stopped there. But, no; they added the last 2½ lines, in which Congress is asked to give the President a blank check, so as to authorize him—with our approval—to send our Armed Forces to any country on the face of the globe; because the joint resolution, as it now stands, continues with the following provision:

And the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

It is as simple as that. The senior Senator from North Dakota does not intend to vote to give such authority to any President unless we know where the troops are going. I do not propose to vote to attack any country which is getting its airplanes ready 500 miles from the coastline. We can get planes ready in this country as fast as the Reds can. We shall be ready for them, if they come. We shall be ready for the very first plane. Mr. Forrestal, the late Secretary of Defense, said that if an attack should come at any time we would be prepared to resist it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. LANGER]. On this

question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY] are absent on official business.

The Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON] and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] are absent by leave of the Senate because of illness.

On this question the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ] is paired with the Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON]. If present and voting, the Senator from New Mexico would vote "yea" and the Senator from Texas would vote "nay."

I further announce that the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. GREEN], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY] if present would vote "nay."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS] is necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. POTTER] is absent on official business as a member of the American delegation attending the 10th anniversary of the World War II Battle of Alsace, at Colmar, France.

The Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. MCCARTHY] are absent on official business.

If present and voting the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. MCCARTHY], and the Senator from Michigan [Mr. POTTER] would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 3, nays 83, as follows:

YEAS—3		
Langer	Lehman	Morse
NAYS—83		
Aiken	Fulbright	Millikin
Allott	George	Monroney
Anderson	Goldwater	Mundt
Barkley	Gore	Murray
Barrett	Hayden	Neuberger
Beall	Hennings	O'Mahoney
Bender	Hickenlooper	Pastore
Bennett	Hill	Payne
Bible	Holland	Purtell
Bridges	Hruska	Robertson
Bush	Humphrey	Russell
Butler	Ives	Saltonstall
Byrd	Jackson	Schoeppel
Capehart	Jenner	Scott
Carlson	Johnston, S. C.	Smathers
Case, N. J.	Kefauver	Smith, Maine
Case, S. Dak.	Kerr	Smith, N. J.
Clements	Kilgore	Sparkman
Cotton	Knowland	Stennis
Curtis	Kuchel	Symington
Daniel	Long	Thurmond
Dirksen	Magnuson	Thye
Douglas	Malone	Watkins
Duff	Mansfield	Welker
Dworshak	Martin, Iowa	Wiley
Eastland	Martin, Pa.	Williams
Ellender	McClellan	Young
Ervin	McNamara	
NOT VOTING—10		
Bricker	Green	Neely
Chavez	Johnson, Tex.	Potter
Flanders	Kennedy	
Frear	McCarthy	

So Mr. LANGER's amendment was rejected.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I offer an amendment, in the nature of a substitute, and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. It is proposed to strike out the preamble and all that follows and in lieu thereof to insert the following:

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace, and, in conformity with that purpose, has undertaken as a member of the United Nations to be ready to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered; and

Whereas the Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Japan, signed September 8, 1951, under which Japan renounced all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, did not specify the ultimate disposition of such islands; and

Whereas the United States has recognized and assumed a responsibility for the peace and security of Formosa and the Pescadores pending definitive settlement of their future status, and pending such settlement has recognized the jurisdiction of the Republic of China over these islands; and

Whereas in China or certain areas thereof there is armed conflict between the Republic of China and the Chinese Communists, and the Chinese Communists are threatening to extend that conflict and endanger international peace by armed attacks on Formosa and the Pescadores; and

Whereas the situation is one appropriate for action by the United Nations for the purpose of ending the present hostilities off the coast of China and their threatened extension in the Formosan Straits which clearly endanger international peace and threaten seriously to dislocate the existing, if unstable, balance of moral, economic, political, and military power upon which the peace of the Pacific depends; and

Whereas the United States would welcome intervention by the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities off the coast of China and in the Formosan Straits, and it is in the interest of the United States and of world peace to facilitate efforts toward peaceful settlement, including a definitive settlement of the future status of Formosa and the Pescadores in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter; and

Whereas pending action by the United Nations the United States has a responsibility to protect and defend the peace and security of Formosa and the Pescadores from armed attack, since the peace and security of these islands are essential to the peace and security of the United States and other nations with vital interests in the west Pacific: Therefore be it

Resolved, etc., That it is the sense of the Congress—in light of the above-described situation and so long as it continues, pending effective action by the United Nations to maintain peace and security in the Formosan Straits and the waters surrounding Formosa and the Pescadores—the President has authority to employ the Armed Forces of the United States if and as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of defending and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores from armed attack. Such authority would include the taking of such other measures consistent with international law and our obligations under the United Nations Charter as he judges necessary or appropriate militarily in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment. The yeas and nays were not ordered.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, on last Wednesday I submitted this amendment in the nature of a substitute, which

is cosponsored by the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] and the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE]. I explained it in some detail on the floor. I should like to speak again briefly, and in doing so I want to make clear that I am not wedded to the words of my substitute. I am simply trying to incorporate certain principles into whatever resolution we eventually pass here in the Senate. I have done that to the best of my ability. If anyone can improve on them, I will gladly adopt their words.

These principles, all of which are present in my substitute, are:

First. That we separate Formosa and the Pescadores from the offshore islands, an end which we are told the President had in mind, but which his resolution, by the time it had gone through departmental conferences and changes, certainly does not accomplish.

Second. That we clearly state the legal and moral justification for our act, which is the treaty of peace between the Allied Powers and Japan, signed September 8, 1951, under which Japan renounced all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores, but did not specify the ultimate disposition of these islands. The United States, therefore, whose arms liberated these islands from Japan, bears some responsibility to protect them until that ultimate disposition is arrived at. This, I believe, will show our true purpose to the world, and particularly to the peoples of the Far East.

Third. The clear statement that we welcome U. N. intervention and respect our obligations under the charter—something that the present resolution does not do.

Mr. President, let us not be met with the argument that this limits the President's authority. It does not. The President has the authority, under the Constitution, to take whatever action is necessary, from a military standpoint, to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. Under the resolution, he may defend the offshore islands, if he desires to do so.

Mr. President, I invite the Members of the Senate to look at the substitute resolution and to read the last two paragraphs before the resolving clause, which are as follows:

Whereas the United States would welcome intervention by the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities off the coast of China and in the Formosan Straits, and it is in the interest of the United States and of world peace to facilitate efforts toward peaceful settlement including a definitive settlement of the future status of Formosa and the Pescadores in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter; and

Whereas pending action by the United Nations the United States has a responsibility to protect and defend the peace and security of Formosa and the Pescadores from armed attack since the peace and security of these islands are essential to the peace and security of the United States and other nations with vital interests in the West Pacific—

And so forth.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator from Tennessee will yield, in order that I may request the yeas and nays on the Senator's amendment.

Mr. KEFAUVER. I should be happy to yield for that purpose.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. In the opinion of the Chair, there is a sufficient second. The yeas and nays are ordered.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I invite the attention of the Senate to the wording of the resolving clause of the proposed substitute resolution:

Resolved, etc., That it is the sense of the Congress—in light of the above-described situation and so long as it continues, pending effective action by the United Nations to maintain peace and security in the Formosan Straits and the waters surrounding Formosa and the Pescadores—the President has authority to employ the Armed Forces of the United States if and as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of defending and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores from armed attack. Such authority would include the taking of such other measures consistent with international law and our obligations under the United Nations Charter as he judges necessary or appropriate militarily in the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

There is some feeling that the President has the authority to protect the vital interests of the United States without coming to Congress and asking its permission to do so. I would not want this to serve as a precedent at some future time when a President might be confronted with an emergency in connection with the defense of some vital island, such as Formosa or one of the Hawaiian Islands. So, Mr. President, my amendment is worded to express the sense of the Congress that the President has authority to do certain things.

Of course, it was not necessary for the President to ask authority of the Congress, or even for an expression of the sense of the Congress, in connection with this matter. But inasmuch as there was no immediate emergency, I am glad the President has done so in this instance. When there is time for the securing of the sense of the Congress on a matter of this kind, it is a wholesome attitude and procedure for the Chief Executive to take the course followed in the present instance, but I would not want the passage of the resolution which we are considering, House Joint Resolution 159, to constitute a precedent that it must be done in every case.

I feel, Mr. President, that under the circumstances the consideration of the resolution has been beneficial to our Nation and to those who are interested with us in the cause of peace in the world. It has given us an opportunity to debate the question, to acquaint the people of our Nation with the situation.

I am convinced that the great concern shown by the Members of the Foreign Relations Committee and of the Armed Services Committee, in the 2 or 3 days of executive hearings, over the desire not to get this Nation into war by some unhappy accident, over the desire not to let some action on the coastal islands involve us in conflict which might last for many, many years, has done much to temper the attitude of some of our military people. I think it has had a leveling influence. If the resolution has not done anything more than to inspire the

President to issue to the Nation the statement that he and he alone would be responsible for any decision to start any actual shooting in the part of the world where the trouble is, I think it has proved to be very beneficial.

What many of us have feared is that some subordinate officer or some line officer, under the influence, perhaps, of Chiang Kai-shek, might get the American Nation into a war over the coastal islands.

Mr. President, I do not believe the American people want to go to war in defense of the coastal islands or to try to pull Chiang Kai-shek's chestnuts out of the fire.

Since the resolution is before the Senate, I know of no test in connection with it except that every Senator vote his own conviction as to what he thinks should be done. That, I am sure, every Senator will do.

We literally stand at the crossroads. If we turn one way we will strengthen the possibilities of peace. If we turn the other, we may seriously endanger the hopes of peace and precipitate our country into war with unforeseeable grave consequences and without allies.

I think that we can and should take the way that enhances the hopes of peace. It is the way not only to unite our country but to unite the free world.

The great difficulty and dilemma we face is that the President asks us to unite on the peace way, and I am sure he means that, but he allows his advisers to incorporate into his message and into the resolution language which plainly suggests that Congress should take the way which may lead to war.

Let us at least pause and consider what way we do wish to go. There is a fatal ambiguity in the President's message and resolution. We in the Congress have grave responsibility to the American people. We cannot escape by following blindly the President's ambiguity.

Make no mistake about it. We are united in favor of a United Nations call for a cease-fire and a cessation of armed hostilities in the Straits of Formosa. I think most of us here would go further than the President. We would not only welcome United Nations intervention but we would exert our influence as a member of the U. N. to the uttermost to secure a cease-fire.

Pending U. N. action we are also united in recognizing our responsibility to defend Formosa and the Pescadores from armed attack. We freed these islands from Japanese rule. In the Japanese Treaty, Japan renounced all her rights to them, but their ultimate disposition and future status was left undetermined. And until there is a treaty fixing their future status, we have a responsibility to defend them from armed attack.

As long as and insofar as our resolution makes clear our position in favor of a U. N. cease-fire and in favor of the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, it is a move toward peace and a move toward unity with our allies.

But the proposed resolution and the President's message go far beyond these two essential points; and insofar as they do, they may turn us back from the road to peace, and I fear may turn us up the

road to war. Indeed the resolution itself is even singularly silent on our attitude toward a United Nations cease fire.

The President's message, and the resolution read in light of the message, unfortunately indicate that we will regard any attempt on the part of the Red Chinese to capture islands like Quemoy and Matsu only a few miles off their port cities as in aid and the preparation for an attack on Formosa. The message even suggests that we might take appropriate military action against concentration or employment of Communist forces on the mainland should our military conclude that the concentrations were "obviously undertaken to facilitate attack upon the mainland" and it is obvious that concentration of the 7th Fleet about Formosa would obviously facilitate attack by us on the mainland in case of need.

If the joint resolution we are considering were entirely forthright, it would read something like this, because this is actually what it means:

That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa, the Pescadores, Matsu, and Quemoy, and all the little islands, the names of which most of our American citizens have never heard, against armed attack.

If the resolution had been worded in such a way, that would be actually what it meant. There would be no question that the Armed Forces of the United States would be used, under the authority of the joint resolution, for the purpose of protecting Quemoy, Matsu, and the other little islands just a few miles off the coast of China. Then there would really be tremendous concern about the authority which we purport to give to the President.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I am glad to yield to the distinguished Senator from Oregon.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Tennessee agree that the debate shows that the spokesmen for the administration have definitely stated that the islands of Quemoy, Matsu, and the other islands within 8 or 10 miles of the mainland of China, islands now occupied by the Nationalist Chinese forces, are going to be defended?

Mr. KEFAUVER. The language of the resolution means the same as if those islands had been specifically named along with Formosa and the Pescadores.

When the people of this Nation understand that, they will be tremendously alarmed about the possibility of our country becoming involved in a war in that part of the world over some islands which the President of the United States said, not so long ago, were not tremendously important in connection with the defense of Formosa.

The people of the United States are going to be tremendously alarmed, when the truth is made known to them, that Congress, by this resolution, was authorizing the President to use the Armed Forces for the defense of little islands over which we have never had any claim,

and as to which there is no legal status, islands which were not ceded by Japan, and which have always been part of the Chinese mainland.

The people of the United States do not want to go to war over some unnamed little coastal island of the Chinese mainland, an island about which they have never heard and do not care anything about.

This clause of the resolution is not forthright:

This authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands.

It means the same as if the islands of Quemoy and Matsu and all the other little islands, had been included along with Formosa and the Pescadores.

We cannot sustain our position in world opinion, and we shall not have any allies, if we get into a world war over what might happen to one of those little islands.

Furthermore, how can the United States defend one of those little islands without engaging in shooting? Just how can that be done? I have read some military discussions of this question. I read such an article by a distinguished writer, which was published in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch a short time ago. How can a little coastal island, like Quemoy, be defended without taking some of the coast itself? Experts have said that it cannot be done so long as guns are placed on the mainland and are shooting at the island. The only thing that can be done is to take some of the coastline itself.

Mr. President, picture our situation with respect to these little islands. Suppose the Communists on the mainland began to shoot at forces of Chiang Kai-shek; or suppose the forces of Chiang Kai-shek began to shoot at the Communists first. Then suppose we went in and undertook to give Chiang's troops naval and air support and cover, even though we did not put any of our own troops on the island. I do not see how it would be possible for our ships and planes not to be hit and our men not to be killed and wounded. If that should happen, we would be engaged in world war III for certain. The grass would burn rapidly then. Things would move rapidly from one juncture to another, and we would quickly be engaged in a war over some little island in which we had no particular interest, which did not belong to us, which was not mandated to us, and in which we never had any trusteeship.

We would be in a particularly precarious situation on those little islands, considering the diverse interests of the United States and of Chiang Kai-shek.

Our interest is, and I hope it always will be, to stabilize that part of the world and to have peace. But that is not Chiang Kai-shek's interest. Chiang Kai-shek's interest is to get air cover in that area, so that he will be able to move his troops onto the mainland and to engage in a reinvansion of Communist China. He has said that all along, so there cannot be any question about his intention. He has been forthright.

I can imagine what would probably be the first thing to happen if we should

place air cover over Chiang's troops on Quemoy, and the Red planes were driven back. If Chiang should go onto the mainland, and we could not stop him from going, then there would be nothing else to do but to give him air cover when he reached the mainland.

I have in my hand a copy of the New York Times of January 1, 1955, in which various world leaders were expressing their opinion about what the new year held in store. The following statement was special to the New York Times from Taipei, Formosa:

A full-scale war between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists may break out at "any time," Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of Nationalist China, said today in a New Year's message.

He declared that Communist attacks against the Nationalist island outposts of Quemoy and the Tachens in the last 3 months were overtures to the battle for the Strait of Formosa.

This statement in a New Year message was regarded as significant, since Generalissimo Chiang earlier had contended, as he did again today, that Communist invasion of Formosa would be the beginning of the destruction of the Communist regime on the Chinese mainland.

He also warned the world that "1955 will witness the further deterioration of international relations." He did not elaborate this statement.

No, Mr. President, we are there with someone who has a different motive from the one we have. We are there furnishing airpower and naval support for a man whose purpose is to get back on the mainland of China, and who knows that the only way the Chinese mainland can be successfully invaded is with our support. Our military leaders have said so. Naturally, he may be expected to try to get us into a war by whatever means he can. I think we are taking a course which may lead to the grave danger of war, and it is an unnecessary course.

We are on clear ground when we talk about Formosa and the Pescadores, and the American people think that that is all that is embodied in the resolution. I do not know why the administration did not put the names of the islands in the resolution, and let the American people know which ones we were going to defend. Why did not the administration put in the names of the islands, so the American people could know for the defense of what islands we were granting authority for the use of naval, air, and Army troops, if necessary, in defense of the little islands off the coast of China?

I wish to say frankly that the President's statement helps us a great deal. It at least alleviates the fear that a line officer might decide that a certain military concentration on the mainland of China should be bombed. But, Mr. President, that area is many miles away in the Pacific, and the President is in this country. After all, we must consider the language in the resolution as it is before the Senate.

I do not know what action the President would take under the proposed resolution, but it clearly authorizes action which the free world outside the United States may not regard as defensive, and authorizes action which is more likely

to precipitate than deter war with Red China.

Mr. President, one of the great difficulties about this matter is that if we get into war over one of those little islands, which is where war would come if it should come—and I hope it will not—what is going to be our situation as far as having allies is concerned? Do we want to assume responsibility for getting into a war with Red China which will last for years and years, as a result of which war, even if our forces won, we would have a worse situation than existed before?

Other nations have an interest in protecting Formosa. Other nations are obligated, on high legal and moral principles, in joining with us, as they joined with us when we were in a war against Japan. But have we seen one ally that has stated it would join with us in a war against Red China if it happened as a result of protecting one of these little islands? I have not seen such a statement, and we should have powerful friends in the world. The statement I have seen nearest to that—and this has been spoken of many times—is a statement attributed to Anthony Eden, which was published in the Washington Star of January 26, 1954.

I wish to pay high tribute to the increasing wholesome influence of that leader of our great and powerful ally, Great Britain, in the interest of world security. It was Anthony Eden who had a large part in salvaging the nine-power agreement, which may be greatly worthwhile, from the defeat by the French Chamber of Deputies of the European Defense Community. Mr. Eden is a man of wisdom, vision, and friendship for this country, and I have great confidence in him. But, Mr. President, Mr. Eden, in defending the pending proposal before the House of Commons, tried to make it clear that, in his opinion, there was not involved the defense of the little offshore islands. I have in my hand a copy of the Washington Evening Star of January 26, 1954, from which I read the following:

Referring to President Eisenhower's request to Congress to authorize him to use United States Armed Forces to defend Formosa, the Pescadores, and related localities, Mr. Eden said:

"The British Government is convinced that the object of the United States administration has also been to reduce the risks of any extension of the fighting."

Mr. Eden said that President Eisenhower, in his message to Congress, "has been careful to say that he is not suggesting that the United States should enlarge its defensive obligations beyond Formosa and the Pescadores as provided by the mutual defense treaty with (Chinese Nationalist) Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek."

In other words, Mr. Eden apparently is under the impression that we are not going to defend those little coastal islands, and that such a defense is not contemplated by the resolution. He has not had a chance to read the resolution. Some of us think such defense may be involved in the resolution. Mr. Eden thinks the resolution contains the same language as that contained in the proposed treaty of mutual assistance between Chiang Kai-shek and the United

States, which is now before the Committee on Foreign Relations. But the language is not the same. That mutual assistance pact merely mentions Formosa and the Pescadores. It does not contain the language, "and such other islands as are now in friendly hands." It is my opinion that if we should get into conflict as a result of trying to defend those coastal islands—and, frankly, I do not see how we could avoid it—we would be very lucky if we found we had any friends or allies who wished to fight with us. We need not, in an attempt to save our honor, take that position. We have a legal and an honorable status with regard to Formosa and the Pescadores. We have world opinion with us as far as those islands are concerned; but, Mr. President, we do not, under the terms of the pending resolution.

Mr. President, I do not know that any resolution is necessary to reaffirm our intention to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. I certainly would not object to the resolution if that is all it proposed to do. I would be strongly for it, as I have said. I had hoped that, in the interest of real national unity, without any equivocation or reservations whatsoever, the resolution could be limited to Formosa and the Pescadores; but I do have grave doubts and reservations about a resolution which might carry us beyond what is necessary for the defense of Formosa.

I am opposed to becoming involved in the Chinese civil war. I think our policy should be to divorce and isolate Formosa from the Chinese civil war, and I do not see how we can do that if we tie the defense of Formosa with the defense of Quemoy and Matsu.

I know it may be argued that if we do not undertake to defend the coastal islands, we might be letting Chiang Kai-shek down. Mr. President, I am interested in the welfare of this Nation. I do not think, over the course of years, Chiang Kai-shek has been too reliable. I do not wish to disparage Chiang Kai-shek, but I submit that it would be even to his advantage if the United States were to defend Formosa and the Pescadores, without getting involved in the other islands.

Frankly, I would rather have Chiang Kai-shek, even with all his shortcomings, in control on the mainland, than to have it controlled by the Godless Communists, whom we know will always cause us difficulty, and with whom we know we shall never be able to get along. But, Mr. President, I am unwilling to underwrite with American men, might, and military strength an undertaking to get Chiang Kai-shek back onto the mainland of China. It is reported in the press that the message and resolution include the offshore islands only for trading purposes, or perhaps only to keep the Reds guessing. But we have no assurance of that, and the very purpose of the resolution fails if it is unclear and murky. The administration may desire to keep the Reds guessing, but it also compels us to guess whether we are standing for peace or war.

Mr. President, it seems to me that in connection with the joint resolution as

it now stands, since it has been sent to us, we have to consider what its language means. Direct language is before us for our consideration. We should not have to rely for an interpretation of the language on some press reports or upon an interpretation made by the President—either by the present President of the United States or by future Presidents. Our action should be controlled by a consideration of whether the language of the joint resolution will be good for the Nation or whether it will result in getting the Nation into an unjustified war.

An unusually well-informed correspondent, Mr. Stewart Alsop, told us in Wednesday's press that there is a definite decision, in accordance with Admiral Radford's recommendation, to defend Quemoy and Matsu and, in so doing, to bomb the mainland of China. As a result of the press conference given by Chiang Kai-shek on January 1, he was reported as saying he thought there would be a war there in a very short time, and the press dispatch went on to say that he made that statement immediately following a long conference with Admiral Radford. Certainly that does not look too good to me; that does not look as if there was any deterring effect upon Chiang Kai-shek as a result of his conversation or conference with Admiral Radford.

Let us make no mistake about it, Mr. President: The bombing of the Chinese mainland would mean all-out war with Red China, with the probable intervention of Russia, because of Russia's obligation under the Sino-Russian treaty. If war comes in that way, we shall have to fight it without assurance of any substantial help from our friends and allies in the free world.

Mr. President, if we are going to have to fight the Communists, I cannot imagine a worse place for us to do so than in a fight over these little coastal islands. We have already had the experience of fighting the Communists in a place which was most disadvantageous to us. I would imagine, Mr. President, that it would please very highly the Communists of Soviet Russia to have our military power be bogged down in a fight with Red China in that part of the world, over a little island as to which our legal and moral position is not too clear.

How about Europe? Are our forces in Europe going to be weakened, so as to make it easier for Red Russia to invade there, if she decides she wishes to do so? If we wish to maintain the balance of power we now have in Western Europe or the position of power we now have there, that would mean a very drastic enlargement of our armed services, because in that event we would have to deploy a great many men in the area of the world to which the joint resolution relates, if we were to get into a war there.

Mr. President, it is not surprising that in yesterday's press there were also indications that our stand in regard to the offshore islands is delaying and frustrating the efforts of our friends and allies in the United Nations to obtain a cease-fire agreement. A firm declaration of our intent to defend Formosa and the

Pescadores will at least deter or at least long defer a war. At least it would have the effect of preventing a war for a long time. But I am afraid that a declaration of our intent to defend the offshore islands would not be likely to deter or prevent a war. On the contrary, I fear it would precipitate a war.

A strong, militant Red China is not likely to tolerate having these small islands in the immediate front of Red China's port cities remain in unfriendly hands, if Red China can help it. Chiang Kai-shek still claims the mainland, and Mao Tse-tung claims these coastal islands, which always have belonged to the Chinese mainland. These islands are not much further from those Chinese ports than Staten Island is from the port of New York. God grant that if the joint resolution in its present form is passed and becomes law, we may still avoid war. I doubt whether the action it authorizes even squares with our obligations under the United Nations Charter. I agree with the President that "its purpose is peace." But, Mr. President, I am afraid that the joint resolution, in its present form, may, if enacted into law, bring us nearer to war and farther away from our friends and allies in the free world.

Mr. President, today we are talking about a display of unity in connection with the joint resolution. I wish to have us united both at home and with our friends in the rest of the world. But I am afraid that we may be sowing the seeds of disunity.

If we wish to have absolute unity in this matter in the United States, we can have it, I think, to the extent of 99.9 percent, by limiting our defense to what is necessary for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. However, the joint resolution includes authority to defend these other islands. I know, Mr. President, that many Senators have said—and many of them have told me—"Well, the joint resolution is here; and if all Senators did not like it, what would happen?"

If all Members of the Senate felt about the joint resolution as I and a number of other Senators do, we would have before us a joint resolution behind which we could have absolute unity.

Besides, Mr. President, all Senators must follow the dictates of their conscience.

Of course, the joint resolution is here. But we did not ask that it be sent here. I know of nothing to do in this case except what each Senator thinks is right under the circumstances.

Mr. President, I should like to call attention again to the address made the day before yesterday by Mr. Anthony Eden, when he spoke in defense of the President. As I have said before, Anthony Eden stated, in defense of the President, that the policy of the United States is to defend Formosa and the Pescadores. However, I do not know what would have happened on that occasion if the actual wording "to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands" had been before the House of Commons at that time. The policy Mr. Eden stated on

the floor of the House of Commons—the policy with respect to Formosa and the Pescadores—I wish to see clearly stated here. It is a policy for which we can obtain firm and united support at home and abroad. For that policy there is a legal, moral, and military basis. My concern is that in the joint resolution Congress appears to be expressing a different policy.

Mr. President, I yield the floor, and ask for a vote on my amendment.

During the delivery of Mr. KEFAUVER's speech,

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the Senator from Tennessee yield to me?

Mr. KEFAUVER. I yield.

Mr. MORSE. I wish to ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD, immediately following the speech of the Senator from Tennessee, what I consider a very significant speech, which was made by the Honorable L. B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the Canadian House of Commons, on January 25, 1955, in which he discussed in a very able manner the message of the President of the United States, and with particular reference to the matter of a United Nations cease-fire, which the Senator from Tennessee has so ably discussed. I think Mr. Pearson's speech is one which should be available in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, not only for the reading of Senators, but also for the reading of the public at large.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Oregon?

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

(Following is text of statement on Formosa and the coastal islands made in the House of Commons on January 25, 1955, by Hon. L. B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs:)

The President of the United States yesterday sent to Congress an important message dealing with the situation in the Formosa Strait. The President's proposals in this message are, of course, a matter of United States policy. The United States has particular commitments of its own in this area. These, and the effect of the President's message on them, will now be under consideration by Congress and it would not, of course, be appropriate for me or for any member of this Government to comment on this aspect of the matter.

Although we are not involved in United States commitments in this area we are, of course, gravely concerned at the dangerous situation existing there and we are, with other free governments, anxious that steps should be taken to bring to an end fighting which has now been taking place for some time along the China coast.

In this message the President of the United States has referred to the possibility of action by the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire. The United Nations has, in Indonesia, Palestine, and in other parts of the world, been successful in bringing to an end fighting which might have had dangerous consequences, and if it could achieve similar results in this case it would be a cause, I am sure, for great satisfaction.

If the question is raised in the United Nations, and there are reports that it may be raised, this would presumably take place in the Security Council of which Canada is not at present a member. However, we are being kept informed of developments in regard to such a reference and are watching them

with great interest and some concern. Incidentally, an essential party to any cease-fire of this kind would be the Communist government of China which, though a non-member of the United Nations, would have to be invited I assume to participate in the Security Council deliberations if they were to have any chance of success. Whether, of course, this particular government would accept such an invitation is another matter.

While it is not proper for me to comment on American policy on this matter which is now being considered by Congress, I think I can say that any move or proposal within the United Nations or through diplomatic channels which could serve to achieve the purpose as stated in the President's message "to improve the prospects of peace in the area" will be warmly welcomed by the Parliament and people of this country.

Before the Korean armistice, I expressed on more than one occasion in the House the view of the Government that Formosa should be neutralized as far as possible while hostilities continued in Korea. We thought then, and we think now that the final disposition of Formosa should be a subject to be discussed at a conference on Far Eastern problems which at that time we thought might be held after the cessation of fighting in Korea. This was the view adopted by the Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on January 13, 1951. Despite the developments since then, it remains the view of the Government that the final disposition of Formosa should be dealt with by international negotiation if you like, at a conference on Far Eastern problems if one could be held. In any decision regarding the future of Formosa the wishes of the people there, which are often forgotten, would naturally be a primary consideration. Pending such a decision I think that a strong case can be made for the neutralization of Formosa both in order to prevent any assault upon it by Communist forces and also so that it will not be used as a base for invasion of the mainland.

In this area of tension and danger a distinction, I think, can validly be made between the position of Formosa and the Pescadores and the islands off the China coast now in Nationalist hands. The latter are indisputably part of the territory of China; the former, Formosa and the Pescadores, which were Japanese colonies for 50 years prior to 1945 and had had a checkered history before that, are not. I suggest therefore that the considerations which recommend the neutralization of Formosa and the Pescadores do not apply to the coastal islands so close to the mainland but about 100 miles or so away from Formosa. Therefore, I welcome that part of the President's message which looks to the redeployment of the Nationalist forces. "Some of these forces," the President's message states, "are scattered throughout smaller offshore islands as a result of historical rather than military reasons directly related to defending Formosa."

My understanding of the basis of a truce or cease-fire is that neither the Nationalists, the government of China which we recognize, nor the Communists need be asked to give up their claims on the territory now held by the other side. What they would be asked to give up, of course, is the use of military means to achieve their aspirations. In other words, negotiations for a cease-fire need not involve any question of the final disposition of the territory in dispute, for in our view this is a suitable matter for international negotiation at a later date through the United Nations or otherwise.

I am sure that this House will particularly welcome the closing paragraph of the President's message which is as follows:

"Our purpose is peace. That cause will be served if, with your help, we demonstrate our unity and our determination. In all that we do we shall remain faithful to our obligations as a member of the United Na-

tions to be ready to settle our international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Oregon, and I know the speech to which he has referred is a very able one by a great Canadian statesman, and will be of interest to the American people.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER].

Mr. CLEMENTS. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will state it.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Is the pending question the amendment offered by the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER] numbered "1-26-55-E"?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. KEFAUVER]. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I hope this amendment will be rejected. It is a complete substitute for the joint resolution which has already passed the House.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY] are absent on official business.

The Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON] and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] are absent by leave of the Senate because of illness.

I further announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR], the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], the Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY] if present would vote "nay."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS] is necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. POTTER] is absent on official business as a member of the American delegation attending the 10th anniversary of the World War II Battle of Alsace, at Colmar, France.

The Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY] are absent on official business.

If present and voting the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], the Senator from Vermont, [Mr. FLANDERS], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. McCARTHY], and

the Senator from Michigan [Mr. PORTER] would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 11, nays 75, as follows:

YEAS—11

Gore	Kilgore	McNamara
Humphrey	Lehman	Morse
Jackson	Long	Neuberger
Kefauver	Magnuson	

NAYS—75

Aiken	Eastland	Monroney
Allott	Ellender	Mundt
Anderson	Ervin	Murray
Barkley	George	O'Mahoney
Barrett	Goldwater	Pastore
Beall	Green	Payne
Bender	Hayden	Purtell
Bennett	Hennings	Robertson
Bible	Hickenlooper	Russell
Bridges	Hill	Saltonstall
Bush	Holland	Schoeppel
Butler	Hruska	Scott
Byrd	Ives	Smathers
Capehart	Jenner	Smith, Maine
Carlson	Johnston, S. C.	Smith, N. J.
Case, N. J.	Kerr	Sparkman
Case, S. Dak.	Knowland	Stennis
Clements	Kuchel	Symington
Cotton	Langer	Thurmond
Curtis	Malone	Thye
Daniel	Mansfield	Watkins
Dirksen	Martin, Iowa	Welker
Douglas	Martin, Pa.	Wiley
Duff	McClellan	Williams
Dworshak	Millikin	Young

NOT VOTING—10

Bricker	Fulbright	Neely
Chavez	Johnson, Tex.	Potter
Flanders	Kennedy	
Frear	McCarthy	

So Mr. KEFAUVER's amendment was rejected.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask that it be stated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Secretary will state the amendment.

The CHIEF CLERK. On page 2, line 7, it is proposed to insert a period after the word "attack" and strike the remainder of the sentence down through line 11.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator from New York yield to me so that I may request the yeas and nays?

Mr. LEHMAN. I yield for that purpose.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment offered by the Senator from New York.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I shall not speak at great length on the amendment. The purpose of the amendment has been discussed very ably on previous occasions by the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], by the junior Senator from New York, and by other Senators.

However, I believe the amendment is one of the most important amendments that has ever come before the Senate. It is simple in its implications. Section 1 of the resolution now reads, in part:

Resolved, etc., That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack.

Up to that point I believe all Senators are in full and affirmative agreement. I have not heard a word uttered by any Senator that he would not wholeheartedly support the protection and defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. I have

so expressed myself not once but many times.

I believe wholeheartedly that on both moral and strategic grounds the United States should and must defend Formosa and the Pescadores and prevent their falling into the hands of the Communists.

If section 1 of the pending resolution ended as is now proposed by our amendment, there would certainly be a unanimous vote in favor of its adoption. However, the section continues:

This authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he—

The President—

judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.

Of course, it is widely recognized—and I believe it is recognized without dissent so far as Congress is concerned—that the President has other broad powers which enable him to carry out the duties imposed upon him under the Constitution. Those powers stem from the Constitution. They are given to him without reserve. They are recognized as necessary for the conduct of the defense of our Nation. Those powers have been asserted many times by Presidents of the United States. It was under that constitutional authority that President Truman sent the 7th Fleet to Formosa.

The fleet was continued there under definite orders of President Eisenhower. No one, of course, can criticize a President for carrying out the responsibilities which repose in his office. This resolution does not limit the constitutional authority of the President, but rather it gives the President further powers, unlimited in scope, unspecified in character, and without any restriction at all. As I look at it, it seems to me that the powers we give him are not in any way powers which he needs in order to defend Formosa and the Pescadores, because those powers already repose, under the Constitution, in the President of the United States. What we do is to say, "Mr. President, you can do anything you want to do, whether it be constitutional or unconstitutional, because the Congress of the United States has given you that authority."

There is no limit, so far as I can see, to what the President of the United States—and I need not assure Senators that the President personally has my great respect and confidence—can do under the resolution. We are giving him a predated blank check to do in the Formosa Strait, or on the mainland, or on the islands adjacent to China, anything he thinks is advisable in his sole authority.

Certainly, Mr. President, I do not believe the Congress of the United States should limit the President in the performance of the duties which he believes to be necessary in the defense and security of our Nation. But when he goes beyond his constitutional responsibilities, he must do so on his own responsibility and not be able to say, "Yes; I did this even though it may not be constitutional,

but I did it on authority given to me by the Congress of the United States."

Mr. President, I cannot conceive of anything more dangerous than that which is now proposed. We have confidence in the President of the United States who now occupies that high office. We do not know what is going to happen in the future. What we do here tonight will be a precedent. We both limit the constitutional authority of the President and, in the same breath, broaden the powers of the President which are not his under constitutional provision.

I believe, Mr. President, it is an extremely dangerous thing we are contemplating doing. I think it is very dangerous because I do not know what is going to happen in the future under the unrestricted and unlimited power we now propose to give to the President, not by constitutional means, but merely by action of the Congress. There is no question whatsoever, as I have many times said before, that we must and should defend Formosa and the islands immediately adjacent to it. But I do not think we are ready to say to anyone, either to the commander of our forces in that area, or even to the President of the United States, that we will allow him or anyone else to embroil us in a great war on the mainland of China which may light the fires of the third world war.

We have a perfectly sound position in defending Formosa. Formosa has not belonged to China for more than 50 years. During this time it was under the jurisdiction of Japan. We took Formosa from Japan at the end of the second world war and it was placed under the protection and jurisdiction of the United States. In accepting that jurisdiction we, of course, assumed a great responsibility which I believe we have carried out to the full.

We have a good case there, Mr. President. Communist China cannot claim that Formosa belongs to her. No other country, even though it recognizes Communist China, can claim that Formosa is a possession of or a part of the mainland of China. That is not true of Quemoy, Matsu, and some of the other islands which are now under discussion. They have always, so far as I know, certainly for centuries, belonged to China. They have not been taken away from China. The distinguished minority leader [Mr. KNOWLAND] pointed out in a colloquy with me yesterday that they belong to China. But to which China? It makes no difference for when we intervene in a fight on the mainland or in a fight on Quemoy or Matsu, or the Tachen Islands, we are directly intervening in a civil war.

Mr. President, the Senate just voted on a substitute amendment which called for the intervention of the United Nations in the hope that a cease-fire order might be secured. The moment we get away from our juridical right to protect Formosa and the Pescadores—and it is a strong juridical right—and we attempt to interfere in some other spot, I believe our action will inevitably be construed by the Communist Chinese government and by many of our allies as intervention in a civil struggle within China, and

I believe our chances of success in persuading the United Nations to intervene and to work for a cease-fire order, for which we all hope, will be greatly reduced if not completely lost.

The President of the United States does not need the completely unlimited, unrestricted, and undefined powers which we propose to give him under the resolution. The Constitutional powers which are lodged with the President today are so great that he can take care of any emergency which may arise. But, instead of being willing to accept the responsibilities of the office of the President, as every other President has done, we are now asked blindly to give him completely unlimited, completely undefined, completely unspecified and completely unknown powers which can involve us in difficulties the extent of which and the seriousness of which cannot possibly be foreseen or described.

Mr. President, I know perfectly well that my colleague from Oregon and I are not going to prevail in having the amendment adopted. I believe with all my heart that it should be adopted, so that we may all vote unreservedly for the affirmation of the principle which has been held for more than 5 years, namely, that the United States has a great responsibility to protect and safeguard Formosa and the Pescadores, and to prevent their falling into the hands of the Communist Reds on the mainland.

I know that we who are sponsors of the amendment are not going to win; but I believe we are, at least, doing the right thing. We are offering the President all the power which he needs. We are not only offering him that power, but we are urging its acceptance. We are urging the passage of an amended resolution for which every Member of the Senate can vote wholeheartedly, in complete sincerity, and with deep conviction.

The pending resolution is not designed to protect the rights of Congress. It is not designed to protect even the rights of the President of the United States. In my opinion, if we pass this resolution, it will be a declaration that Congress is willing to abdicate its responsibilities and to place them, unlimited, undefined, unspecified, and unreservedly, in the hands of the President of the United States.

It makes no difference how greatly we respect our President. I have respected every President whom I have known, and my recollection goes back a great many years, to the days of President Garfield. I would not give the unlimited powers which are set forth in this resolution to any President, be he Democrat or Republican. I would not have given those powers, if I had been in the Senate, to Wilson, a Democrat, for whom I had the greatest respect; or to Franklin Roosevelt or Truman, both Democrats, for both of whom I had the greatest respect and regard.

I am sorry the President has asked for these wide powers. I, as one Senator, do not think that we would be justified in giving them to him.

So, Mr. President, I very much hope, contrary to my expectations, that my colleagues in the Senate will support and

agree to the amendment which the junior Senator from Oregon and I have offered.

Mr. LEHMAN subsequently said: Mr. President, this morning I received a telegram signed by four very distinguished professors of the University of Chicago faculty, namely, Walter Johnson, Charles M. Hardin, Hans J. Morgenthau, and Quincy Wright.

I ask unanimous consent that the telegram may be printed at the end of my remarks in connection with the amendment which I offered this evening.

There being no objection, the telegram was ordered to be printed in the RECORD as follows:

CHICAGO, ILL., January 27, 1955.
Senator HERBERT H. LEHMAN,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.:

Undersigned members of University of Chicago faculty respectfully request your vote against authorization to start preventive war by extending defense of Formosa and Pescadores to offshore islands.

WALTER JOHNSON.
CHARLES M. HARDIN.
HANS J. MORGENTHAU.
QUINCY WRIGHT.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I hope the amendment will be rejected. The fact of the matter is that the language contained in the resolution is as it was recommended by the President, by the National Security Council, and by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; as it was passed by the House by the overwhelming vote of 410 to 3; and as it was reported to the Senate by the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services.

If at this time, after the bluster of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai regarding this situation, the Senate were to modify the resolution, in my judgment, such an action would be considered a backdown on the part of the Government of the United States of America. Furthermore, I think it would be interpreted throughout the Chinese Communist part of the world as being intended as a "come-on" to take the coastal islands. This would not be in our national interest, and certainly it would not be in the interest of the adequate defense of the island chain, of which Formosa and the Pescadores are an integral part.

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, are we to understand that the Senate has under discussion amendment "1-26-55-B," originally proposed by the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY]?

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Connecticut is correct.

Mr. BUSH. I listened attentively to the extended remarks of the Senator from Minnesota this morning, and I have listened carefully to the statement by the Senator from New York, who also is a sponsor of the amendment.

I say with all respect that it seems to me they are objecting to something which does not in any way increase the authority given to the President, or intended to be given to the President, by the joint resolution, but only clarifies the language which appears in the first part of the resolution down through the word "attack" on page 2, line 7, because in line 5 are the words "as he deems necessary."

After listening, off and on, to the debate throughout the day, it seems to me that the language "as he deems necessary" cannot be broadened, and that the language following the word "attack," which the amendment would strike out, is merely clarifying, and only suggests that if a defense shall be undertaken, the United States will not have to fight with its bare hands on the beaches of Formosa or the Pescadores.

So I fail to understand why there is objection to this language, because I submit, after listening to this argument all day, that it seems quite clear that the language does not amplify the powers given to the President, but simply explains what the language in line 5 says implicitly, namely, that the President can do whatever is necessary to be done, and only suggests that the other things might possibly be necessary.

I join with my distinguished leader in expressing the hope that the amendment will be rejected.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] for himself and the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE].

The yeas and nays having been ordered, the Secretary will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY] are absent on official business.

The Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON] and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] are absent by leave of the Senate because of illness.

The Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON] is paired with the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY]. If present and voting, the Senator from Texas would vote "nay" and the Senator from Massachusetts would vote "yea."

I further announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], if present, would vote "nay."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS] is necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. POTTER] is absent on official business as a member of the American delegation attending the 10th anniversary of the World War II Battle of Alsace, at Colmar, France.

The Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] and the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. MCCARTHY] are absent on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS], the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. MCCARTHY], and the Senator from Michigan [Mr. POTTER] would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 13, nays 74, as follows:

YEAS—13

Byrd	Langer	Morse
Fulbright	Lehman	Murray
Humphrey	Long	Neuberger
Kefauver	Manfield	
Kilgore	McNamara	

NAYS—74

Alken	Ellender	Monroney
Allott	Ervin	Mundt
Anderson	George	O'Mahoney
Barkley	Goldwater	Pastore
Barrett	Gore	Payne
Beall	Green	Purtell
Bender	Hayden	Robertson
Bennett	Hennings	Russell
Bible	Hickenlooper	Saitonstall
Bridges	Hill	Schoeppel
Bush	Holland	Scott
Butler	Hruska	Smathers
Capehart	Ives	Smith, Maine
Carlson	Jackson	Smith, N. J.
Case, N. J.	Jenner	Sparkman
Case, S. Dak.	Johnston, S. C.	Stennis
Clements	Kerr	Symington
Cotton	Knowland	Thurmond
Curtis	Kuchel	Thye
Daniel	Magnuson	Watkins
Dirksen	Malone	Welker
Douglas	Martin, Iowa	Wiley
Duff	Martin, Pa.	Williams
Dworshak	McClellan	Young
Eastland	Millikin	

NOT VOTING—9

Bricker	Frear	McCarthy
Chavez	Johnson, Tex.	Neely
Flanders	Kennedy	Potter

So the amendment offered by Mr. LEHMAN, for himself and Mr. MORSE, was rejected.

Mr. BYRD subsequently said: Mr. President, following the vote on the last amendment, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD a statement of my position on the amendment.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BYRD

President Eisenhower's action in requesting the passage of a joint resolution authorizing him to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for the protection and security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories in that area is unprecedented in American history.

I commend the President for this approach to the problem confronting us. In his message, asking the Congress to approve this joint resolution, the President did not, in any measure, waive his constitutional authority to protect our security from attack. Evidently, it was his intention to ask the advice of the Congress of the United States before taking a momentous step affecting our national security.

I do not believe the President wanted Congress to be a mere rubber stamp. He wanted us, after careful consideration, to advise and counsel.

The President did not ask of Congress a present declaration of war. In effect, he asked for an authorization to use our Armed Forces, should necessity arise, to achieve the objectives set forth in his address to the Congress and in the resolution which has been presented.

Actually, he requested a predated declaration of war on the part of Congress. It was testified before the joint meeting of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees that legally no further declaration of war would be required should hostilities break out in China or elsewhere in the area.

However, it was also stated that the President would come to Congress again if, in his opinion, a major land invasion of China becomes necessary.

The joint meetings of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, extending over a period of 3 days, and presided over jointly by Senators GEORGE and RUSSELL, developed clearly the purposes of the action requested by the President. They also developed the dangerous potentialities involved. The gravity of the situation was frankly recognized.

On December 2, 1954, a treaty was signed between the Republic of China and the United States of America. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles signed on the part of our country, and George K. C. Yeh on the part of the Republic of China. This treaty was submitted to the Senate for ratification on January 6, and it is now under consideration by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

It should be noted that the treaty differs in two important particulars from the joint resolution. Article No. 1 of the treaty provides that "the parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security, and justice are not in danger; and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

This article of the treaty, therefore, provides that no action involving force can be taken "in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations," and thus requires other consultation with, or joint action by, the United Nations.

Section 6 of the treaty names the territories of the Republic of China as Taiwan (Formosa) and the Pescadores. It makes no reference to other territories but it adds that, by mutual consent, implementation can be made.

In contrast with the treaty which has already been signed, but not yet ratified by the Senate, the joint resolution omits any direct reference to the United Nations except in the last clause which reads as follows:

"This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and the security of the area are reasonably assured by international conditions created by the actions of the United Nations, or otherwise, and shall so report to Congress."

Is the joint resolution intended to implement the treaty? If it is, orderly procedure would seem to require the Senate to ratify the treaty first. If it is not an implementation of the treaty, is the treaty necessary?

I accept the judgment of the President and our military authorities that Formosa and the Pescadores are in the Pacific perimeter of our security. In the joint committee meeting I supported an amendment to exclude from the joint resolution the words "this authority to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands," so that the resolution would read:

"Resolved, etc., That the President of the United States be and he hereby is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack and the taking of such measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores."

"This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations, or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress."

If this amendment had been adopted in committee, the resolution would authorize the protection of Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack; but to avoid provoking war, the shoreline islands just a few miles off the China mainland would have been excluded.

It should be understood that the pending joint resolution was introduced after Red China had already conquered one of these islands and attacked others. This means that our intervention comes after the act; not before.

If it becomes our obligation to protect the coastline islands—especially Quemoy

and Matsu—now held by the Chinese Nationalists, it will be difficult to avoid war with China, assuming the Chinese Reds continue on the offensive. Our planes covering these island operations would necessarily have to fly over armed Red Chinese territory.

Can we, Mr. President, underwrite the conduct and operations of Nationalist Chinese garrisons in their day-to-day, hour-to-hour, contacts with a militarily aggressive enemy? Should we obligate ourselves for whatever force is necessary to maintain these garrisons and their extremely exposed positions?

It is probable that, day by day, for years to come, there will be conflict between troops on these offshore islands and the Communist regime. When someone attacks you from within 6 or 8 miles, you return the fire and counterattack. This means war and in this instance almost necessarily involves land operations.

Such circumstances are virtually certain to open wide the door for a shooting war on the mainland of China with all of its disastrous consequences.

It is for this reason, and in the belief that the President intended the Members of Congress to give frank opinion, that I voted in committee to delete the language including these offshore islands.

I will vote for the similar amendment now pending before the Senate.

In addition to what I have said to this point, there is another element in this situation which is somewhat delicate to discuss, but it cannot be ignored. If the pending treaty is ratified, we would enter into close partnership, on equal terms, with Chiang Kai-shek, the undisputed leader of the Republic of China. It was Chiang Kai-shek to whom America sent hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of war materials when the civil war began in China. Later, our valuable war materials were found not only in the black markets of China but also in the hands of the Communists.

We are becoming a partner with the leader of Chinese who have been driven from their country. Our purpose is to protect the perimeter of our defense. Above all, we do not want land warfare on the mainland of China. But the primary desire of Chiang Kai-shek is war on the mainland to recapture his power in Asia.

For his purposes, Chiang Kai-shek knows better than anyone else that he can never set foot on China again without American planes, troops, and ships.

As a Senator, it is my considered opinion that Chiang Kai-shek is motivated by self-interest; that when the critical time comes he may place his ambitions above the welfare of his American partner.

These conditions present an extremely dangerous situation which may force our country into a war with China, whether we want it or not. Preservation of our own security is the only justification for the United States to become embroiled in this controversy. In this instance, military experts assure us that this can be accomplished by protecting Formosa and the Pescadores. This perimeter should not be enlarged, and what we intend to do should be clearly set forth. This clarity does not exist in the pending resolution. The amendment I have just discussed would provide it.

Let us remember that in this cold war Russia has the timetable. Unless we engage deliberately in a preventive war, which is unthinkable to me, Russia can select the time and place of her attack. In the dangerous years ahead it is incumbent upon us to avoid in every possible way involvements which will weaken us should the final decision between Russia and ourselves come to climax in a world war.

Let no American underestimate the far-reaching consequences of the step about to be taken. We all hope it will bring stability

and peace in the Far East; but it may bring war. It may resolve in a land war with China, which would be interminable. With its nearly 500 million people, China has never yet been conquered.

For years I have been convinced that Russia deliberately is seeking to sap our strength and weaken us both financially and militarily by trapping us into wars which may be preliminary to a direct attack on this country. I think it is her purpose to strain our economy and our defense with remote and costly wars in which there is no chance of military decision.

During the Korean war, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, I repeatedly inquired whether a single Russian soldier had been captured or killed among the North Koreans. The answer was "No" in every instance. Our Korean war casualties were numbered by the tens of thousands, and our expenditures were counted in the billions, but Russia did not lose a single soldier.

If we should engage our forces in China, and if the Korean war should break out again, what would be our position against a Russian attack? We would then be fighting two wars 10,000 miles from home.

I fully appreciate that the President's belief is that this is a step toward peace. I pray God that it is. But let us remember that when President Truman opened hostilities in Korea, he declared it to be a police action.

I am convinced he was completely sincere in his statement at that time, but that police action developed into a costly and bloody war that lasted more than 3 years and ended by an inglorious truce. There is no true peace in Korea. Like a snake in the grass, the Korean war situation is still treacherous and may break out again.

I have great confidence in President Eisenhower. I respect his military decisions. He is the outstanding military man of this age.

I am firmly convinced that he sincerely wants to keep us out of war. He has demonstrated this burning desire by ending the armed conflict in Korea and by refusing involvement in the Indochina war.

I hope the amendment to which I have referred will be adopted because it will more clearly define our objectives and lessen the danger of being drawn into the mainland of China.

I will support passage of the joint resolution.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The joint resolution is open to further amendment.

MR. MALONE. Mr. President, I offer an amendment to the joint resolution, which I ask to have stated.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. The amendment will be stated.

THE LEGISLATIVE CLERK. At the end of the joint resolution it is proposed to add a new section as follows:

SEC. 2. Inasmuch as—

(1) the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the activating agent behind every aggressive move of the Red rulers of China;

(2) the Red regime at Peiping is wholly dependent upon the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the weapons with which to wage aggressive war in the Far East;

(3) the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics represents brutal tyranny which now holds sway over 800 million human beings and aims ultimately at the enslavement of the entire human race;

(4) hope would be reborn among the captive peoples of Soviet totalitarianism by the assurance that the Government of the United States has no intention of dooming them to perpetual slavery by any act which has the effect of freezing the status quo;

(5) no advantage of any kind accrues to the American people or to the cause of world

peace by the presence in the Soviet Union of diplomatic representatives from the United States;

(6) the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has continually and flagrantly violated its pledge of noninterference in the internal affairs of the United States; and

(7) it is wholly inconsistent to treat the Red regime of China as an outlaw among civilized governments while according diplomatic recognition to the master gangster-state;

it is the sense of the Senate of the United States that all diplomatic relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics be suspended and the consular representatives of this Nation be recalled until such time as the President may determine that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics no longer constitutes a threat to our peace and security.

SUSPEND THE RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST RUSSIA—AMENDMENT TO SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 28—TACKLE THE MAN WITH THE BALL

MR. MALONE. Mr. President, the amendment I have offered sets forth seven reasons for suspending relations with the Government of the U. S. S. R. All of these reasons relate to the resolution which is pending, but which applies specifically to the Government of Red China, which we do not recognize, and which I hope we never will recognize, but the recognition of which I believe has been agreed upon by high officials of this Nation for a considerable time.

Mr. President, my amendment sets forth that the Government of the U. S. S. R. is behind every aggressive move of the Red rulers of Red China. We are tackling every member of the team except the man with the ball.

The amendment states correctly that the Red regime at Peiping is dependent upon the Government of the U. S. S. R. for the weapons with which to wage aggressive war in the Far East. There is not a member on this floor who will dispute that statement.

The amendment further states that the Government of the U. S. S. R. is exercising a brutal tyranny over 800 million human beings, including the 400 million human beings enslaved in Red China.

I do not think that anyone will challenge that statement.

My amendment states that its adoption would revive hope in the hearts of these enslaved peoples, that no advantage accrues to America from the fact of Soviet recognition, that the Government of the U. S. S. R. has continually and flagrantly violated its pledge of noninterference in the internal affairs of the United States, and that it is wholly inconsistent to treat the Red regime in Red China as an outlaw while according diplomatic recognition to the master gangster state of them all.

I do not think that any Senator will deny the facts as stated in my amendment. Unless they can be successfully challenged—which they have not been and cannot be—there is not a reason in the world, in my opinion, for rejecting this amendment and continuing our diplomatic relations with the master gangster-outlaw.

The adoption of my amendment will rectify the greatest mistake that has been made in the history of our foreign

relations, and a mistake which was made by executive agreement.

On November 16, 1933, the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt entered into an executive agreement with Maxim Litvinov, people's commissar for foreign affairs of the U. S. S. R., to recognize Soviet Russia.

I am sure every Member of the Senate has Senate Document No. 170 of the 82d Congress, entitled "The Constitution of the United States of America, Analysis and Interpretation," prepared by the Library of Congress. It states:

The executive agreement attained its fullest development as an instrument of foreign policy under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, even at times threatening to replace the treaty-making power, if not formally, yet actually, as a determinative element in the field of foreign policy.

Mr. President, no truer words were ever published in a Senate document.

The quotation continues:

Mr. Roosevelt's first important utilization of the executive-agreement device took the form of an exchange of notes on November 16, 1933, with Maxim M. Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, whereby American recognition was extended to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in consideration of certain pledges, the first of which was the promise to restrain any persons or organizations under its direct or indirect control from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatsoever to injure the tranquility, prosperity, order, or security of the whole or any part of the United States.

That pledge was, of course, never kept. It was never intended by Soviet Russia to be kept. And ever since the agreement was signed between the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the People's Commissar of Red Russia, Russia has carried on active efforts to overthrow this Government by force and violence and active espionage to gain our military secrets. Red Russia has succeeded, too, as witness her success in obtaining the most vital secrets of our atom bomb, and presumably those of the hydrogen bomb. Yet we continue to recognize the Russians. They are spying on us today, and we still recognize them—all because of the executive agreement between a late President and a People's Commissar of the Soviet Union.

Since the day Soviet Russia was recognized by us, she has sought to destroy us from within. She has always sought to destroy us from outside our boundaries, and always will; but recognition gave her the desired vantage point from which to sabotage us from within our own land and institutions. She is doing that today.

She already has increased her strength manifold from the facts and secrets she has stolen from us—industrial secrets, as well as those of the atom and the hydrogen bomb. She has gained strength from the recognition we have accorded her, and today is passing on this strength to the Red Chinese, the target of the pending joint resolution, as it now stands.

As I stated on the floor yesterday this resolution, without my amendment, is an indictment of the wrong outlaw, and a minor one at that.

My amendment is, in a sense, a perfecting amendment. It names the real

gang leader, and cuts off his diplomatic privileges, pending determination by the President that the peace of areas in the Pacific we are pledged to defend has been restored.

Mr. President, peace and security in the Pacific will never be restored until Red Russia is held accountable before the world for her many sins of espionage and aggression. My amendment does hold her accountable.

It carries no declaration of hostilities or threat of any military action.

What it does is merely to send her spies and saboteurs—and that includes all of her diplomats—packing home, where they belong, and rids our country of the vermin seeking to destroy us from within. Good riddance it will be, too; and we can achieve that now by adoption of my amendment.

Mr. President, I am for the President in this move, because he has—and it is the first time it has been done in two decades—marked a point in the Pacific Ocean at which our security will be threatened. I hope he will soon complete the job, by establishing extension of the 133-year-old Monroe Doctrine to both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, so as to let the people of those areas know that if any nation seeks to extend its form of government, through political, economic, or military influence, we will destroy that nation's war-making capacity by striking through the air in the heart land of that nation's war industries, and by letting such nation know we are prepared to do the job.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Nevada. (Putting the question.)

The amendment was rejected.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The joint resolution is open to further amendment.

If there be no further amendment to be submitted, the question is on the third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was ordered to a third reading, and was read the third time.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The joint resolution having been read the third time, the question now is, Shall it pass?

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, on this question—the question of final passage of the joint resolution—I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

ACTION BY UNITED NATIONS TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN COMMUNIST CHINA AND NATIONALIST CHINA

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I suggest—

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President—

Mr. KNOWLAND. I shall defer, Mr. President, to the distinguished Senator from Minnesota.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I appreciate this courtesy.

I had intended earlier this evening to call up an amendment numbered 1-26-55-C, relating to the preamble of the joint resolution. I have discussed the amendment with the distinguished

chairman of our Foreign Relations Committee. It was deemed wise and prudent in the present situation that the amendment not be called up, but that a proposal of a similar nature be advanced for consideration by the Foreign Relations Committee and, subsequently, by the entire Senate.

Mr. President, I now send to the desk, and request appropriate reference for it, a Senate resolution reading as follows:

Whereas the President of the United States on January 19, 1955, stated that he would "like to see the United Nations attempt to exercise its good offices" with respect to arranging a cease-fire between Communist China and Nationalist China;

Whereas the President in his message of January 24 stated that the situation in the Pacific area "is one for appropriate action of the United Nations under its Charter"; and

Whereas House Joint Resolution 159 provides that it shall expire when he determines that peace in the area is "reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United States or otherwise": Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that it would be in the interest of the United States and of world peace for the United Nations to take prompt action to bring about a cease-fire in the area of hostilities off the coast of China and in the Formosa Straits, and the President is requested to take appropriate steps to achieve that objective.

Mr. President, I send the resolution to the desk. I realize that the only way the resolution could be considered this evening would be to have it considered after the vote on the pending measure; and, of course, that would also require unanimous consent. I have had indications that unanimous consent might not be available. Therefore, I prefer that we deal with the resolution in the regular, normal manner, under the regular procedure.

I think I can say with certainty that a large number of Members of the Senate have spoken to me about the resolution, and a number of Senators desire to join in sponsoring it. Among them are the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], the Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT]; and I imagine there will be other Senators who will wish to join in sponsoring it. I should like to leave open an opportunity for co-sponsorship of the resolution, in order to make that opportunity available to any other Members of the Senate who would like to join in sponsoring it. The Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN] has asked that he be included as one of its sponsors.

So, Mr. President, I now send the resolution to the desk.

At this time I desire to yield to the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE].

Mr. GEORGE. Mr. President, I am very happy that the Senator from Minnesota has asked for the reference of the resolution in order that it may take its regular course before the Foreign Relations Committee. I may say that it will be considered at a very early date—perhaps on Tuesday of next week. So far

as I know, there will be no opposition to the resolution, because already New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States are concerned with this very problem, and will present on Monday next for consideration by the United Nations Security Council, as I am advised, the substance of this resolution. Therefore I am very glad that it is to be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. I assure the Senator that it will be promptly acted upon.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the distinguished Senator from Georgia.

Mr. President, I have submitted this resolution because I believe it would carry out a very pertinent part of the President's message. In the light of the decision we are about to make, which decision I support, namely, the passage of House Joint Resolution 159, it would appear to be very appropriate for the Senate to forward the work which is already underway in the United Nations.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The resolution will be received and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The resolution (S. Res. 55) favoring action by the United Nations to terminate hostilities between Communist China and Nationalist China, submitted by Mr. HUMPHREY (for himself), Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. MORSE, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. LEHMAN, Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. NEUBERGER, and Mr. HILL), was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, as follows:

Whereas the President of the United States on January 19, 1955, stated that he would "like to see the United Nations attempt to exercise its good offices" with respect to arranging a cease-fire between Communist China and Nationalist China;

Whereas the President in his message of January 24 stated that the situation in the Pacific area "is one for appropriate action of the United Nations under its charter"; and

Whereas House Joint Resolution 159 provides that it shall expire when he determines that peace in the area is "reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United States or otherwise": Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that it would be in the interest of the United States and of world peace for the United Nations to take prompt action to bring about a cease-fire in the area of hostilities off the coast of China and in the Formosa Strait, and the President is requested to take appropriate steps to achieve that objective.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF PROGRAM FOR TUESDAY

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I know that following the vote on the final passage of the joint resolution Members of the Senate will leave the Chamber quickly. I desire to announce that a motion will be made tonight to adjourn until Tuesday, and I should like to announce the legislative program for Tuesday.

On Tuesday the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty will be given preferential consideration.

On the legislative calendar, there appear order of business No. 6, Senate bill 613, a bill to further amend the Reorganization Act of 1949, as amended, so that such act will apply to reorganization plans transmitted to the Congress

at any time before April 1, 1957, and also 6 Senate resolutions, orders of business Nos. 9 to 14 inclusive. These measures will be taken up on Tuesday next.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the acting majority leader yield to me?

Mr. CLEMENTS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Earlier in the evening I talked with the acting majority leader with reference to the resolution which I submitted a moment ago. I wonder if the acting majority leader would care to give any indication as to the procedure which might be followed in case the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should report that resolution favorably.

Mr. CLEMENTS. It will be the intention of the acting majority leader to take up that resolution as soon as it comes from the Foreign Relations Committee and is ready for consideration.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I thank the acting majority leader.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Mr. President, will the acting majority leader yield to me?

Mr. CLEMENTS. I am glad to yield to the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. ROBERTSON. As the acting majority leader knows, the junior Senator from Virginia sent to some Virginia newspapers advance copies of a speech which he planned to make in the Senate on Monday. The acting majority leader has announced that there will be no session on Monday. Can the junior Senator from Virginia be assured that he can make his speech on Tuesday?

Mr. CLEMENTS. The acting majority leader will give such assurance as he is able to give under such circumstances.

While I am on my feet, I should like to thank my friend from Virginia for the generous way in which he accepted the proposal to adjourn until Tuesday rather than Monday.

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF ARMED FORCES TO PROTECT SECURITY OF FORMOSA

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 159) authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories of that area.

Mr. KEFAUVER. Mr. President, before the vote is taken on the pending joint resolution, let me say that, as Senators know, I have had many misgivings about our position in connection with the coastal islands and have so stated. An important national policy is about to be decided. I have done my best to have the joint resolution amended or to have a substitute adopted which I thought presented a better and safer policy. However, present indications are that the joint resolution will be passed. The President has announced that he, and he alone, will make the decision and issue the orders for any action other than directly at Formosa or the Pescadores. In effect he has assured that he will not allow Chiang to push us into action, nor will he allow any offi-

cer, including the Chief of the Joint Chiefs, to make that decision. I am confident that the American people do not want war, and certainly they do not want to strike the first blow, nor do they want to engage in any conflict where there is not a clear legal and moral justification to do so. They want to abide by the United Nations Charter, and they want to cooperate with our allies in the world.

I shall accept the President's assurances, for I know him to be an honorable man. I think it is time for us to close ranks behind the position of the President of the United States and present to the world as nearly unanimous a front as we possibly can.

With that point of view, and for that purpose, I expect to vote for the joint resolution despite the misgivings which I have stated.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD at this point, as a part of my remarks, two articles. The first is entitled "Context of the New China Policy," written by Mr. Joseph C. Harsch, and published in the Christian Science Monitor of January 26, 1955.

The second article is entitled "Prospects of the New China Policy," written by Joseph C. Harsch and published in the Christian Science Monitor of January 27, 1955.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Christian Science Monitor of January 26, 1955]

STATE OF THE NATIONS—CONTEXT OF THE NEW CHINA POLICY

(By Joseph C. Harsch)

WASHINGTON.—To understand the new China policy of the United States it is necessary to understand that it reflects a long-postponed, but no longer postponable, exercise in reconciling and blending two equally strong urges within the Eisenhower administration in Washington.

The first of these urges has been to obtain a "disengagement" of the United States from war and the danger of involvement in war on the mainland of Asia.

The second of these urges has been to sustain the Nationalist Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on its exile home of Formosa.

From the opening month of the Eisenhower administration these have both been officially proclaimed policies of Washington. But they are policies which conflict at many points and which cannot easily be reconciled or blended.

Had there been only a policy of "disengagement" from war and the danger of involvement in war in Asia, Washington would long since have cut itself loose from its ties with Formosa. The Pentagon never has been categorical in its opinion that the retention of Formosa in friendly hands is essential to the military needs of the United States in the Far East. South Korea is considered much more necessary to the military security of Japan and Indochina much more valuable to the military security of Southeast Asia than Formosa is considered valuable to the defense of Japan and the Philippines. The Pentagon regards Formosa as desirable, but not as vital. A policy of "disengagement" would long since have led to the abandonment of a United States commitment to Formosa.

On the other hand, had there only been a policy of sustaining the Chinese National-

ist Government, Washington never would have allowed the military position of that government to be eroded by Chinese Communist military action. This action has been going on for over 2 years. Yikiangshan is by no means the first Nationalist-held island off the Chinese coast to be taken by the Communists. By a year ago they already had taken a dozen. Also, had there been no "disengagement" policy the reinvasion of Hainan Island off the south coast of China would have been undertaken a year ago, and General Chiang might well by this time be ready to return to the mainland; in fact, it is conceivable he might already hold some beachheads.

The two policies have been in conflict, and have in part nullified each other. "Disengagement" has operated against a full policy of sustaining General Chiang's purposes. The determination to sustain General Chiang has prevented a full "disengagement" policy.

Yet Washington never has been able to choose between the two policies. It has had powerful reasons for clinging to both.

The Eisenhower administration has clung to a "disengagement" policy for obvious reasons. When it took office the United States was, in the larger sense, at war with Communist China on three fronts—Korea, Indochina, and the Formosa Strait. Its priority promise to the voters in 1953 was a promise to end the Korean war. This was stage 1 of disengagement. It was the most generally popular single act of the administration during its first year in office. It made possible military budget reductions, and, in turn, provided the rationale for tax cuts. Disengagement on that front was popular, and became a major feature of the whole Eisenhower program at home. Neither budget cuts nor tax reductions could have been justified on any other basis.

The program from a settlement of the Korean war to a settlement of the Indochina war was a logical progression in disengagement. With equal logic Washington desires to proceed now to settle its last active war front with Communist China. Only if this is done will the disengagement be complete and lasting.

But at this point disengagement cuts straight across the other policy of sustaining the hopes of Chiang Kai-shek, for from the moment of a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait General Chiang becomes head of the government in Formosa and retains nothing more than an empty title to mainland China. But General Chiang cannot be abandoned totally any more than disengagement could be abandoned. General Chiang is the last residue of a vast American investment in China dating back over a century. There are deep emotional and ideological commitments to him, not to mention political commitments.

The end result is the President's special message to the Congress of this week. It represents a maximum disengagement compatible with sustaining General Chiang on Formosa. Conversely, it represents a maximum of support for General Chiang compatible with a policy of disengagement. It will sustain General Chiang on Formosa, territory which the United States liberated from Japan. It will disengage itself from all territory which is historically Chinese, provided the Chinese Communists will leave Formosa and the Pescadores alone.

[From the Christian Science Monitor of January 27, 1955]

STATE OF THE NATIONS—PROSPECTS OF THE NEW CHINA POLICY

(By Joseph C. Harsch)

WASHINGTON.

Washington would have been much happier had it never been forced to seek the largest common denominator of its two conflicting

policies toward China—its policy of sustaining Chiang Kai-shek and its policy of disengaging the United States from war and the danger of war on the mainland of Asia.

As a matter of fact, the attempted reconciliation was postponed until the action of Communist China acted as a precipitation agent on Washington. When the Chinese Communists not only declared a policy of seeking the conquest of Formosa, but also began what appeared to be a preliminary military campaign among the offshore islands, Washington was finally and reluctantly forced to the point of decision.

Until the last week or so Washington was still clinging to the luxury of pursuing two conflicting policies toward China. It had negotiated a settlement of the Korean war and recognized a settlement of the Indochina war, but at the same time it continued to recognize Chiang Kai-shek's hopes that some day he might obtain United States support for his dream of a reinvansion of the Chinese mainland. At home the Washington Government proceeded to a partial demobilization, but in the Far East it allowed Chiang to bomb and raid the mainland, seize a Soviet oil tanker, and control shipping along the China coast.

When the Chinese Communists opened their island offensive and declared that Formosa was its ultimate target, Washington had to find a reconciled and unified China policy. Since it could not abandon Chiang entirely and since it was committed to a policy of coexistence with the Soviet Union, of disengagement from war in Asia, and of budget retrenchment and tax cutting at home, it had no alternative but an attempted blending of disengagement and Chiang.

This is what we now have. Chiang is to be defended on Formosa, which is not Chinese territory, having been Japanese for half a century and having been won from Japan by United States arms. But by implication and by all that was not said in the President's message Washington has renounced a policy of attempting to seek a political restoration in China proper. It is prepared to accept a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait.

But what are the prospects for the success of such a new China policy?

The reconciliation of the two policies may have come too late. The Chinese Communists are committed now at home to the invasion attempt. Their government has engaged its prestige in the cause. It would be extremely difficult for it to extricate itself even if it wished to do so. No western diplomat can know whether the men of Peking really desire to find a way out of their own commitment to their own people.

The role of Moscow is another enigma. Obviously the problem is a major one in the Kremlin. The Soviets are generally believed not to want a war at this time. Yet the Kaiser probably did not want a war in 1914, but was pulled into it by his only ally, Austria. China is Moscow's only real ally, the others being dependencies. Also Moscow is uneasy over the trend in Europe and might decide that a Chinese invasion of Formosa would be an advantage to its purposes in Europe. The whipsaw technique is an old one in power politics.

Washington, on the other hand, cannot possibly back down on the defense of Formosa itself.

If the Chinese Communists attempt an invasion of Formosa, the United States will fight. There is no doubt whatever in Washington on that point.

The chance for avoiding a war, or at the very least a localized battle for Formosa, depends largely on whether some mediator, presumably Dag Hammarskjöld, can persuade Peking that it can obtain right now by peaceful negotiation everything it can ever obtain by resort to arms.

There is no longer any doubt about what Washington is willing to offer in return for a Formosa Strait cease-fire. It will allow the

military forces of Peking to obtain all the offshore islands if, in return, Peking will abandon its military campaign against Formosa.

A cease-fire could be had tomorrow on those terms insofar as the United States is concerned. And the United States has the ability to enforce an acceptance of the terms by the government on Formosa.

The question remaining is whether Peiping will accept such terms.

No western man can do anything but guess about that. Washington hopes, because the domestic policies of the Eisenhower administration have been staked upon the assumption that there will be no major wars.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Presiding Officer be authorized to sign House Joint Resolution 159, even though the Senate be in adjournment.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered—that is, assuming the passage of the joint resolution.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I take that for granted.

Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, I shall vote against the pending joint resolution. I do not cast this vote lightly. I do not cast it without some regrets.

I had wished I could vote in favor of a resolution on this subject. I had hoped that it would be amended, by the adoption of the Kefauver substitute or by other amendments which have been offered, so that it would be in a form which could command my wholehearted support and my vote.

I want to vote for a congressional statement of support for the defense and security of Formosa and the Pescadores. I would be glad to say to our friends of the free world, and our enemies wherever they may be—whether in Moscow or in Peiping—that the Congress is wholeheartedly behind the President, and that the country is behind the President, in a determination that the status of Formosa and the Pescadores shall not be altered by aggression or force of arms.

I am ready to support, with all my heart, an affirmation that Formosa and the Pescadores do not belong to Communist China, and never will so belong, by force of arms.

I think the free world—including major portions of the so-called neutral nations of Asia—would support such a position by the United States.

I am sure we could rally the free world to support such a position. Our military power plus that of our allies, plus the vast strength of our moral position if we are supported by all the nations of the free world would thus insure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores, against any aggressive designs that the Communists might have, no matter how loud their boast or their threats.

I am pleased to know that the United Nations is going to take up, first in the Security Council and then in the General Assembly, if need be, the question of a cease-fire order between Communist China and the Formosa Government.

But, Mr. President, I still cannot vote for the joint resolution so long as it contains language which writes a blank check of dangerous authority—authority which can be used, or which might be used—to involve us in a war which we do not want and which the free world

does not want, and indeed greatly fears.

I will not cast my vote for any joint resolution containing language which, in my judgment, increases the risk and danger of war, without concomitant benefit to the United States, the cause of peace, and the cause of free-world unity.

PRESIDENT CANNOT TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY TO CONGRESS

The President of the United States has broad constitutional powers and authority. He is free, within the limits of his judgment, to use such power and authority to defend the United States. Whatever activities he deems essential for that purpose he can direct, without let or hindrance from Congress, though, of course, he remains responsible for the consequences of such action. Why must or should Congress write him a predated blank check of authority for acts which might be beyond his constitutional powers, but which are not spelled out in the pending joint resolution?

I will not vote my permission for the President to send our forces into the Quemoy and Matsu and Tachen island groups, under the guns of an irresponsible enemy. I will not vote to tell the President that he can do this with the implicit permission of Congress.

He can send the fleet wherever he chooses, but he should not ask the Congress in advance to authorize him to send the fleet and our Air Force into action which may, or which is likely, to involve us in war.

The possession of Quemoy and Matsu may be important to Chiang Kai-shek, but they are not essential to the security of the United States, or of the free world. The free world recognizes these islands as belonging to China, and it is an established fact, whether we like it or not, that most of the nations of the free world recognize the Red regime as being the government of China.

We dare not and must not put the free world alliance to this acid test, from which that alliance may suffer tragic strains and shocks. The world must know that we seek peace, not war; security, not unnecessary risk; strength, not power. We are neither the instrument nor the agent of Chiang Kai-shek in the Far East.

We are the leading power of the free world. We have a responsibility to all the American people. We have a responsibility to all our allies. We have a responsibility to mankind. Let us discharge that responsibility.

Mr. President, because of my views on this subject, I must reluctantly but with deep conviction cast my vote against the pending resolution.

SEVERAL SENATORS. Vote! Vote! Vote!

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I have an amendment to the pending resolution which I had hoped originally to press very strongly and to bring to a vote.

However, I discussed the matter with the minority leader, the Senator from California [Mr. KNOWLAND], in whom I have the utmost confidence. He suggested that perhaps by my action we would hold up the passage of the pending resolution and, if my amendment were

agreed to, make it necessary to send the amended resolution to conference. Therefore, I have agreed not to press the amendment.

I may say, however, that I strongly feel that something should be done along the line of my amendment, which merely provides that United States aid shall be discontinued to any country which ships goods to Red China or allows ships flying its flag to be used in the Red China trade.

I am very much disturbed to learn what is going on. Although I approve of the pending resolution, I am very much disturbed by the fact that although we had agreed to give Chiang Kai-shek 6 destroyers, we have given him only 2. Although we had agreed to give him aircraft, we are, instead, using aircraft in New Mexico for anti-aircraft targets. At the same time we are sending B-29's to Costa Rica, at a cost of \$1 a plane. I believe that we should send some of those planes to Chiang Kai-shek, at \$1 a plane. I am sure many Senators would be glad to pay for a number of those planes.

Mr. President, we find ourselves in a fantastic position today. We find ourselves in the position of being about to go to war with Communist China, while at the same time, as of this very day we are sending millions of dollars to our friends, who are supplying the sinews of economic and military strength to Red China.

What does that mean? It means that if we should become involved in war—and the threat of war hangs over the Senate tonight—more American boys would be killed, that more sons of American mothers would be killed at our own hands, because of the indirect aid which we are giving to Red China.

I have a large number of newspaper clippings, which I intend to put into the RECORD tomorrow, or whenever the Senate meets again. I am very much disturbed to find that Mr. Stassen, the head of FOA, has agreed to give about \$70 million to Yugoslavia. At the same time another clipping shows that Yugoslavia has signed a trade pact with Red China and with Soviet Russia.

This is only a part of the picture. I shall not hold up this very excellent resolution with an attempt to amend it. I hope, however, that my amendment will be added to appropriate appropriation legislation when the time comes to consider such legislation.

SEVENTY-SEVENTH BIRTHDAY ANNIVERSARY OF SENATOR GEORGE

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, I have no intention to discuss the pending resolution. I had intended to do so, but I have foregone that intention.

I merely wish to call the attention of the Senate to the fact that on tomorrow the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, will reach his 77th birthday anniversary.

As one of the younger Members of the Senate, I wish to congratulate him on having reached that milestone. [Applause, Senators rising.]

Mr. President, I also wish to congratulate him on the magnificent contribu-

tion he has made to the history of the Senate in the handling of the resolution which is about to be passed. I am glad to congratulate the Senator from Georgia and to welcome him into the fellowship of youth.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I would not wish the occasion to pass without saying that on this side of the aisle we hold the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia in as high regard as he is held by his colleagues on the other side of the aisle. We recognize not only his great service to his State of Georgia but his outstanding service to our Government and to all the people of the United States, not only in his present highly important position as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and as President pro tempore of the Senate but also as a Senator who has served as chairman of the Committee on Finance, and whose name is on much important legislation passed by Congress.

Mr. GEORGE subsequently said. Mr. President, since the Senate was kind enough to note the fact that I will reach my 77th year tomorrow, I wish to call attention to the fact that the distinguished senior Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], who is universally esteemed among and has the confidence of the membership of this body, and whose services to his country as a Member of the United States Senate are of a very high order, will reach his 75th birthday on Sunday, before the Senate will again convene.

So I wish to congratulate him, his State, and the country upon his entry into the Three-Quarters of a Century Club, a club which I entered 2 years ago, and which my distinguished friend, former Vice President BARKLEY, entered about 2 months in advance of my entry.

I can only say that I am very grateful for the appreciation expressed for me, and I am profoundly humble to think that in my lifetime I have done so little good for mankind. [Applause.]

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. President, I rise to thank my colleague, the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], who is chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, for his kind reference to me, and to thank Senators for their kind expression of applause upon my attainment of three-quarters of a century, following close upon the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia in our Young Men's Club.

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF ARMED FORCES TO PROTECT SECURITY OF FORMOSA

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 159) authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and related positions and territories of that area.

SEVERAL SENATORS. Vote! Vote! Vote!

Mr. NEUBERGER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD at this point a statement which gives my reasons for voting in favor of the pending resolution, House Joint Resolution 159.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR NEUBERGER

I want to state for the record my reasons for my vote on the resolution to authorize the President to defend Formosa and the Pescadores.

Mr. President, the issue which has been submitted to the Congress in the form of this resolution may well be one of the most serious one to come before us during my present term in the Senate. It is a particularly grave and difficult issue to confront a new Senator within 4 weeks of his assumption of office.

As a freshman Senator, I do not pretend to have experience or expert knowledge in the field of our foreign relations or military strategy. To the best of my ability, I have tried to reach a conscientious judgment on the basis of the facts which have been made available to us and the considerations which have been ably presented by the debate on the floor of the Senate. I have studied with particular attention the arguments so forcefully put forward by my distinguished colleague from Oregon [Mr. MORSE], who had the benefit of attending the executive session of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and—on the other hand—the equally forceful presentation of the distinguished chairman of that committee [Mr. GEORGE].

Mr. President, I have decided to support the resolution. I have reached that decision in spite of the following doubts:

REASONS ARE LISTED

First. When the resolution was first requested, it seemed to ask the Congress to endorse a policy which presented a very serious danger—the danger that we might be drawn into a war by actions not of our own choosing, the actions of Chiang Kai-shek.

I would not vote to endorse a policy which presents that danger. I believe that a war which would start, not in defense of the recognized interests of the United States, but in support of the ambitions of Chiang and his regime to return to the mainland of China, would be fought without the support of our closest allies. It could mean the end of our vital North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It would be fought against the opposition of almost all other nations in Asia, and without any hope of recognition or support by the United Nations.

Second. I believe that the resolution is not particularly necessary, and that perhaps it went too far toward asking congressional endorsement of future decisions which belong properly in the field of military rather than foreign policy.

CONGRESS SHOULD BE CONSULTED

It may well be commendable to ask congressional consideration of a proposed foreign policy before taking action, if time permits this. Even when the speed of events makes this impossible, as in the Korean emergency, it might have been wise to obtain at the earliest opportunity a congressional determination of the hostilities which resulted from that collective resistance to Communist aggression. But when this resolution includes additional authorization of action for the purpose of accomplishing the major foreign policy objective, it comes close to matters of military strategy which ought to remain the responsibility of the Commander in Chief.

For that reason I have supported the amendment proposed by the distinguished Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN]. This would have effectively gone to the heart of the problem by striking from the authorization the reference to "related" areas.

Third. I would have preferred to see added to the text of the resolution a recognition of the proper role of the United Nations in dealing with this threat to international

peace and security, a role which was recognized in the message from the President. This recognition of the role of the United Nations was also the chief purpose of the excellent amendment proposed by my distinguished colleague, Senator KEFAUVER. I supported that amendment, and I think the cause of peace and international standing would have been well served if the Senate had been asked to advise the President in the terms of the substitute rather than that of the present resolution.

ADMINISTRATION NOT CONSISTENT

Perhaps because these issues of foreign and military policy are still relatively new to me, I must confess I have been puzzled by the contrast between this administration's reaction to the crisis in Indochina and to the present Formosan crisis. We were told that the loss of Indochina would be irreparable, that it meant the prelude to the loss of all of southeast Asia. Yet, rightly or wrongly, no emergency action was asked of the Congress to forestall that loss, and North Vietnam has disappeared behind the bamboo curtain of tyranny. Yet now, the same administration has asked for congressional endorsement of a much stronger policy to defend an area which, though it is important, is no more so than Indochina, and whose defense would not command the wholehearted enthusiasm of our friends in the free world and the United Nations.

Nevertheless, I have concluded, in spite of misgivings, that I shall support the resolution.

PRESIDENT MUST BE TRUSTED

I do not regard the need for national unity behind the President's policies as alone enough to command an affirmative vote. I do not understand the Senate of the United States to play the role of a rubber stamp. If we are asked to consider a proposed policy, even a foreign policy, and to give our advice, each of us must do so conscientiously in the light of his own best knowledge and conviction.

Yet, although I often disagree most decidedly with the domestic policies of the President and his administration I shall support his foreign policies when, in his best judgment, they are necessary in the cause of peace.

I do not claim the knowledge to judge whether the policy here presented to the Congress will in fact—better than some alternative policy—promote the cause of security for the United States in a peaceful world. But I believe that President Eisenhower is sincerely seeking this goal—that peace in the western Pacific is, indeed, the objective of the policy he presents to us.

The public discussion of the past 2 days has convinced me that President Eisenhower does not, as at first appeared, ask a blank check which might even be said to have authorized preventive war against the Chinese mainland—and I believe the debate has successfully demonstrated that for such a blank check, no congressional endorsement is in fact being given.

In that belief, and in the confidence that the President's explanations should be taken at their face value and that a secure peace is his only objective, I support the adoption of the resolution by the Senate. I think we are impelled by many reasons to trust to the judgment of the President in this crisis.

Mr. LONG. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there may be printed in the RECORD a statement I have prepared giving my reasons for voting in favor of the joint resolution.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR LONG

On Wednesday last I expressed my concern about the momentous decision that

we are making at this time. For my part, I felt that it was both unfair to the country and to Senators themselves to be required to vote on the pending resolution before they fully understood its implications. I then said that I owed it to those whom I have the honor to represent to vote my own convictions in this matter after learning the facts.

I have since studied the facts and read the hearings carefully, mindful of the significance of the decision we are now making. The debate here has tended to make clear the purposes and intentions of the resolution.

As I said at that time, this resolution could very well be an invitation for a showdown with Communist China and Russia as well. During the past 2 days I have read much of the secret testimony upon which the 2 Senate committees based their recommendations. I believe I now understand the meaning of the resolution and its implications. I hope that this is true of my colleagues.

I personally would not have advised that this Nation should undertake to defend the small offshore islands held by the Chinese Nationalists along the China coast. In my judgment their defense is much more difficult than the defense of Formosa itself. To hold them is like defending the doormat in front of your enemy's home. Nevertheless, so long as these islands are held, they simplify the task of defending Formosa.

It has also been my feeling that we should avoid striking the Chinese mainland unless the nature of the attack upon us was such as to make it necessary. Even in that event, I would urge that we should not strike the first blow.

As a Senator of the United States, I am not in a position to dictate either the tactics or the strategy that this Nation will follow. That prerogative belongs to the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States. He has the responsibility for the decisions that will mean the survival of this Nation and of free governments throughout the world.

Of this much I am certain—the resolution before us will pass. It is only a question of the number by which it will be agreed to.

Basically, this resolution serves notice upon Communist China that she has taken all of the territory by force of arms which she will be permitted to take. The President is in the process of drawing the line upon which this Nation will stand.

In passing this resolution, this Nation accepts the risk that Russia will come to China's assistance. These are dangers which we must accept. The danger makes our duty more clear. As a matter of fact, we have already accepted the risk of war with Russia from the day that we undertook the Berlin airlift. We did it when we went to the aid of the Republic of Korea. I could see no other reason for the weakness that this Nation displayed when the Chinese intervened in North Korea, except that this Nation was not prepared to face the consequences of a third world war.

We might as well face the fact that we no longer have anything to gain by giving our enemies cause to feel that we fear them. By this, we do not mean that we will not readily agree to an honorable settlement at the peace table. We mean that we will fight rather than surrender any further territory to aggression.

It is for these reasons that I shall vote for the resolution. I will not vote against it because I seriously disagree with some of the tactics involved. In view of the matters involved here, I regard it as of the utmost importance that this resolution should be passed by an overwhelming vote.

If the resolution should fail, it would be interpreted by our enemies—and even our friends—to mean that during the next 2 years the word of the President of the United States would not necessarily speak the foreign policy of this Nation. It would be

to display the greatest of weakness in the face of our enemies at a time when strength is our best hope. For that reason, I shall vote to strengthen the hand of the President. In doing so, I strengthen the hand of the United States in world leadership. If this leadership is exercised wisely, our Nation will survive. I would rather accept the risk that it would be used in error than the risk that it would not be used, or that it would be seriously weakened.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on the final passage of the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 159).

The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY] are absent on official business.

The Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON] and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] are absent by leave of the Senate because of illness.

I further announce that the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ], the Senator from Delaware [Mr. FREAR], the Senator from Texas [Mr. JOHNSON], the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY], and the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], if present, would vote "yea."

Mr. SALTONSTALL. I announce that the Senator from Vermont [Mr. FLANDERS] is necessarily absent.

I also announce that the Senator from Michigan [Mr. POTTER] is absent on official business as a member of the American delegation attending the 10th anniversary of the World War II Battle of Alsace, at Colmar, France.

The Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER] is absent on official business.

If present and voting the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BRICKER], the Senator from Vermont, [Mr. FLANDERS], and the Senator from Michigan [Mr. POTTER] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 85, nays 3, as follows:

YEAS—85

Aiken	George	Millikin
Allott	Goldwater	Monroney
Anderson	Gore	Mundt
Barkley	Green	Murray
Barrett	Hayden	Neuberger
Beall	Hennings	O'Mahoney
Bender	Hickenlooper	Pastore
Bennett	Hill	Payne
Bible	Holland	Purtell
Bridges	Hruska	Robertson
Bush	Humphrey	Russell
Butler	Ives	Saltonstall
Byrd	Jackson	Schoeppel
Capehart	Jenner	Scott
Carlson	Johnston, S. C.	Smathers
Case, N. J.	Kefauver	Smith, Maine
Case, S. Dak.	Kerr	Smith, N. J.
Clements	Kilgore	Sparkman
Cotton	Knowland	Stennis
Curtis	Kuchel	Symington
Daniel	Long	Thurmond
Dirksen	Magnuson	Thye
Douglas	Malone	Watkins
Duff	Mansfield	Welker
Dworshak	Martin, Iowa	Wiley
Eastland	Martin, Pa.	Williams
Ellender	McCarthy	Young
Ervin	McClellan	
Fulbright	McNamara	

NAYS—3

Langer	Lehman	Morse
--------	--------	-------

NOT VOTING—8

Bricker	Frear	Neely
Chavez	Johnson, Tex.	Potter
Flanders	Kennedy	

So the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 159) was passed.

The preamble was agreed to.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, Senate Joint Resolution 28 will be indefinitely postponed.

Mr. CASE of South Dakota. Mr. President, now that the vote has been taken on the resolution and the record has been made, I merely wish to invite the attention of the Members of the Senate to what I think is a historic fact. It is that the two Senators from the State of Georgia presided during the hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee on Armed Services, sitting jointly. I make this statement because I wish the record of the future to show that in this country we have the kind of a spirit under which unity develops and grows.

As I sat the other day in the hearings, seeing the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations on one side of the table and the members of the Committee on Armed Services on the other side of the table, I noted that at the head of the table there were seated the two Senators from the State of Georgia, the distinguished senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE] as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the distinguished junior Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL], as the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services. There occurred to me the thought that less than 100 years ago he would have been a bold man, indeed, who would have predicted that such a thing would ever take place.

In the days when the Union was threatened with destruction and in the days when that threat to the Union was partially ended by a military campaign across the State of Georgia, he would have been a bold man who would have predicted at that time that the day would come when the United States Senate would be headed in its deliberations on a matter of such transcendent importance as House Joint Resolution 159 by the two Senators from the State of Georgia.

I call attention to it, Mr. President, because I wish to pay tribute to the leadership of those two men, and to the sort of country which has produced such a situation, and also because I desire to suggest it to the world as an example of the kind of unity and patriotism which develops in a free country.

FEDERAL RECORDS COUNCIL

The VICE PRESIDENT. Under authority of section 504 of Public Law 754, approved September 5, 1950, the Chair announces the appointment of Felton M. Johnston, Secretary of the Senate, as a member of the Federal Records Council, representing in part the legislative branch of the Government, vice J. Mark Trice, resigned.

READING OF WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS

The VICE PRESIDENT. Under the authority of the order of the Senate of January 24, 1901, the Chair designates the Senator from Connecticut [Mr.

BUSH] to read Washington's Farewell Address to the Senate on February 22 next.

ADJOURNMENT TO TUESDAY

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment until Tuesday next, at 12 o'clock noon.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 9 o'clock and 54 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned until Tuesday, February 1, 1955, at 12 o'clock meridian.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received January 28 (legislative day of January 27), 1955:

UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION

The following-named persons to be members of the United States Advisory Commission on Information for a term expiring January 27, 1958, and until their successors have been appointed and qualified:

Philip D. Reed, of New York.
Erwin D. Canham, of Massachusetts.

PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

The following candidates for personnel action in the Regular Corps of the Public Health Service:

I. For appointment, subject to qualifications therefor as provided by law and regulations, to be effective date of acceptance:

To be senior assistant surgeon

Jacob A. Haller, Jr.

To be assistant surgeons

Jack Durell
John R. Moran
Donn E. Leuzinger

To be senior assistant dental surgeon

James J. Kennedy

To be assistant dental surgeons

L. Charles Larsen
Charles H. Davis
George E. Garrington

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

The following licensed officers of the United States merchant marine to the grade indicated in the United States Coast Guard:

To be lieutenants (junior grade)

Ernest Lee Murdock
Paul Nichiporuk

The following for permanent appointment subject to qualifications provided by law, to the grade indicated in the Coast and Geodetic Survey:

To be commissioned lieutenant commander
John O. Boyer

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MONDAY, JANUARY 31, 1955

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.
The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., offered the following prayer:

O Thou who art the way, the truth, and the life, Thou knowest how desperately we need Thee as we seek to be equal to the issues and the tragic necessities of our time.

We penitently confess that our plans and hopes for peace among men and nations have not always included a strong faith in Thee and in the vitality of the moral and spiritual resources.

Grant that in these days of crisis and challenge we may be aware of the weakness of our own finite wisdom and the futility of relying upon material strength.

Inspire us daily with a clear vision of the greatness and nearness of our blessed Lord as we strive to bring to fulfillment and fruition the nobler instincts, the fondest hopes, and the divine possibilities of all mankind.

In His name we offer our prayers.
Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of Thursday, January 27, 1955, was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT

A message in writing from the President of the United States was communicated to the House by Mr. Miller, one of his secretaries, who also informed the House that on the following dates the President approved and signed bills and a joint resolution of the House of the following titles:

On January 20, 1955:

H. R. 2369. An act to amend section 7237 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

On January 25, 1955:

H. R. 2091. An act making appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955, and for other purposes.

On January 29, 1955:

H. J. Res. 159. Joint resolution authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores and related positions and territories of that area.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE CLERK

The Clerk laid before the House the following communication, which was read by the Clerk:

JANUARY 28, 1955.

The honorable the SPEAKER,
House of Representatives.

Sir: Pursuant to authority granted on January 27, 1955, the Clerk today received from the Secretary of the Senate the following message:

That the Senate has passed without amendment the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 159) entitled "Joint resolution authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores and related positions and territories of that area."

Respectfully yours,

RALPH R. ROBERTS,
Clerk of the House of Representatives.

ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTIONS SIGNED

The SPEAKER. The Chair desires to announce that pursuant to the authority granted him on Thursday, January 27, 1955, he did on January 28, 1955, sign the following enrolled joint resolution of the House:

H. J. Res. 159. Joint resolution authorizing the President to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores and related positions and territories of that area.

Mr. BURLESON, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found